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Preface
Over 20 years ago, Geraint Howells and Thomas Wilhelmsson wrote EC Consumer 
Law. That was at an exciting time when the EU was forging ahead with the adop-
tion of many consumer law rules inspired by the desire to strengthen the protec-
tion of the European consumer. At that time, Christian Twigg-Flesner had just 
embarked on his PhD. Two decades on, EU consumer law has changed beyond 
recognition, and it is time for a fresh assessment of this topic. Christian has joined 
Geraint and Thomas on the team to produce this book. This is a completely new 
text and not just a second edition of Geraint and Thomas’s earlier work – so much 
has changed that we want to present a fresh analysis of these topics. 
The EU has remained active in the field of consumer law, but the emphasis has 
changed. There is less direct concern to protect the consumer as an end in its own 
right. Instead, consumer law is primarily seen as a tool to promote the internal 
market. We comment on this change and map its impact. More generally, we see 
a need for a thorough rethinking of the theoretical underpinnings of consumer 
law, and we offer our suggestions throughout the book.
One should not be too pessimistic. By international standards the EU con-
sumer is well protected. However, so much effort in this field deserves to be 
supported by strong coherent foundations. We hope our critique will encourage 
a debate that will strengthen the brand of EU consumer law and help its export 
to other jurisdictions.
We take joint responsibility for the final product. Geraint Howells took the 
lead on Chapters 1, 6, 7 and 8 (he wishes to thank Jonathan Watson for research 
support and his work was supported by a grant from City University of Hong 
Kong Project No.9380074), Christian Twigg-Flesner on Chapters 2, 3, 5 and 9, 
and Thomas Wilhelmsson on Chapter 4. The bulk of the writing was completed 
by late summer 2016, but we have been able to include developments up to 1 
January 2017.
Geraint Howells, Hong Kong
Christian Twigg-Flesner, Hull
Thomas Wilhelmsson, Helsinki
1 The rich canvas of EU  
consumer law
An introduction
Introduction
This book provides the reader with a critical analysis of the development and 
current state of EU consumer law as well as proposals for its future develop-
ment. The EU has been exceptionally active in the consumer protection field. 
Almost all areas of consumer law (from advertising and marketing through con-
tract and tort law rules to enforcement and redress) have been touched by 
EU law. EU consumer law is a subject of broad scope and some careful selec-
tion of topics has been necessary. This text concentrates on the traditional core 
areas of safety, contract law including credit, commercial practices and access 
to justice. Some areas, such as food and financial services regulation, have been 
excluded because they have become so complex at the EU level that they are 
topics in their own right. The same might also be said of travel law. This is not 
considered as a specific topic in this book, but several of the measures are used 
to illustrate key points. Other topics beyond the scope of our analysis are the 
consumer effects of competition law,1 as well as services of general interest2 
and telecommunications. The latter two fields in particular are becoming more 
important and may challenge the application of the traditional principles of 
consumer protection. 
Looking forward, the consumer marketplace is likely to evolve rapidly. A 
subject and body of legislation formed in the era of the development of mass 
consumer markets for cars and white goods is developing fast and being driven 
by increased consumer affluence and technological developments. The service 
sectors are growing, and the digital revolution is likely to spawn both new 
products and new ways of delivering them. This is an ideal time to review the 
development of EU consumer law to check that its fundamental values are fit 
for purpose. These will be tested moving forward to see if they are appropriate 
1 On the relationship between consumer and competition law, see KJ Cseres, Competition Law 
and Consumer Protection (Kluwer, 2005).
2 See E Tjong Tjin Tai, ‘Services, including services of general interest’ in C Twigg-Flesner, 
Research Handbook of EU Consumer and Contract Law (Edward Elgar, 2016).
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3 See C Twigg-Flesner, ‘Some thoughts on consumer law reform – consolidation, codification, 
or a restatement?’ in L Gullifer and S Vogenauer (eds), English and European Perspectives on 
Contract and Commercial Law – Essays in Honour of Hugh Beale (Hart, 2014).
4 The European Commission is undertaking its own review of the consumer acquis. Results 
and possible reform proposals are not expected until well into 2017. With elections to the 
European Parliament due in 2019, it seems unlikely that there will be major reforms until after 
then. For more information, see http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_rights/review/
index_en.htm [last accessed 18 December 2016].
5 Norbert Reich once aptly described this as the ‘Janus face’ of EU consumer law: N Reich, 
Europäisches Verbraucherrecht. (Nomos, 1996), p.56.
6 L Waddington, ‘Vulnerable and confused: the protection of “vulnerable” consumers under 
EU Law’, European Law Review 6 (2013), p.757.
7 AL Sibony, ‘Can EU consumer law benefit from behavioural insights? An analysis of the 
unfair commercial practices directive’ (2014) 22 European Review of Private Law p.901, and 
J Trzaskowski, ‘Behavioural economics, neuroscience, and the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive’ (2011) 34 Journal of Consumer Policy p.377.
8 Directive 2005/29/EU, analysed in Chapter 2.
for the new challenges facing the global, digital and service-oriented con-
sumer market. 
Additional scrutiny of the robustness of EU consumer law might come from 
the UK. Following the referendum in June 2016, the UK will cease to be a mem-
ber of the EU although the details of this process and the UK’s future relation-
ship with the EU remain unclear. Depending on the outcome of the negotiations, 
the UK might gain the freedom to develop a more independent consumer policy. 
The UK has always had a strong focus on consumer protection law, evidenced 
by recent reforms to its consumer legislation.3 The UK may decide to tackle 
emerging challenges for consumer protection differently from the EU. However, 
it is likely that EU law will remain highly influential on the development of UK 
consumer law, at least in the medium term, and this book will have continued rel-
evance for UK readers. What is clear is that there are many reasons why the quality 
of EU consumer law will be under continued and probably intensified scrutiny.4
The starting point for the analysis in this book is our belief that European con-
sumer law and policy in recent times have risked over-emphasising the internal 
market goal.5 There is a need to develop a philosophy to underpin its consumer 
protection policy. This should include a continued adherence to market transpar-
ency so consumers can be confident actors in the market and so help drive up 
standards by being part of a competitive environment. However, the EU policy 
needs to have more depth and an appreciation of the social welfarism goals of 
consumer policy. In part this involves protecting the vulnerable. This is occa-
sionally reflected in the current acquis;6 but there is little critical analysis of the 
concept of vulnerability or how to address the problems it gives rise to. However, 
any consumer policy also needs to recognise all consumers are subject to limita-
tions when acting on the market. There is growing recognition of the important 
lessons for consumer law from behavioural economics in this regard,7 particu-
larly in the context of applying the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive.8 One 
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9 G Howells and T Wilhelmsson, EC Consumer Law, (Dartmouth, 1997); G Howells, I Ramsay 
and T Wilhelmsson, ‘Consumer law in its international dimension’, in G Howells, I Ramsay 
and T Wilhelmsson (eds), Handbook of Research on International Consumer Law (Edward 
Elgar, 2010); V Mak, ‘Two levels, one standard? The multi-level regulation of consumer pro-
tection in Europe’ in J Devenney and M Kenny (eds), European Consumer Protection: Theory 
and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2012); H-W Micklitz, ‘The relationship between 
national and European consumer policy’ in C Twigg-Flesner et al. (eds), The Yearbook of 
Consumer Law 2008 (Ashgate, 2008), p.49; L Miller, The Emergence of EU Contract Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2011); C Twigg-Flesner, ‘EU law and consumer transactions with-
out an internal market dimension’ in D Leczykiewicz and S Weatherill (eds), The Involvement 
of EU Law in Private Law Relationships (Hart, 2013); S Weatherill, ‘The links between com-
petition policy and consumer protection’ in G Howells et al. (eds), The Yearbook of Consumer 
Law 2007 (Ashgate, 2007). 
function of the law should be to share risks so that all consumers can expect their 
purchases fulfil certain legitimate expectations. An effective consumer law is also 
compatible with the interests of good traders and should promote the EU brand 
and raise its international competitiveness.
Our analysis is underpinned by a number of key themes. We develop these 
in this chapter. Our analysis of specific fields within EU consumer law will then 
develop these further.
1 The balance between internal market and consumer protection objectives has 
swung too much in favour of market integration by the overstatement of the 
case for maximum harmonisation.
2 A high level of consumer protection is desirable not only for consumers but 
to enhance the international competitiveness of the ‘European brand’.
3 The EU approach to consumer protection risks being viewed as insufficiently 
protective due to its adoption of the average consumer standard and an infor-
mation-based protection model which has not been developed in a sophis-
ticated manner taking into account the lessons of behavioural economics.
4 EU consumer law should be more explicit in recognising that it has a social 
welfare function of redistributing risk.
5 EU legislation should be in a form which allows the EU rules to be integrated 
into national regimes and parallel regimes for cross-border sales should only 
be introduced where there are good justifications.
6 The EU needs to ensure laws are effectively enforced.
The balance between internal market and consumer protection 
objectives has swung too much in favour of market integration by 
the overstatement of the case for maximum harmonisation
There has always been a tension between the avowedly consumer protection 
motivations of the EU when enacting the consumer acquis and the more utilitar-
ian objective of enhancing the internal market by creating a level playing field 
for technical, administrative and private law regulation.9 As the next section 
4 Introduction to EU consumer law
10 A crucial turning-point concerning the shift from ‘minimum harmonisation’ to ‘full har-
monisation’ was set out in Commission, Consumer Policy Strategy (2002–2006), OJ [2002] 
C137/2 at 3.1.2. For an overview of the shift in policy see H-W Micklitz, ‘The targeted full 
harmonisation approach: Looking behind the  curtain’ in G Howells and R Schulze (eds), 
Modernising and Harmonising Consumer Contract Law (Sellier, 2009).
11 For critiques of the EU’s view of consumer confidence, see T Wilhelmsson, “The abuse of 
the ‘confident consumer’ as a justification for EC consumer law”. Journal of Consumer Policy 
27 (2004), p.317; and C Twigg-Flesner, ‘The importance of law and harmonisation for 
the EU’s confident consumer’ in D.Leczykiewicz and S.Weatherill (eds), The Images of the 
Consumer in EU Law (Hart, 2015).
12 See, for example, Commission, Green Paper on policy options for progress towards a European 
Contract Law for consumers and businesses COM (2010) 348 final, 5; see also G Howells, 
‘European contract law reform and European consumer law – two related but distinct 
regimes’. European Review of Contract Law 2 (2011), pp.173, 185. In relation to stan-
dard contract terms see, for example, H Collins, ‘The freedom to circulate documents: 
Regulating contracts in Europe’ (2004) 10 European Law Journal p.787; S Whittaker, 
‘On the development of European standard contract terms’ (2006) 2 European Review of 
Contract Law  p.51.
13 See Chapter 2 on unfair commercial practices, and Chapter 4 on unfair contract terms.
illustrates, this is inevitable given the legal base on which most of the acquis is 
founded. However, there have been some subtle (and other less subtle) changes 
in emphasis and policy in recent years.10 This was marked most obviously by the 
increased preference for maximum harmonisation directives. In the early days of 
EU consumer law the internal market criterion was met by mainly minimum har-
monisation laws that sought to give consumers the confidence to shop anywhere 
in the EU marketplace.11 Nowadays, this is no longer seen as sufficient. Instead 
businesses are considered to need the confidence that they will not be surprised 
by legal provisions when selling abroad.12 Maximum harmonisation is the order 
of the day. This legal policy change has been underpinned by an institutional 
reshuffling of the cards away from the old Directorate-General on Health and 
Consumer Protection (DG SANCO), with most areas of EU consumer law now 
being handled by DG JUST (Justice and Consumers).
This faith in the level playing field as a motor for deeper integration seems 
misguided. EU regulation is rarely complete. It leaves gaps either expressly (e.g. 
with regard to sanctions and remedies) or by default due to the limited scope of 
the measures. These lacunae have to be filled by national law. Moreover, many 
EU provisions contain open-textured clauses which allow for different national 
legal and cultural interpretations.13 Indeed national traditions of enforcement 
and styles of interpretation mean that the cross-border trader can never be 
assured that the law in practice will be the same in every state whatever the law 
books say. A false sense of security can be created if producers and consumers are 
led to believe the law is identical in substance and application throughout the 
Community. Moreover, there are many other factors more directly influencing 
decisions to buy and sell across borders than the substantive law, such as lan-
guage, convenience, delivery costs and access to redress.
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14 Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Consumer Rights COM (2008) 614 final. For criticism see, amongst others, G Howells and 
R Schulze (eds), Modernising and Harmonising Consumer Contract Law (Sellier, 2009); 
H-W Micklitz and N Reich, “Crónica de una muerte anunciada: The Commission proposal 
for a ‘Directive on Consumer Rights’” (2009) 46 Common Market Law Review p.471; C 
Twigg-Flesner and D Metcalfe, ‘The proposed Consumer Rights Directive – less haste, more 
thought?’ (2009) 6 European Review of Contract Law p.368.
15 Acquis Group (Redaction Committee), ‘Position paper on the proposal for a Directive on 
Consumer Rights’ in H Schulte-Nölke and L Tichý (eds), Perspectives for European Consumer 
Law (Sellier, 2010); G Ajani and M Ebers (eds), Uniform Terminology for European Contract 
Law (Nomos, 2005); C Perfumi, ‘Theory and practice of constructing a common contract 
law terminology’ in J Devenney and M Kenny (eds), The Transformation of European Private 
Law (Cambridge University Press, 2013); B Pozzo and V Jacometti (eds), Multilingualism 
and the Harmonisation of European Law (Kluwer, 2006).
16 Seminally, G Akerlof, “The market for ‘lemons’: Quality uncertainty and the market mecha-
nism” (1970) 84 Q J Econ p.488.
17 Ibid. 
18 Commission, Contribution of the Internal Market and Consumer Protection to Growth 
(2014), p.30.
Maximum harmonisation is seen as an attack on some higher levels of protection 
that historically exist in some Member States. For example, under the maximum 
harmonisation approach adopted in the original proposal for a Consumer Rights 
Directive,14 the ability of Nordic states to control core terms, or the rights of con-
sumers in some states immediately to reject non-conforming goods without allow-
ing an attempt to cure, would have been lost. This was one reason why the measure 
was scaled back by the removal of sale of goods and unfair terms rules. This episode 
adversely affected the image of the EU as a champion of consumer rights. 
A high level of consumer protection is desirable not only for 
consumers but to enhance the international competitiveness 
of the ‘European brand’
Our view is that creating high minimum standards that lead to gradual conver-
gence is the best way forward. It is a credit to Europe that consumer lawyers now 
all use a common terminology15 and there has been a high degree of legal con-
vergence. Maximum harmonisation seeks to push this further, but for relatively 
small gains and at the risk of alienating the consumer movement. This policy 
has undermined confidence in the EU as a legislator with concern for a high 
level of consumer protection running through its DNA. Consumer protection 
should not just be a by-product of the internal market. Moreover, consumer 
protection is not only a concern for consumers. Strong consumer protection is 
also a protection for traders against unfair competition.16 High standards prop-
erly enforced remove any incentive to produce poor products or act unfairly.17 
The EU consumer standards are also part of a branding exercise for Europe as 
a region known for high quality goods that are internationally attractive.18 An 
6 Introduction to EU consumer law
19 For example, B Lurger, ‘Protection of consumers in European private law’ in R Brownsword, 
H-W Micklitz, L Niglia and S Weatherill (eds), The Foundations of European Private Law 
(Hart, 2011); I Maletić, The Law and Policy of Harmonisation in Europe’s Internal Market 
(Edward Elgar, 2013); W-H. Roth, “Transposing ‘pointillist’ EC guidelines into systematic 
national codes – problems and consequences” (2002) 6 European Review of Private Law 
p.761. See also T W, ‘Private law in the EU: Harmonised or fragmented Europeanisation’ 
(2002) 6 European Review of Private Law p.77. 
20 For example, H Unberath and A Johnston, ‘The double-headed approach of the ECJ con-
cerning consumer protection’ (2007) 44 Common Market Law Review pp.1237, 1282; B 
Lurger, ‘The Common Frame of Reference/Optional Code and the various understand-
ings of social justice in Europe’ in T Wilhelmsson, E Paunio and A Pohjolainen (eds), 
Private Law and The Many Cultures of Europe (Kluwer, 2007); see also the contribu-
tion by T Wilhelmsson, ‘The average European consumer: A legal fiction?’ in the same 
 volume.
effective high level of protection means EU products and services become more 
competitive  globally as their quality is trusted. Indeed, the whole of Europe 
can benefit from the reputation of those states whose products already have 
high standing, as it will be assumed those states only agreed to standards that 
met their consumers’ expectations and maintained the quality level of their key 
industry sectors. However, if the EU were to mandate lower standards, then 
over time the reputation of the best will be dragged down. In the globalised 
economy, high income states like those in Europe will only flourish if they can 
manufacture and sell high-value-added products that carry a premium for con-
sumer confidence.
A reflection of this EU brand is the export of European legal models. If legisla-
tion is seen to promote high standards in a way that is compatible with a competi-
tive market it is likely that other states will adopt its rules. Imitation is after all 
the sincerest form of flattery. Several areas of EU law have been exported; this is 
most notable in the product liability and safety area, but also is reflected in other 
aspects such as unfair terms and unfair commercial practices.
The EU approach to consumer protection risks being viewed as 
insufficiently protective due to its adoption of the average consumer 
standard and an information-based protection model which has not 
been developed in a sophisticated manner taking into account the 
lessons of behavioural economics
Various characteristics of EU consumer law and policy have been criticised for 
threatening to undermine traditional notions of consumer protection.19 These 
may jeopardise not only consumer protection, but also the brand of European 
goods and services. An often-cited example is the reference to the ‘average con-
sumer’ standard as a standard by which to measure the impact of trader conduct, 
rather than using more protective images of the consumer.20 Indeed, despite the 
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21 For example, Commission, Consumer Decision-making in Retail Investment Services: A 
Behavioural Economics Perspective (2010); Policy Studies Institute, Designing Policy to 
Influence Consumers: Consumer Behaviour Relating to the Purchase of Environmentally 
Preferable Goods (2010). See also R van Bavel et al., Applying Behavioural Sciences to EU 
Policy-making (2013); P Lunn, Regulatory Policy and Behavioural Economics (OECD 
Publishing, 2014), pp.32–33.
22 C–216/96, Gut Springenheide GmbH v Oberkreisdirektor des Kreises Steinfurt [1998] ECR 
I–4657; C–303/97 Verbraucherschutzverein eV v Sektkellerei G.C. Kessler GmbH und Co. 
[1999] ECR I–513; C–220/98, Estée Lauder Cosmetics GmbH & Co. OHG v Lancaster Group 
GmbH [2000] ECR I–117; C–465/98 Verein gegen Unwesen in Handel und Gewerbe Köln eV 
v Adolf Darbo AG. [2000] ECR I–2297; C–3/99 Cidrerie Ruwet SA v Cidre Stassen SA and 
HP Bulmer Ltd. [2000] ECR I-8749. See also Recital 18 of the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive.
23 G Howells, ‘The potential and limits of consumer empowerment through information’. JLS 
32(3) (2005), p.349.
24 J Stuyck, ‘The notion of the empowered and informed consumer in consumer policy and 
how to protect the vulnerable under such a regime’ and T Wilhelmsson, ‘The informed 
consumer vs the vulnerable consumer in unfair commercial practices law – a comment’ in 
G Howells et al (eds), Yearbook of Consumer Law 2007 (Ashgate, 2007).
EU’s espousal of the value of consumer behavioural economics,21 it takes as its 
model the rather empirically unsupported image of an average consumer as being 
someone who is ‘reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circum-
spect’.22 It seems to assume a mathematical test which exposes anyone below the 
average to risk of manipulation in the marketplace. It also risks marginalising 
consumer protection by suggesting any additional protection is something not 
needed by the typical consumer and only necessary for some vaguely termed cate-
gory of ‘vulnerable consumers’. 
The EU also relies heavily on a model of regulation which prioritises informa-
tion over substantive regulation. Whilst consumer empowerment is to be wel-
comed there are concerns that this may become a replacement for some desirable 
substantive rights.23 It is another example of the EU failing to heed the lesson 
from its own discussion of behavioural economics, by not applying those insights 
fully to understand the limits of information as a means of protection. Whilst 
policy-makers will claim to be alert to these risks, the danger is that their rhetoric 
favours a more liberal approach to trade practices. There is a risk that consumer 
protection is only seen as needed by marginalised weak consumers,24 whereas we 
feel consumers should be recognised as a class who are structurally poorly posi-
tioned to protect themselves in the marketplace. 
EU consumer law should be more explicit in recognising that  
it has a social welfare function of redistributing risk
One dimension that is lacking in EU consumer policy debates is a real advocacy 
of consumer law as a legitimate socialisation of risk. The same criticism could 
be made of national consumer policy in many Member States. Whilst part of 
the social welfare function involves making adequate provision for those who 
8 Introduction to EU consumer law
25 Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regula-
tions and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective 
products (Product Liability Directive) (1985) OJ L210/29.
26 Regulation 261/2004/EC on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of 
denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights (2004) OJ L46/1.
27 M Hesselink, CFR and Social Justice (Sellier, 2008); H-W Micklitz (ed), The Many Concepts 
of Social Justice in European Private Law (Edward Elgar, 2011); T Wilhelmsson, Social 
Contract Law and European Integration (Dartmouth, 1995). For an overview of different 
approaches see N Reich, ‘Diverse approaches to consumer protection philosophy’ (1992) 
14 Journal of Consumer Policy p.257; T Wilhelmsson, ‘Varieties of welfarism in European 
contract law’ (2004) 10 European Law Journal p.712.
28 H Eidenmüller et al., ‘The Common Frame of Reference for European private law – policy 
choices and codification problems’ (2008) 28 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies p.659.
29 See, in general, D Leczykiewicz and S Weatherill (eds), The Involvement of EU Law in Private 
Law Relationships (Hart, 2013). In relation to the underlying ideological tendencies of balanc-
ing freedom and regulation see, D Kennedy, ‘Genealogy of proportionality in private law’, in 
R Brownsword, H-W Micklitz, L Niglia and S Weatherill (eds), The Foundations of European 
Private Law (Hart, 2011). See also H Collins, ‘European private law and the cultural identity of 
states’ (1995) 3 European Review of Private Law p.353. 
are vulnerable, it should go beyond this. Consumer protection should offer all 
consumers protection against exposure to undue risks which are nevertheless 
common features in market transactions. Things go wrong in the market either 
through incompetence, fraud or chance. Some risks consumers might have to 
accept as simple lessons to be learned, but others need to be redressed either 
because of the harm caused or to clean up the market going forward. This 
socialisation of risk underpins many consumer rules. The law steps in to prevent 
simple market power determining where risk falls and lies. In some areas as 
diverse as product liability25 and rights of delayed airline passengers26 the alloca-
tion of risk is more obviously a factor underpinning legislative intervention. Yet, 
it is a policy motivation that is not spoken of too loudly for fear of accusations 
of paternalism. 
All inalienable consumer rights could be viewed as enforced insurance as the 
potential liability has to be factored into the price of goods and services. Many 
substantive consumer rights provide inalienable standards, but the information 
rhetoric risks downplaying them. Indeed there are important questions about just 
how inalienable these rights are if business is given too much latitude to manipu-
late the obligations through disclosure. Consumer protection needs to take note 
of the vulnerabilities of all consumers and some socialisation of risk should be 
part of the portfolio of consumer protection tools. This is a social welfare model 
of consumer protection27 and should be contrasted with the neo-liberal model 
which simply wants to maximise consumer preferences in an open market by 
enhancing decision-making.28 The balance between personal freedom and state-
mandated minimum market requirements requires careful balancing. This in turn 
often depends upon national traditions.29
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EU legislation should be in a form which allows the EU rules 
to be integrated into national regimes and parallel regimes 
for cross-border sales should only be introduced where there are 
good justifications
The sale of goods and unfair terms provisions were removed from the proposal 
for a Directive on Consumer Rights.30 The successor initiative for a Common 
European Sales Regulation31 was more overtly internal market-focused. It sought 
to create a tailored regime expressly for cross-border sales. This focus on solutions 
for exclusively cross-border problems was first adopted in the area of access to jus-
tice where sensitivity about interferences with national procedural autonomy was 
the rationale. The Common European Sales Regulation attempted to promote 
cross-border sales without threatening national substantive law by limiting its 
scope to cross-border sales. However, it is hard to find any objective justifica-
tion32 for different substantive rules depending upon whether one buys locally, on 
the internet, or from other Member States.33 The proposal was withdrawn, but 
instead a new set of proposals were brought forward including one establishing 
a mandatory regime adopting maximal harmonisation for online sales.34 This is 
unlikely to be adopted and the criticism is again the complexity created by having 
different regimes for online and offline contracts.
The Common European Sales Regulation proposal is also illustrative of an 
increasing preference for regulations over directives.35 This ensures more uni-
formity in the laws of the Member States as the same laws become directly 
applicable in all Member States.36 It can also be seen as more honest in many 
respects as the strict way the Commission and CJEU monitors Member States’ 
implementation leaves little latitude for national diversity of legal culture and 
terminology.37 Indeed, the use of regulations makes particular sense in situations 
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where new EU rules are adopted that can operate in isolation from national rules. 
They make sense when a particular EU institution is created such as the Online 
Dispute Resolution (ODR) platform38 or an additional European procedure is 
adopted as in the case of small claims.39 The move to maximum harmonisation 
makes the use of regulations more tempting given the lack of national discretion. 
However, directives should not be too readily abandoned as they allow the law to 
be framed in national terminology. This is particularly important where the EU 
rules  interact or sit alongside national rules.
The EU needs to ensure laws are effectively enforced
The effectiveness of any consumer protection regime is a combination of the 
quality of the substantive rules, the extent of their enforcement and the effective-
ness of any sanctions. Consumer law enforcement models typically involve both 
public (through government- or state-sponsored agencies) and private (individ-
ual or consumer organisations) bodies. The exact mix of public/private models 
varies between Member States. 
As important to overall effectiveness as the mechanisms of enforcement, is 
ensuring the resources are available within Member States to make use of those 
means. Some state agencies are well-resourced; others are not. Some states have 
consumer organisations that can undertake significant litigation; other consumer 
groups in Europe simply do not have the expertise or resources to engage in such 
activity. Some court systems function efficiently; others have such long backlogs 
that they cannot deliver timely justice.
The EU has recently become more engaged in access to justice issues.40 This 
is to be welcomed. It also recognises the need to address the challenges posed 
by increased cross-border sales. The borders between Member States should not 
be used as cloaks by disreputable traders to avoid their legal liabilities. The EU 
also has an important role in promoting the exchange of ideas and development 
of best practice particularly in states where enforcement mechanisms have been 
lacking or weak.
Summary
In summary, the drive to use substantive law harmonisation as an engine for 
increased cross-border sales has taken the focus off defining the key elements 
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42 The Preamble to the Rome Treaty talked of ‘the constant improvement of the living and 
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of consumer protection. Information provision has become the dominant tool 
of protection, because it fits well into this internal market dialogue since it does 
not challenge basic standards. Substantive standards risk creating fissures between 
states that have different ideas of risk-sharing. Such risk-sharing is, however, at 
the core of a social welfare model of consumer protection. There is likely to be 
diversity in how states want to allocate risks between consumers and producers. 
Europe has a role to keep these divergences within tolerable limits. The internal 
market objective needs to be balanced against national consumer protection val-
ues to foster convergence in a manner which is sympathetic to consumer expecta-
tions of protection. In some areas of regulation there may be good reasons why 
EU standards need to be imposed on a maximal harmonisation basis, for exam-
ple, as regards technical harmonisation. However, EU consumer policy should 
not be about imposing uniform values where these are not reconcilable with 
national social and cultural standards.
These features of EU consumer law will be developed using examples from 
particular areas of EU consumer law in subsequent chapters. First, some back-
ground information is provided.
What is the EU’s motivation for regulating consumer law? 
Legal base
Any critique of the EU’s consumer protection policy has to take account of the 
legal base for EU legislative activity, which essentially requires that consumer 
protection be an adjunct of internal market policy. This might be an excuse 
for a rather limited approach to consumer protection, focusing on cross- border 
dimensions. At least until recently that has not been a key criticism of EU con-
sumer policy. Indeed, even in the early days when legislative powers in the 
consumer field were even more limited, the EU felt confident to legislate on 
doorstep sales41; this was no doubt a pressing consumer concern, but was hardly 
the most obvious topic to tackle from an internal market perspective. Moreover, 
the internal market legal base should not be an excuse for a weak consumer 
protection policy, for the Treaty provisions dictate that a high level of consumer 
protection be adopted.
The original Treaty made sparse reference to consumer protection. A role for 
consumer protection could be viewed as implicit in general statements about liv-
ing conditions42 and it formed an element in the Common Agricultural Policy43 
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and competition policy.44 This did not prevent the Commission developing a 
consumer policy with legislation being based on Article 100 (now Article 115 
TFEU) which permitted directives to be adopted for the approximation of mat-
ters directly affecting the establishment or functioning of the internal market. 
Article 100 required unanimity and the first significant liberalisation of pow-
ers came under the Single European Act in 1986 where under Article 100a (now 
Article 114 TFEU) a qualified majority procedure was introduced to allow for 
‘measures’, not just directives, affecting the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market. Significantly, Article 100(a)(3) EC provided that proposals con-
cerning consumer protection would take as a base a high level of protection.45
The Maastricht Treaty provided that the Community’s activities should include 
‘a contribution to the strengthening of consumer protection’.46 Consumer pro-
tection was therefore recognised as an explicit objective of the Community in its 
own right. The Treaty of Amsterdam included a specific provision on consumer 
protection, on which the current provision concerning consumer protection, in 
Article 169 TFEU, is still modelled. 
In the current treaties there are several specific mentions of consumer protec-
tion as well as provisions promoting economic and social progress and other 
provisions that relate to consumer interests such as public health47 and the envi-
ronment.48 The rules of judicial co-operation on civil matters are also relevant 
for access to justice and enforcement measures.49 Those provisions specifically on 
consumer protection are:
i The Charter of Fundamental rights demands that Union policies shall ensure 
a high level of consumer protection (Article 38);
ii Consumer protection is listed as an area of shared competence (Article 4(2)(f) 
TFEU);
iii Consumer protection requirements should be taken into account in defining 
and implementing other Union policies and activities (Article 12 TFEU);
iv Consumer protection is listed in competition provisions as potentially 
exempting otherwise illegal agreements allowing consumers a fair share of 
benefit (Article 101(3) TFEU) and defining abuse of dominant position as 
including developments prejudicial to consumers (Article 102(b) TFEU);
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v Requiring a high level of consumer protection to be taken as a baseline when 
approximating laws to improve the internal market by qualified majority 
(Article 114(3) TFEU);
vi Art. 169 TFEU provides a specific provision on consumer protection. This 
provides as follows:
1 In order to promote the interests of consumers and to ensure a high 
level of consumer protection, the Union shall contribute to protect-
ing the health, safety and economic interests of consumers, as well as 
to promoting their right to information, to education and to organise 
themselves in order to safeguard their interests.
2 The Union shall contribute to the attainment of the objectives referred 
to in Paragraph 1 through:
a measures adopted pursuant to Article 114 in the context of the 
completion of the internal market;
b measures which support, supplement and monitor the policy pur-
sued by the Member States.
3 The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with 
the ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the Economic and 
Social Committee, shall adopt the measures referred to in paragraph 2(b).
4 Measures adopted pursuant to paragraph 3 shall not prevent any 
Member State from maintaining or introducing more stringent protec-
tive measures. Such measures must be compatible with the Treaties. The 
Commission shall be notified of them.
This Article sets out the broad range of consumer interests the EU is concerned 
with in paragraph 1. It then provides two ways in which this can be met – para-
graph 2(a) does not provide a new legal base but rather just refers to Article 114. 
Paragraph 2(b) is a separate legal base, but is limited to measures which support, 
supplement or monitor Member State policies. Given the subordinate nature of 
these rules, it is not surprising that paragraph 4 ensures these are of a minimum 
character and do not interfere with Member States’ autonomy.
The Treaty has conferred powers on the Union to be competent with respect 
to consumer protection, but as it is an area of shared competence its powers 
are governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.50 Subsidiarity 
means that the Union shall only act:
if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional or local 
level, but can rather, by reasons of the scale or effects of the proposed action, 
be better achieved at Union level.51 
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The proportionality principle requires that neither the content nor form of meas-
ures shall exceed what is necessary to achieve Treaty objectives.52 Thus in the 
consumer context substantive controls might not be justified if information rules 
could achieve the same objective. As regards form, it implies a hierarchy with 
binding rules such as Regulations and Directives being a last resort. Protocol 
(No. 2) on the application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality 
provides various procedural safeguards, including consultation especially with 
national Parliaments. It also has requirements for reasoned justifications includ-
ing the need to provide qualitative and where possible quantitative indicators. 
These constitutional controls have only rarely been an impediment to the 
development of consumer protection policy. The striking down of the Tobacco 
Advertising Directive53 in Germany v Parliament and Council 54 was based on the 
Union exceeding its powers with regard to public health, but could have been the 
start of a closer scrutiny of legislation. In reality it is best viewed as a response to 
mute the concerns of the German Constitutional Court.55 To a certain extent the 
Tobacco Advertising judgment’s emphasis on the measures promoting free move-
ment has assisted calls for maximum harmonisation measures. The Commission 
is diligent in ensuring impact assessments are undertaken, but their methodol-
ogy and the implications that can be derived from these have not always been 
convincing. One can see a tendency to see the jurisdictional issues as a reason for 
limiting measures to cross-border situations, but whether it is desirable to have 
different rules for domestic and inter-state consumer matters is a matter for dis-
cussion. Certainly such limited rules seem more a response to political pressures 
than to constitutional controls.
Consumer policy
The consumer policy of the Commission has been fashioned through policy state-
ments. In the early years (1975–1990) these were described as programmes,56 
in the middle years as action plans (1990–2001)57 and in more recent times as 
strategy documents.58 They often set out policy for prescribed periods. The latest 
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document is A European Consumer Agenda – Boosting Confidence and Growth,59 
which does not have any fixed dates attached to it.
In the early stages the Community was concerned simply to establish the basic 
principle that consumer protection was a matter it had jurisdiction over. The 
1975 Preliminary Programme60 set out five basic consumer rights:
i the right to protection of health and safety;
ii the right to protection of economic interests;
iii the right of redress;
iv the right to information and education; 
v the right of representation (the right to be heard).
There has never been any serious questioning of the Union’s involvement in 
health and safety. A focus of the early programmes and action plans was to expand 
the scope of EU consumer policy to encompass a range of economic interests 
affecting consumers. This era included the push to create the Single Market and 
consumer protection became part of that initiative.61 The urgency was reflected 
in document names, such as the Commission internal communication on A New 
Impetus for Consumer Protection Policy62 in 1985 and Council resolutions in 1989 
on Future Priorities for Relaunching Consumer Protection Policy63 and in 1992 
on Future Priorities for the Development of Consumer Protection Policy.64 There 
was much talk of integrating consumer protection into other policies.65 This was 
understood to extend beyond simply integrating consumer policy into the inter-
nal market to include its integration in other policies such as environment66 and 
telecommunications.67 The 1999–2001 action plan felt confident in talking about 
consumer policy ‘coming of age’.68 This was an important element in creating the 
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image of Europe with a social face granting rights to its citizens and detracting 
from criticism that Europe was just benefiting capital.69
The new century saw a fresh change of emphasis. If consumer law had reached 
maturity, it was in a very different form from that espoused by many of the early 
advocates of consumer law.70 Substantive regulation was still an important part 
of the EU framework, but the rhetoric of consumer empowerment by providing 
consumers with information to protect their own interests was taking hold.71 The 
2002–2006 Strategy talked of measures giving ‘consumers the means to pro-
tect their own interests by making autonomous, informed choices’. Empowering 
consumers was in the title of the 2007–2013 Strategy and empowerment runs 
through the 2012 European consumer agenda.72 Empowerment is admittedly 
broader than merely providing information about products and services and 
includes general consumer education as well as building up knowledge of legal 
rights and the capacity to enforce them. Undoubtedly promoting confident con-
sumers is a valuable goal. However, it is unclear to what extent education can 
assist consumers. Moreover, it is potentially dangerous to believe that even well-
educated consumers can always protect themselves as the structural weakness they 
face in the marketplace often demands a need for minimum enforced standards 
ensuring they can benefit from a high level of protection in the market.
The debate on the integration of consumer law into Single Market policy 
has been recast. Instead of promoting consumer protection by instilling the 
consumer protective ethic into other policies, consumer protection has itself 
become the vehicle for establishing the internal market.73 Harmonising con-
sumer laws has become the vehicle for both promoting more confident consum-
ers and giving businesses the confidence to shop across borders.74 This has led to 
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a preference for maximum harmonisation measures. It reflects an ideology that 
consumers benefit from more competition as consumers move across borders or 
businesses offer their goods and services in more Member States. Any marginal 
losses in national protective rules are considered insignificant in the light of the 
constitutional guarantee that EU consumer rules would take as their base a high 
level of protection. The ability of consumer rules to promote greater trade is 
itself disputable given the importance of other factors, such as language, ease 
of delivery and ability to resolve problems, in determining the amount of cross-
border trade. Certainly it can be questioned whether consumer confidence is 
increased by consumers knowing they can have no protection beyond that set by 
the European legislator. 
The Green Paper on Consumer Protection75 paved the way for the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive76 and the adoption of the Communication on 
European Contract Law.77 The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive was the 
zenith in the maximum harmonisation strategy, perhaps because it focused on 
trade practices and provided much greater clarity on permissible marketing strat-
egies. Maximum harmonisation of consumer contract law has proven less suc-
cessful as opposition from consumer groups and some Member States forced the 
Commission away from ambitious plans in the original proposal for a Consumer 
Rights Directive78 or from other plans for a form of European Civil Code79 or 
even from the more focused measure limited to cross-border sales in the pro-
posed Regulation on a Common European Sales Law.80
The meaning, effect and value of the maximal harmonisation process are 
returned to shortly below. However, it is important to recognise a couple of other 
features of EU consumer policy. One is the promotion of consumer organisa-
tions as a voice for consumers. This has been a consistent strand of EU policy. 
Of course, it is diplomatic for the Commission to have good relations with con-
sumers. It is advised by a European Consumer Consultative Group81 that meets 
three times a year in Brussels. It is unclear what effective influence the Group has 
as typically this format it is more about imparting information rather than real 
engagement. Real engagement comes through consultations on specific proposals 
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with the umbrella organisation for national consumer organisations, the European 
Consumer Organisation, BEUC, playing an important role. In recent times rela-
tions have been strained as BEUC has not supported the Commission’s policy of 
maximal harmonisation and the optional regime for cross-border sales under the 
proposed Regulation on a Common European Sales Law. The link with consumer 
organisations seems to have weakened as the Commission has come to see con-
sumer law as increasingly a dimension of the internal market policy and has pro-
moted competition sometimes at the expense of traditional forms of protection.
Another increasing trend has been the desire to increase the effectiveness of 
consumer law enforcement and redress. This is covered in detail in Chapter 8, but 
there is an increased realisation that the substantial acquis which has been built 
up needs to be effective in practice to achieve its objectives. There has of course 
always been a concern for good enforcement, but it is becoming more prevalent 
in policy documents in this century. What is not so often written about, but is 
a very real concern in practice, is the differential level of application between 
Member States. As a rough rule of thumb the further South and East one goes 
the harder it is for consumers and governments effectively to utilise the law to 
control business. There are fewer resources to regulate or litigate and courts are 
more overburdened. However, in all states there is a gap between the law in books 
and the law in practice – if for no other reason than many consumer cases are of 
too small a value to justify individual action.82 Individuals taking on such actions 
need to have ‘super-spite’.83 One response is to simplify procedures so that costs 
are brought down and more claims are worth bringing. However, there is also a 
need for some sort of public interest regulation and whether this is through pub-
lic administration or private collective actions is a major contemporary debate.84
Institutional structures
Originally, the Commission dealt with consumer affairs in D-G XI which had 
responsibility for the environment, consumer protection and nuclear safety. An 
independent Consumer Policy Service was established in 1989, which was given 
Directorate-General status in 1995 (D-G XXIV). It subsequently became known 
as DG SANCO. However, there have been frequent reshuffles, and responsi-
bilities for contract law and consumer and marketing law were transferred to 
DG Justice in 2009. Its current incarnation is DG JUST with the responsibility 
for most aspects of consumer law. Other Directorate-Generals also interact with 
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consumer policy, for instance, DG GROW (internal market and industry), DG 
FISMA (financial services) and DG SANTE (health and food safety).
Since 1973 the Commission has been assisted by a consumer consultative group. 
As already noted, today this body comprises the European Consumer Consultative 
Group85 and involves one representative per state representing national consumer 
organisations and one from each European consumer organisation – BEUC (the 
European Consumer Organisation), and ANEC (European Association for the 
Co-ordination of Consumer Representation in Standardisation). This Group was 
intended to be smaller and more streamlined than its predecessor the Consumers’ 
Consultative Council, which it replaced in 2003. It meets three times a year, but 
it seems mainly to be a forum for explaining EU policy to consumer groups rather 
than for critical reflection on that policy and interrogation of the Commission. 
The same point could be made about the far larger annual Consumer Forum 
which the Commission has now ceased to host. Most of the critical input into EU 
consumer policy discussions from the consumer perspective comes during specific 
consultations from the engagement of BEUC and those national organisations 
which are sufficiently well funded and organised. 
The European Parliament has also been active in consumer affairs through 
in particular its Internal Market and Consumer Protection86 and Legal Affairs 
committees and the European Economic and Social Council has also pushed the 
consumer agenda.87
Maximum harmonisation
Traditionally, many of the consumer directives, at least in the contract and unfair 
commercial practices fields, were minimum harmonisation directives. This meant 
the EU law created a foundation on which national law could build, but all con-
sumers throughout the Community were assured of a common minimum set of 
rights. This was modelled on an image of the confident consumer,88 who was to 
be the engine for greater cross-border sales which would in turn lead to a more 
competitive market as traders became sensitive to the loss of sales to more con-
sumer-friendly shopping environments. Whether this would really increase cross-
border sales became questionable as it became obvious that consumers’ legal 
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rights were only part of the picture – other factors such as distance, transport and 
delivery costs, language, and access to redress all influence the decision on where 
to purchase.89 The ability to use the internal market provision (now Article 114 
TFEU) combined with a minimum harmonisation clause was also questioned in 
the Tobacco Advertising90 judgment, because it was doubted whether the effects on 
the internal market could be achieved by measures that did not guarantee access to 
all the internal market for products that complied with the EU rules. However, it 
might be questioned whether private law rules with more indirect effects on mar-
ket access will be scrutinised as carefully. There is after all a direct call for minimum 
harmonisation on Article 169 TFEU, but the use of that Treaty provision has not 
been well developed. Nevertheless, the legal uncertainty combined with a new pol-
icy direction to favour maximum harmonisation. The way to increase cross-border 
sales was seen to be by encouraging more businesses rather than more consumers 
to trade across borders. Under this policy ideally the only protection allowed to 
be granted to consumers would be at the level set down in EU laws. Confident 
businesses were now the object of consumer law.91 It was hoped they would trade 
across borders using the internet or set up subsidiaries in other Member States. 
The obvious risk is that whilst confident consumers would demand high protec-
tion, businesses if anything would favour lower levels. The Commission points to 
its commitment to a high level of protection, which is also written into the Treaty, 
but it seems willing to sacrifice some of the highest levels of protection in some 
Member States for the sake of promoting greater competition. Nevertheless, a 
high level of protection is relevant to promote the brand of ‘Europe’.
The Commission finds current levels of cross-border trade unsatisfactory (e.g. in 
2012 only 25% of retailers sold cross-border and only 15% of consumers made online 
cross-border purchases).92 It is not entirely clear why it finds this level unsatisfac-
tory as there is nothing inherently better about a cross-border sale than a domestic 
sale. Indeed all things being equal one would have thought domestic sales in most 
cases were preferable on environmental grounds, which is another concern of the 
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Community.93 Certainly, cross-border sales can make enforcement more difficult 
and undoubtedly complicate legal redress as the disputes involve questions of pri-
vate international law as well as substantive law. Nevertheless, the Commission has 
become frustrated sitting in Brussels and possessing relatively few levers to achieve 
its objective of increasing cross-border sales. Adopting maximum harmonisation is 
one of the few ways in which it can show it is seeking this objective. This policy has 
unsettled many who have traditionally supported consumer rights, because, in some 
instances, it requires the removal of long-standing consumer remedies. Whether 
this is justified due to the overall gains is questionable, though the answer may 
vary from state to state. The more limited competition there is currently in a state 
(typically those to the East and South of the EU) the greater impact on consumer 
welfare there may be from any new entrants as a result of the policy.
Leaving aside concerns about whether the Commission is right to be pressing 
so hard on this matter, there is a risk that maximum harmonisation will in any 
event have a relatively low impact on encouraging cross-border sales. The extent 
to which legal rules really affect traders’ decisions to sell beyond their home juris-
diction is uncertain.94 Whilst traders may voice concerns about disparities and 
suggest that more harmonised rules would give them greater confidence, this is 
not the same as evidence demonstrating that varying rules actually affect decisions 
on whether to trade cross-border. There are plenty of examples of states with 
internal legal systems (UK, US and Spain being just three) where the differences 
in law seem to have little impact on sales. For some legal rules, it is clear that hav-
ing EU laws which guarantee access to all EU markets for all compliant products 
is important. Technical harmonisation rules and those concerning labelling and 
presentation of products are clearly examples where disparate laws would make 
market integration difficult. It is less clear that private law rules or general com-
mercial practice rules have such a strong impact. EU harmonised rules may not 
provide the legal security the trader desires in any event.
Stuyck has noted that the Commission and Court prefer the terms full or 
total harmonisation to maximum harmonisation.95 In fact, ‘maximum’ is prefer-
able, for rarely does an EU law achieve full or total harmonisation of the field.96 
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EU law in areas of shared competence, such as consumer law, only pre-empts 
national law where it has entered the field. Thus matters outside the scope of the 
EU law remain covered by national competence; so, for instance, damage caused 
by a defective product to non-consumer goods remains a matter for national 
law.97 There may in some areas be partial exemption from the EU rules, so the 
full impact of EU law does not apply, for example, as regards the application of 
consumer credit rules to social lending.98 Member States may be given discretion 
as to how to implement rules, for example, in relation to the scheme for early 
repayment of loans. Even in directives, such as the Product Liability Directive, 
which are understood to be maximum harmonisation directives, certain measures 
are made optional or left to national law.99 It also expressly left some existing 
regimes in place. It is also not uncommon for a directive to have a main maximum 
harmonisation clause, but then to expressly provide certain provisions are subject 
to minimum harmonisation.100 Some of these partial harmonisation outcomes 
result from political compromises; others from the reality that the law is a mass 
of regulations and any one measure only covers part of the legal terrain affecting 
particular issues. Even a proposal as broad as that for a Common European Sales 
Law101 did not provide a full code governing all private law or even all contract 
law obligations.102 
These reasons should be enough to deter traders from relying on EU assur-
ances of uniform consumer law. This is even before one moves on to the dif-
ference in practical application of the laws between states. For example, studies 
have shown different national traditions affecting the application of the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive.103 The concept of good faith has also been inter-
preted differently in the Member States.104 At a very practical level the  differences 
between enforcement approaches will also affect businesses. What is governed by 
state regulation in one state might be dealt with by private law in another, and 
self-regulation will mean different things in different contexts. Even the enforce-
ment mechanisms, tools available to regulators, and civil and criminal law proce-
dures will differ. These factors can be as perplexing to enterprises as differences 
in the substantive law.
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European motivations – some conclusions
The initial activity by the EU in the consumer field seemed motivated by a genu-
ine desire to promote consumer rights and give Europe a social dimension. In 
recent times, the internal market has been to the fore and consumer welfare has 
been promoted through greater competition spurred on by a more business-
friendly legal environment. The risk that this will bring with it lower standards 
should be mitigated by the constitutional requirement to take as a base a high 
level of consumer protection. There is also a business case for Europe setting 
high consumer standards. Not only will this assure high value for European con-
sumers, but will also promote the quality of European products and Europe as a 
purchasing destination (in person or at a distance, for example over the internet). 
Europe should be a brand that resonates with consumer quality and protection. 
There are some examples that might indeed reflect EU consumer policy is a brand 
used for the benefit of traders and consumers. For example, the CE marking,105 
even if placed on products in say China, is using EU laws as a designation of qual-
ity. The idea behind the ‘blue button’106 approach to persuading consumers to 
contract under a distinctly EU law of consumer sales again has the message that 
consumers should trust the European brand.
What kind of consumer policy does the EU want? 
General observations
One consequence of the maximum harmonization policy is that it places the 
substantive content of EU consumer laws under greater scrutiny.107 So long as 
the EU only provided a minimum level of protection, Member States which were 
concerned to better protect their consumers could be agnostic about the EU level 
of protection. They were free to offer higher protection than the minimum man-
dated by the EU. Once these rules become the maximum permitted – thereby 
ousting existing national rules and barring any new additional rules – the quality 
of the protection provided by the EU rules becomes crucial.
First, the formal scope of the EU rules is considered. This reveals that the EU 
has a relatively restricted definition of who counts as a consumer. Several groups 
that might benefit from protective rules for similar reasons as consumers are 
excluded from the protection of EU law. Thus a professor buying a laptop to write 
his book would not be protected, but the same person would be protected when 
buying a computer to play games on. However, this can have the ironic effect that 
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those outside the scope of the EU rules can benefit from national laws which are 
allowed to offer higher levels of protection.108 There is, however a double irony, 
for this narrow definition of the consumer should have allowed the EU to develop 
a rather high level of protection. Indeed, one criticism of attempts to generalise 
consumer law to include broader groups such as small and medium-sized enter-
prises (SMEs) is that it can tempt legislators to adopt a relatively low level of pro-
tection with a view to the rules being generalised. The blandness of much current 
EU consumer law makes it relatively easy to call for this generalisation.
Next, the type of consumer laws the EU has adopted is explored. The EU’s 
image of the consumer is reflected on. This informs the content of the laws. The 
nature of protective rules will be conditioned by the extent to which consumers 
are assumed to be capable of protecting themselves. Like most national laws, 
EU consumer law contains a mix of rules – some fix minimum required levels 
of protection before traders and their products and services are permitted entry 
to the market (safety, quality, contract terms, and marketing practices). Others 
are information rules to enable consumers to make informed choices within the 
sphere of permitted competition. The EU has tended to favour information rules 
as these are more conducive to the internal market. This in turn is because it 
has a rather robust image of the consumer. Vulnerability is seen as an exception 
only to be taken into account in particular instances.109 Consumers generally are 
expected to act in a very prudent manner that does not map on to real-life experi-
ence and is actually irrational; for instance, few consumers would rationally read 
every contract term! We also discuss the EU right of withdrawal, which has been 
a key element and also can be seen as supporting an informed consumer policy. 
Finally, the crucial issue of what drives consumer law and policy is consid-
ered. We find, as in national systems, a mixture of motives that are not always 
well articulated. Certainly driving out rogue traders is one objective. The notion 
that the average trader is oppressive towards consumers has perhaps become less 
commonplace. Instead the relative strength of both parties in terms of bargain-
ing power, investment in the contract and asymmetry of information have come 
to the fore. It is not totally clear to what extent the EU accepts all consumers 
suffer from these disadvantages or whether protection should be focused more 
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on only the vulnerable consumers. A criticism of the EU policy is that it fails to 
fully articulate that consumer law should be about a sharing of risks and that all 
consumers (and indeed fellow traders) need the ‘insurance’ of good consumer 
law. A high level of consumer protection is in fact necessary for Europe if it wants 
to maintain its international trading competiveness.
The consumer concept
Legal definition of ‘consumer’
The definition of consumer found in most EU legislation is fairly formal and 
given in a negative form, excluding business and professional activities.110 In 
some particular contexts legislation uses analogous concepts which are broader 
in scope. Thus, in the Package Travel Directive,111 the term traveller (which is 
used instead of consumer) is defined more widely to include any person who is 
seeking to conclude a contract, or is entitled to travel on the basis of a contract 
concluded, within the scope of the Directive.112 The Overbooking Regulation113 
uses the term passenger without defining it. Again this would seem to cover any 
one flying in any capacity, including business people. Equally, although financial 
services are outside the scope of this book, the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive (MIFID)114 refers to clients rather than consumers and distinguishes 
between professional and retail clients, with the criteria being set out in Annex 
II. Those criteria allow certain high-net-worth individuals with experience of 
financial markets to opt to be treated as professionals. This is not the case for 
most consumer laws under which consumers cannot opt out of their consumer 
status or the protection afforded them in EU law and are also protected from the 
choice of a non-EU law that would reduce protection.115 Typical of the standard 
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definition of ‘consumer’ is Art. 2(1) of the Consumer Rights Directive,116 accord-
ing to which “’consumer’ means any natural person who, in contracts covered by 
this Directive, is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business, craft 
or profession.”
There has been much discussion about whether consumer protection should 
be extended to small and medium-sized enterprises, which often face similar dif-
ficulties in the marketplace to consumers. Indeed, the proposal on a Common 
European Sales Law117 would have encompassed small and medium-size enter-
prises.118 As the typical EU consumer definition refers to natural persons only, it 
clearly excludes legal entities.119 Some business entities may still formally qualify 
as natural persons if formed as partnerships or associations, but when acting for 
commercial purposes these will still be outside the scope of consumer law direc-
tives. The notion of ‘consumer’ has been given an abstract definition based on 
the status of the purchaser. The opinion of Advocate General Mischo in di Pinto 
that the concrete experience of the person (in that case the seller of a business) 
should be relevant was not followed.120 As the Court said some time ago in the 
context of interpreting the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement 
of Judgments, ‘only contracts concluded for the purpose of satisfying an indi-
vidual’s own needs in terms of private consumption come under the provisions 
designed to protect the consumer as the party deemed to be the weaker party 
economically’.121
The CJEU, in the Gruber case, has also been restrictive as regards mixed pur-
poses contracts, excluding from consumer protection any contract where there is 
a business element unless the trade or professional purpose is so limited as to be 
negligible in the overall context of the supply. It was even considered irrelevant 
that the private element was predominant.122 That decision was made in the con-
text of a jurisdiction issue raised by a farmer who bought tiles for his farm where 
the farm buildings, were used for farming and as his private quarters. It had been 
wondered whether this rather strict interpretation was unique to private interna-
tional law where certainty as to jurisdiction might be considered paramount or 
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should be applied more broadly across the substantive EU  consumer acquis.123 
The Consumer Rights Directive in recital 17 states: 
in the case of dual purpose contracts, where the contract is concluded for 
purposes partly within and partly outside the person’s trade and the trade 
purpose is so limited as not to be predominant in the overall context of the 
contract, that person should also be considered as a consumer.
This clearly resolves the issue for that Directive in favour of allowing contracts 
to be consumer contracts so long as the business element does not predominate. 
Probably in other substantive consumer legislation the Court will feel able to 
distinguish a private international law case like Gruber and also apply this more 
generous test.
The Court has also been strict in not allowing consumer protection rules to 
apply to related contracts if the main contract is not a consumer contract. So in 
one case the rules on doorstep-selling did not apply to a son, who was not in busi-
ness, but who had guaranteed his father’s business loan.124 
Undoubtedly, even with the more generous rules in the Consumer Rights 
Directive, the EU concept of ‘consumer’ is limited to those who in large meas-
ure are furthering their private consumption needs. These actors benefit from a 
substantial consumer acquis. As maximum harmonisation increases its reach they 
are coming to rely more and more solely on the quality of EU law to afford them 
protection as the scope for national intervention is reduced. The next section 
begins to investigate the quality of these rules.
Images of consumers
It is well known that European law uses the average consumer as its benchmark. 
This started in internal market law as a reaction, in particular, against the rather 
over-protective German unfair commercial practices law which focused on pro-
tecting the uneducated, stupid or otherwise weak consumers.125 The Court’s 
average consumer standard may have served a useful purpose in that context, but 
it went on to be rather uncritically applied expressly in the Unfair Commercial 
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Practices Directive126 and by the Court when assessing the fairness of terms.127 It 
has been suggested that despite concerns about the standard it is best to apply the 
standard consistently across the EU acquis.128 
There are, however, several concerns about the use of the average consumer 
test in substantive consumer law.129 First, it separates consumers into the average 
and the vulnerable, and makes the need for additional consumer protection a 
statement of weakness. Some consumers may be unwilling to label themselves as 
vulnerable to obtain protection. Moreover, it fails to underline that in some situ-
ations all consumers need protection.130 
Second, this approach means that all less-than-average consumers are left with-
out protection under that rule unless they can be deemed vulnerable. However, it 
is not clear they do not need protection. There is a continuum between protecting 
all consumers and protecting no consumers, with the average consumers being 
somewhere on that line. It is not always clear that the average standard reflects 
the correct protective level. One might well wish to intervene at a standard differ-
ent from that needed to protect the average consumer where the consequences 
of a practice are severe and its utility small. Protective levels may well fall above 
or below this arbitrary line depending on what policy choices are made. There is 
clearly a sense from the EU that in advertising and marketing, the welfare of the 
majority should dominate, but this is not fully articulated. Indeed, it may well 
depend on how many below-average consumers are harmed and to what extent, 
compared to the gains of the above-average consumer. For example, an adver-
tisement that most people find mildly amusing, but actually confuses a significant 
number of consumers and causes them serious loss, may be worth controlling 
even if it does not affect the average consumer.
Third, this approach at best requires a careful policy as regards vulnerability. 
EU law does protect the vulnerable in some instances,131 but it is unclear how 
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extreme the vulnerability has to be and whether all categories of vulnerability are 
covered.132 There is now a wealth of literature on consumer vulnerability, but this 
seems not to have informed EU policy.133 It implies that consumer protection of 
the vulnerable is an exception that has to be justified and is not derived from any 
structural weaknesses of consumers as a class. 
Fourth, the average standard is a rather arbitrary line to draw. Indeed the 
calculation of average is well known to be subject to different calculations. The 
median consumer may be different from the mean. 
Fifth, even if it is justified to strip out protection of the vulnerable from the 
protection of the average consumer, the image of the average consumer as ‘a 
reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect’ person is 
not truly reflective of actual consumer behaviour. The EU law’s average con-
sumer could indeed be labelled the prudent or careful consumer. Empirically, 
the average consumer is likely to be closer to the Nordic law image of the passive 
glancer, rather that the active and critical information-seeker which dominates 
EU thinking.134 Although the EU mentions behavioural economics frequently135 
it does not seem to appreciate in legislative practice that consumer behaviour is 
not always in accordance with rational expectations.136 More details will be given 
in the next section when the information policy approach is critiqued. However, 
at a very basic level it has to be questioned whether the consumer image of the 
average is the right one. Behavioural science has itself been criticised for focus-
ing on ‘weird’ (Western, educated, industrialised, rich, and democratic) people, 
but even within that set optimistic assumptions seem to be made. Although the 
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standard takes account of social, cultural and linguistic factors,137 in practice lin-
guistic issue are the most likely to be taken seriously into consideration. 138 That 
said the Court has at times shown itself open to protecting vulnerable categories 
of consumers.139
In sum, the policy of selecting the average consumer as the standard for protec-
tion has not been fully articulated and justified.140 Even if the average consumer 
is the one used to judge the appropriate level of protection, establishing who that 
average consumer is empirically is not an easy matter. It is clear that underpinning 
some of the statements by courts and legislators is a belief that consumers should 
be given more space to protect themselves. This was in the free movement cases 
a reaction against national laws whose main achievement had been to prevent fair 
competition by too easily condemning practices as unfair competition. This is also 
seen as a theme of many of the post-Unfair Commercial Practice Directive cases, 
which have sought to liberalise trade practices laws.141 However, one can sympa-
thise with that objective and still not want a law of consumer protection which is 
only there for the benefit of consumers who are always reasonably well-informed 
and reasonably observant and circumspect. Indeed there are examples where the 
Court has been willing to support genuine cases of consumer protection142 and 
the legislation has shown at times a concern to not exclude those needing protec-
tion.143 There is scope for reconsidering the dominant image of the consumer in 
EU law and finding a better way to express legislative policy which recognises that 
all consumers can be vulnerable, whilst also ensuring those that are acutely vul-
nerable are given particular protection to the extent appropriate. Possibly inspira-
tion might be found in the New Zealand case of Godfrey Hirst v Cavalier144 that 
would treat as average “all the consumers in the class targeted except the outliers. 
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The ‘outliers’ encompass consumers who are unusually stupid or ill equipped, or 
those whose reactions are extreme or fanciful.”145 The consumer is then expected 
to act with the ‘care to be expected of reasonable consumers. Or, to put it accu-
rately, by a reasonably careful consumer’.146
Information policy
One of the key debates in modern consumer policy is the extent to which con-
sumers can protect themselves through information. This links back to the pre-
vious discussion on the average consumer. If the image of the person being 
protected is an average consumer, defined as having a good ability to consume 
and process information, one will naturally see information as an effective pro-
tective tool. It certainly enhances the autonomy of the consumer, at least in a 
formal sense, whilst imposing limited demands and constraints on the trader. 
The modern approach is to use information, sometimes alongside other tech-
niques such as default options based on favoured consumer behaviour, to guide 
or ‘nudge’ consumers to make the ‘right decisions’.147 It is seen as more accept-
able politically than regulation that mandates minimum standards for products 
and services. These risk threatening to remove perceived ‘risky’ products from the 
market and thereby reducing consumer choice and competition between produc-
ers. Information has a role to play in allowing consumers to make better choices. 
However, EU policy-makers seem on occasions to unduly favour information 
regulation as promoting market-driven decisions.148 Whereas, the structural vul-
nerability of consumers as a class tends to suggest that consumers’ real autonomy 
can best be exercised once the law has screened out dangerous and poor-quality 
goods and services, and unfair terms and practices. Nevertheless, in the European 
context information is an appealing strategy for the EU as it makes less formal 
demands on producers to change their basic product designs which may be based 
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on national traditions and regulation. Instead many consumer concerns can be 
addressed by providing information.
The EU has long had rules preventing misinformation.149 This is now reflected 
in the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive.150 EU laws have also been used to 
support the right of traders to give factual information.151 However, the heart 
of EU consumer information policy lies in the positive obligations it places on 
 traders to provide information about goods and services. This has grown from the 
very modest obligation in the Doorstep Selling Directive to mention the right of 
withdrawal152 to far more extensive obligations. Doorstep- and distance-selling 
rules have now been combined in the Consumer Rights Directive.153 There are 
numerous directives following this duty to provide information model, such as 
the directives on distance selling of financial services,154 consumer credit,155 time-
share,156 and package travel.157 
These rules seek to redress the balance between trader and consumer caused 
by the asymmetry of information. This formal balancing of access to information, 
however, often fails to take account of the insights of behavioural economics 
literature.158 This teaches us that consumers have limited ability to handle infor-
mation and even when they have the information they may process it in ways that 
do not lead to the expected outcomes if the consumer acted economically ration-
ally.159 Moreover, if there is little choice for even the perfectly informed consumer 
its impact is naturally of limited utility.
The EU has engaged at a theoretical level with behavioural economics, but 
putting them into practice is harder. Thus concentrating on ensuring consumers 
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are aware of key information may well be a good policy, but often comes up 
against the political imperative of needing to please states that are keen to allow 
national information rules to be maintained. The need to placate national senti-
ment explains why the Distance Selling of Financial Services Directive allows for 
over 30 potential pieces of information to be provided.160 The difficulties of fully 
implementing the behavioural economics insights should not be underestimated. 
It is hard to get consensus on which are the key pieces of information or to agree 
which information can safely be left out or given less profile. It is understandable 
that it is easier to reach a consensus that over-includes information obligations. 
Consumer groups themselves even tend to argue for more information, even if 
they know less might mean more effective information.161 It is hard to decide 
which pieces of information should be left out.
Consumers have limited ability to understand and process information. This is 
not just an issue for those with literacy, numeracy or financial skill deficits.162 All 
consumers have limited ability to process information. The human mind handles 
data by breaking it down into manageable chunks. It has been estimated that 
roughly seven chunks of information is the most the human mind can handle 
at any one time.163 Less can mean more when it comes to information disclo-
sure.164 Moreover, as consumers have only limited time, it is only to be expected 
they glance at advertisements or decide it is not practical to read standard terms 
and conditions.165 Many consumers will not take full notice of information pro-
vided.166 This need not be a problem on a macro-scale as a margin of active 
information-seeking consumers can have a healthy impact on the market.167 
However, it would be wrong to assume that all information was actually being 
read so that all consumers were making fully informed decisions. Indeed there is 
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a social equity issue as it is typically better-off consumers who tend to make use 
of information.168 
There are ways in which information can have a greater impact. Focus can be 
placed on a limited range of key sets of information; these can be chosen for the 
relevance to consumers and presented using language and visual images in ways that 
attract the consumers’ attention.169 We shall see the unfair terms rules on intelligibil-
ity have been interpreted to demand that consumers are presented with information 
in a manner that enables them to understand its consequences.170 However, just as 
regulators can seek to ensure information helps consumers make rational decisions, 
industry is also aware of the human psychology and can use this to promote its desired 
outcomes. This may potentially include limiting the impact of mandatory disclosures 
and warnings.171 Consumer choices can also be manipulated by the way information 
is provided172 or by the use of visceral factors to deflect consumer preferences.173 
Standardised formats that take account of these factors may be required. This is well-
illustrated by the controls on tobacco product presentation and warnings.174
However, even if the consumer receives the information it may be processed in 
ways that limit its impact. Consumers do not view all information equally. They 
will tend to prefer information confirming their view and to discount information 
that does not sit easily with their opinion.175 In other words there is a tendency 
to anchor assessments around initial judgments, effectively discounting the value 
of experience and subsequent knowledge.176 Equally consumers may not be well 
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placed to process the information about risk as their perception of risk may be 
affected by how much they value the product or service.177 Classically warnings 
may go unheeded as the desire to use the product is strong. Moreover, it is natu-
ral to tend to downplay everyday risk and exaggerate the risk of major harm.178 
Also immediate benefits may be emphasised and delayed costs downplayed.179 
This is typical for health risks for consumer products or the need to repay loans at 
high interest rates. Even if a risk is understood in a general sense, consumers may 
be too optimistic about their own ability to avoid a risk, especially when they feel 
they have some control over the situation.180
Finally, information only helps if consumers have choices. If there are no alter-
natives – for instance, for low-income consumers of credit – then understanding 
the only choice you have only promotes your autonomy to the limited extent of 
allowing you to decide whether to make that particular purchase. In a similar way 
if all the products are clearly understood, but the comparison between them is 
hard to make because there are too many variables then again the information has 
limited utility.181 Indeed if the information illustrates there is a better deal, but the 
switching costs create impediments, again the information is of limited value.182
There have been instances of the consumer having been assisted, on the basis 
of information rules, by the development of a strong principle of transparency.183 
This has often been used to alleviate the position of a consumer in an indirect way. 
The lack of transparency allows relief to be given without reviewing the substan-
tive fairness of the transaction. However, though useful in the instant cases, such 
solutions do not address the underlying problem. The same transaction could 
take place if the terms had been more transparent; it would rely on that transpar-
ency affecting consumer behaviour. That is by no means a certain outcome.
The challenge for Europe is to find the appropriate role for information policy 
and to then apply lessons of behavioural economics to ensure the information 
36 Introduction to EU consumer law
184 G Howells, ‘The potential and limits of consumer empowerment by information’ (2005) 
Journal of Law and Society p.349. 
185 See Chapter 3, pp.113–125.
186 For example, the purchase of goods via distance means (e.g. via the internet) or in ‘off-
premises’ situations (e.g. doorstep sales) (see Directive 2011/83/EU), timeshare contracts 
(see Directive 2008/122/EU) and consumer credit contracts (Directive 2008/48/EC). 
187 P Rekaiti and R Van den Bergh, ‘Cooling-off periods in the consumer laws of the EC 
Member States. A comparative law and economics approach’ (2000) 23 Journal of 
Consumer Policy p.371.
188 O Ben-Shahar and EA Posner, ‘The right to withdraw in contract law’ (2011) 40 Journal 
of Legal Studies p.115.
enhances consumer autonomy. Information is important, but it also has its limita-
tion as a consumer protection technique.184
Right of withdrawal
Another way in which EU consumer law seeks to enhance autonomy is by grant-
ing consumers a right of withdrawal.185 This is a rather remarkable right when set 
against the traditional contract law doctrine of pacta sunt servanda. Consumers 
in some circumstances, based either upon the type of goods or services or the 
circumstances in which they were sold, are given a right of withdrawal within a 
limited period without having to give any explanation.186 This is done to enhance 
autonomy in case undue pressure was placed on the consumer or they were rushed 
into making a decision. Another factor in some cases is to allow the consumer to 
be fully informed about the product by actually being able to use it, before being 
irrevocably committed. This is of course particularly important in sales where the 
product is not seen, such as those made at a distance.
The modalities of exercising this right can be complex and are discussed below. 
For now we simply want to note the limitations of this approach.187 Consumers 
may be reluctant to take advantage of the right. They may not want to admit they 
made a mistake; may not realise what a bad deal they have struck, or may not have 
realised that within the withdrawal period; may not have sufficient incentive to 
make use of the right or be worried that they may not actually recover any sums 
paid over.188 The incentive to make use of the right of withdrawal reduces if deduc-
tions can be made for the fact they have used the product for a period or delivery 
costs cannot be recovered or high return costs need to be incurred. Despite the 
information obligations about the right, many consumers may still be unaware of 
the right. Traders may well negotiate with them when they seek to exercise the 
right. All of this does not mean that rights of withdrawal are bad for consumers. 
On the contrary, they can provide a rather simple self-help remedy in many cir-
cumstances. However, they should not be seen as a panacea for all ills. Consumer 
law should seek to minimise the likelihood that anyone would want to change 
their mind by ensuring products and services of good quality are fairly marketed.
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Goals beyond enhanced autonomy 
Arguments to enhance consumer autonomy by enhancing information and giv-
ing rights of withdrawal seem a painless means of promoting consumer welfare. 
There may be a few complaints that they restrict the freedom of  traders, but 
these are rather mild.189 There may also be concerns that they impose unnec-
essary costs, but again these criticisms though occasionally voiced are not 
strongly forced; this is probably because the costs are relatively low and seen 
as a price worth paying to avoid more interventionist regulatory approaches. 
However, their effectiveness in achieving enhanced consumer welfare and pro-
tection needs to be questioned. Indeed information obligations have become 
in many respects a defence for industry; whether it be warnings against the risk 
of tobacco (described by the main lawyer for the tobacco industry as the best 
achievement he gave the industry190) or the open disclosure of extraordinary 
high-interest rates adding to their apparent legitimacy. The open-hands policy 
provides legitimation of industry practices. It makes those goods or services 
seem acceptable even if their implied acceptance by consumers in the market is 
often a mirage.
However, going beyond promoting autonomy provides challenges to justify 
any interventions. The interventions are seen to limit choice – something which 
is highly prized in Western economies191 – and have the potential to be anti-
competitive. There is certainly a risk that established players participate in the 
rule-making process and so can skew it in their favour. There is a danger of pric-
ing poorer consumers out of the market if the standards are set too high.192 This 
can lead to criticism that consumer protectionism benefits the upper classes.193 
The poor are left out because legal rules cannot normally alter market realities and 
traders are normally, discrimination laws aside, allowed the freedom to decide 
with whom to contract and on what conditions. This is, of course, a familiar 
criticism of paternalism. The greater the formal legal requirements for entry to 
the market the less role there is for autonomous freedom of contracting. It can 
be argued that consumer contracts are not a pure form of contract anymore, but 
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rather a form of regulation.194 However, this is only within limits. There is still 
plenty of scope in most contexts for a wide choice to be offered to consumers 
within the broad scope of what is legally permissible.
The state has a duty to regulate the market. It can of course impose limits of 
what can be bought and sold. So bans on sale of human body parts are widely 
viewed as appropriate in Europe.195 Forms of marketing that mislead or offend 
taste and decency are also widely accepted as wrong. There would be horror if 
the state did not prevent the sale of dangerous goods. In the economic sphere, 
there is arguably more room to allow consumers freedom to make mistakes, but 
consumers have come to have legitimate expectations of quality and contractual 
fairness. Even in the UK despite many years of ideological opposition, a conserva-
tive government has recognised the need for interest and fee caps to deal with 
problematic payday loans.196 Some rationales will be suggested to support these 
interventions. It is also noticeable that often good traders benefit as much as con-
sumers from consumer laws. The real winner of the EU adopting a progressive 
and enlightened consumer policy is the EU itself. The right policy should gener-
ate higher consumer welfare within the EU and a better reputation globally for 
EU products and services.
Certainly one easy justification for consumer rules is to prevent rogue traders. 
The dodgy second-hand car salesperson has probably been replaced by a remote 
unscrupulous internet seller as the most obvious source of consumer detriment. 
Such practices often involve fraud and their regulation needs little justification. 
It is when the trading practices of legitimate businesses are questioned that the 
rationales for intervention become more complex. Early justifications for control-
ling standard-form contracts were indeed still driven by the notion that a powerful 
trader would seek to use its power to abuse consumers.197 This may have been true 
in the 1960s and 70s, but in Europe is less so today – though some of the manda-
tory arbitration clauses in the United States suggest that legacy may be alive there 
and the Apple warranty cases might have traces of such behaviour.198 In Europe, 
one often-advanced argument in favour of regulation is that traders will seek to 
make small advantages that can go under the radar of consumers. There will not 
be gross abuses but rather techniques to squeeze extra profit at the margin, for 
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example by placing terms that marginally favour traders in the small print.199 The 
unfairness is that consumers are taken by surprise, but an equally important rea-
son for controlling such terms is to make sure that traders that seek to use them 
do not have an unfair advantage over traders that want to provide a straightfor-
ward honest deal to consumers. This same rationale of being fair between traders 
is again seen in terms of laws fixing minimum quality standards. This goes back to 
the famous piece by Akerlof on the market for lemons.200 If traders were allowed 
to sell sub-standard products without sanction there would be no incentive to 
produce goods of the appropriate quality. Again consumer laws are seen to be 
as much for the benefit of preventing unfair competition as consumer welfare. 
Consumers do, however, benefit as they have the insurance that they will have 
redress, in sales or product liability law if they suffer loss because a product fails 
to meet legitimate expectations prescribed by law. There is actually no regressive 
effect on the poor as the rules only seek to ensure the goods meet the standards 
that were promised and presumably that had already been reflected in the price. 
It might be contended that the mandated standard might have been pitched too 
high, but in fact it is hard to understand how anyone would want to accept goods 
which were non-conforming or defective. Moreover, those standards are framed 
as minimum standards of acceptable quality and safety, and are sufficiently flexible 
to be adapted by disclosure on the trader’s part.201 In this sense the liability rules 
are an insurance that reflects a socialisation of risks to ensure that the consumer 
obtains what has been bargained for. This risk might be because the design of the 
product fails to meet the expected standard, but it can of course be the case that 
the product is a true ‘lemon’, in the sense where something has gone wrong in 
the production of that particular product or batch of products. 
The socialisation of risk is recognised expressly in the Product Liability 
Directive which talks about the ‘fair apportionment of risk inherent in mod-
ern technological production’.202 Unfortunately, the meaning given to that 
has been restricted and the full impact of strict liability has been diluted so 
that there has only been a limited sharing of risks. In the most obvious cases, 
such as rogue products, the insurance principle undoubtedly applies and indeed 
its impact has been felt in contexts as emotive as the supply of contaminated 
blood. However, there has not been a strong interpretation of strict liability to 
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ensure consumers are compensated for all unexpected product-related injuries. 
Although not express, the socialisation of risk is also inherent in compensation 
for non-conforming poor quality goods. One area where it is very clear to see a 
choice has been made in favour of the socialisation of risk is as regards the duties 
to provide assistance and possibly compensation for denied boarding, cancella-
tion and delay of flights.203 Indeed this is contentious because the socialisation 
of risk is very evident in that it imposes an active obligation to meet consumers’ 
needs, rather than a mere liability. It is fiercely opposed by the low-cost carriers 
as the compensation is not linked to the price of the ticket. The Eyjafjallajökull 
volcano explosion in 2010 brought widespread calls for limitations on the obli-
gations from a wider range of carriers. It is likely that this Regulation will be 
revised to moderate the obligations of carriers204 and it is only right that the 
extent of the insurance is reviewed. However, the basic principles are likely to 
remain intact. There will always be problems in air transit and the policy reflects 
that airlines are better placed to deal with the issues than passengers. If those 
on low-cost flights tend to be relatively poorer they are even less well placed to 
deal with the emergency.
Brand Europe
Promoting the competitiveness of Europe is a key part of the European agenda.205 
A strong consumer protection policy that empowers consumers to make choices 
and enforce their rights can be an important driver in promoting good stand-
ards and hence enhancing competitiveness.206 The importance of branding is well 
known in commerce.207 But just as companies benefit from brand recognition so 
do states. Just think of the connotations associated with German engineering, 
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Japanese electronics or Finnish vodka! If consumer protection is at a high level 
in the EU, it will encourage consumers to have trust in those markets. This was, 
after all, the original idea behind the consumer acquis, which by setting minimum 
standards sought to promote consumer confidence to shop anywhere within the 
EU. Those who advocated the Common European Sales Law believed consumers 
would press the ‘blue button’ to contract under EU law because it would repre-
sent a high level of protection.208 Strong and effective EU consumer laws should 
attract global consumers to shop from EU traders with confidence and make EU 
goods attractive wherever they are sold in the world. In part the CE marking, 
signifying conformity to new-approach technical harmonisation directives, can be 
viewed as a brand mark for the EU.209
In summary, there should be a role for consumer protection in setting stand-
ards that socialise some of the risks in the market. Consumers will benefit, but so 
will traders who avoid unfair competition and generally the EU brand will gain 
strength. Of course there are debates about the extent to which risks should be 
socialised and the boundaries between interventionist regulation and free choice 
guided by information. 
The EU should develop a consumer protection regime which pays more 
 attention to the limits of information policy as a protective tool and recognises that 
there are risks faced by all consumers in the marketplace that need to be socialised. 
The rules are fair to traders as they will only kick in when standards, which they 
agreed to either expressly or which were imposed on all traders by law as the price 
for the right of entry to the market, are not met. Obviously they will help consum-
ers. The risk of any negative impact caused by the increased associated costs is also 
negligible given the nature of those standards. Strong consumer protection rules 
are good for EU consumers, but also for traders who are not undermined by unfair 
competition and the improved image of European goods and services. 
Those who argue that the EU does not have the mandate for developing such 
a policy are right to the extent that the EU could usefully amend its constitution 
to provide an independent base for consumer protection. In practice, by using its 
internal market powers it has already addressed almost every aspect of consumer 
protection; therefore it should take responsibility for the content of those laws. 
If the EU cannot provide a strong consumer protection content to its laws, then 
that is a reason for opposing its deeper involvement. However, the EU already 
has a mandate to develop a strong consumer protection policy along the lines 
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advocated because of the obligations in the Treaty to provide a high level of con-
sumer protection when legislating.
What tools does EU use to achieve its objectives?
What form should EU intervention take? This very much depends upon what is 
sought to be achieved. If the goal is uniformity then a regulation achieves that 
better than a directive.210 Indeed given the lack of leeway the court has allowed 
states when implementing directives,211 one can well understand why there have 
been moves to use regulations rather than directives. Equally if improving cross-
border trade is the concern, limiting measures to cross-border contracts is a 
potentially useful way forward and can avoid opposition from those who want the 
EU intervention to leave their domestic law intact. However, it might be ques-
tionable whether it is wise to develop dual regimes for domestic and cross-border 
goods, given the need for consumer law to be understood with ease by consumers 
and traders. These two policy drivers – uniformity and cross-border sales – came 
together neatly in the Proposal for a Regulation on a Common European Sales 
Law.212 More recently, they are reflected in the proposal for a directive on online 
sales of tangible goods.213
However, a top-down model may not be the best way forward. EU law should 
work with, not against, national law. Directives and other instruments that allow 
the integration of the EU rules into national law should be favoured. The con-
tinued use of national legal terminology is to be preferred as this normally makes 
the law simpler to understand and promotes coherence with non-harmonised 
legal areas. Calls to have a European consumer code214 miss the point that a neat 
and tidy EU law is not what is needed. It is a coherent and simple national law 
that is important. Achieving that requires instruments that proscribe the ends 
to be reached without dictating the means. Of course regulations may still be 
 appropriate where entirely new regimes are being established or there is a need to 
set up institutions or methods of co-operation between states. They may there-
fore have a continued role in enforcement and access to justice policy. However, 
their role in private and trade practices law should be limited.
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There are clearly some areas that need to be fully harmonised if the internal 
market is to work. In other fields only minimum harmonisation may be required 
for internal market reasons to ensure the differences between systems are not so 
great that they affect competitiveness. The EU should become a torchbearer for 
a progressive consumer protection policy grounded in strong theoretical under-
pinnings. This theoretical support is needed as the EU protectionist philosophy 
is coming under a strong challenge from US scholars and reformers who favour 
a more market-based consumer policy.215 Just as some states may feel the current 
EU policy is too limited, others might be reluctant to embrace a more radical 
base that promotes more fully the socialisation of risk doctrine. Within bounds 
this is a reflection of national cultures and traditions which should be respected. 
However, the EU should advocate for its preferred approach. The ‘Open Method 
of Co-ordination’ (OMC) can be a valuable approach to seek to educate states to 
accept the value of the EU’s favoured approach.216 This may rely on framework 
directives that in addition to fixing minimum rights set out goals and procedures 
for developing strong consumer protection. These may be fleshed out in soft law 
instruments like recommendations or codes.
Finally, the CJEU merits particular mention. The Court has been called upon 
a perhaps surprisingly high number of times to adjudicate on consumer matters. 
Many of its judgments will be mentioned in the following pages. What is striking 
is that lots of the decisions are on constitutional issues relating to legal base,217 
implementation,218 and the relationship between EU and national measures.219 
Relatively few address substantive matters and in the recent glut of unfair contract 
terms cases many were treated as involving procedural law.220 Indeed the CJEU 
has been criticised for lack of expertise in private law matters as many of the 
judges have a public law background.221 
44 Introduction to EU consumer law
222 For an excellent analysis, see the PhD thesis by A Beka, The ex Officio Doctrine in European 
Consumer Law. A Procedural Tool Reinvigorating Individual Consumer Litigation 
(University of Luxembourg, 2015).
223 See Chapter 4, pp.150–160 for a fuller discussion.
224 C-240-244/98 Oceano Grupo Editorial SA v Rocio Quintero and others [2000] ECR I-4941.
225 C-168/05 Elisa María Mostaza Claro v Centro Móvil Milenium SL [2006] ECR I-10421.
226 C-243.08 Pannon GSM Zrt. v Erzsébet Sustikné Győrfi [2009] ECR I-4713.
227 Ibid.,  para [35].
228 C-429/05 Max Rampion and Marie-Jeanne Godard, née Rampion v Franfinance SA and K 
par K SAS [2007] ECR I-8017.
229 C-32/12 Soledad Duarte Hueros v Autociba SA and Automóviles Citroën España SA 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:637 and C-497/13 Froukje Faber v Autobedrijf Hazet Ochten BV 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:357. See P Rott, ‘Improving consumers’ enforcement of their rights 
under EU consumer sales law’ (2016) 53 Common Market Law Review p.509.
230 C-227/08 Eva Martín Martín v EDP Editores SL [2009] ECR I-11939.
231 C-243/08 Pannon GSM Zrt. v Erzsébet Sustikné Győrfi [2009] ECR I-4713.
232 The possibility that actions by a national court could result in Member State liability was 
established in C-224/01 Gerhard Köbler v Republik Österreich [2003] ECR I-10239.
233 C-168/15 Milena Tomášová v Slovenská republika ECLI:EU:C:2016:602.
One particular development in the CJEU’s jurisprudence needs to be noted 
here: the development of an ex officio doctrine which focuses on the role national 
courts can play in ensuring the effective application and enforcement of EU con-
sumer law.222 This principle has evolved principally in the context of the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive.223 It started with Oceano,224 where the CJEU held that 
a domestic court could decide, of its own motion, that a term in a consumer con-
tract is unfair and refuse to apply it. Subsequently, in Mostaza Claro,225 the CJEU 
held that a national court hearing an action for the annulment of an arbitration 
award must determine of its own motion whether the arbitration clause is unfair, 
even though the consumer has not raised this argument himself. In Pannon v 
Győrfi,226 the Court confirmed that if a national court has all the factual and legal 
information available to it to assess the unfairness of a term, it is required to do so 
of its own motion. This went beyond recognising a mere power to do so, which 
was the approach in Oceano. However, the CJEU also said that a consumer, aware 
of the court’s assessment on unfairness, can decline the non-application of the 
term.227 This doctrine initially developed in the field of unfair contract terms, but 
it has since extended to many other areas of consumer law, including consumer 
credit,228 consumer sales,229 and doorstep-selling.230 It is potentially a very con-
sumer-friendly doctrine because it should ensure the application of consumer law 
even where a consumer omits to plead this before a national court. However, it 
does create concerns too. The full extent of the national court’s duties is unclear; 
sometimes, the CJEU speaks of a power to act of its own motion, and at other 
times (particularly after Pannon231) as an obligation. This, in turn, raises the ques-
tion whether the failure by a national court to apply a relevant provision of con-
sumer law of its own motion could form the basis of a claim for state liability.232 
This issue was considered in Tomášová v Slovenia.233 Here, the CJEU confirmed 
that an action for state liability is available against the final court of appeal in 
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national jurisdiction for an infringement of EU Law. In this case, a national court 
had failed to consider the unfairness of a contract term of its own motion. The 
consumer eventually brought a claim for state liability. The national court had 
given its ruling in the original dispute in 2008. This pre-dated the CJEU’s rul-
ing in Pannon,234 which established the full obligation on national courts to raise 
the unfairness of a contract term of their own motion. In Tomášová, the breach 
of EU Law therefore was not sufficiently serious to form the basis of a claim for 
state liability, although the CJEU seems to have reached that conclusion because 
the Pannon obligation to act ex officio had not been established at the time of the 
national ruling. Nevertheless, Tomášová is an important warning call to national 
courts to take seriously their obligation under the ex officio principle. 
On the whole the CJEU has shown itself willing to understand the concerns of 
consumers, but national court systems are often better-placed to handle consumer 
matters as domestic litigation can generate sufficient cases to allow some specialisa-
tion and expertise. If minimum harmonisation measures are the norm, the CJEU will 
only be responsible for determining the core obligations required by EU law. States 
that are not satisfied with the EU’s approach will be allowed to maintain or introduce 
more protective rules. If the protective ethic of consumer protection is more clearly 
spelt out, it will assist the CJEU to follow the EU’s consumer protection philoso-
phy. Hopefully, the justifications will be convincing so that a high level of consumer 
protection becomes accepted as the EU norm with Member States retaining the 
freedom to experiment within the broad framework established at the EU level.
Next steps
This chapter has provided the context for the discussion of specific areas of EU 
consumer law in the subsequent chapters. Each chapter will develop one or more 
of the themes discussed above in analysing a particular topic. The topics chosen 
for this book are the mainstream areas of EU consumer law: the regulation of 
unfair commercial practices, pre-contractual information and the right of with-
drawal; unfair contract terms; sales contracts; consumer credit; product liability 
and safety; and enforcement and redress. A number of more specialist areas are 
not covered in-depth in this volume,235 although reference is made to these where 
appropriate. The final concluding chapter will draw together the main strands of 
our discussion, and offer a number of pointers for the future development of EU 
consumer law, both in the context of its short-term focus on the challenges of the 
digital agenda and beyond.
2 Regulation of unfair commercial 
practices
Introduction
General
This chapter focuses on the way EU law regulates unfair commercial practices, 
i.e. the behaviour of traders towards consumers as regards the marketing of goods 
and services. This aspect of EU consumer law has had a lengthy gestation period, 
developing from the early case law of the CJEU in the context of the free move-
ment of goods and the first directive on misleading advertising into the land-
mark directive on unfair commercial practices (UCPD) adopted in 2005.1 Prior 
to the adoption of the UCPD, the EU had adopted directives on misleading2 
and comparative3 advertising. Together, these directives had provided a good 
basis for the regulation of advertising throughout the EU. This had been done 
using minimum harmonisation. At the national level, there had been considerable 
variation in the way advertising, and fair trading generally, had been regulated.4 
The advertising directives were a first step towards a common set of rules, but fell 
short of the broader approach to fair trading rules found in some Member States.
In 2001, the European Commission published a Green Paper on EU Consumer 
Protection.5 Its primary focus was on whether there should be broader regulation 
of trade practices at the EU level. In particular, the Green Paper mooted the pos-
sibility of a framework directive based around a general clause on fair commercial 
practices. Subsequently, the Commission confirmed its intention to proceed with 
such a framework directive,6 and duly put forward its proposal for a directive on 
unfair commercial practices.7 Alongside this proposal, the Commission also put 
1 Directive 2005/29/EC on business-to-consumer unfair commercial practices (2005) OJ 
L149/22.
2 Directive 84/450/EEC on misleading advertising (1984) OJ L250/17.
3 Directive 97/55/EC on comparative advertising, amending Directive 84/450/EEC (1997) 
OJ L290/18.
4 For a useful summary, see G Howells, H-W Micklitz and T Wilhelmsson, European Fair 
Trading Law (Ashgate, 2006), Chapter 1.
5 COM (2001) 531 final.
6 European Commission, Follow-up Communication on EU Consumer Law (2002) 289 final.
7 COM (2003) 356 final.
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forward a proposal for a regulation on sales promotions.8 This overlapped with 
aspects of the proposal for the UPCD. The UCPD prevailed, and the sales pro-
motion regulation was ultimately withdrawn.9 The UCPD is noteworthy for sev-
eral reasons. First, it is one of the first consumer law directives which is based on 
a maximum harmonisation standard. Second, at its heart is a broad general clause 
outlawing unfair commercial practices. This is supplemented by more specific 
clauses as well as a list of practices prohibited outright. Third, the UCPD explic-
itly utilises the average consumer concept which had already developed in the case 
law of the CJEU in the context of the free movement provisions,10 albeit with 
modifications where commercial practices target specific groups of consumers or 
are likely to have detrimental impact on vulnerable consumers. These features of 
the UCPD make it a good example of EU consumer law to explore several of the 
themes considered in this book.11
Chapter themes
Maximum harmonisation
The UCPD is based on maximum harmonisation, and seeks to establish a sin-
gle set of European rules for combatting unfair commercial practices. It came 
at a time when the EU was changing its philosophy to one in which consumer 
protection per se was less emphasised, and instead the role of consumer law har-
monisation driving the single market came to the fore. Its success in this measure 
encouraged the Commission to start with the maximum harmonisation objective 
in other subsequent areas, but with mixed success. In contrast to many prior key 
EU consumer law directives, therefore, the UCPD removed the scope for the 
Member States to adopt or retain domestic legislation offering a higher level of 
consumer protection. In particular, as the UCPD contains a list of commercial 
practices prohibited outright, the ability of the Member States to prohibit other 
commercial practices has been pre-empted by the Directive. Non-prohibited prac-
tices need to be challenged under the general standards in the UCPD instead. 
Moreover, the maximum harmonisation nature of the UCPD has prompted a 
number of references to the CJEU to determine the compatibility of national 
legislation with the UPCD’s maximum harmonisation standard. In particular, 
whilst the UCPD is intended to cover only business-to-consumer commercial 
practices, this does not mean that only those national laws concerned exclusively 
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with business-to-consumer commercial practices are affected; several CJEU rul-
ings have made it clear that the maximum harmonisation effect of the UCPD also 
touches national measures regulating commercial practices more generally, to 
the extent that these apply to business-to-consumer commercial practices. This 
consequence might not have been anticipated at the time of adopting the UCPD, 
and might be described as the Directive’s ‘Jack-in-the-box’ effect. These issues 
will be explored fully in light of the body of case law which has been handed 
down by the CJEU. Despite this approach, the use of broad standards to ensure 
that the UCPD can be applied to newly-emerging practices means that questions 
arise as to how consistency of interpretation and application can be ensured across 
the EU. One tool deployed by the European Commission is a very detailed guid-
ance document.12 
Consumer – average consumer and vulnerable consumer
A second feature is that the UCPD is the first Directive which explicitly 
 incorporates the average consumer yardstick into its provisions. Thus, whether a 
commercial practice is unfair depends on the effect, or likely effect, on the average 
consumer. This is, of course, a concept familiar from the CJEU’s case law, partic-
ularly in the context of the free movement of goods provisions of the TFEU. The 
average consumer concept has been defined as a ‘reasonably well-informed and 
reasonably observant and circumspect’13 consumer, ‘taking into account social, 
cultural and linguistic factors’.14 This concept has not gone without criticism,15 
particularly because it seems to be a rather different image from the majority of 
consumers. It is doubtful whether empirical testing of the characteristics of an 
average consumer would conform to this norm. This has been recognised by the 
EU’s legislature, and the UCPD therefore contains two modifications of the aver-
age consumer test: first, if a commercial practice is targeted at a particular group 
of consumers, then the average consumer is to be taken from that group; second, 
if a commercial practice is likely to affect consumers who are particularly vulner-
able, then the fairness of the practice is to be assessed with reference to its impact 
on such vulnerable consumers. The explicit recognition of vulnerable consumers 
is an important feature of the UCPD, although it will be seen that the particular 
instantiation of the vulnerable consumer in this Directive is rather more limited: 
only a small number of categories of vulnerability are recognised. 
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Relationship with rest of acquis
The UCPD is a full-harmonisation directive which has both links and overlaps 
with other directives making up the EU’s consumer acquis. In particular, there 
is some duplication with regard to the provision of information, relevant both 
under the UCPD and other directives.16 However, there has been insufficient 
co-ordination between these directives and the UCPD, with the consequence 
that overlapping information duties are presented in different and not always 
consistent ways. Moreover, whilst the UCPD does not directly affect individual 
consumer contracts,17 the existence of an unfair commercial practice can have 
a bearing both on contract formation and performance, but this has also not 
been considered appropriately by the EU legislature. This issue has arisen e.g. 
in the context of contract terms which could be regarded as both unfair under 
the Unfair Contract Terms Directive and qualify as unfair commercial practice.18 
The UCPD does not grant individual consumers any immediate rights to indi-
vidual redress; instead, this is a matter left to domestic law. However, the overlap 
between the UCPD and other directives carves out some instances where indi-
vidual redress might be available, albeit in an uncoordinated fashion. Greater 
alignment of the UCPD with other directives could certainly improve the overall 
coherence of EU consumer protection.
Role of the CJEU
Finally, the CJEU’s role in the interpretation of the UCPD is interesting.19 It is 
trite law that the CJEU’s role is to interpret the law but not to apply it, but with 
the UCPD based on a full-harmonisation standard and utilising broad clauses to 
catch as many commercial practices as possible, there may be both a desire on 
the part of national courts for greater guidance from the CJEU and a tempta-
tion for the Court to stray into the application of the UPCD’s rules to the facts 
of the particular case which has given rise to a reference under Art. 267 TFEU. 
There have been instances where the line between the respective responsibilities 
of the national courts and the CJEU has become blurred, with the CJEU pro-
viding a very strong steer to national courts as to how the relevant provisions of 
the UCPD could be applied to the facts of the case which led to a reference. On 
the one hand, there is a benefit in this in that it may be possible to extrapolate 
general points regarding the scope and application of the UCPD which could 
be of assistance to other courts and therefore promote greater consistency across 
the EU. On the other, it leaves the CJEU open to criticism that it has exceeded 
its responsibilities. If obtaining greater guidance from the CJEU is felt desirable, 
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then this should lead to a more fundamental reconsideration of the CJEU’s role – 
whether limited to the field of consumer law, or more generally.
Overview of the UCPD
This section will present a general overview of the main provisions of the UPCD,20 
and will take into account relevant rulings by the CJEU on the interpretation of 
particular provisions.21 
Commercial practices
The UCPD only applies to ‘business-to-consumer commercial practices’ which 
are defined in Art. 2(d) as ‘any act, omission, course of conduct or represen-
tation, commercial communication including advertising and marketing, by a 
trader, directly connected with the promotion, sale or supply of a product to 
consumers’. There are a number of points to note about this definition. First, 
it covers both acts and omissions by a trader,22 i.e. it can extend to a failure by 
a trader to do something. Second, whatever action or omission occurs has to 
relate to the promotion, sale or supply of the product, but it is not necessary 
that the trader who undertakes the commercial practice is the one who then 
supplies the product to the consumer – this can be someone further below in 
the supply chain.23 
Third, the commercial practices must be ‘directly connected with the promo-
tion, sale or supply of a product’. ‘Product’ is defined broadly as ‘any good or 
service, including immovable property, rights and obligations’ (Art. 2 (c)). There 
is, however, some difficulty with the fact that the trader’s commercial practice 
must be ‘directly connected with the promotion, sale or supply’ of the product. It 
clearly covers any actions or omissions leading up to the conclusion of a contract 
(or the decision not to conclude a contract), but it is not entirely clear from this 
definition whether it extends to matters arising after a contract has been con-
cluded, i.e. during its performance or at the time of renewal. However, in light 
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of Art. 3, which states that the Directive applies to commercial practices ‘before 
during and after a commercial transaction in relation to a product’, it seems that 
the UCPD applies to all stages of a transaction. 
It will be obvious that the notion of ‘commercial practice’ is extremely broad, 
essentially covering the full range of ways in which a trader deals with a consumer. 
As will be explained below, the UCPD includes a list of commercial practices which 
are always regarded as unfair, as well as broad prohibitions against misleading and 
aggressive practices. However, despite the broad and flexible notion of ‘commercial 
practice’, there may still be doubt at times whether a particular type of conduct by 
a trader qualifies as a commercial practice. Since the UCPD became law, there have 
been a significant number of requests for a preliminary ruling on the interpreta-
tion of the Directive to the CJEU. Although the role of the CJEU in the context 
of Art. 267 TFEU proceedings should be confined to providing guidance on the 
interpretation of the various provisions of the UCPD, the court has adopted a ten-
dency towards applying the definition of commercial practice from Art. 2(d) in 
considering whether in the case before it, the UCPD would be applicable at all. 
Many of these cases were concerned with the compatibility of national rules pro-
hibiting specific commercial practices with the maximum harmonisation standard 
of the UCPD. 
In VTB-VAB NV v Total Belgium NV,24 the CJEU noted the ‘particularly 
wide definition to the concept of commercial practice’ in Art. 2(d).25 That 
definition covers ‘commercial acts which clearly form part of an operator’s 
commercial strategy and related directly to the promotion thereof and its 
sales development’.26 Crucially, the practices ‘must be commercial in nature, 
that is to say, they must originate from traders and they must be directly 
connected with the promotion, sale or supply of their products to consum-
ers.’27 There has to be a clear link between the trader’s commercial practice 
and the products supplied by that trader. In RLvS Verlagsgesellschaft mbH v 
Stuttgarter Wochenblatt GmbH.28 a newspaper had included several sections, 
which had been sponsored by another trader to advertise that trader’s prod-
ucts. They had not been identified clearly as advertisements by the newspaper, 
as required under state law in Germany. Another newspaper publisher com-
plained about this, and the question arose whether the state law was compati-
ble with the UCPD. The CJEU concluded that the UCPD was not applicable, 
because the newspaper itself had not engaged in a commercial practice in this 
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instance – the sponsored pages were not promoting the newspaper itself. The 
various promotional activities by third parties found inside a newspaper are, in 
the CJEU’s view, unlikely to affect a consumer’s decision whether to acquire 
the newspaper itself.29
Moreover, the notion of ‘commercial practice’ does not envisage a particular 
course of conduct; it is sufficient that the action of a trader takes place once and 
only affects one consumer to be regarded as a commercial practice.30 
From the various preliminary rulings handed down, it can be seen that the 
following are regarded as commercial practices which fall within the scope of the 
UCPD:
•• combined offers (where the right to acquire goods or services on certain con-
ditions depends on the purchase of other goods or services, such as buying 
petrol to obtain free breakdown cover31 or a magazine containing a discount 
voucher for a store32);33
•• participation in a lottery or prize draw which is conditional on buying goods 
or services;34
•• sales with free advantages/bonuses;35
•• price reductions;36
•• announcements of price reductions during periods preceding specific sales 
periods;37
•• selling goods at a loss;38
•• announcement of a clearance sale;39
•• a travel agency advertising the exclusive availability of certain hotels;40
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•• communication of information in the context of after-sales service relating 
to a subscription;41
•• indicating an APR on a loan lower than the real rate.42
All of these are instances where the CJEU has applied the definition of ‘com-
mercial practice’ to the particular practice in issue in the case which prompted a 
reference. This was done because the national courts had referred questions about 
the relationship of the UCPD with national legislation addressing particular prac-
tices. In order to consider whether there was a conflict between the UCPD and 
national law, the CJEU first had to establish whether the practice dealt with in 
the national legislation fell within the UCPD’s definition of commercial practices. 
Once this had been established, the CJEU proceeded to consider the compat-
ibility of national law with the maximum harmonisation mandate of the UCPD.
Outright prohibitions
The UCPD approaches the prohibition of unfair commercial practices in three 
stages, which are best understood as moving from particular to general assess-
ment; there are some practices which are prohibited outright, and these are listed 
in Annex I of the Directive.43 There are then specific prohibitions of misleading 
actions and omissions as well as aggressive commercial practices, and finally a 
general clause which effectively operates as a safety net to catch unfair commercial 
practices neither listed in the Annex nor the more specific prohibitions. 
The commercial practices listed in Annex I are regarded as unfair in all circum-
stances,44 and there is no need to consider the additional requirements for estab-
lishing unfairness which are relevant to the specific or general prohibitions. If a 
trader engages in a practice which is listed in Annex I, then the mere fact that the 
action has been undertaken will be sufficient. As will be explored more fully later, 
the maximum harmonisation nature of the UCPD means that Member States are 
precluded from prohibiting outright any commercial practices not listed in Annex 
I, a matter which has prompted a high volume of CJEU cases.
Annex I lists 31 unfair commercial practices, grouped into ‘misleading com-
mercial practices’ and ‘aggressive commercial practices’, which corresponds with 
the specific treatment of misleading and aggressive behaviour in Arts. 6–9 UCPD, 
discussed below. There are 23 misleading practices, and 8 aggressive practices. 
The classification of particular commercial practices under these headings is not 
always convincing – for example, item 27 regards as an aggressive commercial 
practice ‘requiring a consumer who wishes to claim on an insurance policy to 
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produce documents which could not reasonably be considered relevant as to 
whether the claim was valid …’ – certainly a frustrating practice, but not particu-
larly aggressive. One might wonder whether it matters that a practice listed in 
Annex I has been classified as misleading or aggressive or whether the fact that the 
practice listed is to be regarded as inherently unfair and therefore always prohib-
ited without requiring examination on a case-by-case basis is crucial. However, 
the CJEU’s ruling in Purely Creative v OFT  45 suggest it may be. This case was 
concerned with the prohibition in point 31 of Annex I which prohibits: 
Creating the false impression that the consumer has already won, will win, or 
will on doing a particular act win, a prize or other equivalent benefit, when 
in fact either:
• there is no prize or other equivalent benefit,
or
•  taking any action in relation to claiming the prize or other equivalent 
benefit is subject to the consumer paying money or incurring a cost.
Purely Creative (and others) had run various promotional activities in which con-
sumers received various forms of communications stating that they were entitled 
to claim a prize from a range of low-value to one prize of considerable value. 
These prizes were genuinely available but in order to claim a prize, a consumer 
had to call a premium telephone line, use reverse SMS text messaging or use the 
ordinary post. Consumers were encouraged to use the premium-rate phone line, 
and phone calls took several minutes; in addition, consumers also had to incur 
additional charges for delivery and insurance. Action was taken by the OFT and 
the Court of Appeal requested a preliminary ruling on two issues: first, whether 
the prohibition was infringed even if the cost to the consumer is de minimis; 
and second, whether the word ‘false impression’ is an additional requirement 
to the obligation to pay money or incur a cost to claim the prize. On the sec-
ond point, the CJEU swiftly explained that ‘false impression’ was not a separate 
requirement and that the false impression arose from the fact that a prize was 
not truly free when the consumer had to make a payment. The CJEU referred to 
the classification of the prohibition in point 31 as ‘aggressive’ as rendering irrel-
evant whether the commercial practice had a misleading character, and that the 
aggressive features of the particular practice were the result of the ‘psychological 
effect created in the mind of the consumer by the perspective of having won 
something and to cause him to take a decision which is not always rational’.46 
This suggests that the way commercial practices have been grouped in Annex I 
does have a bearing on how these should be interpreted. On the first issue, the 
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CJEU’s conclusions were that any payment or cost, even if de minimis, was pro-
hibited. This was so even where a consumer had a range of options for claiming 
the prize, one of which was free of charge, because the psychological effect is 
such that a consumer is more likely to choose the quickest method for discover-
ing which prize has been won, even if that method is the most expensive.47 The 
CJEU further explained that the way the prize is described is important and that 
it is necessary to distinguish between information about the prize itself and the 
steps needed to claim it.48 The prohibition in point 31 only relates to the latter, 
which means that prize should not be described as ‘free’ if the consumer has to 
incur expenses in claiming it. However, by making it clear what the prize entails, 
a trader can avoid falling foul of point 31. The onus is on the trader to ensure 
that the description of the prize is unequivocal and that it must be clear what is 
included in the prize and what is not.49 Otherwise some costs may be deemed to 
be costs related to claiming the prize. The CJEU gave the following example to 
illustrate this: ‘a prize defined as an ‘entrance ticket’ for a certain football match 
does not include the transport of the consumer from his home to the football 
stadium where the match takes place. On the other hand, if the prize is stated 
simply to be ‘attendance’ at that sports event, the trader must bear the costs of 
the consumer’s travel’.50 The clarity of this information is tested against the aver-
age member of the group of consumers targeted by the practice. The assumption 
here is that a consumer should be able to tell from the prize description which 
costs are covered and which costs need to be incurred, e.g. in the case of a cruise, 
the need to travel to the port of departure. 
A number of observations can be made on this case. First, it illustrates that the 
prohibition of certain commercial practices throughout the EU brings with it the risk 
that traders might seek to circumvent the prohibition, unless the prohibition is clear 
and comprehensive. The traders in this case sought to do so by having one de mini-
mis or free way of finding out about the prize, but this option was firmly closed-off 
by the CJEU. It underlines how important it is that any outright prohibitions are 
clear and do not leave any room for debate about what is covered. This might not 
prevent some traders from deploying arguments that their actions do not quite fall 
within the prohibitions (as the traders in Purely Creative attempted), but that CJEU 
decision and general approach should make it easy to dismiss such arguments.
The need for clarity of such outright prohibitions also necessitates careful trans-
lation of the UCPD into the various official languages of the EU to ensure that 
the requirements of the prohibition are consistent. A variation between different 
language versions was an issue in ‘4finance’ UAB,51 a case involving a pyramid 
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scheme prohibited by point 14 of Annex I. The English language version, with 
which most other language versions were consistent, prohibits
Establishing, operating or promoting a pyramid promotional scheme where 
a consumer gives consideration for the opportunity to receive compensation 
that is derived primarily from the introduction of other consumers into the 
scheme rather than from the sale or consumption of products. (italics added)
The German version, with which the Lithuanian version corresponds, says
Einführung, Betrieb oder Förderung eines Schneeballsystems zur 
Verkaufsförderung, bei dem der Verbraucher die Möglichkeit vor Augen 
hat, eine Vergütung zu erzielen, die hauptsächlich durch die Einführung 
neuer Verbraucher in ein solches System und weniger durch den Verkauf 
oder Verbrauch von Produkten zu erzielen ist.
The words in italics in the English version do not have an equivalent in the 
German version. The CJEU was therefore asked whether the provision of con-
sideration by consumers participating in the scheme was essential. In the CJEU’s 
view, three cumulative conditions are required: (i) there is a promise that a con-
sumer will receive a commercial advantage; (ii) the realisation of the promise 
requires that more and more consumers join the scheme; and (iii) the greater part 
of the payments made to consumers are not the result of an economic activity.52 
The Court noted that such schemes are based on money being contributed by 
new entrants which is used to pay compensation to earlier members, and that 
consequently some financial contribution (consideration) is required.53 However, 
there was no minimum amount required – even 1 cent would suffice. In the 
case itself, the payments made to existing members were only in a very small 
part based on financial contributions made by new entrants (and therefore not 
‘derived primarily from the introduction of other consumers into the scheme’),54 
which meant that the particular scheme was not caught by point 14 at all and 
instead had to be assessed under the general prohibition in Art. 5. The CJEU has 
subsequently added to this by holding that there will be a pyramid scheme even 
if there is only an indirect link between the contributions paid by new members 
and any payments made to existing members (‘compensation’).55 
Both Purely Creative and ‘4finance’ UAB demonstrate that the outright prohi-
bitions in Annex I are given a literal interpretation. This means that no additional 
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elements other than those in the wording of each prohibition itself may be con-
sidered before concluding that there has been an infringement; on the other 
hand, such literal interpretation also entails that practices which do not satisfy all 
of the elements in an outright prohibition will not automatically be unfair and 
need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. This matter is particularly important 
when it comes to the extent of UCPD’s maximum harmonisation standard.
The specific prohibitions
The specific clauses on misleading and aggressive practices and the general clause 
raise a number of issues which are briefly explored at this stage. The most com-
plex provision is the general clause prohibiting unfair commercial practices in 
Art. 5. Before these prohibitions are examined further, it needs to be emphasised 
that a number of factors have no bearing on whether a commercial practice falls 
to be considered as unfair. Thus, Article 11 UCPD which deals with enforcement 
(see below) states that it is irrelevant whether the trader acted intentionally or 
negligently in engaging in an unfair commercial practice (to which one can add 
‘innocently’). The mere fact that the practice satisfies the criteria to be considered 
as unfair suffices. Similarly, it is not necessary to show that consumer(s) have suf-
fered any loss or damage as a result of the unfair commercial practice. This can 
in some instances be unfortunate where a commercial practice qualifies as unfair 
at a technical level; for example, in Nemzeti Fogyasztovedelmi Hatosag,56 a trader 
provided the wrong date on which a subscription agreement was due for renewal 
(typing ‘02’ rather than ‘01’ for the month) which caused a consumer to be liable 
for an additional charge. This was deemed to be an unfair commercial practice. 
The CJEU emphasised that there is no minimum threshold in terms of the fre-
quency of the action or number of consumers affected,57 and that it is irrelevant 
that it was unintentional.58 In short, the UCPD operates with a strict liability 
approach which is only concerned with the fact that a particular commercial prac-
tice is caught by the criteria for unfairness.
The following discussion will first explain the elements of the general clause in 
Art. 5, before turning to the specific clause on misleading actions, omissions and 
aggressive practices. In most cases, a particular commercial practice is likely to be 
covered by the specific clauses, and the general clause will be a safety net to cover 
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all the remaining commercial practices. However, as the general clause underpins 
the whole of the UCPD, it is appropriate to consider this first.
The general clause (Article 5)
The core of the UCPD is the general clause in Art. 5, which contains the general 
prohibition of unfair commercial practices as well as the criteria to be applied in 
assessing the fairness of a particular commercial practice. Article 5 is supplemented 
by more specific prohibitions in Arts. 6–8. Consequently, the main function of 
Art. 5 is to act as a safety net for commercial practices which are not caught by 
Arts. 6–8 nor by the list of prohibited practices in Annex I. A number of elements 
make up the prohibition in Art. 5 but, as discussed below, these elements are not 
relevant to applying the more specific prohibitions in Arts. 6–8.
Art. 5(1) opens with the straightforward statement that unfair commercial 
practices are prohibited, but this raises the question of how one determines when 
a commercial practice should be regarded as unfair. Art. 5(2) therefore sets out 
the criteria for establishing unfairness. The first is that the commercial practice 
is ‘contrary to the requirements of professional diligence’. The notion of profes-
sional diligence is defined in Art. 2(h) as the ‘the standard of special skill and care 
which a trader may reasonably be expected to exercise towards consumers, com-
mensurate with honest market practice and/or the general principle of good faith 
in the trader’s field of activity’. 
In order to consider whether a trader’s practices fail to meet this standard, 
several matters have to be considered; generally, it refers to a ‘standard of special 
skill and care’ which presumably merely stresses the fact that a trader’s actions 
are measured against the particular skills and care expected of a trader rather 
than persons generally, i.e. a higher threshold. Moreover, the reference point is 
what would be regarded as honest market practice in the trader’s field of activ-
ity. Although one might fear that this could set a low expectation for traders in 
sectors where standards are low, the emphasis on ‘honest’ practices provides a 
normative point against which to assess a trader’s conduct. The explicit inclusion 
of ‘good faith’ adds a further normative element to the notion of ‘ professional 
diligence’. A trader deliberately treating a consumer unfairly cannot be act-
ing in good faith, but even inadvertent unfair treatment might be regarded as 
contrary to good faith. Although the scope of the good faith criterion is left 
vague, one may assume that it covers both the need for a trader to be transpar-
ent in his dealings with a consumer, and to take the interests of a consumer 
into account. For instance, in Deroo Blanquart v Sony,59 the CJEU mentioned 
as relevant considerations the fact that ‘the consumer was correctly informed’60 
and that the trader’s actions ‘met the expectations of a significant proportion 
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of consumers’.61 These factors relate to both transparency and regard for the 
consumer’s interests.
If the actions of a trader are found to be contrary to professional diligence, 
then the second element to show is that the commercial practice in question 
materially distorts (or is likely to materially distort) the economic behaviour of 
the average consumer who is subject to the commercial practice. This is defined 
in Art. 2(e) as appreciably impairing a consumer’s ability to make an informed 
decision which causes a consumer to take a transactional decision he would not 
have taken otherwise. ‘Transactional decision’ is defined in Art. 2(k) as a decision 
to act or not to act with regard to making a purchase or payment, keeping or dis-
posing of a product or exercising a contractual right in respect of a product – in 
other words, any decision which is connected to a product. The CJEU has con-
firmed that a transactional decision is any decision ‘directly related to the decision 
whether or not to purchase a product’,62 something which includes ‘in particular, 
the decision to enter into a shop’.63 
The consumer notion in the UCPD is discussed below. For present purposes, 
it should be noted that the inclusion of the average consumer standard makes 
this an objective test: the economic behaviour of an average consumer determines 
whether the commercial practice is unfair, rather than the fact that a particular 
individual consumer was affected adversely by the trader’s practices. This standard 
can be modified where a particular group of consumers is targeted by the practice, 
or where the commercial practice is likely to affect only a group of consumers 
who are particularly vulnerable. 
The nature of this general prohibition in Art. 5 is such that it is rather open-
ended as it needs to cover a wide range of situations. National courts handling a 
case which cannot be dealt with under more specific general provisions (discussed 
below) might therefore be concerned that their view on how the prohibition 
should apply to a specific practice might not be shared by the CJEU and other 
national courts. This could be seen to reduce the maximum harmonisation effect 
of the UPCD, a matter explored more fully later in this chapter. Here, it is impor-
tant to recall that the CJEU’s role is to provide guidance on the interpretation of 
the various components of the prohibition, rather than to advise a national court 
as to the application of the law to the specific case before it.64 Although many 
of the cases involving the UCPD decided by the CJEU contain clear statements 
requiring national courts to form a final view on the facts of the case, there are 
instances where the CJEU has offered quite detailed guidance. 
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This was particularly so in Deroo-Blanquart v Sony.65 In this – somewhat 
strange – case a consumer, who had bought a laptop with pre-installed software, 
argued that the fact that the laptop was not available without preinstalled soft-
ware was an unfair commercial practice. The French Cour de Cassation referred 
a number of questions on the UCPD to the CJEU, including whether the sale 
of a laptop combined with pre-installed software would be an unfair commercial 
practice under Art. 5(2). Rather than merely offering general guidance on the 
notions of ‘professional diligence’ and ‘material distortion’, the CJEU provided 
rather detailed guidance on the factual elements that might need to be consid-
ered in this case. Thus, with regard to professional diligence, the CJEU noted 
that market analysis indicated that most consumers prefer computers with pre-
installed software, that the consumer was informed that there was pre-installed 
software on the laptop, and that the consumer was given the choice to cancel 
the purchase when he did not wish to accept the licence conditions of the pre-
installed software.66 Taken together, these factors ‘are likely to satisfy the require-
ments of honest market practices or of the principle of good faith in the field of 
the manufacturing of computer equipment for the general public’.67 Although 
the CJEU acknowledges that the final decision is for the national court, there is 
a very clear steer coming from the CJEU in applying Art. 5(2) to the facts of the 
particular case. Similarly, the CJEU considered whether the fact that a laptop was 
offered for sale only with pre-installed software had the effect of undermining the 
ability of a consumer to make an informed decision. Again, the Court provided 
strong guidance to the national court, observing that the court should consider:
in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, namely when 
a consumer has been duly informed, prior to the purchase, that the model 
of computer that is the subject matter of the sale was not marketed without 
pre-installed software and that he was therefore, in principle, free to choose 
another model of computer, or another brand, with similar technical specifi-
cations, sold without software or used with different software, the ability of 
that consumer to make an informed transactional decision was appreciably 
impaired.68
Perhaps the reason why the CJEU gave such a strong steer to the national court 
was due to the fact that the consumer’s claim seemed to lack sufficient merit to 
have gone this far. Whilst this might be acceptable in this particular instance, 
it is important for the CJEU not to stray too far into applying the provisions 
of the UCPD to the particular facts of the case giving rise to a reference, not 
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least because the national court’s order for reference might not contain sufficient 
information to do so (although in Deroo-Blanquart, this was not an issue).
The specific prohibitions
As will be apparent, the general clause in Art. 5 is very broad and its various ingre-
dients comprise multiple open-ended standards. There are therefore more specific 
prohibitions which deal with the most common types of unfair commercial prac-
tices:69 misleading actions and omissions, as well as aggressive commercial practices. 
Before considering these further, it can be noted that, unlike Art. 5, the 
specific prohibitions in Arts. 6–9 do not require that the trader must be acting 
contrary to the ‘professional diligence’ test. The European Commission, in its 
Explanatory Memorandum to the proposal for the Directive, stated that mislead-
ing (and aggressive) practices are contrary to professional diligence which made 
it unnecessary to show explicitly that the actions by a trader breached the profes-
sional diligence requirement.70 This was confirmed by the CJEU in CHS Tour 
Services v Team4 Travel.71 Team4 Travel, an Austrian company selling skiing trips 
for schoolchildren from the UK, had negotiated an exclusive arrangement with 
several hotels. Those hotels subsequently entered into agreements for accom-
modation with CHS, a company providing the same service as Team4, and these 
agreements were a breach of contract between the hotels and Team4. CHS sub-
sequently complained that Team4’s brochure claiming exclusivity in respect of 
these hotels was an unfair commercial practice because that information was mis-
leading by virtue of Art. 6(1)(b) UPCD.72 Team4 argued that it had acted with 
due professional diligence at the time the brochures were printed and published 
as it was not aware at that time of the breach of contract by the hotels. The lower 
courts agreed with Team4, but the Austrian Supreme Court requested a prelimi-
nary ruling on whether it was permissible to consider professional diligence when 
applying the specific prohibitions. The CJEU noted that a commercial practice 
which fulfils the criteria in Arts. 6–9 is categorised as unfair by virtue of Art. 5(4) 
UCPD, rendering the general criteria in Art. 5(2) irrelevant.73 Furthermore, the 
misleading nature of a commercial practice arises once the criteria in Art. 6 are 
met, with no consideration of any other factors.74 
The CJEU’s ruling in CHS Tour Services is not surprising and is consistent 
with the overall scheme of the UCPD – the broad general clause in Art. 5 is sup-
plemented by more specific prohibitions in Arts. 6–9 which deal with particular 
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kinds of commercial practice. However, on the facts of this particular case, the 
outcome could be detrimental to a trader who has done everything reasonable 
to ensure that no unfair commercial practice has been committed.75 It is possible 
for national law to take this into account when determining how to respond 
to a finding that the trader’s commercial practice is unfair – for example, the 
severity of any sanctions might be reduced in light of the trader’s care in try-
ing to avoid the fact that an unfair commercial practice has been committed. 
Moreover, national law might treat a claim such as the one brought by CHS with 
a degree of disdain – e.g. by applying general requirements of good faith (where 
available) or abuse of process rules. Indeed, the fact that the UCPD leaves the 
conditions of enforcement to the Member States (see below) places the onus 
on each Member State to consider the range of appropriate sanctions when it is 
established that an unfair commercial practice exists. In this regard, the CJEU 
has stated clearly that 
it is for the Member States to provide for an appropriate system of sanc-
tions…while ensuring that those sanctions comply, in particular, with the 
principle of proportionality. It is in this context that due account could be 
taken of factors such as the frequency of the practice complained of, whether 
or not it is intentional, and the degree of harm caused to the consumer.76
On the other hand, as explained above, the UCPD operates with a strict lia-
bility approach which does not allow for inadvertence or the fact that there 
was only a single infringement to affect a finding of unfairness. This will be 
the case even where, for instance, a consumer could have discovered that the 
information was incorrect.77 Perhaps at national level, the strictness of this 
approach could be mitigated by making available a defence to a trader that he 
had acted with all the necessary care in conducting the commercial practices. 
This would not affect the finding that the trader’s conduct amounted to an 
unfair commercial practice, but could reduce or eliminate the application of the 
penalties otherwise envisaged under national law.78 The CJEU’s emphasis on 
proportionate sanctions would certainly indicate that a low penalty or a purely 
notional sanction might be imposed in instances such as that giving rise to CHS 
Tour Services.
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PROHIBITION OF MISLEADING COMMERCIAL PRACTICES (ARTICLES 6 AND 7)
Two types of misleading actions are prohibited by Art. 6(1): (i) a commercial prac-
tice containing false information which is therefore untruthful; or (ii) a commercial 
practice which in any way, including overall presentation, deceives or is likely to 
deceive the average consumer, even if the information is factually correct, in relation 
to a number of specified categories of information. There are seven categories of 
information referred to in Art. 6(1): the existence or nature of the product; its main 
characteristics;79 the extent of trader’s commitments, motives for the commercial 
practices and the nature of the sales process as well as any statement or symbol in 
relation to direct or indirect sponsorship or approval of the trader or the product; 
price or the manner in which the price is calculated, or the existence of a specific 
price advantage;80 need for service, part, replacement or repair; nature, attributes 
and rights of the trader or his agent; and consumer’s rights or risks he may face.
For either type of misleading action, the information must cause, or be likely 
to cause, the average consumer to take a transactional decision he would not have 
taken otherwise.81
In addition to these broad types of misleading actions there are more specific 
types of misleading actions in Art. 6(2). These practices which, in their factual 
setting, cause or are likely to cause a consumer to take a transactional decision he 
would not have taken otherwise are:
a Marketing, including comparative advertising, creating confusion with prod-
ucts, trade marks, trade names and other distinguishing marks of a competitor
b Non-compliance with commitments in a code of conduct the trader has 
undertaken to follow, provided that:
i The commitment is not aspirational but firm and verifiable; and
ii The trader has indicated in a commercial practice that he is bound by 
the code.
In addition to these types of misleading action, Art. 7 also regards as an unfair 
commercial practice an omission to provide information. This applies, where, in 
the factual context and taking account of limitations of the means of communi-
cation used, material information which the average consumer needs to take an 
informed transactional decision is not provided. If the consumer takes, or is likely 
to take, a transactional decision he would not have taken otherwise, then this 
constitutes a prohibited practice. An ‘omission’ includes circumstances where the 
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information is hidden, or provided in an unclear, unintelligible, ambiguous or 
untimely manner or fails to identify the commercial intent of the practice if not 
apparent from the context (Art. 7(2)). One qualification is that the information 
in question must be ‘material’. Greater precision of what is ‘material’ is given in 
two instances. It includes information that has to be provided in accordance with 
existing EU legislation (a non-exhaustive list of which is in Annex II).82 Where 
the commercial practice qualifies as an invitation to purchase, Art. 7(4) specifies 
the information that is regarded as material (primarily about the characteristic 
of the product, details relating to the trader, price, payment and delivery, and 
the existence of a right of withdrawal).83 An ‘invitation to purchase’ is defined as 
‘a commercial communication which indicates characteristics of the product and 
the price in a way appropriate to the means of the commercial communication 
used and thereby enables the consumer to make a purchase.’84 
The meaning of this definition was considered by the CJEU in 
Konsumentombudsmannen v Ving Sverige AB,85 which concerned an advertise-
ment in a Swedish newspaper for trips to the USA. The advertisement only 
indicated the starting price and did not provide full details of the trip. The 
Konsumentombudsmannen argued that this was a breach of the national rules 
implementing Art. 7(4) UCPD. The CJEU first considered the point at which 
a commercial communication should be treated as an invitation to purchase and 
consequently be subject to the requirements of Art. 7(4), in particular, whether 
such a commercial communication had to include an actual opportunity to place 
an order or whether the fact that information about the product and its price 
was sufficient for a consumer to make a decision on whether to purchase was 
enough for it to qualify as an invitation to treat. The CJEU held that the defini-
tion should be given a ‘non-restrictive’86 interpretation to ensure a high level of 
consumer protection. Moreover, the word ‘thereby’ in the definition was to be 
interpreted not as adding an additional requirement. Rather, the information 
about the product and its price was sufficient to allow a consumer to make a 
decision. Consequently, the inclusion of an actual opportunity to make a pur-
chase was not required for the commercial communication to be regarded as an 
invitation to treat. The CJEU further commented on the amount of detail about 
the price and product required, holding that it could be sufficient to provide the 
entry-level price where a product was available at different prices for different ver-
sions of the product. Similarly, a visual or verbal reference to indicate a product’s 
main characteristics (such as a close-up picture) could be sufficient to meet the 
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requirements of the definition of ‘invitation to purchase’. However, in respect of 
both, this depended on the medium of communication used as well as whether 
the information provided was sufficient to enable a consumer to make a trans-
actional decision. From this ruling, it seems that a commercial communication 
qualified as an ‘invitation to purchase’ as soon as the information about price and 
characteristics of the product were sufficient for a consumer to decide on whether 
to make a purchase. For a trader, it is important therefore to consider how much 
detail to include in a commercial communication, because once it is regarded as 
an ‘invitation to purchase’, the requirements of Art. 7(4) must be complied with. 
The CJEU was further asked about the detail of information that needs to be 
included in the ‘invitation to purchase’ to comply with Art. 7(4). For example, 
Art. 7(4)(a) requires information about the main characteristics of a product, 
which, depending on the nature of the product, might have to be quite detailed. 
The CJEU accepted that it could be sufficient if certain main characteristics were 
given in the communication together with a reference to the trader’s website 
where all the required information was provided, taking into account the context 
of the invitation to purchase, the medium of communication used and the nature 
and characteristics of the product.87 Similarly, it might be sufficient to comply 
with the requirements as to price in Art. 7(4)(c) if an entry-level price only is 
given, but again, this would depend on the nature of the product and also require 
consideration of whether the omission of any indication of how the final price 
would be calculated would prevent a consumer from taking an informed transac-
tional decision.88 On the other hand, where a subscription payment includes both 
a monthly charge and a six-monthly charge, giving undue prominence to the 
former and barely mentioning the latter is likely to be misleading.89
One thing that becomes immediately apparent from considering this particular 
ruling is a seeming desire on the part of the CJEU to balance the need for a high 
level of consumer protection with a recognition that applying the various rules of 
the UCPD could impose too tight a straightjacket on traders. In particular, the 
CJEU refrained from stating firm requirements for complying with the particular 
obligations in Art. 7(4) in respect of ‘invitations to purchase’, requiring instead 
that national courts consider each situation on a case-by-case basis taking account 
of a range of variables in determining whether a trader is guilty of a misleading 
omission. It might be argued that this leaves the law too uncertain; yet, with 
broad and inherently flexible requirements such as those in Art. 7, it is important 
to take a much more context-sensitive approach. This would seem to be the 
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trade-off between imposing sweeping obligations on traders and the realism of 
the huge variety in which business and marketing is conducted.
PROHIBITION OF AGGRESSIVE COMMERCIAL PRACTICES (ARTICLES 8 AND 9)
Article 8 prohibits aggressive commercial practices. There are three aspects to 
this prohibition: (i) there has to be harassment and/or coercion and/or undue 
influence; (ii) this must significantly impair the average consumer’s freedom of 
choice (or be likely to do so); and (iii) an average consumer will, or is likely to, 
take a transactional decision he would not have taken otherwise. In applying these 
criteria, the factual context of the practice and its features and circumstances need 
to be taken into account. 
Only undue influence is defined (in Art. 2(j)) and requires that the follow-
ing is established: (i) the trader is in a position of power in relation to a con-
sumer; (ii) the trader uses this position to put pressure on the consumer; and 
(iii) this significantly limits the ability of the consumer to make an informed 
decision. Duress and coercion are not defined separately, but Article 9 provides 
a list of factors that should be taken into account in establishing whether there 
has been harassment, coercion or undue influence. They are: (i) timing, loca-
tion, nature or persistence of the practice; (ii) whether there was threatening 
or abusive language/behaviour; (iii) exploitation of a specific misfortune or 
circumstance of such gravity as to impair the consumer’s judgement, of which 
the trader is aware; (iv) onerous or disproportionate non-contractual barriers 
to the exercise of contractual rights and (v) any threat to take action that can-
not legally be taken.
It is not entirely clear whether this list is exhaustive so that domestic courts are 
precluded from considering additional factors. Bearing in mind that the UCPD 
is a maximum harmonisation measure, it is plausible that only those factors listed 
in Art. 9 can be considered. Alternatively, the list in Art. 9 could be seen as pro-
viding factors which must be considered in every case where it is alleged that a 
commercial practice is aggressive, i.e. a court would only be permitted to con-
clude that a practice is not aggressive if it has considered all of these factors. On 
this latter view, Art. 9 would not be exhaustive and other factors could also be 
considered by a national court. 
As with the other prohibitions, the effect of the trader’s practice on the aver-
age consumer’s freedom of choice and the fact that a transactional decision would 
be taken by an average consumer as a result is a determining factor. This behav-
iour will only constitute an unfair commercial practice within Art. 8 if it would 
have a significant impact on the average consumer’s freedom of choice. 
The consumer image: Average, targeted and vulnerable
The summary of the various prohibitions in the UCPD above repeatedly men-
tioned that the effect of the trader’s actions on an ‘average consumer’ need to 
be considered. This means that the UCPD is not designed to assist individual 
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consumers who have reason to complain about the actions of a trader, but rather 
to police the way traders behave in the market. In that regard, it is as much about 
protecting competitors as it is about protecting consumers. However, the con-
sumer image in the UCPD is not straightforward,90 because it not only focuses 
on the ‘average consumer’, but can also be modified in certain instances to focus 
on the average consumer within a group specifically targeted by a commercial 
practice, as well as on certain categories of vulnerable consumers particularly sus-
ceptible to a commercial practice.91
The ‘average consumer’ benchmark
The benchmark for establishing that the behaviour of a trader constitutes an unfair 
commercial practice is the impact on the average consumer. It is important to 
explore this notion more fully. The concept is familiar from the case law of the 
CJEU,92 where it has been developed in the context of assessing whether advertis-
ing is misleading,93 as well as in determining the compatibility of national rules with 
the free movement provisions. The UCPD adopts this test and treats the average 
consumer as someone ‘who is reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant 
and circumspect, taking into account social, cultural and linguistic factors’.94 
The shortcomings of this concept were already discussed earlier in this book95 
and are relevant in this specific context.96 A key concern about the use of the 
‘average consumer’ yardstick is whether focusing on whether an artificial average 
consumer is sufficiently protected is likely to fail those consumers who fall below 
that standard who probably are more in need of protection from the law. This is 
because the average consumer test might be set at too high a level of competence 
which does not reflect the majority of consumers. The CJEU’s guidance on this 
concept has been rather limited, with judgments generally repeating the same 
explanations.97
68 Regulation of unfair commercial practices
 98 J Trzaskowski, ‘Behavioural economics, neuroscience, and the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive’ (2011) 34 Journal of Consumer Policy p.377.
 99 For a fuller discussion, see AL Sibony, ‘Can EU consumer law benefit from behavioural 
insights? An analysis of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’ (2014) 22 European 
Review of Private Law p.901.
100 C-195/14 Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherverbände eV v 
Teekanne GmbH & Co KG EU:C:2015:361.
101 H Schebesta and K Purnhagen, ‘The behaviour of the average consumer: A little less nor-
mativity and a little more reality in the court’s case law? Reflections on Teekanne’ [2016] 
European Law Review p.590. 
102 Ibid., pp.595–596.
103 T Wilhelmsson, ‘The average European consumer: A legal fiction?’ in T Wilhelmsson, E 
Paunio and A Pohjolainen, Private Law and the Many Cultures of Europe (Kluwer, 2007).
One possible way forward which is beginning to emerge is to draw on modern 
research about consumer behaviouralism.98 This might reveal a number of guid-
ing criteria which could be attached to the concept of the ‘average consumer’ 
to give it a normative component. Research from behavioural economics and 
consumer psychology offers valuable insights into how individuals react to cer-
tain techniques or triggers. This could be utilised in defining objective criteria to 
determine which actions will have a misleading effect, i.e. certain practices will 
always have a particular effect.99 There are early indications of how this could work 
in practice: In commenting on Tekanne,100 Schebesta and Purnhagen101 note that 
the reasoning by the CJEU indirectly reflected behavioural economics research. 
In Teekanne, packaging for teabags contained pictures of raspberries and vanilla 
but these were not present in the tea, as the list of ingredients clarified. The CJEU 
held that packaging should not give the impression that there are ingredients 
which the product does not in fact contain, even where this is made clear on 
the list of ingredients. Applying the traditional ‘average consumer’ concept, one 
would have expected the information from the list of ingredients to provide all 
the relevant information to that consumer. By taking into account the pictorial 
depiction, the CJEU reflected the fact that consumers process visual information 
quickly, whereas textual information required more deliberative processing.102
Concerns about the substance given to the ‘average consumer’ test are partic-
ularly pertinent in the context of the UCPD, which seeks to regulate the behav-
iour of traders towards consumers generally. Depending on how the ‘average 
consumer’ is ultimately understood, this might result in a threshold for compli-
ance which is set at a rather generous level for traders. This might be welcome 
from a business perspective in that it makes cross-border trading more attrac-
tive, but it does run the risk of many commercial practices being found to be 
fair despite their negative impact on a proportion of consumers. Even if taking 
behaviouralism into account might mitigate this, it might not suffice: some prac-
tices might affect only certain categories of consumers adversely (e.g. children, 
or elderly or disabled consumers), or be understood differently as between con-
sumers from different Member States.103 To some extent, this is recognised in 
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the UCPD through the modification of the average consumer standard in two 
instances, discussed below. 
Weatherill has rightly observed that using the average consumer standard 
familiar from CJEU case law ‘is an attempt to navigate a course between the rich 
diversity of actual consumer behaviour and the need for an operational regulatory 
benchmark’104 in order to ensure that harmonisation can proceed at all.105 In that 
context, it must be borne in mind that the average consumer will rarely, if ever, 
be at the same level across the EU. Indeed, the explicit recognition of ‘social, 
cultural and linguistic factors’106 will usually mean that the average will be drawn 
from a regional, national or local context. This means that the objective concept 
of the ‘average consumer’ – perhaps supplemented by established findings from 
the research on consumer behaviouralism – is the starting point for setting a gen-
eral standard, with recognition of specific social or cultural factors as appropriate. 
Additional mitigation to reflect the impact on particular (groups of) consumers is 
achieved through the variations to the average consumer concept, discussed next.
The average targeted consumer
The average consumer is generally regarded as the representative consumer of 
the entire body of consumers. This standard is therefore appropriate to consider 
the fairness of commercial practices which are directed at consumers generally 
(subject to the discussion of vulnerable consumers in C, below). However, some 
commercial practices will have a narrower target group in mind, e.g. new par-
ents, people about to retire or the recently bereaved. In the UCPD, the average 
consumer standard can therefore be modified in circumstances where a com-
mercial practice is directed at a particular group of consumers; in that case, the 
average consumer will be an average consumer from within the group at which 
the practice is directed (the ‘targeted average consumer’). This permits a more 
focused assessment of the fairness of targeted commercial practices – if assessed 
against the average consumer, it might be more likely that such a practice will 
be regarded as fair, whereas seen from the perspective of an average consumer 
from within the targeted group, it might not. However, the use of this standard 
does raise questions about which of the attributes of the average consumer are 
modified or to be disregarded altogether. At the very least, the expectations with 
regard to the features of the average consumer (reasonably informed, observant 
and circumspect) must be reduced in view of the general characteristics of the 
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targeted group.107 This will be particularly the case where one of the character-
istics of the group being targeted is that it is less observant and able to identify 
information which might be misleading.
Vulnerable consumers
However, in addition to the average consumer test, the UCPD also recognises a 
different category of consumer: the vulnerable consumer. Explicit reference to this 
idea is made in the context of the general prohibition in Art. 5 only. This raises the 
question whether the vulnerable consumer test could also be applied in the con-
text of Arts. 6–8, or whether the specific prohibitions are only assessed as against 
the average consumer test. However, it would be more coherent if the vulnerable 
consumer test could be deployed in the context of the specific prohibitions, too.108
According to Art. 5(3), where a commercial practice, or the product to which 
the practice relates, is likely only to materially distort the economic behaviour of 
a group of consumers which is clearly identifiable and these consumers qualify 
as vulnerable, the average consumer standard is modified to reflect the average 
vulnerable consumer, provided that this is reasonably foreseeable by the trader.109 
The introduction of this category seems to reflect the obvious concern that some 
commercial practices such as advertising or cold-calling directed at consumers 
generally could have a particularly detrimental effect on some consumers because 
of their vulnerability. Thus, a commercial practice which would not distort the 
economic behaviour of an average consumer could nevertheless be tackled if its 
detrimental impact on vulnerable consumers can be demonstrated.110 
However, this possibility is limited by the proviso that ‘this is without prejudice 
to the common and legitimate advertising practice of making exaggerated state-
ments or statements which are not meant to be taken literally’.111 This could be 
seen as taking away much of the special protection granted to vulnerable consumers 
as swiftly as it was provided. However, it may only exclude matters which are so 
obvious that even vulnerable consumers should realise that these statements are not 
serious. Either way, the proviso raises many questions as to its scope:112 for example, 
Regulation of unfair commercial practices 71
113 See also the discussion in L Waddington, “Vulnerable and confused: The protection of 
‘vulnerable’ consumers under EU law” (2013) European Law Review p.757.
114 See M Friant-Perrot, ‘The vulnerable consumer in the UCPD and other provisions of EU 
law’ in W van Boom, A Garde and O Akseli, The European Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive (Ashgate, 2014).
115 Cf. T Wilhelmsson, ‘The informed consumer vs the vulnerable consumer in European 
unfair commercial practices law – a comment’, in Howells et al., Yearbook of Consumer Law 
2007, op. cit., pp.212– 213.
116 S Weatherill, “Who is the ‘average consumer’?” in S Weatherill and U Bernits, The 
Regulation of Unfair Commercial Practices under EC Directive 2005/29 – New Rules and 
New Techniques (Oxford: Hart, 2007), p.136.
117 P Cartwright, ‘Understanding and protecting vulnerable financial consumers’ (2015) 38 
Journal of Consumer Policy p.119.
when is it common and legitimate to make exaggerated statements? And how can 
one determine which statements are not to be taken literally? This seems particularly 
difficult if one bears in mind that one of the instances of vulnerability in Art. 5(3) 
is ‘credulity’ – i.e. a tendency to believe rather too readily that something is true. 
Indeed, the approach to defining who qualifies as a vulnerable consumer for 
the purpose of Art. 5(3) is questionable.113 Only three types of vulnerability are 
covered: (a) mental or physical infirmity; (b) age; and (c) credulity. All of these 
categories of vulnerability can be described as person-focused vulnerability – they 
are attributes which attach to individuals who form a distinct group because of this 
attribute.114 Generally speaking, these attributes are also long-term or permanent 
(although mental and physical infirmities can be both short-term and long-term/
permanent). There is no recognition in the UCPD that most consumers can be 
vulnerable not because of a long-term personal attribute but rather because of 
a particular situation in which they find themselves. Indeed, the category-based 
classification rather than a situational one in the UCPD invites the criticism that 
it is liable to stigmatise certain consumers.115 Moreover, even if a categorisation 
using person-focused attributes is appropriate, the UCPD is open to challenge 
for taking insufficient account of other key instances of vulnerability, such as low 
educational attainment, ethnicity, or income.116
Cartwright developed a different taxonomy of vulnerability which seeks to 
avoid classifying consumers as vulnerable based purely on person-focused attrib-
utes and instead focuses on vulnerability created by particular circumstances.117 
He proposes the following instances of vulnerability:
i informational vulnerability, both with regard to the ability to obtain and to 
process information;
ii pressure vulnerability, arising from individual characteristics, temporary indi-
vidual circumstances, or the physical situation they find themselves in;
iii supply vulnerability – the inability to access and/or afford essential goods 
and services;
iv redress vulnerability – difficulties in being able to seek redress;
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v impact vulnerability – a consumer who suffers more severely from the impact 
of making a bad choice with regard to a particular product or service.
The advantage of this taxonomy is that it avoids categorising consumers into 
vulnerable or non-vulnerable purely on their membership of a particular class 
(children, elderly, disabled etc.) and instead considers whether in a given context 
an individual consumer is likely to be vulnerable because of one or more of the 
factors set out above. This kind of approach offers a much more sophisticated 
approach to the question of vulnerability, although it should not preclude con-
sideration of person-focused attributes as well. Admittedly, it would be more 
difficult to reflect in legislation. Relying on clear categories has the advantage of a 
higher degree of certainty, whereas recognising vulnerability based on situational 
factors would require flexible legal standards to define vulnerability.
A question that might be asked is whether it would be permissible for Member 
States to recognise additional categories of vulnerability, or, indeed, adopt a sit-
uational approach such as that suggested by Cartwright. Whilst such a move 
might be welcome from a consumer protection perspective, it seems that the 
ever-present clash with the overarching objective of a fully harmonised level play-
ing field for traders throughout the EU would rule this out. This is yet another 
of the many detrimental aspects of maximum harmonisation. If the EU continues 
to persist with a maximum harmonisation approach, then it seems essential to 
develop a better understanding of vulnerable consumers.118 In the meantime, 
the only route for recognising other vulnerabilities might be on the basis of the 
‘targeted average consumer’ concept for instances where a commercial practice 
is directed at a particular category of consumers that could be described as vul-
nerable.119 One example might be a leaflet with information about memorial 
headstones for graves sent to someone recently bereaved (“targeted” due to the 
bereavement which is a situational factor).
Scope of the targeted average consumer and vulnerable 
consumer standards
Although there are questions about the precise interpretation of the two modified 
consumer standards in Arts. 5(2)(b) and (3), the fact that there is recognition in the 
legislation that vulnerable consumers, in particular, need special protection has been 
a welcome development. However, the precise scope of these modified standards is 
also not clear; the recognition of the ‘average targeted’ and ‘average vulnerable’ con-
sumers in Art. 5 appears to be confined to the context of the general prohibition in 
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that Article only. It is unclear from the UCPD itself whether the vulnerable consumer 
standard can also be deployed in the context of the specific prohibitions in Arts. 6–9. 
The specific prohibitions are not merely an amplification of the general pro-
hibition in Art. 5, but operate as free-standing specific prohibitions. The absence 
of any reference to the vulnerable consumer here suggests that the specific pro-
hibitions might only operate with reference to the standard average consumer 
test. However, if the effect of a commercial practice on a group of vulnerable 
consumers could only be challenged on the basis of Art. 5, then it would poten-
tially be more cumbersome because of the need to show that the practice in 
question is contrary to the requirement of professional diligence. This question 
has not been considered directly by the CJEU. However, in CHS Tour Services 
v Team4 Travel120 and Nemzeti Fogyasztovedelmi Hatosag,121 the CJEU held that 
the professional diligence requirement in Art. 5(2) was irrelevant when applying 
the provisions in Arts. 6–9, and one might assume that this would also be the case 
with regard to the modified consumer standards. However, that would signifi-
cantly limit the opportunities for considering the effect of commercial practices 
on targeted and/or vulnerable consumers and strengthen criticism of the UPCD 
as being insufficiently protective of consumers.
Maximum harmonisation
The UCPD was adopted as a maximum harmonisation measure at a time in the 
development of EU consumer law when there was a strong desire on the part of 
the European Commission to shift from minimum to maximum harmonisation, 
ostensibly with the desire to create a single set of rules on commercial practices 
applicable throughout the Single Market.122 The intention behind the UCPD is 
therefore to create a single set of rules for the regulation of unfair commercial 
practices which harm consumers’ economic interests.123 In short, this means that 
Member States cannot regulate commercial practices in a manner which deviates 
from the standard of regulation adopted in the UCPD, a matter underlined by 
Art. 4 which makes it clear that the free movement of goods or services cannot 
be restricted ‘for reasons falling within the field approximated by this Directive’. 
In other words, national authorities in a Member State cannot challenge the con-
duct of a trader whose commercial practices are not unfair within the meaning of 
the UCPD – whether that trader is based in that or another Member State. 
There are several exceptions to this, which are listed in Art. 3:
•• rules on the validity, formation and effect of a contract (Art. 3(2));
•• health and safety aspects of products (Art. 3(3));
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•• specific Community rules regarding specific aspects of unfair commercial 
practices prevail in respect of those aspects (Art. 3(4));124
•• until 12 June 2013, it was possible to maintain stricter national provisions 
where these national provisions implemented directives based on a minimum 
harmonisation standard (Art. 3(5));
•• conditions of establishment or authorisation regimes for regulated profes-
sions (Art. 3(8));
•• in respect of financial services (as defined in Directive 2002/65/EC) and 
immovable property, Member States may impose more restrictive or pre-
scriptive requirements than the UCPD.
So, although the UCPD has a broad scope and its maximum harmonisation 
standard makes deep inroads into national law, there are several areas where this 
does not apply. However, the leeway given to the Member States to derogate is 
monitored closely by the CJEU. For example, in Commission v Belgium,125 it was 
argued that a Belgian rule requiring that any announcement of a price reduction 
had to refer to the lowest price charged in the month prior to the reduction was 
incompatible with the UCPD. The Belgian government, somewhat disingenu-
ously, argued that it could rely on the derogation in Art. 3(5) because Directive 
98/6/EC on unit pricing was only a minimum harmonisation measure. This was 
rejected swiftly by the CJEU because Directive 98/6 dealt with price indications 
with reference to unit prices only and was not concerned with rules on pricing 
generally.126 In the same case, it was emphasised that the derogation in Art. 3(5) 
was only available in respect of national rules already in force on the date the 
UCPD entered into force (para [73]). Consequently, Belgian rules prohibiting 
certain forms of itinerant trading which entered into force after that date were not 
compatible with the UCPD, despite the fact that they would have been permis-
sible by virtue of Art. 3(5) and Art. 8 of Directive 85/577/EEC on contracts 
negotiated away from business premises, had they already been in force when the 
UCPD became law.
Nevertheless, the wide reach of the maximum harmonisation standard raises a 
number of issues for further consideration: first, the extent to which the UCPD 
curtails the ability of individual Member States to regulate commercial practices 
aimed at consumers and respond to unfair commercial practices of particular 
concern to that Member State. As will be seen shortly, there are several cases 
concerning the compatibility of national rules prohibiting particular commercial 
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practices with the UCPD. Second, it is clear that the UCPD fully harmonised the 
manner in which the national laws of the Member States can regulate unfair com-
mercial practices and therefore effectively displaced any national rules regarding 
such practices. However, it was unclear as to the extent to which the maximum 
harmonisation nature of the UCPD also affected national legislation which was 
not exclusively or primarily intended to regulate unfair business-to-consumer 
commercial practices, but could be deployed in that context. This was especially 
controversial where the objective pursued by that national legislation did not 
focus on business-to-consumer practices. Third, as was explained above, the 
UCPD combines clear outright prohibitions with a number of flexible prohi-
bitions requiring case-by-case application by national enforcement authorities. 
In this regard, there may be concerns over potential divergences in the way 
national authorities in different ways interpret and apply these prohibitions. There 
is at least a theoretical risk that a commercial practice may be regarded as unfair by 
the authorities in one Member State, but not in another. Such an outcome might 
be seen as undermining the maximum harmonisation objective pursued in the 
UCPD. It also invites discussion about the role of the CJEU in the application 
of these prohibitions, in particular whether it should offer its views on particular 
commercial practices in the context of Art. 267 TFEU preliminary reference rul-
ings. In the context of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (93/13/EEC),127 
there has been much debate about whether the CJEU should express its opinion 
as to whether a particular term is unfair, or whether this matter should be left to 
the national courts. Furthermore, there might be alternative means of facilitat-
ing greater consistency in the decisions taken at national level, such as databases 
recording national decisions or detailed guidance based on such case law. These 
issues will now be considered in turn.
Ability of Member States to regulate unfair  
business-to-consumer commercial practices
The UCPD prohibits outright only those specific commercial practices listed in 
Annex I. However, there are many more commercial practices which will only 
then be unfair if they are caught by the prohibitions in Arts. 5–8 UCPD. This 
means that Member States are no longer able to prohibit outright any commer-
cial practices not listed in the Annex. It was seen earlier that the outright prohibi-
tions in Annex I are interpreted strictly and that only those commercial practices 
which satisfy all the elements of a practice included in Annex I can be prohibited 
outright.128
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However, whilst this position would appear to be simple enough to state, 
there have nevertheless been a noticeable number of cases which concerned the 
compatibility of national rules which prohibit certain practices with the UCPD. 
Indeed, this was the main issue in the first-ever Art. 267 TFEU reference 
regarding the UCPD, VTB-VAB NV v Total Belgium NV.129 Belgian law prohib-
ited the use of combined offers. Having established that combined offers consti-
tute a commercial practice within the scope of Art. 2(d), the CJEU went on to 
consider how such offers are treated in the UCPD. As combined offers are not 
listed in Annex I of the UCPD, they are not prohibited outright. Had the UCPD 
been a minimum harmonisation measure, it would have been possible for indi-
vidual Member States to prohibit other commercial practices, but the maximum 
harmonisation nature of the UPCD precludes such action. The presumption of 
unlawfulness of combined offers in Belgian law was therefore not compatible 
with the Directive.130 This outcome cannot have come as a surprise – the effect 
of maximum harmonisation is to curtail significantly the ability of Member States 
to take action which derogates from the approach taken in a directive, and so the 
prohibition of commercial practices not included in Annex I to the UCPD was 
clearly not possible. However, the CJEU did not go so far as to say that Member 
States are precluded from singling out certain types of commercial practice as 
giving rise to particular concern. The Court noted that the incompatibility of the 
Belgian law related only to the general and pre-emptive nature of the prohibition. 
Had the national provisions incorporated the criteria from Arts. 5–9 UCPD in 
determining whether a combined offer was unlawful, then this would have been 
compatible with the UCPD.131 Including these criteria would entail the need 
for a case-by-case analysis of whether combined offers constitute an unfair com-
mercial practice and would not result in their prohibition in all circumstances. 
The CJEU’s judgment offers helpful pointers for working out the extent of the 
maximum harmonisation principle – on the one hand, it can have a very restrictive 
effect on the ability of the Member States to take action in respect of most com-
mercial practices. On the other hand, it does not make it impossible for individual 
Member States to include prohibitions of specific commercial practices in addi-
tion to those listed in the Annex, provided that such additional prohibitions need 
to be applied on a case-by-case basis and by taking into account the criteria for 
this in Arts. 5–9 UCPD. In other words, it would be permissible to have national 
rules targeting specific practices, provided that the criteria establishing a violation 
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of that prohibition require consideration of the factors from Arts. 5–9 (such as 
the transactional decision and professional diligence requirements). Although 
this is a long way from being able to respond to concerns about commercial prac-
tices at a domestic level in a way which derogates from the UCPD, the ability to 
list specific commercial practices could have a signalling function which will make 
it clear to traders that there are suspicions about certain practices, and it might 
also make the task of enforcement bodies slightly easier. 
This approach to national provisions which prohibit commercial practices 
not listed in Annex I outright without requiring the criteria in Arts. 5–9 UCPD 
to be considered has been followed repeatedly in subsequent rulings, such Plus 
Warenhandelsgesellschaft mbH,132 Euronics Belgium CVBA,133 and Cdiscount.134 
In these cases, there were some exceptions to the outright prohibitions in the 
national laws in issue. However, the CJEU has consistently held that as such 
exceptions are both limited and pre-defined rather than depending on a case-
by-case analysis taking full account of the individual fact situations, they cannot 
justify an otherwise outright prohibition of a commercial practice not included 
in Annex I.135
However, it is compatible with the UCPD’s maximum harmonisation stand-
ard for a Member State to prohibit commercial practices to the extent that they 
fall within exceptions in Art. 3 (see above). In Citroën Belux NV v FvF,136 the 
national prohibition in issue concerned combined offers of which at least one 
component was a financial service. In VTB-VAB, the CJEU had declared outright 
prohibitions of combined offers as incompatible with the UCPD; however, in 
Citroën, the CJEU referred to the exclusion of financial services from the maxi-
mum harmonisation standard of the UCPD in Art. 3(9), which permits more 
restrictive requirements with regard to financial services. The CJEU notes that 
this permission to derogate is not subject to any ‘limit as regards how stringent 
national rules may be in that regard’,137 so outright prohibitions are permissible. 
The prohibition of combined offers in the national law in issue was not restricted 
to a combination of different financial services, nor an instance where the financial 
services component was dominant. The CJEU gave the derogation in Art. 3(9) a 
generous interpretation, which had the effect of upholding the national prohibi-
tion in this instance. The CJEU concluded that the intention of the EU legislature 
had been to ‘leave it to the Member States themselves to assess how restrictive 
they wish to make those measures and to allow them freedom of action in that 
78 Regulation of unfair commercial practices
138 Para [27].
139 C-391/12 RLvS Verlagsgesellschaft mbH v Stuttgarter Wochenblatt GmbH ECLI:EU: 
C:2013:669.
140 Directive 2010/13/EC concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (2010) OJ 
L95/1.
141 Ibid., Art.10(1)(c).
142 RLvS Verlagsgesellschaft, para [48].
connection, enabling them to go so far as to prohibit certain arrangements’.138 
However, even though this particular commercial practice was not incompat-
ible with the UCPD, it might still be in conflict with the Treaty provisions on 
free movement of services (Art. 56 TFEU). The CJEU therefore also considered 
whether the prohibition of combined offers involving at least one financial service 
was compatible with Art. 56 TFEU. Although such a prohibition could impede 
the free movement of services, the restriction pursued the legitimate objective of 
ensuring a high level of consumer protection and was not disproportionate. So 
on this occasion, the national prohibition was also compatible with the TFEU. 
Overall, the approach in Citroën to the derogation in Art. 3(9) appears unusually 
generous, particularly in view of the CJEU’s generally restrictive approach when 
determining the scope of any derogating provisions, although in this particular 
instance, this might be explained because of the broad wording of Art. 3(9) and 
sensitivity to the need for financial service regulation.
Another instance where the UCPD was not found to affect the freedom 
of Member States to regulate certain practices was RLvS Verlagsgesellschaft v 
Stuttgarter Wochenblatt.139 State press law required that pages sponsored by a 
trader as part of their promotional activities were identified clearly as advertise-
ments. RLvS published two features of sponsored content which had not been 
clearly identified as such, and this was challenged by a competitor, Stuttgarter 
Wochenblatt. Point 11 of Annex I to the UCPD prohibits advertorials, i.e. a trader 
paying for editorial content in the media to promote a product without clearly 
identifying that content as an advertisement. The CJEU held that this prohibition 
relates to the trader whose products are being promoted, rather than imposing an 
obligation on newspaper publishers to ensure that advertisers clearly identity the 
advertisements as such where the content is linked to the promotion of their prod-
ucts. The only direct obligation in EU Law arises in the audiovisual field,140 which 
requires a broadcaster to identify sponsored content clearly as such,141 but a similar 
obligation has not been introduced in respect of print media. Consequently, the 
obligation to identify sponsored content in a newspaper as an advertisement was 
not covered by EU Law, but lay within the power of the Member States.142
Reach of maximum harmonisation 
The maximum harmonisation standard of the UCPD only extends to prohibit-
ing ‘business-to-consumer commercial practices’, i.e. prohibitions which concern 
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the way a trader acts in dealings with a consumer. This is underlined by Recital 
6, which includes the qualification that the UCPD ‘neither covers nor affects 
the national laws on unfair commercial practices which harm only competitors’ 
economic interests or which relate to a transaction between traders’. If there 
is national legislation prohibiting commercial practices which clearly does not 
relate to the protection of the economic interests of consumers, then the maxi-
mum harmonisation standard of the UCPD does not preclude Member States 
from maintaining or adopting such legislation. However, this possibility might 
encourage a Member State facing a challenge to legislation prohibiting particular 
commercial practices outright to claim that this legislation is not primarily con-
cerned with the protection of the economic interests of consumers. This issue 
was first raised in Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs eV v Plus 
Warenhandelsgesellschaft mbH143 in the context of a German law provision which 
prohibited tying participation in a lottery with the purchase of goods or ser-
vices. Following its approach in VTB-VAB, the CJEU held that this provision was 
incompatible with the UCPD. One of the arguments before the court was that 
the principal aim of the German law was not to protect consumers, but competi-
tors of the business in question, and therefore, following Recital 6,144 it was not 
affected by the UCPD’s maximum harmonisation standard. The CJEU rejected 
this argument, not least because the relevant German law included clear refer-
ences to consumer protection as one of its objectives.145 
The determination of whether a particular national law has consumer protec-
tion as one of its objectives is for the national court to make – especially where 
this is not obvious from the legislation itself.146 Once it is established that the 
protection of consumers’ economic interests is at least one objective of the 
national law in issue, then the maximum harmonisation standard of the UCPD 
precludes any deviation, except where the UCPD itself permits such derogation. 
The derogations in Art. 3 were set out above, and if a Member State claims that a 
national measure that affects consumers pursues an objective not included in Art. 
3, then it is not permissible to introduce additional restrictions without making 
an assessment based on the general criteria found in the UCPD. For example, in 
Mediaprint v ‘Österreich’ Zeitungsverlag,147 the Austrian government’s claim that 
a prohibition of sales with bonuses had the objective of preserving pluralism of 
the press was rejected, because this was not a permissible ground of derogation. 
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On the other hand, where it is clear that the national provision in issue is not con-
cerned with the protection of consumers’ economic interests (such as a national 
law requiring shops to close for a 24-hour period each week148), it falls outside 
the ambit of the UCPD.
Dealing with the risk of divergent application 
A third aspect of the UCPD’s maximum harmonisation nature is how the consist-
ent application of the Directive’s open-ended clauses and the average consumer 
standard149 by the national courts of the Member States can be assured. It was seen 
earlier that there are multiple elements of the UCPD’s provisions which require 
application on a case-by-case basis, and this leaves scope for divergence between 
the courts of the Member States in the way similar situations might be addressed. 
Some degree of variance at national level is inevitable, but if this becomes too pro-
nounced, then this would undermine the objective pursued by full harmonisation. 
In that situation, although the formal legal rules are the same in all the Member 
States, the practical operation of these rules would not be sufficiently harmonised. 
There are a number of ways of addressing this. Perhaps ideally, the CJEU 
would have a much stronger role in monitoring the application of the UCPD at 
national level, but this would be inconsistent with the constitutional role ascribed 
to it by Art. 267 TFEU. This has not stopped the CJEU from offering very 
detailed guidance at times (cf. the discussion of Deroo-Blanquart v Sony150 above), 
but relying on this alone would not address this issue sufficiently.
The challenge of ensuring consistent application of harmonised laws is not 
unfamiliar, and a solution used in several contexts is to create a mechanism for 
recording and making accessible decisions by national courts, to allow lawyers 
and other national courts to discover how the rules implementing a harmonising 
measure in a particular domestic law have been applied by the national courts 
in that jurisdiction.151 In the context of the UCPD, the European Commission 
has utilised two tools to provide information about how the Directive operates 
throughout the EU. The first of these is a database which records national and 
CJEU case law applying the domestic provisions implementing the Directive.152 
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There are several options for navigating this database. For example, if someone 
wishes to find out if there are any cases on the application of Art. 5 UCPD, the 
database allows a user to navigate to the text of Art. 5 and access a pop-up menu 
offering a number of options, including ‘cases’. 
Databases such as this are potentially very useful in that they could provide 
detailed information about the way in which the UCPD works at national level, 
and also help to identify aspects where there is a danger of significant divergence 
in the approaches taken between several Member States. However, the useful-
ness of this database will depend on the accuracy and clarity of the information 
fed into it, as well as on its comprehensiveness. It requires that decisions handed 
down at national level (whether by courts or administrative authorities) are noti-
fied to the European Commission (or the contractor managing the database on 
its behalf) for inclusion in the database. In addition, the information about the 
case has to be clear about the essential facts of the case, the legal issues considered 
and the reasoning for reaching a particular conclusion. Moreover, there will be 
the need to ensure the accurate translation of this information. At the present 
time, the database is only available in English, so the information about many of 
the reported cases will have to be translated prior to inclusion. This could make 
this database a costly endeavour, and might mean that there could be selectivity 
in the information to be included, as well as limited opportunities for updating 
the database.153 Also, one needs to bear in mind the experiences encountered 
with the CLAB database in the context of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive154 
which was ultimately abandoned.155
A second tool provided by the European Commission is a detailed guidance 
document on the UCPD.156 This is a lengthy document (175 pages in total) 
which provides article-by-article guidance on the application of the UCPD, with 
examples taken from national and CJEU case law. As such, it provides both a 
more detailed explanation of how the provisions of the UCPD should be under-
stood and a digest of significant cases applying the Directive. 
Taken together, both the database and the guidance are designed to facilitate 
the enforcement of the UCPD and to enable national authorities and courts to 
take a more consistent approach. It will be interesting to see if empirical evidence 
can be gathered to gauge the effectiveness of these initiatives. 
There is a more fundamental question: to what extent ought divergence in 
the application of the UCPD at national level be regarded as problematic at 
all? One might be tempted to dismiss this question – the purpose of maximum 
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harmonisation is to have uniform rules in the interest of legal certainty,157 and 
surely that must entail also the necessity of uniform application. However, uni-
form application is much easier to achieve with more technical and straight-
forward provisions such as the duration of the period during which a right of 
withdrawal can be exercised than with the flexible and open-textured general 
clauses in the UCPD.158 De Vries argues that one should not be too concerned 
with consistency of outcomes, because the effect of the UPCD is that the same 
legal criteria will be deployed in assessing the fairness of commercial practices, 
and that uniformity in application might take much longer to emerge.159 Stuyck, 
on the other hand, bemoans the fact that the CJEU cannot give clearer guid-
ance to national courts on the application of the UCPD.160 But perhaps it is 
right to suggest that there should be less concern with ensuring consistent 
application than with clarity about the criteria which national authorities and 
courts should apply. 
For example, should the ‘average consumer’ test be applied as meaning the 
average European consumer, or should it be possible to reflect peculiarities of 
national consumer cultures? The maximum harmonisation standard of the UCPD, 
which entails maintaining consistent standards across the Member States so as to 
enable traders to operate on the same basis throughout the Single Market, might 
suggest not. However, the average consumer standard developed in CJEU case 
law reveals some recognition of variations in consumer culture; in the famous 
Lifting case,161 the CJEU acknowledged that, in applying the average consumer 
test, particular variations could mean that consumers in one country may under-
stand particular terms differently from consumers in another country. This could 
have the effect that something might be regarded as misleading in that country 
whereas consumers elsewhere have not complained about being misled. The ref-
erence to ‘social, cultural or linguistic factors’162 from this judgment is part of the 
UCPD average consumer concept already,163 which seems to reinforce the fact 
that national variations in applying the average consumer test are fully expected. 
The ‘average consumer’ is unlikely to be the average European consumer, but 
will in most cases relate to ‘the average of a certain national or local market’.164 It 
is well-known that there are cultural variations among the consumers of Europe, 
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and the ability to take this into account when applying the ‘average consumer’ 
test is important.165
In the same vein, therefore, one might also expect some national variation in 
the way other flexible concepts, such as the ‘professional diligence’ requirement 
in Art. 5(2), are applied. This offers a degree of counter-balance to the pre-
emptive effect of the maximum harmonisation standard of the Directive. Whilst 
no additional outright prohibitions are possible at national level, there is at least 
the possibility to take into account national consumer cultures in applying the 
‘average consumer’ standard, and perhaps also the ‘professional diligence’ test. 
Maximum harmonisation – evaluation
The effect of the maximum harmonisation approach seems to have been under-
estimated by some Member States, if the number of cases concerning a clash 
between the UCPD and national prohibitions is taken as a measure. The CJEU’s 
interpretation of the scope of the UCPD’s maximum harmonisation standard 
demonstrates just how far-reaching this approach can be. It also shows that con-
sumer protection becomes a subsidiary issue to the maximum harmonisation 
principle because it is no longer possible for Member States to introduce outright 
prohibitions of commercial practices beyond the list in Annex I. There is, as the 
CJEU has noted several times, still the possibility for a case-by-case assessment 
on the basis of the criteria in Art. 5. However, the drawback of this approach 
is that it requires enforcement bodies to take specific action, which could be 
resource-intensive.
The UCPD suffers from one major gap: the possibility for Member States to 
derogate from the maximum harmonisation standard where there is a specific 
need to do so at national level. It is not inconceivable that some commercial 
practices will be particularly prevalent in one Member State (or in a small num-
ber of Member States). For that Member State, it would be much more effec-
tive to introduce an outright prohibition, but the UCPD does not permit this. 
A procedure for derogating from the maximum harmonisation standard to deal 
with particular circumstances of concern for a Member State should have been 
considered for inclusion in the UCPD.166 Such a procedure could have allowed 
a Member State to prohibit a specific commercial practice on its territory. The 
European Commission would have had to monitor the use of this procedure 
and publish information about any such prohibitions. In order to minimise the 
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derogation from the UCPD’s maximum harmonisation standard, a national pro-
vision adopted on this basis could be time-limited and subject to regular review. 
Such an approach could have ensured a better balance between the needs of the 
Single Market and of consumer protection. It is unfortunate that this has not 
been done.167 It is worth noting that the European Commission included a simi-
lar procedure in its proposal for the Consumer Rights Directive to update the list 
of contract terms which would have been deemed unfair in all circumstances as 
well as the indicative list of terms presumed to be unfair.168 This would have been 
subject to a maximum harmonisation standard. However, the final version of the 
CRD does not affect the minimum harmonisation status of the unfair contract 
terms rules,169 and so this procedure was not enacted.
Enforcement
One important feature of the UCPD is that it does not envisage a right of action 
for individual consumers in circumstances where they have been the victims of 
an unfair commercial practice. Instead, the UCPD merely requires ‘adequate and 
effective means to combat unfair commercial practices’.170 However, at the time 
when the UCPD was adopted, the CJEU had indicated that the principle of 
effectiveness might entail that individual rights of redress needed to be provided 
so as to ensure the adequate and effective application of EU Law.171 This resulted 
in the recognition of individual rights in the context of directly applicable provi-
sions of EU Law, such as competition law.172 The UCPD, as a directive, is not 
directly applicable, and this case law would not be sufficient as a basis for allowing 
individual consumers to bring individual claims against traders. However, the 
CJEU’s jurisprudence does indicate173 that Member States should consider a pri-
vate right of redress for individual consumers as part of its ‘adequate and effective 
means’ to prevent unfair commercial practices.174 Some Member States already 
provided a private right of redress for unfair commercial practices and this is not 
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affected by the Directive. Indeed the UCPD’s implementation has caused some 
states to introduce such a private right.175 
However, the UCPD is purely concerned with regulating the conduct of trad-
ers in their dealings with consumers. Consequently, the enforcement of the pro-
hibitions in the UCPD is viewed as primarily a matter for public bodies and other 
organisations with an interest in combating unfair commercial practices to take 
legal action and/or complain to a relevant administrative authority.176 
Member States must empower courts or administrative authorities (i) to order 
the cessation of unfair commercial practices or (ii) to prohibit a practice which 
is imminent but before it is carried out.177 Such powers may only be exercised 
where they are necessary, taking all the interests involved into account, as well 
as the overall public interest, although it is not necessary to prove that there 
has been any actual loss or damage, or that the trader intended to commit an 
unfair commercial practice, or was negligent. Moreover, Art. 13 requires Member 
States to specify the penalties for infringements of the provisions implementing 
the UCPD, which must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. 
The CJEU has supplemented these provisions in its ruling in Köck v 
Schutzverband gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb.178 This case involved an Austrian 
provision which required prior authorisation before a trader could announce a 
clearance sale. Having concluded that such announcements would constitute a 
commercial practice, the CJEU held that the criteria used by the relevant author-
ity in determining whether to authorise such sales should be those which deter-
mine whether a commercial practice is unfair (something the Austrian authorities 
had not been required to do). The CJEU therefore confirmed that a require-
ment of prior authorisation of particular commercial practices is permissible and 
in accordance with the discretion given to the Member States in determining 
how to tackle unfair commercial practices, because ‘anticipatory or preventive 
measures…may in certain circumstances prove more adequate and more appro-
priate than subsequent measures’.179 The UCPD precludes a prohibition of a 
commercial practice without prior authorisation where the refusal not to author-
ise the commercial practice does not involve an assessment of its fairness on the 
basis of the criteria in the UCPD, but where the authority does undertake such 
an assessment before refusing to authorise the commercial practice, there is no 
infringement of the UCPD.
86 Regulation of unfair commercial practices
180 S Whittaker, ‘The relationship of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to European 
and national contract laws’ in S.Weatherill and U.Bernitz, The Regulation of Unfair 
Commercial Practices under EC Directive 2005/29 (Oxford: Hart, 2007).
181 For a useful survey of the relationship of the UCPD with contract law, see M Durovic, ‘The 
subtle Europeanization of contract law: The case of Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair 
Commercial Practices’ (2015) 23 European Review of Private Law p.715; also M Durovic, 
European Law on Unfair Commercial Practices and Contract Law (Bloomsbury, 2016).
182 C-453/10 Jana Pereničová and Vladislav Perenič v SOS financ spol. s r. o. ECLI:EU:C: 
2012:144.
Relationship with the rest of the acquis
The UCPD is an important component of the consumer acquis, but it is also dis-
tinct from most of the other directives because it does not envisage any individual 
rights or remedies for consumers who have been the victims of an unfair com-
mercial practice. Indeed, as already noted, Art. 3(2) UCPD makes it clear that it 
is ‘without prejudice to contract law and, in particular, the rules on the validity, 
formation or effect of a contract’. This proviso does not preclude any influence 
of the UCPD on domestic or EU contract law rules, and one might expect that 
EU rules, in particular, would be more clearly aligned with the UCPD. As will 
be seen, this does not yet seem to be the case. Moreover, although the UCPD is 
‘without prejudice’ to contract law, it could still have an indirect effect on con-
tract law,180 e.g. with regard to the interpretation of directives in the consumer 
contract law acquis.181 
Focusing on the first issue: a key instance where there seems to be insufficient 
alignment between the UCPD and the rest of the acquis is the field of pre-con-
tractual information duties. As was seen earlier, Art. 7 on misleading omissions 
could effectively be regarded as an obligation on a trader to disclose certain items 
of information, with particular items specified in Art. 7(4) as being ‘material’ in 
the context of an invitation to treat. In comparison, Arts. 5 and 6 of the Consumer 
Rights Directive (CRD) contain duties to provide a list of items of information 
before a consumer decides to enter into a contract. There are strong similarities 
between the lists in the UCPD and the CRD, but they are not identical. Those 
items which are required in both directives are not set out in the same way, and 
some are more detailed than others (e.g. information about price in Art. 6(1)(d) 
CRD compared to Art. 6(d) or 7(c) UCPD). Art. 6 CRD also contains several 
additional items of information. It is clear that, by virtue of Art. 7(5) UCPD, the 
information required by the CRD is regarded as material for types of transactions 
the CRD covers (primarily off-premises and distance contracts), and so there is 
no direct conflict. However, it seems unnecessary to have such variations in the 
requirements to provide information, and greater consistency between the vari-
ous directives would make the law both clearer and more certain.
Second, the potential overlap between the UCPD and the Unfair Contract 
Terms Directive was considered in Pereničová.182 In this case, a loan agree-
ment had stated that the APR was fixed at 48.63%, but the national court had 
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calculated the true APR as being 58.76%. On the basis that this amounted to a 
misleading commercial practice, the national court asked the CJEU whether a 
finding that a contract term constituted an unfair commercial practice was rel-
evant to a finding of whether this was also an unfair contract term for the pur-
poses of the Unfair Terms Directive (93/13/EEC). As explained elsewhere,183 
Art. 4(1) UTD states that the assessment of unfairness requires inter alia, ‘all the 
circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract’ to be taken into account. 
The CJEU held that the fact that a term in a contract amounted to an unfair 
commercial practice could be such a relevant factor, but this would not be suf-
ficient to lead to the automatic conclusion that the term was also unfair.184 The 
CJEU based its reasoning on the fact that Art. 3 (2) UCPD is without prejudice 
to the validity of a contract: a finding that a term constitutes an unfair commer-
cial practice can therefore not lead to the automatic conclusion that the term is 
unfair, because that could, in turn, affect the validity of the contract as a whole 
by virtue of Art. 6(1) UTD. The indirect approach185 adopted by the CJEU in 
this regard seems to strike the right balance.186 Conversely, it has been argued 
that the use of an unfair contract term should also be regarded as constituting an 
unfair commercial practice because such a term could mislead a consumer about 
their rights and obligations.187
Then there is the relationship of the consumer concept of the UCPD188 with 
that in other directives. For example, are the provisions of the Unfair Contract 
Terms Directive to be applied with reference to the same average consumer test, 
including, possibly, an average targeted consumer or vulnerable consumer? Stuyck 
has argued that the yardstick for all EU consumer law is the average consumer but 
that individual directives compensate for instances where a consumer might be at 
risk of not being sufficiently well-informed.189 Thus, the Unfair Contract Terms 
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Directive assumes that the consumer is a weaker party in contractual relations 
with a trader, but the aim of the rules of that Directive is to restore a consumer to 
the position of the average consumer.190 The CJEU referred to the average con-
sumer test in Kásler191 in the context of the duty of a national court to determine 
whether a term is in plain and intelligible language, showing an explicit recogni-
tion of the average consumer standard in that Directive. Moreover, the notion of 
the ‘vulnerable consumer’ has found its way into the preamble of the Consumer 
Rights Directive (2011/83/EU). When providing information to a consumer,192 
a trader should take into account the ‘specific needs of consumers who are partic-
ularly vulnerable because of their mental, physical or psychological infirmity, age 
or credulity in a way which the trader could reasonably be expected to foresee’193 
to ensure information is provided in a clear and comprehensible manner. So, for 
example, if a consumer is visually impaired, a trader should provide information 
in a format which the consumer can utilise, such as braille. However, it is impor-
tant to note that the UCPD’s notion of the vulnerable consumer has only founds 
its way into the preamble, but not into the substantive articles of the Consumer 
Rights Directive. 
A further instance where the UCPD and the acquis might overlap is in respect 
of directives which regulate certain types of commercial practices but do so sub-
ject to a minimum harmonisation standard. One such instance was the issue in 
Commission v Belgium.194 Belgian law prohibited door-to-door sales of goods or 
services exceeding €250, which was compatible with the minimum harmonisa-
tion standard of the old Doorstep-selling Directive (85/577/EEC). Following 
the adoption of the UCPD, such a prohibition would only be permitted if it was 
compatible with the UCPD, and as Annex I does not list door-to-door sales as 
a commercial practice always regarded as unfair, the prohibition in Belgian law 
could no longer be maintained.195
Similarly, a difficulty arises where a directive contains rules on a specific mat-
ter which can also be of broad application. For example, Directive 98/6/EC 
on price indications requires the provision of a ‘selling price’,196 defined as the 
Regulation of unfair commercial practices 89
197 Art. 2 of Directive 98/6/EC.
198 C-476/14 Citroën Commerce GmbH v Zentralvereinigung des Kraffahrzeuggewerbes zur 
Aufrechterhaltung lauteren Wettbewerbs eV (ZLW) ECLI:EU:C:2016:527.
199 See above, p.64.
200 (2001) OJ L311/67, as amended.
201 Cf. the discussion of this point in joined cases C-544/13 and C-545/13 Abcur AB v 
Apoteket Farmaci AB and Apoteket AB and Apoteket Famaci AB ECLI:EU:C:2015:481.
‘final price for a unit of the product, or a given quantity of the product, includ-
ing VAT and all other taxes’.197 This obligation extends to advertisements men-
tioning the selling price. In Citroën Commerce,198 the CJEU held that the final 
selling price of a car includes the costs of transfer from the manufacturer to the 
dealer where this is payable by the consumer (so-called ‘Überführungskosten’). 
An advertisement by Citroën had failed to include this cost in the overall sell-
ing price. The referring court put questions to the CJEU in respect of both 
Directive 98/6/EC and the UCPD, notably Art. 7(4) on invitations to pur-
chase.199 The CJEU determined that the UCPD was not applicable to the extent 
that Directive 98/6/EC governed the way the final selling price of a product is 
presented in advertisements. This ruling reveals a difficulty regarding the overlap 
between Directive 98/6/EC and the requirements as regards the price in Art. 
7(4) UCPD. Insofar as Directive 98/6/EC deals with the selling price, Art. 
7(4) UCPD cannot apply. However, Art. 7(4) UCPD requires more detailed 
information about the price (e.g. delivery charges), so will still be applicable to 
those other aspects.
Outside the immediate consumer acquis, there are other EU directives which 
overlap with the UCPD. For example, Directive 2001/83/EC relating to 
medicinal products for human use200 contains provisions in Arts. 86–100 deal-
ing with the advertising of such products. These provisions overlap with those 
in the UPCD, as acknowledged in Annex II to the UCPD according to which 
the requirements in Directive 2001/83/EC are regarded as material informa-
tion for the purposes of Art. 7 UCPD. However, as noted earlier, Art. 3(3) 
UCPD clarifies that it is ‘without prejudice to [EU] or national rules relating 
to health and safety aspects’, and Art. 3(4) provides that EU directives contain-
ing rules on specific aspects of unfair commercial practices prevail to that extent 
over the UCPD. From this, one can see a clear hierarchy between specific rules 
and the UCPD. Specific rules such as those in Directive 2001/83 apply to the 
extent that they overlap with the UCPD, but all other aspects regarding com-
mercial practices with regard to medicinal products for human use are subject 
to the UCPD.201 
It is apparent that there are as-yet-unresolved issues regarding the relationship 
between the UCPD and the rest of the consumer acquis. There are inconsisten-
cies which would benefit from being ironed out, and there is need to verify to 
what extent the UCPD and other directives are still at risk of clashing on specific 
issues. The no-prejudice rule in Art. 3(2) with regard to contract law does not 
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offer a complete screen between the UCPD and the contract law directives (even 
if it had been intended as such), as the Pereničová case illustrates. 
Conclusions
More than a decade has passed since the UCPD was adopted, and there is 
now considerable experience of how the Directive operates across the Member 
States.202 As the discussion in this chapter has shown, there has been particular 
interest in the way the UCPD utilises the average consumer concept, but also 
recognises the needs of (some) vulnerable consumers. An aspect of the directive 
which is likely to give rise to further debate is the relationship between the UCPD 
and the directives on consumer contract law, as well as the wider effect of the 
UCPD on national contract laws.
A considerable volume of CJEU case law has built up during this time. A 
substantial number of cases have been concerned with the extent to which the 
UCPD pre-empts the possibility for national law to prohibit specific types of 
unfair commercial practices. The CJEU’s line has been consistent in precluding 
this possibility except where national legislation does not impact at all on con-
sumer protection. In all of these decisions, the CJEU has upheld the maximum 
harmonisation mandate of the UCPD. This neatly illustrates the tension between 
maximum harmonisation and effective consumer protection, with maximum har-
monisation having the upper hand in this context. Perhaps the reason for this 
success is that the UCPD had a more regulatory aim, and did not have a direct 
impact on private law rules. This is in contrast to the experience with the CRD, 
where maximum harmonisation of core areas of private law was rejected. As a 
consequence of the UCPD’s maximum harmonisation standard, the interests of 
a level playing field in the Single Market outweigh particular – and often justi-
fied – concerns at national level about particular unfair commercial practices. One 
important lesson to be drawn from the experience under the UCPD thus far is 
that maximum harmonisation is best regarded as the default position, but that 
there needs to be a procedure to allow Member States to take action in deroga-
tion from a harmonised standard where peculiarities at national level so demand. 
Such a procedure could be managed by the Commission and could ensure trans-
parency about any specific action taken at national level. It could also be designed 
to be time-limited. 
The UCPD is also the focus of the ongoing debate about developing a more 
realistic conception of the consumer image in EU consumer law. The average 
consumer test is well established but equally well criticised. With a commitment 
towards incorporating behavioural economics into policy-making, and a growing 
body of scholarship to apply behavioural economics and consumer psychology 
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research to the average consumer notion, the time for a rethink of the consumer 
concept has come.
Annex – List of unfair commercial practices
Commercial practices which are in all circumstances 
considered unfair
Misleading commercial practices
  1 Claiming to be a signatory to a code of conduct when the trader is not.
  2 Displaying a trust mark, quality mark or equivalent without having obtained 
the necessary authorisation.
 3 Claiming that a code of conduct has an endorsement from a public or other 
body which it does not have.
 4 Claiming that a trader (including his commercial practices) or a product has 
been approved, endorsed or authorised by a public or private body when he/
it has not or making such a claim without complying with the terms of the 
approval, endorsement or authorisation.
 5 Making an invitation to purchase products at a specified price without disclos-
ing the existence of any reasonable grounds the trader may have for believing 
that he will not be able to offer for supply or to procure another trader to 
supply, those products or equivalent products at that price for a period that 
is, and in quantities that are, reasonable having regard to the product, the 
scale of advertising of the product and the price offered (bait advertising).
 6 Making an invitation to purchase products at a specified price and then:
a refusing to show the advertised item to consumers;
or
b refusing to take orders for it or deliver it within a reasonable time;
or
c demonstrating a defective sample of it,
with the intention of promoting a different product (bait and switch)
 7 Falsely stating that a product will only be available for a very limited time, 
or that it will only be available on particular terms for a very limited time, 
in order to elicit an immediate decision and deprive consumers of sufficient 
opportunity or time to make an informed choice.
 8 Undertaking to provide after-sales service to consumers with whom the trader 
has communicated prior to a transaction in a language which is not an official 
language of the Member State where the trader is located and then making 
such service available only in another language without clearly disclosing this 
to the consumer before the consumer is committed to the transaction.
 9 Stating or otherwise creating the impression that a product can legally be 
sold when it cannot.
10 Presenting rights given to consumers in law as a distinctive feature of the 
trader’s offer.
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11 Using editorial content in the media to promote a product where a trader 
has paid for the promotion without making that clear in the content or by 
images or sounds clearly identifiable by the consumer (advertorial). This is 
without prejudice to Council Directive 89/552/EEC.
12 Making a materially inaccurate claim concerning the nature and extent of the 
risk to the personal security of the consumer or his family if the consumer 
does not purchase the product.
13 Promoting a product similar to a product made by a particular manufacturer 
in such a manner as deliberately to mislead the consumer into believing that 
the product is made by that same manufacturer when it is not.
14 Establishing, operating or promoting a pyramid promotional scheme where 
a consumer gives consideration for the opportunity to receive compensation 
that is derived primarily from the introduction of other consumers into the 
scheme rather than from the sale or consumption of products.
15 Claiming that the trader is about to cease trading or move premises when he 
is not.
16 Claiming that products are able to facilitate winning in games of chance.
17 Falsely claiming that a product is able to cure illnesses, dysfunction or 
malformations.
18 Passing on materially inaccurate information on market conditions or on the 
possibility of finding the product with the intention of inducing the consumer to 
acquire the product at conditions less favourable than normal market conditions.
19 Claiming in a commercial practice to offer a competition or prize promotion 
without awarding the prizes described or a reasonable equivalent.
20 Describing a product as ‘gratis’, ‘free’, ‘without charge’ or similar if the con-
sumer has to pay anything other than the unavoidable cost of responding to 
the commercial practice and collecting or paying for delivery of the item.
21 Including in marketing material an invoice or similar document seeking pay-
ment which gives the consumer the impression that he has already ordered 
the marketed product when he has not.
22 Falsely claiming or creating the impression that the trader is not acting for 
purposes relating to his trade, business, craft or profession, or falsely repre-
senting oneself as a consumer.
23 Creating the false impression that after-sales service in relation to a product is 
available in a Member State other than the one in which the product is sold.
Aggressive commercial practices
24 Creating the impression that the consumer cannot leave the premises until a 
contract is formed.
25 Conducting personal visits to the consumer’s home ignoring the consumer’s 
request to leave or not to return except in circumstances and to the extent 
justified, under national law, to enforce a contractual obligation.
26 Making persistent and unwanted solicitations by telephone, fax, e-mail or other 
remote media except in circumstances and to the extent justified under national 
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law to enforce a contractual obligation. This is without prejudice to Article 10 
of Directive 97/7/EC and Directives 95/46/EC and 2002/58/EC.
27 Requiring a consumer who wishes to claim on an insurance policy to produce 
documents which could not reasonably be considered relevant as to whether 
the claim was valid, or failing systematically to respond to pertinent corre-
spondence, in order to dissuade a consumer from exercising his contractual 
rights.
28 Including in an advertisement a direct exhortation to children to buy adver-
tised products or persuade their parents or other adults to buy advertised 
products for them. This provision is without prejudice to Article 16 of 
Directive 89/552/EEC on television broadcasting.
29 Demanding immediate or deferred payment for or the return or safekeeping 
of products supplied by the trader, but not solicited by the consumer except 
where the product is a substitute supplied in conformity with Article 7(3) of 
Directive 97/7/EC (inertia selling).
30 Explicitly informing a consumer that if he does not buy the product or ser-
vice, the trader’s job or livelihood will be in jeopardy.
31 Creating the false impression that the consumer has already won, will win, or 
will on doing a particular act win, a prize or other equivalent benefit, when 
in fact either:
• there is no prize or other equivalent benefit,
or
• taking any action in relation to claiming the prize or other equivalent 
benefit is subject to the consumer paying money or incurring a cost.
3 Pre-contractual information duties 
and the right of withdrawal
Introduction
This chapter examines two key instruments of EU consumer law: the provision of 
information before a contract is concluded, and the right to withdraw from (or 
‘cancel’) a contract for a short period of time after it has been concluded. Both 
these tools have been integral parts of the EU’s consumer law toolbox from the 
very beginning – indeed, the Doorstep-selling Directive (85/577/EEC) was the 
first to introduce both the right to withdraw from a contract concluded away 
from business premises and the obligation to provide information (albeit lim-
ited to information about the right to withdraw). Both instruments have been 
deployed in several other contexts since, and the rules on both have become 
progressively more detailed as EU consumer law has continued to evolve. The 
culmination of this development has been the enactment of the Consumer Rights 
Directive which now contains the most detailed sets of rules on both pre-contrac-
tual information duties (PCIDs) and the right of withdrawal.
Chapter themes
In this chapter, two particular themes from those set out in the introductory 
chapter are pursued in more depth: the impact of a gradual shift from minimum 
to maximum harmonisation, and the information-based approach to consumer 
protection as a hallmark of EU consumer law.
The move towards maximum harmonisation
The evolution of both pre-contractual information duties and the right of with-
drawal provides an interesting lesson of what happens when an area of law initially 
subject to minimum harmonisation is converted into one of maximum harmoni-
sation. It will be seen in this chapter that this tends to have the effect of creating 
both more legal rules and an increase in their technical and complex nature. The 
drive towards maximum harmonisation is usually underpinned by concerns that 
allowing too much legal fragmentation would be detrimental to the operation 
of the internal market. In order to remove discrepancies, there has to be more 
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detailed regulation at the EU level of areas subject to maximum harmonisation. 
The need to satisfy different national traditions with regard to the provision of 
information has resulted in lists of information which have become longer and 
longer. The invariable consequence of this is that EU consumer law has increas-
ingly become a straightjacket, with inflexible information duties and an over-
regulated set of rules on the right of withdrawal. A fundamental review of the way 
information duties are used is overdue.
At the same time, one can also trace some inconsistencies in this context. For 
example, there has been a strong desire to move towards maximum harmonisa-
tion. This entailed the need for a more coherent set of legal rules, which was 
attempted as part of the reform process in the early years of the new millen-
nium.1 However, this has not always been successful; for example, the rules on 
the right of withdrawal are not all identical in all of the directives providing for 
this. Similarly, there are still discrepancies in the treatment of pre-contractual 
information duties. The Consumer Rights Directive, which was intended to be a 
consolidating directive for much of the consumer acquis, has fallen short of pro-
viding consistency across EU consumer law.
Information-based consumer protection
One of the themes of this book is that the approach of EU consumer law could be 
criticised as being insufficiently protective, especially for those consumers who are 
in particular need of protection. Much of EU consumer law takes as the notional 
consumer who is to benefit from protection the ‘average consumer’. That aver-
age consumer is said to be reasonably well-informed, reasonably observant and 
reasonably circumspect.2 As a result, there is a general focus on enhancing the 
position of consumers by ensuring they receive information to enable them to be 
reasonably well-informed. However, it is by now a rather uncontroversial state-
ment to say that there is a gap between the focus on information and withdrawal 
rights in EU law on the one hand and the growing body of scholarship, particu-
larly from the field of behavioural economics, about the limited value of these 
instruments on the other.3 Although the EU has committed to making better use 
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of behavioural economics in policy-making,4 there is little evidence that this has 
filtered down into the design of EU consumer legislation. Our discussion of the 
development of pre-contractual information duties neatly illustrates how there 
has been a steady increase in the volume of information to be given to consumers 
before they enter into a contract, despite a clear message from the behavioural 
economics literature that too much information will have little or no beneficial 
effect and may even confuse the consumer.
Pre-contractual information duties
Why have pre-contractual information duties? 
The introduction of contractual information duties is often justified on the basis 
that this would be preferential to substantive regulation of consumer transac-
tions.5 Early case-law by the CJEU in the context of the free movement of goods 
laid the foundations for the EU’s strong focus on information duties, particularly 
in the pre-contract setting.6 The provision of information by the stronger party to 
the weaker party (i.e. by the trader to the consumer) is also said to promote the 
exercise of a consumer’s freedom of contract because a fully-informed consumer 
can be said to be able to truly consent to any contract they wish to conclude. 
On that basis, rather than regulating the substance of the contract, as well as the 
conduct of the parties, the provision of information is deemed sufficient to enable 
a consumer to take a fully-informed decision. This will mean that contractual 
freedom and the ability to give informed consent to a contract are preserved. In 
addition, the provision of information by a trader could facilitate the process of 
shopping-around by a consumer and thereby enable him/her to compare what 
a number of traders are offering, before deciding where and what to purchase. 
A related feature of pre-contractual information duties, particularly where 
these require the provision of information by durable means, will ensure that 
essential information regarding the contract is recorded and can be referred to 
throughout the lifetime of the contract. A similar objective is pursued by rules 
which require the confirmation of information once a contract is concluded, and 
the provision of contract documentation.
Going beyond the transaction-supporting function of pre-contractual infor-
mation duties, there are additional benefits which may flow from the requirement 
to provide information about the various aspects of a transaction. For example, if 
information has to be provided about after-sales support offered to a consumer, 
a trader who does not offer a great deal of such support might be encouraged 
Pre-contract information/right to withdraw 97
7 I Ramsay, ‘Framework for regulation of the consumer marketplace’ (1985) Journal of 
Consumer Policy pp.353, 359.
to develop this so as not to appear to be likely to be unsupportive once a con-
sumer has concluded a contract. In other words, the requirement to provide 
pre-contractual information can have an indirect standard-raising effect, because 
consumers might be expected to prefer to buy from a trader who will generally 
treat them better than a trader who is less likely to support a consumer after a 
contract has been concluded. And finally, pre-contractual information duties may 
be one element in the law reflecting a broader objective of securing transparency 
and honesty in the way contracts are made and performed.
In light of this, one can distinguish between two broad purposes of information 
duties; the first focuses on the disclosure of information which the party required 
to provide might prefer not to reveal. Such a duty encourages both the protec-
tion of informed consent and promotes honesty. The extent to which such a duty 
is imposed varies considerably throughout the European legal systems, with the 
common law jurisdictions tending to be less demanding when it comes to the dis-
closure of information than e.g. the Continental civilian and Nordic jurisdictions. 
In general terms, disclosing information allows a consumer (at least in theory) to 
decide more carefully whether to conclude a contract and on what terms. At the 
same time, it prevents a trader from hiding information from the consumer.
The second purpose primarily seeks to ensure that transparency in the con-
tracting process is enhanced by requiring the provision of a range of items of 
information about the transaction to the consumer. Whilst this purpose also 
 facilitates the exercise of real consent by the consumer, it is much more concerned 
with seeking to enable a consumer to act rationally in the market. 
Related to both purposes is also a duty not to omit information. Disclosure 
and transparency duties ensure that a consumer has access to all the relevant 
information, and this can be expressed also as a duty not to omit relevant infor-
mation rather than merely being a positive duty which stipulates all the informa-
tion that has to be provided.
These general observations prompt the question of how useful the use of 
information is as a tool for protecting consumers. There can be little doubt that 
it is a widely used tool, but despite its popularity, the effectiveness of information 
provision as an effective consumer protection tool has been doubted in recent 
years, not least as a result of findings in the field of behavioural economics.
The classic reason for consumer protection measures focusing on the provi-
sion of information is that consumers are generally insufficiently informed about 
all the relevant aspects of any particular contract. Iain Ramsay seminally com-
mented that ‘imperfect consumer information is a fundamental rationale for 
consumer protection measures’.7 As a result, a requirement to provide consum-
ers with pre-contractual information sounds superficially very attractive; starting 
from the assumption that a trader is better informed than a consumer, pre-con-
tractual information duties have the effect of correcting such an imbalance in 
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the distribution of information. However, this approach presupposes that (i) the 
trader is able to provide all the information required by pre-contractual duties, 
and (ii) that a consumer is both able and willing to process such information.
With regard to the latter, a number of points can be made: first, the ability to 
comprehend and process information will vary significantly from consumer to 
consumer, with some more likely to utilise information than others. For exam-
ple, it has been suggested that ‘affluent, well-educated, middle-class consumers’8 
might be better placed to utilise information than less-educated consumers. But 
well-educated consumers will probably also in any event generally be able to 
evaluate the benefits and drawbacks of any given transaction prior to making any 
decisions, and so any pre-contractual information duty may have a limited effect. 
More significantly, those consumers who would need greater protection are also 
less likely to be able to process huge amounts of information and might therefore 
be left without any de facto protection. 
In addition, the cognitive ability of consumers to deal with information gener-
ally is restricted and the notion of the rational consumer taking full account of all 
available information does not reflect reality. Thus, consumers are described as 
having ‘bounded rationality’9 which means that they can only process a limited 
amount of information. 
Moreover, even if consumers do pay attention to pre-contractual information 
and are able to understand it, this does not mean that they will also be aware of 
all the implications which flow from that information.10 For example, telling a 
consumer that a car emits a certain amount of greenhouse-gas emissions might be 
clear on its own, this does not mean that a consumer will immediately understand 
how environmentally (un)friendly the car really is. 
Finally, as will be seen below, one of the hallmarks of current pre-contractual 
information duties is that consumers will be given information at a time when 
that information will not be relevant and is therefore less likely to be considered 
properly.11 So whilst pre-contractual information duties offer some assistance to 
consumers, their effectiveness is often over-stated and insufficiently reflects the 
way consumers really act in the market-place. There are solutions to this: in some 
instances, it might be possible to tailor the information to the particular needs of 
a consumer and therefore provide more personalised information.12 Additionally, 
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the provision of some information which will not be of immediate relevance for a 
decision to enter into a contract could be moved into the post-contractual stage. 
This could be done by supplying this information with the goods, or even later. 
Moreover, in some instances, it would be rational for a consumer to decide to 
limit the amount of information to be considered before concluding a contract. 
Invariably, processing information in order to make a better-informed decision 
takes time, which is a form of transaction cost, and a consumer might decide to 
reduce that cost by limiting the information considered. This is particularly perti-
nent for small-value transactions.
The use of pre-contractual information duties in EU consumer law
The Consumer Rights Directive
Pre-contractual information duties were first introduced in the Doorstep-selling 
Directive and then developed in the Distance-selling Directive. Both were 
repealed by the Consumer Rights Directive (CRD). The CRD introduced the 
most detailed set of pre-contractual information obligations yet – not only for 
doorstep and distance contracts, but also for face-to-face in-store contracts. 
The CRD was initially intended to be a more wide-ranging directive than it 
eventually became,13 but its provisions on pre-contractual information duties are of 
broad application. However, there are different provisions for different contracting 
situations, and the CRD operates with three types of contracts: off-premises con-
tracts, distance contracts, and contracts which are neither of the previous two types. 
Before examining the rules on information duties, the definitions for these contract-
ing types are examined. ‘Business premises’ are ‘(a) any immovable retail premises 
where the trader carries out his activity on a permanent basis; or (b) any movable 
retail premises where the trader carries out his activity on a usual basis’ (Art. 2(9)). 
Whereas the old Doorstep-selling Directive only applied to unsolicited visits 
by a trader, the CRD covers all contracts concluded in an off-premises situation. 
Although this might seem overly generous to consumers, it eliminates a tactic 
deployed by some traders of artificially creating a solicited visit.14
An off-premises contract is a contract between trader and consumer ‘concluded 
in the simultaneous physical presence of the trader and the consumer, in a place 
which is not the business premises of the trader.’15 This could be at the consumer’s 
100 Pre-contract information/right to withdraw
16 Art. 2(8)(d) CRD.
home, or perhaps the consumer’s place of work, or even just somewhere in the 
street. The crucial element is that both trader and consumer are present at the 
same time, but not on the trader’s business premises. Furthermore, the definition 
also includes excursions which were organised by the trader in order to promote or 
sell goods or services to consumers.16 These situations are familiar from the earlier 
Doorstep-selling Directive with the extension to all off-premises situations. The 
definition of an ‘off-premises’ contract in the CRD deals with a potential avoid-
ance tactic in Art. 2(8)(c), which applies the definition to contracts ‘concluded on 
the business premises of the trader or through any means of distance communica-
tion immediately after the consumer was personally and individually addressed in 
a place which is not the business premises of the trader in the simultaneous physi-
cal presence of the trader and the consumer’. For example, a consumer might be 
stopped in the street by a trader offering particular goods or services, and after 
some discussion, the consumer is persuaded to sign a contract. He is then invited 
into the trader’s shop nearby. The contract is then formally concluded on the busi-
ness premises, but the negotiations leading up to it were conducted off-premises. 
A ‘distance contract’ is ‘any contract concluded between a trader and a con-
sumer under an organised distance sales or service-provision scheme without the 
simultaneous physical presence of the trader and the consumer, with the exclusive 
use of one or more means of distance communication up to and including the 
time at which the contract is concluded’ (Art. 2(7)). There is no definition of 
‘organised distance-selling scheme,’ although one may assume that it is directed 
as traders who regularly conclude contracts at a distance and as an integral part 
of their business activities. This definition specifies three elements for a contract 
to be regarded as a distance contract: (i) the trader must operate an organised 
distance-selling scheme; (ii) consumer and trader do not have face-to-face contact 
during the process of contract formation; and (iii) the contact between trader and 
consumer has to be entirely through means of distance communication until the 
contract has been concluded. The basic definition is supplemented by the follow-
ing explanation in Recital 20:
[The definition] should also cover situations where the consumer merely 
visits the business premises for the purpose of gathering information about 
the goods or services and the subsequent negotiation and conclusion of the 
contract takes place at a distance. By contrast, a contract which is negoti-
ated at the business premises of the trader and finally concluded by means 
of distance communication should not be considered a distance contract. 
Neither should a contract initiated by means of distance communication, 
but finally concluded at the business premises of the trader be considered 
a distance contract. Similarly, the concept of distance contract should not 
include the reservations made by a consumer through a means of distance 
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communications to request the provision of a service from a professional, 
such as in the case of a consumer phoning to request an appointment with 
a hairdresser. The notion of an organised distance sale or service-provision 
scheme should include those schemes offered by a third party other than 
the trader but used by the trader, such as an online platform. It should not, 
however, cover cases where websites offer purely information on the trader, 
his goods and/or services, and how the trader can be contacted.
This Recital provides clarification with regard to one potential grey area: where 
a consumer visits the trader’s premises to browse goods but then negotiates and 
concludes the entire contract at a distance. Such a situation has features of both 
a ‘distance’ and an ‘on-premises’ contract, and this clarification illustrates where 
the line between both should be drawn. A key aspect is whether the consumer 
has merely been a passive browser before an order is placed online (in which 
case, it is a distance contract), or has actively discussed the prospective contract 
with the trader. In the latter situation, the contract would not be treated as a 
distance contract. This distinction could be justified on the basis of fairness – in 
the latter situation, the trader has provided some effort and it might seem inap-
propriate to then make that trader subject to the rules on distance contracts. 
However, it is not clear what sort of distance communication is envisaged here. 
A simple follow-up telephone call to confirm that a consumer wishes to go 
ahead should clearly not turn an in-store contract into a distance contract. On 
the other hand, if the actual order is placed through the trader’s website after an 
in-store negotiation, the case for not treating this contract as a distance contract 
might be weaker. At the very least, it might be difficult to prove that a particu-
lar order based online was preceded by in-store negotiations. As it might be 
difficult to distinguish between orders only placed online and orders based on 
in-store negotiations, in purely practical terms both instances are better treated 
as distance contracts.
Such a precise explanation is probably necessary in view of the maximum har-
monisation character of the CRD. However, even seemingly helpful clarifications 
such as those in Recital 20 raise further questions. This is an inevitable problem 
of trying to provide an indication of how definitions should be understood in spe-
cific contexts. As soon as some explanations are given, further questions arise. For 
example, one gap in this Recital is a situation where a trader provides an in-store 
computer terminal to order goods from the trader’s online service, e.g. clothing 
where the size desired by the consumer is not available in-store. It would seem 
that such a contract could be regarded as a distance contract if the consumer had 
been a passive browser, but might not be so if the consumer had been advised by 
a sales assistant. 
There is a fairly lengthy list of contracts which are excluded from the scope of 
the CRD in Article 3. Some of these are contracts for specific situations (social 
services or health care), contracts relating to real estate, and contracts which are 
governed by other EU directives requiring information provision (package travel 
and timeshare).
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Content of information
The detail of the information which has to be provided before a contract is con-
cluded has gradually grown in detail. In the old Doorstep-selling Directive, the 
only information which had to be given was about the right of withdrawal. By the 
time the Distance-selling Directive was enacted 12 years later, the list of informa-
tion to be given had grown, and a consumer had to be given information about 
(Art. 4): (a) the supplier’s identity, and, where prepayments are required, his 
address; (b) main characteristics of the goods or services; (c) price, including all 
taxes; (d) delivery costs, where appropriate; (e) arrangements for payment, deliv-
ery or performance; (f) where available, the existence of the right of withdrawal; 
(g) the cost of using the means of distance communication if it varied from the 
basic rate; (h) period during which the offer/price remained valid; and (i) the 
minimum duration of the contract, where the goods or services were to be sup-
plied permanently or recurrently. Also, where a consumer was contacted by tel-
ephone, it was additionally required that the supplier make clear his identity and 
the commercial purpose of the call.17 However, in comparison to the information 
requirements in the CRD, this list was still relatively short.
The CRD has separate information requirements for contracts off-premises/
distance contracts and then for other contracts. Article 5(1) CRD requires of 
these other contracts that a range of items of information is given before a con-
sumer is bound by a contract (or any corresponding offer).18 Broadly speaking, 
this information relates to the main characteristics of the goods or services; the 
trader; the price and other charges; payment, delivery and after-sales support; 
contract duration; and, in the case of a contract for the supply of digital content, 
functionality and interoperability of the digital content. This information has to 
be given in a clear and comprehensible manner.19 However, this information is 
only required to the extent that it is not ‘already apparent from the context’. 
Also, as far as ‘day-to-day transactions’, which are ‘performed immediately at 
the time of their conclusion’ are concerned, an option is given to the Member 
States not to require the provision of the information under this Article.20 Which 
transactions are covered by this is not defined further. There is already an exclu-
sion in Art. 3(3) of contracts under which a trader regularly delivers ‘foodstuffs, 
beverages or other goods intended for current consumption in the household’. 
One may assume that this derogation covers e.g. groceries purchases in a super-
market, or drinks or food bought in cafes and restaurants. 
Finally, Member States retain the freedom to provide additional pre-con-
tractual information duties with regard to contracts covered by Art. 5, so could 
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introduce additional requirements. In this regard, Art. 5 deviates from the maxi-
mum harmonisation character of the CRD. 
There is an even more detailed list of items of pre-contractual information for 
distance and off-premises contracts.21 This list contains 20 paragraphs on differ-
ent categories of information, and many of these paragraphs go into consider-
able detail about the various elements of information to be provided.22 Broadly 
speaking, the categories in respect of which information has to be given are the 
main characteristics of the goods or services; details about the trader; price and 
additional charges, as well as any deposits or financial guarantees to be provided 
by the consumer; arrangements for delivery, payment and performance; right of 
withdrawal; conformity requirement with regard to goods; after-sales support; 
functionality and interoperability of digital content; contract duration and mini-
mum contract period; existence of relevant codes of conduct; and availability of 
out-of-court dispute settlement procedures. All this information has to be given 
in a clear and comprehensible manner. This seems somewhat ironic in view of the 
volume and detail which Art. 6(1) requires. 
Although this is a very extensive list the provision of some of this informa-
tion is facilitated through model instructions on the right of withdrawal,23 use of 
which is deemed as compliance with items (h), (i), and (j). However, these model 
instructions only cover a small fraction of the overall information to be provided. 
The extent of the information obligation in Art. 6(1) is bewildering. It is possi-
ble to view this list as the high-water mark in the development of pre-contractual 
information duties in EU consumer law. Every time a new directive containing 
obligations to provide information was adopted, the list of information grew. The 
CRD covers a wide range of contracts, and combined with its maximum harmo-
nisation nature, it is not surprising that there are both a large number of different 
categories of information and a lot of prescriptive detail about the various facets 
of those categories. This development shows an obvious drawback with this par-
ticular kind of maximum harmonisation pursued in EU consumer law. This has 
focused on technical and quite detailed provisions, rather than broad principles. 
It might be asked why broad headings did not find favour over very detailed 
requirements. It seems to have been an inevitable development that more detail 
would be added to the list of information to ensure that almost anything conceiv-
able was covered. 
The fact that maximum harmonisation would bring with it ever more detailed 
lists of information was already evident from the Directive on the Distance 
Marketing of Financial Services.24 This Directive had very detailed pre-contrac-
tual information obligations. It divided these into broad categories: supplier (five 
items), financial service (seven items, including the main characteristics of the 
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financial service, and various items relating to cost), contract (seven items, includ-
ing details of the right of withdrawal and the minimum duration of a contract to be 
performed permanently or recurrently), and redress.25 The volume of information 
reflects both the complex nature of financial services contracts and the maximum 
harmonisation standard of that Directive.26 However, by grouping this informa-
tion into categories, the volume of information seems to have been made more 
manageable. It is unfortunate that this approach was not adopted for the CRD.
In this regard, it is instructive to consider Art. II.-3:103 of the Draft Common 
Frame of Reference,27 which had originally been intended as a toolbox to be 
tested when preparing the Consumer Rights Directive.28 That provision only 
identifies the broad categories of information to be provided rather than going 
into fine detail. Some additional detail in respect of price29 and the identity of the 
business30 is set out in subsequent articles, but overall, there is much less detail in 
these provisions.31 Unfortunately, the CRD as adopted shows little evidence of 
having been inspired by the DCFR. 
In this context, it is also important to note that the CRD has not been suffi-
ciently aligned with the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive.32 The UCPD also 
contains pre-contractual information requirements (particularly through its pro-
visions on misleading actions and misleading omissions). There is some overlap 
between the items of information required in the UCPD and CRD, but they are 
not fully congruent. Although the UCPD does not affect contract law directly,33 
it nevertheless seems that both the UCPD and the CRD require the provision of 
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pre-contractual information, and there should therefore have been more joined-
up thinking.34 
One further point about can be made about the CRD: although it is con-
cerned with distance selling, the pre-contractual information duties in the CRD 
have not been combined with the specific information duties in respect of con-
tracts concluded electronically from the E-Commerce Directive.35 Where con-
tracts are concluded by electronic means (with the exception of those concluded 
exclusively by electronic mail or equivalent individual communications36), infor-
mation has to be given about (a) the different technical steps that need to be 
followed in order to conclude the contract; (b) whether the contract will be filed 
by the service provider, and whether it will be accessible; (c) how input errors can 
be identified and corrected before an order is placed37; and (d) the languages in 
which the contract may be concluded.38 Also, information about relevant codes 
of conduct must be given,39 and, where applicable, the terms of the contract and 
general conditions have to be provided in a way that will allow the recipient to 
store and reproduce them.40
Pre-contractual information duties in other directives
Although the CRD contains a very extensive list of pre-contractual information 
obligations, it does not apply to all types of contracts. In particular, there are cer-
tain other directives which contain separate pre-contractual information require-
ments. In the field of travel law, the Package Travel Directive41 contains a long 
list of pre-contractual information duties in Art. 5. In particular, the requirement 
to provide information about ‘(a) the main characteristics of the travel services’, 
is broken down into 8 elements of information specific to a package travel con-
tract, and there are other information requirements of particular relevance to this 
type of contract (e.g. para (c) and (d) on aspects of costs and payment, or (g) on 
visa and health requirements). In the Timeshare Directive,42 there are different 
requirements for the marketing stage and the immediate pre-contractual phase. 
Article 4(1) specifies the information to be provided, with detailed standardised 
information forms for the various types of contract (timeshare, long-term holiday 
product, resale, and exchange contract) provided in the annexes to the Directive. 
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This information becomes an integral part of the contract.43 Changes to this 
information may be agreed by the parties, and other changes are only permitted 
where these result from circumstances beyond the trader’s control.44 
In order to manage the volume of information required for contracts falling 
within the scope of the Consumer Credit Directive,45 also a maximum harmo-
nisation Directive, a template has been designed. The Directive requires that all 
the information is provided by using the standard ‘European Consumer Credit 
Information’ (SECCI) form.46 Article 5 specifies no fewer than 19 items of 
 information for this form, such as basic information about the credit provider 
and details of the proposed credit agreement, including the APR, total amount 
borrowed and repayable, details of repayments, penalties for failing to maintain 
regular payments and information about early repayment. All of these directives 
show that maximum harmonisation brings with it very detailed information obli-
gations.47 In each of these, there are attempts to make this information seem less 
complex, although the extent to which it has become easier for consumers to 
comprehend and act upon this information remains a matter of debate.
Form
A further feature of the requirement to provide pre-contractual information in 
EU consumer law are rules on form and presentation, as well as language. Once 
again, the Consumer Rights Directive contains detailed rules on form in respect 
of off-premises contracts in Art. 748 and for distance contracts in Art. 8. These 
reflect the continuous evolution towards more and more detailed (and technical) 
rules. In the CRD, there are different requirements as to form depending on the 
type of the contract. 
The default position is that the information required under Art. 6(1) has to 
be given on paper, but, if the consumer agrees, it may instead be provided on 
another ‘durable medium’. This term has been utilised for some time in EU 
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consumer law directives, although it was not always defined clearly. Early direc-
tives only required ‘written notice’.49 This then developed into the possibility 
that the requirement for a contract to be in writing could be met by providing 
the contract in ‘another form which is comprehensible and accessible to the con-
sumer’.50 Since then, the requirement found in most directives (including the 
CRD) is that information should be provided on paper or on another durable 
medium.51 The phrase ‘durable medium’ is intended to cover the alternative ways 
of providing information electronically in the context of the digital environment. 
However, it is not easy to determine when the provision of information by elec-
tronic means qualifies as ‘durable’, and so the definition of this term is crucial. 
Surprisingly, the old Distance-selling Directive used the phrase but provided no 
definition. A definition was first provided in the Distance Marketing of Financial 
Services Directive. According to this, a durable medium ‘means any instrument 
which enables the consumer to store information addressed personally to him in a 
way accessible for future reference for a period of time adequate for the purposes 
of the information and which allows the unchanged reproduction of the informa-
tion stored.’52 This definition is essentially the same in the CRD, with the addi-
tion of the words ‘or trader’ after ‘consumer’.53 
From the perspective of the digital environment, the most difficult question 
is how information provided via websites or e-mail should be treated. In the 
Insurance Mediation Directive,54 the definition of ‘durable medium’ was sup-
plemented with an additional sentence, which states that ‘durable medium covers 
floppy disks, CD-ROMs, DVDs and hard drives of personal computers on which 
electronic mail is stored, but it excludes Internet sites, unless such sites meet the 
criteria specific in the first paragraph’.55 This definition is a product of its time, and 
15 years later, most of the tangible mediums are less common. Moreover, emails 
are now frequently stored on remote servers and no longer downloaded onto the 
consumer’s hard-drive. In the CRD, it is suggested that durable medium ‘should 
include in particular paper, USB sticks, CD-ROMs, DVDs, memory cards or 
the hard disks of computers as well as e-mails’.56 At least with regard to emails, 
this suggests a more flexible approach, and it may be assumed that information 
supplied in an email will qualify as having been provided on a durable medium, 
irrespective of where this is stored. However, websites are unlikely to satisfy this 
requirement. The CJEU said as much in Content Services in the context of the old 
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Distance-selling Directive,57 because information stored on a website could be 
modified at any time and therefore could not assure the unchanged reproduction 
of that information. However, the CJEU left open whether emerging website 
designs (‘sophisticated websites’) might qualify as a durable medium.58 In any 
event, the CJEU also held that allowing a consumer to access this information via 
a hyperlink would not satisfy the requirement that the information is ‘given to’ 
or ‘received’ by the consumer. This is so because clicking on a hyperlink would 
require an active step by the consumer, such as clicking on the link.59 This seems 
to be a rather strict approach – in practical terms, there is little difference between 
clicking on a hyperlink and opening an email message. However, the CRD uses 
the word ‘provided’, which entails that a consumer cannot be required to take an 
active step to access this information. 
Information must be in plain and intelligible language, and be legible. The 
explicit reference to legibility is a requirement introduced by the CRD, and it will 
be interesting to see how this will be interpreted by the CJEU.60 A second formal 
requirement is that the consumer must receive a copy of the signed contract, or 
the confirmation of the contract – again on paper as a default obligation, but 
another durable medium can be used if the consumer so agrees. 
Finally, there is a modified formal requirement in respect of off-premises con-
tracts where the consumer has called out a trader to carry out repairs or main-
tenance and where the payment to be made by the consumer does not exceed 
€200. The trader only has to provide information about his identity and address 
together with the price or an estimate of the total price on paper (or another 
durable medium if the consumer agrees). Information about the main character-
istics of the service, and the fact that a right of withdrawal is not available, can be 
given orally if the consumer so agrees.61
Article 8 CRD stipulates the formal requirements for distance contracts.62 
Again, information has to be provided in plain and intelligible language, but 
instead of specifying that it be given on paper or another durable medium, the 
information has to be given in ‘a way appropriate to the means of distance com-
munication used’.63 Where information is provided on a durable medium, the 
information must be legible.
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An additional requirement is introduced by the CRD in respect of contracts 
concluded by electronic means, where the contract places the consumer under 
an obligation to pay. Before the consumer places his order, information about 
the main characteristics of the goods/service, price, contract duration and the 
minimum contract period has to be given in a clear and prominent manner. The 
consumer must acknowledge explicitly that there is an obligation to pay once the 
order is placed. Art. 8 (2) states that if the consumer has to activate a button to 
place the order, this has to be labelled with the words ‘order with obligation to 
pay’ or words to that effect. If the trader does not comply with this requirement, 
the consumer is not bound by the contract/order.
There are also a number of rather technical requirements. Thus, trading web-
sites have to specify any delivery restrictions and accepted methods of payment 
at the start of the ordering process.64 Further, where the means of distance com-
munication used for concluding the contract allows limited space or time to dis-
play information (e.g. text messages or short communication on social media 
(‘Twitter’)), then only some items of information have to be given.65 Also, a 
trader who contacts a consumer by telephone has to disclose his identity and the 
commercial purpose of the call at the start of the conversation.66
Finally, there is a confirmation requirement: a trader has to provide confirma-
tion of the pre-contractual information on a durable medium (if not already so 
provided).67 Also, Member States are given the option of requiring that where a 
distance contract is concluded by telephone, the consumer has to receive a con-
firmation of the offer, and the consumer will only be bound once he has signed 
the offer or sent his written consent.
Also, as is the case with off-premises contracts, if the supply of a service is to 
commence during the withdrawal period, the trader must require the consumer 
request this expressly.68
A general observation which can be made about the formal requirements in the 
CRD is that these are rather prescriptive and quite technical. This is undoubtedly 
one of the effects of the full harmonisation approach adopted in the Directive. 
Style and language
As already noted, the CRD requires that any information given must be in plain 
and intelligible language.69 It must also be given in a ‘clear and comprehensible 
manner’.70 The ‘plain and intelligible language’ requirement is also used in the 
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Unfair Contract Terms Directive.71 In that context, the CJEU has held that this 
requirement had to be understood in a broad sense and was not limited to con-
sidering whether a contract term is ‘formally and grammatically intelligible’.72 
Rather, a consumer must be able to evaluate on the basis of clear, intelligible 
criteria, the economic consequences resulting from the term in question.73 If 
this approach were applied in the context of the CRD, it would make its pre-
contractual information duties even more onerous, because it might be neces-
sary to provide additional clarification in respect of some items of information. 
Moreover, the additional requirement in the CRD that the information must be 
given in a comprehensible manner could suggest that the CJEU would treat this 
requirement in the CRD in the same way. 
Some directives contain provisions on the use of a particular national language. 
For example, the Timeshare Directive requires that both the information docu-
ment and the contract itself should be in writing and drafted in the language of 
the Member State where the consumer is a resident, or the language of which the 
consumer is a national (provided it is an official language of the Union). However, 
the Consumer Rights Directive does not contain a specific language requirement 
of this kind. Member States have the option of introducing a language require-
ment in their domestic law,74 but the CRD is not intended to harmonise language 
requirements.75 A decision on whether to introduce a language requirement for 
contracts within the scope of the CRD is therefore a matter for the Member 
States. This is yet another instance where EU legislation can be criticised for not 
addressing an issue which is of high significance for consumers from a Single 
Market perspective. Some consumers might be deterred from buying goods or 
services from another Member State because of language barriers rather than out 
of concerns over variations in the levels of consumer protection. Consumers and 
traders need to be able to communicate in order to conclude a contract, so lan-
guage is crucial. It is regrettable that the EU continues to shy away from dealing 
with issues such as this. It might be a controversial issue from a political perspec-
tive, but it would be an issue of particular relevance to the Single Market.76 
Burden of proof
The Consumer Rights Directive contains a specific provision on the burden of 
proof for showing that the information duties under Art. 6 have been complied 
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with. This burden falls on the trader,77 rather than on the consumer, i.e. the 
trader has to show that the information was provided, rather than the consumer 
having to show that it was not. 
Sanctions
Despite the widespread use of information requirements in various EU consumer 
law measures, the consequences of failing to comply with such requirements have 
not been regulated consistently. Generally, the question of sanctions was left to 
domestic law, resulting in a range of different responses at Member State level.78 
However, in some directives, one sanction for failing to provide pre-contractual 
information was to extend the period during which a consumer could exercise 
the right of withdrawal, where available.79 However, in the CRD, this particular 
sanction has been limited to a failure to inform a consumer about the existence 
of the right of withdrawal.80 
The Consumer Rights Directive attempts to deal with this, but only does so 
up to a point. All the items of information are part of the contract between trader 
and consumer,81 which means that a failure to provide information as required 
could give rise to an action for breach of contract. Also, information which has 
become part of the contract by virtue of this provision cannot be amended with-
out the express agreement of the parties.82 Furthermore, where information 
about  additional charges or costs payable, or the costs of returning goods, is not 
provided, then the consumer will not have to bear those costs.83
Whilst this creates a route for a potential sanction for at least for some instances 
of non-compliance, it still falls a long way short of a clear set of remedies/sanc-
tions for non-compliance.
Pre-contractual information: Conclusions
The preceding pages have demonstrated how crucial the provision of pre-con-
tractual information is for EU consumer law, and how the rules on this have 
become more and more detailed as time has progressed. In part, the ever-increas-
ing detail will have been shaped by the desire progressively to move to a maxi-
mum harmonisation standard for aspects of EU consumer law. The popularity of 
this tool is perhaps less well explained on the basis of any convincing theoretical 
rationale (pure economic theory with the image of the rational consumer acting 
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with the benefit of full information is on rather shaky foundations these days) 
than the rather more pragmatic reason that requiring information interferes less 
with national laws than rules which would substantively regulate consumer con-
tracts. Although information duties raise some issues about how these relate to 
national doctrines on matters such as pre-contractual liability, duties of disclosure 
or requirements of honesty and transparency, they are still more easily absorbed 
into national law than more substantive rules. The difficulties with the latter are 
well-illustrated by the problems encountered with reforming the rules on con-
sumer sales over recent years.84 However, even though information duties might 
be perceived as less intrusive than substantive rules, it also has to be noted that the 
volume of information now required seems excessive, leading us to ask whether 
providing all this information will really equip consumers to make better deci-
sions.85 Indeed, it has been argued that the direct provision of information should 
be abandoned as a regulatory tool altogether, with compromise alternatives to be 
found in intermediaries who mine all the information to provide focused guid-
ance to consumers.86
There are also cost-based arguments against the current approach to infor-
mation: the cost for a trader of having to comply with all these obligations 
might be rather high. One can therefore question whether the value gained 
from improving the information available is not outweighed by the associated 
costs. From a consumer perspective, the volume of information is often mean-
ingless,87 at least to the extent that it is simply generic information and not 
personalised to the consumer’s circumstances. In respect of the latter, there 
might be a solution. Not so long ago, the idea of personalising information 
might have seemed far-fetched; however, the possibilities offered by ‘big data’, 
i.e. the extensive accumulation of data about individuals online, could one day 
be harnessed in providing information in a more tailored and personalised fash-
ion.88 However, this would undoubtedly raise concerns over privacy and data 
protection.89
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Right of withdrawal
As already mentioned, the second major instrument frequently used in EU con-
sumer law is the ‘right of withdrawal’ (this has also been called a right of can-
cellation in some directives, but by now, the term ‘right of withdrawal’ is the 
norm). A right of withdrawal permits a consumer to declare themselves as being 
no longer bound by a contract they have concluded, and perhaps performed,90 
without having to give any reason for this. Crucially, there is no requirement that 
the trader must somehow be in breach of contract; it suffices that the consumer 
has decided that he no longer wishes to proceed with the performance of the con-
tract. The existence of such a right seems to conflict with a fundamental principle 
of contract law in all European jurisdictions (and beyond): the notion of pacta 
sunt servanda, which means that a contract, once concluded, cannot be set aside 
unless a party was in default or there was some defect in the process of contract 
formation which vitiated the consent of either party.91 Where available, a right of 
withdrawal therefore provides a route for a consumer to escape from a contract 
for no reason other than that he has changed his mind.
Contrary to what consumers might often assume, a right of withdrawal does 
not exist in respect of every consumer contract; instead, it is only made available 
in specific instances. In the context of EU consumer law, it is possible broadly to 
identify 3 such instances:92
1 Where a contract has been concluded in circumstances where a consumer 
might have been caught by surprise and/or felt under some degree of pres-
sure to sign without having the opportunity properly to consider the nature 
of the transaction and possible alternatives;
2 Where the consumer is unable to inspect or evaluate the goods or services 
offered by the trader in advance;
3 Where the transaction is complex and/or has potentially very significant 
implications for the financial position of the consumer.
The classic example for the first category is contracts concluded away from the 
trader’s business premises (off-premises or doorstep contracts), particularly where 
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the trader appears without prior arrangement. A consumer may be caught una-
wares. As a consequence, a consumer might decide to buy something without 
due reflection, or even just to get the trader to leave, even though the purchase 
was neither contemplated nor necessary.
As for the second category, the main example is goods bought through dis-
tance or online contracts. In these circumstances, there is usually less of a pressure 
element (although cold-calls do have a pressure element). Instead, the consumer 
will not be able to see the goods, for example, by inspecting a display model, or 
try on the goods. Colours might for instance look different on a screen than in 
reality. This opportunity to examine will only arise once the goods have been 
delivered. Finally, many financial services contracts, such as consumer credit 
agreements, fall in the third category, as do timeshare contracts.
It is important to appreciate that the three instances listed above provide the 
rationales for the introduction of a withdrawal right in the various contexts in 
which it is found; however, as will become clear, once a particular situation has 
been earmarked as meriting the availability of a right of withdrawal, it is not 
necessary for a consumer to demonstrate an underlying rationale was present. 
It sufficient that the contract from which the consumer seeks to withdraw was 
entered into in the circumstances specified in the rules. So whilst a right of with-
drawal in the context of online shopping is generally justified on the basis that a 
consumer cannot inspect goods until they are delivered, it is often the case that 
a consumer might already have seen the goods in a store but has chosen to find 
them at a better price online. Similarly, in a doorstep setting, it is not necessary 
that the consumer was surprised or felt under pressure – the right of withdrawal 
is made available for the particular type of contract, irrespective of the precise 
circumstances in which it was concluded.93
Moreover, whilst the three factors set out above are the most commonly 
advanced reasons for the adoption of a right of withdrawal in EU law, there are 
other justifications for this.94
The right of withdrawal in EU consumer law
First introduced in the Doorstep-selling Directive in 1985, the right of withdrawal 
became increasingly heavily regulated in subsequent directives, culminating in the 
full harmonisation provisions in the Consumer Rights Directive. The evolution 
of the right of withdrawal can be tracked through a number of directives, start-
ing with the Doorstep- and Distance-selling Directives which provided for this 
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right on a minimum harmonisation basis. The revised Timeshare and Consumer 
Credit Directives (which replaced earlier directives in these areas95) also contain 
provisions on a right of withdrawal, but on a maximum harmonisation basis. In 
the Consumer Rights Directive, also a maximum harmonisation directive, a set of 
detailed rules on the right of withdrawal was included.96
The evolution of the right of withdrawal 
Initially, there were not many rules about the right of withdrawal other than the 
fundamental requirement that such a right should be made available for certain 
contracting situations or contract types, as well as a duty on a trader to provide 
clear information about the existence of this right. The early instantiations of 
the right of withdrawal were all of a minimum harmonisation character, which 
resulted in considerable variation between the laws of the Member States,97 and 
the partial regulation of the various aspects of providing and exercising such a 
right also prompted several requests for preliminary rulings to the CJEU, whose 
determinations added complexity to the legal rules on the right of withdrawal. 
This is seen very clearly in the Doorstep-selling Directive (‘contracts nego-
tiated away from business premises’), which was enacted in 1985. According 
to Article 5 of the Doorstep-selling Directive, a consumer had a right to with-
draw from a contract for a period of not less than seven days98 from the day on 
which the consumer was given information about the right of withdrawal. As 
the Directive said nothing about the consequences of failing to inform the con-
sumer about this right, it was arguable that the withdrawal period could not start 
until this information was given. This would effectively mean that there would 
be an unlimited period of time for exercising this right. This view was endorsed 
by the CJEU when it ruled that national law could not impose a restriction of, 
e.g. one year from the date of concluding the contract for exercising the right of 
withdrawal.99 As will be seen below, more recent directives now provide an outer 
time-limit for this situation, rather than permitting an unlimited extension of the 
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withdrawal period. The CJEU also held that a national court is able to raise the 
lack of appropriate notice of its own motion, without the consumer raising this, 
and determining that the contract is void as a result.100 This is another instance 
of the CJEU’s endorsement of an ex officio approach by national courts to the 
enforcement of consumer law. In this instance, the CJEU merely accepted the 
possibility for a national court to act, rather than imposing an obligation.101
To exercise the right of withdrawal a consumer had to give notice before the 
period had expired (Art. 5(1)), and once given, the consumer was released from 
all the obligations under the contract (Art. 5(2)). No charge could be made to 
the consumer for withdrawing from a contract in this context.102
There was nothing in the Doorstep-selling Directive about the consequences 
of a consumer exercising the right of withdrawal. This matter was left to the 
Member States. This eventually prompted several references to the CJEU about 
the compatibility of national provisions with EU law. For example, in the con-
text of a loan agreement, an obligation to repay a loan in full and immediately, 
together with interest at the market rate, would not be incompatible with the 
Directive.103 That obligation applied whether or not the consumer was aware of 
his right of withdrawal. However, where the consumer had not been made aware, 
Member States had to ensure that consumers who were exposed to a risk because 
they were not informed about their right of withdrawal could avoid ‘bearing the 
consequences of the materialisation of those risks’.104 The context for these rulings 
was loan agreements to finance the acquisition of a property to be made available 
for rent, but the rental returns fell well below what had been promised. The CJEU 
seemingly tried to equate this situation with that of a consumer who had with-
drawn from the contract after having been informed correctly about the right of 
withdrawal, but the precise meaning and consequences of its ruling are unclear.105 
In the same context the CJEU held that a national rule which provided that 
a consumer’s decision to withdraw from a loan agreement had no effect on the 
supply contract.106 In the case itself, the main contract was for the transfer of an 
interest in immovable property and such contracts fell outside the scope of the 
Directive. The CJEU rejected the argument that both contracts should be treated 
as an economic unit.107 
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The Distance-selling Directive provided a right of withdrawal from a distance 
contract for a period of at least seven working days.108 Unless agreed otherwise 
between the parties, there was no right of withdrawal for contracts for services 
where performance had begun with the consumer’s agreement before the with-
drawal period had expired, and there were various other excluded contracts.109 
The seven-day withdrawal period only started once the pre-contractual informa-
tion required by Art. 5(1) had been given. Failure to do so resulted in an exten-
sion of the period during which the right of withdrawal could be exercised for up 
to three months. If the information was provided within the three-month period, 
the seven-working-day withdrawal period started from that point.110 Once the 
consumer had exercised his withdrawal right, all sums which the consumer had 
paid to the supplier had to be refunded as soon as possible and within 30 days at 
the latest, although the consumer could be charged for the direct cost of return-
ing the goods.111 In addition, the Directive dealt with the question of certain 
linked contracts: if the purchase of the goods or service by the consumer had been 
financed at least in part with a credit arrangement (whether with the same sup-
plier, or under a separate agreement with a third party), the decision to withdraw 
from the supply contract would also bring the credit agreement to an end without 
penalty to the consumer.112 The precise rules for the cancellation of the related 
credit agreement were to be determined at Member State level.
Both Directives were of a minimum harmonisation standard, which left some 
freedom to the Member States to adopt more generous rules for consumers, e.g. 
by extending the duration of the period during which the right of withdrawal 
could be available. This brought with it inevitable variations between the national 
laws. As a result, the Distance Marketing of Financial Services Directive113 became 
the first Directive to provide for a right of withdrawal on a maximum harmonisa-
tion basis. It was also the first where the withdrawal period was fixed at 14 calen-
dar days.114 The withdrawal period starts either when the contract is concluded or 
from the day when the consumer receives the written terms and conditions and 
other information if this happens later.115
The right of withdrawal is not available for contracts for financial services where 
the price depends on fluctuations in the financial markets which are outside the 
supplier’s control, travel or baggage insurance policies of less than one month’s 
118 Pre-contract information/right to withdraw
116 Art. 6(2). Moreover, Member States have the option to exclude from the right of with-
drawal contracts for credit for the purpose of acquiring or retaining property rights in land 
or building, including for the purpose of renovating or improving a building; or credit 
secured either by a mortgage on immovable property or another right in immovable prop-
erty (Arts.6 (3)(a) and (b). Paragraph (c) also excludes declarations by consumers using the 
services of an official).
117 Art. 6(1).
118 Art. 6(6).
119 A consumer can be required to pay for a service that has already been provided, subject to 
the requirements that the consumer must have been informed about the amount payable 
before the contract was concluded, and, if performance of the contract commenced before 
the expiry of the withdrawal period, that the consumer consented to the performance com-
mencing (Art. 7).
120 Directive 94/47/EC.
121 Directive 2008/122/EC.
122 Art. 6(1) and (2)(a).
123 Art. 6(2)(b).
124 Art. 5(4).
125 Art. 6(3)(a).
duration, and contracts which have been fully performed before the consumer 
seeks to exercise his right of withdrawal.116 
A consumer is entitled to exercise the right of withdrawal without penalty, 
and is not obliged to give any reasons for withdrawing.117 A consumer seeking 
to withdraw has to do so in line with the ‘practical instructions’ provided before 
the contract was concluded, ‘by means which can be proved in accordance with 
national law’.118 Following withdrawal, a consumer is entitled to a refund of all 
prepayments.119 In return, the consumer is required to return any sums or prop-
erty received from the supplier. Both consumer and supplier must do so within 
30 calendar days.
The shift from minimum to maximum harmonisation then began to be further 
felt when existing directives were reviewed and replaced. This is illustrated by the 
two Timeshare Directives. The earlier Directive120 provided a right of withdrawal 
for a period of 10 calendar days from signing a timeshare contract. When the 
new Directive was adopted in 2008,121 it changed from a minimum to a maxi-
mum harmonisation measure. As with other directives at the time, the complete 
provision of specific information (in this case in the contract) is a pre-condition 
before the withdrawal period starts. The right to withdraw from the contract 
without having to give a reason is available for a period of 14 calendar days from 
the conclusion of the contract or any binding preliminary contract,122 or from the 
date the consumer receives the contract if this is later.123 This Directive requires 
that a consumer is given a completed standard withdrawal form;124 failure to do 
so extends the withdrawal period to one year and 14 calendar days.125 Similarly, 
if the consumer does not receive a standard information form containing the 
required information, the withdrawal period only ends after three months and 14 
calendar days. If the required information is given during these extended periods, 
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the 14 day withdrawal period starts from that date. Following withdrawal, both 
parties are discharged from their obligation to perform the contract.126 A con-
sumer will not be liable to pay any costs, nor pay for any value of a service received 
before exercising his right to withdraw.127 Furthermore, any ancillary contracts 
are also terminated automatically, at no costs to the consumer.128 Finally, a con-
sumer must not be required to make any advance payments before the end of the 
withdrawal period.129
The revised Consumer Credit Directive (2008/48/EC), which is of a maxi-
mum harmonisation standard, also allows a consumer to withdraw from a credit 
agreement within 14 calendar days. This is discussed more fully in Chapter 6.
The right of withdrawal in the Consumer Rights Directive
The development of the right of withdrawal in these directives provides a use-
ful background for the enactment of a fully harmonised right of withdrawal in 
respect of distance and off-premises contract in the Consumer Rights Directive 
(2011/83/EU). There are eight articles in the CRD on the right of withdrawal, 
its exercise and consequences. There is, however, a surprisingly long list of con-
tracts in respect of which there is also no right of withdrawal in Article 16, and 
these exclusions are mandatory for the Member States (‘Member States shall not 
provide for the right of withdrawal’130). The full harmonisation nature of the 
CRD and the imperative wording of Art. 16 mean that Member States are pre-
cluded from extending the right of withdrawal to contracts listed in that Article.
A standard withdrawal period of 14 days for all distance and off-premises con-
tracts131 is provided for in Art. 9(1) CRD. As with previous directives, the point 
at which the withdrawal period commences varies for contracts for goods and 
services. For services, it starts on the day the contract is concluded,132 but in the 
case of goods, it starts on the day the consumer receives the goods.133 The CRD 
further deals with contracts for more than one item, or goods consisting of mul-
tiple pieces, which are not all delivered at the same time. In both instances, the 
withdrawal period starts when the last item has been delivered.134 Moreover, in 
respect of a contract for the regular delivery of goods, the period starts once the 
first delivery has been made.135
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A consumer has to be given information about the right of withdrawal.136 
Where this does not happen, then the withdrawal period is extended by up to 12 
months.137 If the information is provided during this extension, then the 14-day 
withdrawal period starts from the day on which the information is given.138 
Although this rule may seem familiar from the earlier directives, there is one 
significant difference: the extension of the withdrawal period only happens where 
the trader has failed to inform the consumer about the existence of the right of 
withdrawal. Previously, this extension could happen for failing to comply with 
any of the pre-contractual information duties. In view of the very detailed infor-
mation duties imposed by the CRD,139 this seems to provide a fairer approach. 
Otherwise, a trader could be exposed to an extended withdrawal period for fail-
ing to provide an item of information even though the consumer has been fully 
informed about the right of withdrawal.
There are additional requirements with regard to the right of withdrawal 
where digital content or services are supplied before the period for exercising the 
right of withdrawal has expired. Where digital content is supplied other than on 
a tangible medium, and the consumer has consented expressly to performance 
of the contract commencing, then the right of withdrawal which would be avail-
able is lost at that point.140 Therefore, the additional formal requirement is that 
the copy of the contract or contract confirmation must also include confirmation 
of the consumer’s consent that performance is to begin before the end of the 
withdrawal period as well as the consumer’s acknowledgement that the right of 
withdrawal is lost once performance commences.
As for services, if performance is to commence during the withdrawal period, 
the trader must ask the consumer to request this expressly and on a durable 
medium. There are no specific consequences provided in the Directive where this 
requirement is not complied with – presumably, a trader should not commence 
performance unless a request made in the required manner has been received. If 
the trader commences regardless of this, then one might assume that the with-
drawal period is not curtailed as a result. 
The modalities for exercising the right of withdrawal are provided for in Article 
11 CRD. A consumer has to inform the trader of the decision to withdraw. This 
can be done either by using the model withdrawal form (Annex 1(B) to the 
Directive) or by an unequivocal statement of his decision to withdraw.141 Also, 
a trader may provide an electronic version of the withdrawal form (or equiva-
lent) on his website which the consumer can complete online. Where a consumer 
chooses to withdraw online, the trader has to acknowledge this on a durable 
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medium and without delay.142 As long as the consumer has sent his communica-
tion of withdrawal before the expiry of the withdrawal period,143 the right has 
been exercised in time. This is so even if it could not arrive within the period as it 
had been posted minutes before the deadline. The consumer bears the burden of 
proving that the communication was despatched in time.144 
The consequence of an effective exercise of the right of withdrawal is that the 
parties’ respective obligations under the contract are terminated.145 The Directive 
then goes on to specify a number of post-withdrawal obligations for both the 
trader and the consumer. The trader has to reimburse all payments received from 
the consumer without undue delay and no later than 14 days from the date of 
being informed of the consumer’s decision to withdraw. The trader will be per-
mitted to delay the reimbursement until he has received back the goods, or at 
least evidence from the consumer that the goods have been sent back to the 
trader, except where the trader has offered to collect the goods himself.146
The reimbursement has to include the costs of delivery, where applicable;147 
however, if the consumer selected a method of delivery other than the standard 
method offered by the trader, then the trader is not required to reimburse the 
difference in cost between those two methods.148
As far as the consumer’s obligations are concerned, he is required to return the 
goods to the trader within 14 days of communicating his decision to withdraw from 
the contract, unless the trader has offered to collect the goods.149 At the very least, 
the consumer has to send back the goods before the expiry of this 14 day period. 
The consumer will have to bear the direct costs of returning the goods to the 
trader,150 but there are two exceptions to this obligation: first, where the trader has 
agreed to bear this cost (which, in practice, might be done by arranging for collec-
tion of the goods); and second, where the trader has failed to inform the consumer 
that the consumer would have to bear this cost.151 Also, in the case of off-premises 
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contracts where the goods were delivered to the consumer’s home at the time of 
concluding the contract, and where by their nature, the goods cannot be returned 
by post, the trader is required to collect the goods at his own expense.152 
The full harmonisation nature of the CRD has seemingly made it necessary to 
introduce provisions which deal with quite specific issues. Thus, in addition to the 
direct cost of returning the goods, a consumer may also be liable for any dimi-
nution in the value of the goods if this has been caused by handling the goods 
beyond what is necessary to ‘establish the nature, characteristics and functioning 
of the goods’.153 In one sense, this provision is stating the obvious: a consumer 
should only make sure the goods are suitable and then decide whether to keep or 
return them. On the other hand, such a rule might create a loophole which would 
allow a trader to argue that goods have been used beyond what was necessary 
and that a reduction should be made from the refund. Overall, however, the rule 
ensures an adequate balance between the interests of consumers and traders.154 It 
should be noted that the consumer will not be liable for any reduction in refund 
if the trader has failed to provide information about the right of withdrawal as 
required by Art. 6(1)(h).155
Another provision on an issue of detail exists in respect of contracts for a 
service. If performance has begun during the withdrawal period at the consum-
er’s request, and then the consumer exercises his right of withdrawal, he will be 
required to pay for the proportion of the contract services received up to the 
point of withdrawal.156 However, this does not apply if information about the 
right of withdrawal has not been given, or if the consumer has not given his con-
sent to performance commencing;157 a similar rule applies to digital content not 
supplied on a tangible medium.158 There is no other liability on a consumer as a 
consequence of exercising the right of withdrawal.159 
Finally, exercising the right of withdrawal in respect of an off-premises or dis-
tance contract also has the effect of terminating any ancillary contract automati-
cally (Art. 15(1)), although the detailed provisions on this have to be determined 
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at Member State level (Art. 15(2)). As already noted above, if the ancillary con-
tract is a consumer credit contract, Art. 15 of the Consumer Credit Directive on 
the termination of credit agreements will apply (see above).
This account of the evolution of the right of withdrawal is a clear example 
of how the harmonisation approach to EU consumer law has evolved over the 
decades. From a quite general minimum requirement which gave considerable 
leeway to the Member States with regard to the design of the national laws giv-
ing effect to a right of withdrawal, there has been a creeping standardisation not 
only of the core features of the right of withdrawal, but also related provisions. 
The high-water mark of this development is the CRD, which has provided the 
most detailed set of rules yet. Such detailed regulation of so many aspects of the 
right of withdrawal invariably heightens concerns about the fact that some ques-
tions are not resolved in the CRD, e.g. what should happen if the consumer, 
having exercised his right of withdrawal, returns the goods back to the trader, 
but they are lost in transit? Solutions for such questions can, of course, be found 
in domestic law, but the detailed regulation and the maximum harmonisation 
standard of the CRD seem to put the burden on the EU, rather than national 
law, to deal with.
One final observation can be made about the CRD and its detailed rules on the 
right of withdrawal. The CRD is the result of the Acquis Review, one objective of 
which was to ensure greater coherence of the acquis.160 It is therefore surprising 
that other directives which provide for a right of withdrawal were not amended so 
as to have one single consistent set of rules on the right of withdrawal. 
As with pre-contractual information duties, the work on the DCFR included 
a strong focus on the right of withdrawal (again, primarily based on the work of 
the Acquis Group).161 Book II, Chapter five, Section one of the DCFR contains 
a number of articles162 which deal with the right of withdrawal. In substance, 
these provisions are similar to those in the CRD. However, they are presented in 
a more succinct format which avoids the reader getting lost in too much techni-
cal detail. In that respect, the DCFR provides a better set of rules than the CRD.
Right of withdrawal: Evaluation
The right of withdrawal is an essential feature of EU consumer law. In one sense, 
the right of withdrawal is an adjunct to the information-based focus of EU con-
sumer law. It seeks to compensate for the fact that a consumer might not have 
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had sufficient information to evaluate fully a particular contract at the time it was 
concluded. The withdrawal period provides a consumer with an opportunity to 
reflect on whether the decision to conclude the contract really was the right one. 
Furthermore, it illustrates how the harmonisation of consumer law has 
become increasingly detailed and technical whilst reducing and ultimately largely 
eliminating the scope for national variations beyond a minimum  standard set at 
the EU level. With the adoption of the Consumer Rights Directive, there is a 
now in place a comprehensive, if not fully complete, set of legal rules governing 
the existence and exercise of the right of withdrawal, as well as its consequences 
for both trader and consumer. On the one hand, it seems that this is a welcome 
development, because the right of withdrawal had become somewhat infamous 
as an example of inconsistent EU legislation.163 On the other hand, the stand-
ardisation and maximum harmonisation of the right of withdrawal which had 
been one of the objectives of the Acquis Review has only been achieved in part 
– whilst there is now a standard withdrawal period of 14 days across the various 
directives which make available a right of withdrawal, each of these directives 
continues to have its own set of legal rules, rather than simply relying on one 
fully standardised set of rules. One might have expected this to be achieved by 
the Consumer Rights Directive. If the EU continues with its current trajectory 
of harmonisation in the field of consumer law, then we might expect to see fur-
ther developments with regard to the right of withdrawal in the future. 
There is a wider question to be asked, however: to what extent is the right of 
withdrawal an effective means of consumer protection? To answer this, one needs 
to see whether consumers utilise their right, and also gain an understanding as 
to why consumers decide to exercise this right or not. Comprehensive empirical 
evidence on this has yet to be provided. In the absence of such evidence, Luzak 
offers an assessment of the right of withdrawal from a behavioural economics 
perspective.164 Although she finds some support in that literature for the intro-
duction of a right of withdrawal, she also identifies a number of significant factors 
which might discourage consumers from exercising that right. One of these is 
an aversion of consumers to loss, which might prevent a consumer from with-
drawing from a contract because of the costs potentially associated with this.165 
Another factor is the endowment effect, according to which consumers might 
overvalue goods in their possession over the gain they would make by return-
ing them.166 Moreover, consumers might be more concerned about loss arising 
from taking action (exercising the right of withdrawal) than inaction (keeping the 
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goods).167 These, and the other factors discussed by Luzak, all suggest that there 
are significant behavioural barriers to consumers making effective use of the right 
of withdrawal.
It has also been noted that the standardisation of the withdrawal period to 14 days 
was primarily driven by a desire for consistency in the legal rules.168 However, this par-
ticular period might suffer from being too long for some transactions and not long 
enough for others.169 A short period might suffice in respect of contracts concluded 
in the consumer’s home, where the consumer will probably want to change his mind 
quickly. Indeed, a shorter period might encourage consumers to exercise their right 
because of the need to act swiftly. That said, even in this context, the full implications 
of the contract might not be realised immediately and more time might be needed. 
In contrast, for more complex transactions, a longer period might be better.
Indeed, the lack of a sound basis for withdrawal rights has been criticised, not 
least because withdrawal rights are effectively a derogation from the pacta sunt 
servanda principle.170 As such, withdrawal rights should be used only where the 
benefits exceed their cost, because the costs involved for a trader to comply with 
the rules regarding rights of withdrawal will be shared among all consumers.171 
This suggests that a broadly available, but rarely utilised, right of withdrawal 
would impose costs for very little benefit. It has therefore been suggested that 
in many contexts, consumers might benefit from having an optional withdrawal 
right, rather than the mandatory right currently provided for.172 An ‘optional’ 
withdrawal right would present consumers with a choice when concluding a con-
tract whether they wish to benefit from the option of a right of withdrawal. If 
they do, they may pay a slightly higher fee. Clearly, such an approach would not 
work in circumstances where the right of withdrawal is provided because of the 
risk of pressure-selling. However, in other contexts, such as online shopping, it 
could work – and already does, in some instances.173
Conclusions
In this chapter, we have explored the development of the two of the most fre-
quently deployed tools of consumer protection: the provision of pre-contractual 
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information and the right of withdrawal. Both can be used together and seek to 
overcome perceived informational imbalances between a trader and consumer 
by making available as much information as possible to a consumer, giving a 
consumer the opportunity to acquire information about alternative products, and 
allowing a consumer to escape from a contract if, on reflection, he no longer 
regards that contract as suitable.
For the development of EU consumer law, we can see how there has been a 
gradual increase in the technical detail of both tools as a result of a shift towards 
maximum harmonisation. This provides us with one useful lesson: if maximum 
harmonisation is to be effective as a policy goal, then the legal rules in EU con-
sumer legislation have to be both sufficiently detailed and comprehensive to 
minimise the scope for significant national variations. In the Consumer Rights 
Directive, this is evident both with regard to pre-contractual information duties 
and the right of withdrawal. It seems to have been possible to reach agreement on 
these detailed provisions, although they are not complete – even here, aspects still 
need to be resolved at national level. This makes it far from certain that maximum 
harmonisation would translate into other areas. Indeed, there are some rather 
obvious problems with the particular brand of maximum harmonisation pursued 
here. As seen, the rules on both the provision of pre-contractual information 
and the right of withdrawal have become very detailed and quite technical. One 
drawback is that the level of precision in these rules invariably invites exploration 
of the remaining loopholes. However, the case for such filigree-style regulation is 
not obvious. Moreover, it will raise questions about the adaptability of these rules 
as business models develop and new ways of supplying goods to consumers and 
traders emerge, particularly in the context of the digital revolution.174 
Appendix I: Information required by Art. 5 CRD
a the main characteristics of the goods or services, to the extent appropriate to 
the medium and to the goods or services;
b the identity of the trader, such as his trading name, the geographical address 
at which he is established and his telephone number;
c the total price of the goods or services inclusive of taxes, or where the nature 
of the goods or services is such that the price cannot reasonably be calculated 
in advance, the manner in which the price is to be calculated, as well as, 
where applicable, all additional freight, delivery or postal charges or, where 
those charges cannot reasonably be calculated in advance, the fact that such 
additional charges may be payable;
d where applicable, the arrangements for payment, delivery, performance, the 
time by which the trader undertakes to deliver the goods or to perform the 
service, and the trader’s complaint handling policy;
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e in addition to a reminder of the existence of a legal guarantee of conformity 
for goods, the existence and the conditions of after-sales services and com-
mercial guarantees, where applicable;
f the duration of the contract, where applicable, or, if the contract is of inde-
terminate duration or is to be extended automatically, the conditions for 
terminating the contract;
g where applicable, the functionality, including applicable technical protection 
measures, of digital content;
h where applicable, any relevant interoperability of digital content with hard-
ware and software that the trader is aware of or can reasonably be expected 
to have been aware of.
Appendix II: Information required by Art. 6 CRD
a the main characteristics of the goods or services, to the extent appropriate to 
the medium and to the goods or services;
b the identity of the trader, such as his trading name;
c the geographical address at which the trader is established and the trader’s 
telephone number, fax number and e-mail address, where available, to enable 
the consumer to contact the trader quickly and communicate with him effi-
ciently and, where applicable, the geographical address and identity of the 
trader on whose behalf he is acting;
d if different from the address provided in accordance with point (c), the geo-
graphical address of the place of business of the trader, and, where applica-
ble, that of the trader on whose behalf he is acting, where the consumer can 
address any complaints;
e the total price of the goods or services inclusive of taxes, or where the nature 
of the goods or services is such that the price cannot reasonably be calcu-
lated in advance, the manner in which the price is to be calculated, as well 
as, where applicable, all additional freight, delivery or postal charges and 
any other costs or, where those charges cannot reasonably be calculated in 
advance, the fact that such additional charges may be payable. In the case 
of a contract of indeterminate duration or a contract containing a subscrip-
tion, the total price shall include the total costs per billing period. Where 
such contracts are charged at a fixed rate, the total price shall also mean the 
total monthly costs. Where the total costs cannot be reasonably calculated in 
advance, the manner in which the price is to be calculated shall be provided;
f the cost of using the means of distance communication for the conclusion 
of the contract where that cost is calculated other than at the basic rate;
g the arrangements for payment, delivery, performance, the time by which the 
trader undertakes to deliver the goods or to perform the services and, where 
applicable, the trader’s complaint handling policy;
h where a right of withdrawal exists, the conditions, time limit and proce-
dures for exercising that right in accordance with Article 11(1), as well as the 
model withdrawal form set out in Annex I(B);
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i where applicable, that the consumer will have to bear the cost of returning 
the goods in case of withdrawal and, for distance contracts, if the goods, by 
their nature, cannot normally be returned by post, the cost of returning the 
goods;
j that, if the consumer exercises the right of withdrawal after having made a 
request in accordance with Article 7(3) or Article 8(8), the consumer shall 
be liable to pay the trader reasonable costs in accordance with Article 14(3);
k where a right of withdrawal is not provided for in accordance with Article 16, 
the information that the consumer will not benefit from a right of withdrawal 
or, where applicable, the circumstances under which the consumer loses his 
right of withdrawal;
l a reminder of the existence of a legal guarantee of conformity for goods;
m where applicable, the existence and the conditions of after sale customer 
assistance, after-sales services and commercial guarantees;
n the existence of relevant codes of conduct, as defined in point (f) of Article 2 
of Directive 2005/29/EC, and how copies of them can be obtained, where 
applicable;
o the duration of the contract, where applicable, or, if the contract is of inde-
terminate duration or is to be extended automatically, the conditions for 
terminating the contract;
p where applicable, the minimum duration of the consumer’s obligations 
under the contract;
q where applicable, the existence and the conditions of deposits or other finan-
cial guarantees to be paid or provided by the consumer at the request of the 
trader;
r where applicable, the functionality, including applicable technical protection 
measures, of digital content;
s where applicable, any relevant interoperability of digital content with hard-
ware and software that the trader is aware of or can reasonably be expected 
to have been aware of;
t where applicable, the possibility of having recourse to an out-of-court com-
plaint and redress mechanism, to which the trader is subject, and the meth-
ods for having access to it.
4 Unfair contract terms
Introduction
Unfair contract terms regulation as a key indicator of EU policy
In 1993, European contract and consumer law was pushed towards new fron-
tiers through the adoption of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive.1 This was 
the first step by the European lawmaker into the heartland of contract law. After 
this Directive traditional national private lawyers could no longer ignore the 
development of European rules. From a private lawyer’s perspective, the adop-
tion of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive was one of the most important 
among the first wave of European consumer law measures. In the beginning, 
Europeanisation in many jurisdictions appeared as mainly symbolical, as the 
Directive did not produce much European case law. In others, like the UK, the 
implementation of the Directive started major changes in practice. However, 
the CJEU’s law on unfair terms has started to expand rapidly after the turn of 
the millennium.
The early focus of the European lawmaker on the issue of unfair contract 
terms is understandable, as unfairness regulation can be seen as a key indica-
tor of the basic approach of the private law system. The differences between 
the Member States in approaching this issue were probably wider in principle 
than in day-to-day practice. The Directive is therefore one further step towards 
building a common European approach to fairness, but is blended with national 
approaches.
As the starting point of the private law system is the recognition of the binding 
force of contracts, the system is disturbed by the question of how law should react 
to the use of unfair contract terms. The way of dealing with unfair contract terms 
regulation directly reflects the basic understandings of contract and contract law 
in the jurisdiction. Therefore, the Unfair Contract Terms Directive forces the EU 
consumer law discourse to focus on basic contract law issues. Basic principles of 
contract law have been brought on the European table in the discussions con-
cerning the drafting and the application of the Directive.
 1 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts.
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Chapter themes
The discussions and practice around the Directive connect with the deeper lay-
ers of the contract law discourse. Moreover, they also illustrate the tendencies in 
European consumer policy outlined in Chapter 1. As will be noted below, the 
Directive both reflects and resists these tendencies. Looked at from the perspec-
tive of these tendencies, the Unfair Contract Terms Directive offers a complex – 
one could even say contradictory – picture. From this perspective it is also an 
illustrative expression of the deeper levels of European discourse. 
Harmonisation and the need for national regimes
The Unfair Contract Terms Directive offers an enduring example of the tension 
between attempts to enhance further market integration through maximum har-
monisation and the need for national regimes based on the culture and expecta-
tions of the actors in the local marketplace. As the issue has been on the agenda 
during various stages of drafting, implementation and amendment, the fate of 
the Directive illustrates the changes in the discourse during the relevant period. 
In fact, the variations in the focus of the practice of the CJEU also adds its own 
perspective to this picture. 
When the Directive was first drafted, the starting point was fairly clear. The 
Directive should be a minimum harmonisation directive. This was due to several 
reasons – in addition to the fact that minimum harmonisation in consumer law 
was the prevailing model in most cases at the time. The fact that unfair contracts 
regulation, as noted above, is connected to deep cleavages between the Member 
States in their conception of the role of contract law would have made it difficult 
to pursue maximum harmonisation, which would have brought with it a need for 
further harmonisation of contract law as well. For example, the huge variety of 
national mandatory rules on various issues and contract types would have had to 
be scrutinised in order to check that their protection level did not rise higher than 
the Directive would allow. Therefore, the Directive appears as a minimum com-
promise between the very differing starting points in Europe (see ‘The Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive as a European compromise’). 
The later attempts in the original proposal for a Consumer Rights Directive2 
to turn the Directive into a maximum one did not succeed because of opposition 
from several Member States, among them the Nordic states fearing it would pre-
vent them from reviewing the core terms of contracts. This is an example showing 
that the tendencies outlined in Chapter 1 of the book are occasionally successfully 
resisted, in this case even in relation to an important matter. 
Adopted as a minimum harmonisation measure, the Directive has been inte-
grated into the national regimes. With the different starting points in national 
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laws, this has been the natural solution, but it also means that the law is not fully 
harmonised in this area, and even in practice appears only marginally harmonised 
as the CJEU has left many of the concrete issues to the national courts. The 
internal market link has not been able to remove national systems and their objec-
tives. Despite the suggested task of promoting European standard forms, no such 
forms have been developed on the basis of the Directive. Instead, the develop-
ment of case law has reinforced the basic differences between the Member States 
and the need to connect the assessment to national legal surroundings – and so 
also to national consumer expectations (see ‘Back to national culture’).
However, even though the CJEU has recognised the important role of 
national law and national assessment of unfairness, the law has other dimensions 
as well. One can identify a willingness in more recent cases from the CJEU to 
move towards seeing the Directive as a more free-standing European consumer 
protection measure which offers the Court the means for gradually developing 
a European doctrine of fairness. As these cases usually have not questioned the 
minimum role of the Directive, but rather have discussed how far the protection 
offered by the Directive would reach both substantially (see ‘Steps towards a free-
standing consumer protection measure’) and procedurally (see ‘The next step: 
A procedural Jack-in-the-box’), they are difficult to criticise from a consumer 
protection angle. Harmonisation is in these cases pushed both by internal market 
reasons and by consumer protection arguments. 
One may argue that more far-reaching harmonisation might seem needed with 
regard to e-commerce. Then, however, not only unfair contract terms regulation, 
but the whole area of contract and sales law (see Chapter 5), as well as access to 
justice (Chapter 8), is affected.
Information and distribution of risk
Contract terms have a price. The function of the Directive could therefore be seen 
as an obligatory insurance against unfair terms, administered by the business. In 
addition one should mention the transaction cost argument in this context: with 
regard to transaction costs (time used) it would seem preferable that one authority 
uses a few hours to check a standard form than having thousands of consumers 
using half an hour each to read the conditions (without even understanding them).
There are, however, few explicit indications of such insurance or transaction 
cost-thinking in the materials around the Directive. Despite this the Directive 
offers a good example of an insurance-like, welfarist approach to consumer 
protection – even though it stops halfway because of important limitations of 
scope of the Directive. As the Directive in practice develops towards becoming 
a more free-standing consumer protection measure, there is a need to discuss 
to what extent this does and can imply a move towards a more insurance-moti-
vated welfarist substantive approach. At least the CJEU has adopted a level of 
protection in applying the Directive that is relatively high, as compared to case 
law regarding other directives (see ‘Steps towards a free-standing consumer 
 protection measure’).
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The Court seems to recognise that standard terms are often not understood by 
consumers, irrespective of their degree of vulnerability. The real issue is in other 
words often an issue of whether the substance is fair in general rather than an 
issue of what a particular person might understand. The familiar concept of legiti-
mate expectations would rather seem like a good yardstick for the assessment (see 
‘Conclusions and ways forward’). 
Focus on enforcement
The general enforcement rules in the Directive are the same as in other directives 
(adequate and effective means). Demands for better enforcement apply to this 
Directive as well. In fact, the CJEU seems to have been exceptionally preoccupied 
with the issue of enforcement when applying this Directive. Case law regarding 
the Directive has to a considerable degree dealt with issues concerning procedural 
enforcement. 
CJEU case law has brought the application of the Directive far into the heart-
land of procedural law – even so much that one could speak about a Jack-in-the-
Box effect (see ‘The next step: A procedural Jack-in-the-box’). The practice of 
the CJEU regarding these issues could be understood as an indication of a more 
serious engagement of the Court in ensuring effective enforcement of consumer 
law. The Court has been pushed in this direction by a recurring need to grapple 
with grave social problems due to the European recession.
Towards a European brand?
Being at the core of private law policy, the Unfair Contract Terms Directive has 
met interest also outside of the EU. Perhaps it is not legally as ‘branding’ as the 
Products Liability Directive, but it has been looked at as one of the models for 
coping with contractual unfairness, competing with traditional unconscionabil-
ity standards. The model function of the Directive is enhanced by the fact that 
it has been at least partially incorporated in general proposals for codification of 
European contract law, such as the Principles of European Contract Law and the 
Draft Common Frame of Reference for European Private Law. This issue is dis-
cussed further in the last section of this chapter on ‘Conclusions and ways forward’.
More generally, it would certainly be a brand advantage for European busi-
nesses, if it could convey the message that European businesses are not using 
‘deceptive’ fine print to limit liability and shift fair balance of rights and obligations. 
Being in such a central position, the Directive has inspired legal theory. 
Some have described unfair contract terms regulation as a legal irritant,3 whilst 
 others may use the metaphor of Jack-in-the-Box.4 The Directive also offers good 
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building blocks for the construction of a more general principle of fairness for 
European contract law.5 The ‘brand’ of European contract theory is undoubtedly 
affected by the Directive. 
The Unfair Contract Terms Directive as a 
European compromise
The process of drafting the Directive was not an easy one. The starting points of 
the Member States were very different. Both within the EU, as well as in a more 
broad international perspective one can distinguish four different approaches to 
unfair contract terms regulation.6
The first approach is the one that traditionally was adopted by the UK. This 
model lacks a general rule on unfairness of contracts, as the law should recognise 
what the parties have agreed on, without fraud or force, as a just solution. Only 
for particular situations or issues might the law direct the courts to disregard the 
terms of the agreement. Even the UK Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 fits into 
this model, as it does not, despite its name, contain a general rule on unfairness, 
but is only applicable to exemption clauses. And for standard contract terms only 
some specific rules exist, such as the ‘red-hand rule’ requiring a party who uses 
an onerous standard clause to draw the other party’s attention to it.7 Only with 
the introduction of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994,8 
based on the EU Unfair Contract Terms Directive, did UK contract law take a 
step towards the other approaches.9 
The second approach is particularly focused on the fairness problems related to 
the use of standard form contracts. The philosophy behind this approach could 
be described as an attempt to take the justifications for the binding force of con-
tracts seriously. The binding force of contracts is based on the consent or will 
of the parties; when a party uses standard conditions, there is no real consent 
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from the other party and therefore the law has to intervene. The internationally 
paradigmatic example of this kind of approach was the German Act on General 
Conditions from 1976,10 which was later included as a part of the German Civil 
Code.11 This legislation is based on the recognition that there is a risk of a partial 
market failure when standard form contracts are used. The market failure has to 
be remedied with the help of rules allowing interference against unfair contract 
terms in standard forms. As market failure relates to the use of standard forms and 
not to the particular role of the parties to the contract, the unfairness regulation in 
this approach usually covers both consumer contracts and commercial contracts.
The third approach takes its starting point in the protection that certain 
groups of parties to a contract – or parties in a particular role – are perceived to 
need. The main reason for rules concerning unfairness of contracts is consumer 
protection and protection of other types of weak parties. The application of the 
rules is in this case usually delimited to business-to-consumer relations (and per-
haps to other similar relations between strong and weak groups of parties), and 
does not apply to business-to-business relations. On the other hand, as the need 
for protection of consumers is not necessarily limited to the situations in which 
standard contract forms are used, the fairness control may be extended to indi-
vidually negotiated clauses in consumer contracts as well. French law has usually 
been mentioned as an illustrative example of such a consumer protection-based 
approach.12 Later, the Consumer Rights Act moved UK law in this direction.
Finally, the fourth approach looks at unfairness of contracts in the most com-
prehensive way, including the perspectives of both the standard form contract and 
consumer protection models and extending them in principle to cover the whole 
area of contract law. One might call this a general fairness approach. Nordic 
law – that is Finnish, Swedish, Norwegian, Danish and Icelandic law – probably 
contains one of the best examples of this approach. The Nordic Contracts Acts 
include in Section 36 an internationally rather well-known provision, according 
to which a court may set aside or adjust a contract term, if its application leads 
to unfair results.13 This provision is applicable both to consumer contracts and 
to business-to-business relationships, and it covers both standard form contracts 
and individually negotiated terms, including the price. The hurdle for making 
use of the clause is considerably lower when dealing with standardised consumer 
contracts. This kind of approach is based on the recognition that contracting can 
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lead to unfair results in all kinds of relationships and with regard to all kinds of 
terms, and on the understanding that the court system of a just state should not 
be used to enforce substantive unfairness.
As there were at least four different approaches adopted in Europe with regard 
to the regulation of contractual unfairness, the drafting of the European Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive was a challenge. How could these differences be recon-
ciled in a way that was acceptable to all Member States?
The task was made somewhat easier by the fact that the practical consequences of 
the different approaches were not as different as one could expect. In all approaches 
– even the general fairness approach – there is in the overwhelming majority of cases 
of disagreement between contractual parties no reason for applying the unfairness 
provisions. And in that margin where unfairness does occur, very many of the cases 
concern consumer contracts based on standard forms – covered by all approaches. 
So the cases in which the differences between the approaches would gain relevance 
are perhaps not so many as one might expect. But certainly there are such cases.
In the Unfair Contract Terms Directive the problem of harmonizing such dif-
ferent approaches was solved through two aspects that made the Directive accept-
able and easy to implement for the Member States, with provisions based on the 
second, third and fourth approaches. The Directive is focused on the most impor-
tant group of cases, that is consumer contracts based on standard forms (a kind 
of combination of the second and third models), and other situations have been 
left outside its scope. However, in order to accommodate the remaining parts of 
the second and third models as well as the fourth model, the Directive was made 
a minimum harmonisation directive that allowed Member States to have more 
stringent rules than the Directive prescribed. In national law, it was still possible to 
protect consumers against individualised terms, as well as to have unfairness rules 
for business-to-business contracts which are outside the scope of the Directive. 
The amendments of national laws because of the Directive therefore were 
often of minor importance. Only for countries like the UK, representing the 
first approach with little general regulation of unfairness, the Directive required 
thorough changes. First implemented by the UK in Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulation 1994, in 2015 the provisions on unfair contracts terms in 
consumer contracts were included in the Consumer Rights Act, Part 2.
The Directive in this way pushed a new standard into English contract law, 
the principle of fairness and good faith which might in a longer perspective have 
even broader implications. In a well-known paper, the German legal theorist 
Gunther Teubner therefore has called the good faith principle of the Directive 
a ‘legal irritant’ in English law, in many unforeseen ways affecting the English 
legal  landscape, perhaps for example by triggering ‘deep, long-term changes from 
highly formal rule-focused decision-making in contract law toward a more discre-
tionary principle-based judicial reasoning.’14 
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20 In addition to the issues mentioned below there are a couple of cases stating that the 
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The main content and goals of the Directive
The drafting of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive started as early as the 
1970s.15 The goal was ambitious. In the first proposals of the Commission the 
Directive had a wide sphere of application, covering both individually negotiated 
and standard form contracts.16 Later the scope was limited to a term ‘which has 
not been individually negotiated’ (Art. 3). 
The limitation of the scope reflected criticism, in particular in German legal 
literature, according to which the fairness control of individually negotiated con-
tracts was in conflict with private autonomy and the functioning of the market 
economy.17 This reflected the German standard form contract approach to unfair-
ness. Autonomy and real consent should be the guiding principles of unfairness 
regulation. In this perspective it is understandable that the Directive has been said 
to represent ‘a victory for the consumer choice perspective’.18
In the preamble of the Directive the consumer protection goal is addressed in 
the language of abuse of power: ‘acquirers of goods and services should be pro-
tected against the abuse of power by the seller or supplier, in particular against 
one-sided standard contracts and the unfair exclusion of essential rights in con-
tracts’ (Recital 9). At the same time the internal market aspect is underlined as 
well. It is noted that varying rules on unfair contracts may lead to distortions of 
competition and also deter active internal market consumers from making pur-
chases in other Member States (Recitals 2 and 5). The idea of the confident 
cross-border shopping consumer, which has been referred to as a reason for much 
European regulation,19 has already appeared in the context of this Directive.
Considering the Directive is primarily concerned with standard form contracts 
and is based on the internal market perspective, one could claim that the Directive 
was aimed at promoting a reasonable standardisation of consumer contract forms 
to improve the operation of the single market. The free movement of standard 
contract forms could at least impliedly be seen as a basic goal of the Directive.
The compromise nature of the Directive, relating it to several of the European 
models mentioned above, is reflected in its sphere of application.20
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First, it covers only consumer contracts. The definitions of ‘consumer’, as ‘any 
natural person who … is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business 
or profession’, as well as of ‘seller and supplier’, as ‘any natural or legal person 
who … is acting for purposes relating to his trade, business or profession, whether 
publicly owned or privately owned’ are in line with similar definitions in other 
pieces of European consumer legislation and are analysed elsewhere in this vol-
ume.21 The CJEU has for example ruled that tenancy agreements,22 contracts for 
legal services,23 and certain securities given by a consumer24 are within the scope 
of the Directive.
Second, as mentioned above, the Directive only covers terms which have not 
been individually negotiated. Taken at face value, this seems to refer to standard 
contract terms, which obviously are at the core of the Directive. However, due 
to its compromise nature, the scope of the Directive is wider than just covering 
standard terms proper. It also covers ‘pre-formulated individual terms’, if they 
were not individually negotiated. A term is considered as not individually negoti-
ated if it is drafted in advance and the consumer has therefore not been able to 
influence its substance (Art. 3(2)). The burden of proof that a term has been 
individually negotiated lies on the seller or supplier who makes that claim (Art. 
3(2)). It does not matter how the not-individually negotiated terms are included 
in the contract. According to the preamble of the Directive oral agreements are 
also covered by the Directive (Recital 11).
The focus on terms that have not been individually negotiated is reinforced by 
the particular delimitation concerning the definition of the main subject matter of 
the contract and the adequacy of the price and remuneration, mentioned in Art. 
4(2) of the Directive. According to the Directive, terms relating to these issues 
are outside the scope of the unfairness clause. However, the terms are not com-
pletely outside the scope of the Directive, as they are covered by the requirement 
that they should be expressed in plain intelligible language. As will be shown 
later,25 this has been used to narrow the scope of the delimitation, as the transpar-
ency criteria have been set relatively high. 
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Third, contractual terms which reflect mandatory statutory or regulatory provi-
sions and provisions or principles of international conventions are not subject to 
the Directive (Art. 1(2)).26 More generally, statutory and regulatory provisions are 
excluded, when there is no contractual term altering the effect or ambit of those 
provisions.27 But the limitation does not preclude applying the Directive to con-
tract terms that reproduce a rule of national law to another category of contracts.28
The substantive rules of the Directive may also be divided into three groups.
First and foremost, the Directive attempts to formulate a European concept of 
unfairness. The basic rule of the Directive is a general clause, in Art. 3(1):
A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be 
regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a 
significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the 
contract, to the detriment of the consumer.
In addition, in Art. 4(1) the Directive contains some guidelines for the applica-
tion of the unfairness clause:
Without prejudice to Article 7, the unfairness of a contractual term shall be 
assessed, taking into account the nature of the goods or services for which 
the contract was concluded and by referring, at the time of conclusion of the 
contract, to all the circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract 
and to all the other terms of the contract or of another contract on which it 
is dependent.
These general clauses are supplemented by a fairly extensive list of examples on 
unfair contract terms (Annex). As the Annex is expressly described as being indic-
ative and non-exhaustive (Art. 3(3)) – a so-called grey-list – the fairly detailed 
nature of the Annex does not narrow the rather broad scope of decision-making 
power given to the courts through the general clauses.29
In other words, the ways in which the courts apply Art. 3(1) and 4(1) are deci-
sive with regard to the question of whether the Directive reaches the goal that has 
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been set for it. This issue is very much at the core of the following analysis. As will 
be shown, one can find both a fairly strong respect for the various national legal 
cultures in the practice of the CJEU, but lately also some steps towards a more 
truly European concept of unfairness. 
Secondly, the Directive contains a provision on interpretation. In Art. 5 the 
Directive emphasises the significance of plain, intelligible language.30 As men-
tioned before, this requirement concerning plain intelligible language also covers 
terms relating to the definition of the main subject matter of the contract and 
to the adequacy of the price and remuneration, even though these terms are not 
subject to assessment based on the unfairness clause (Art. 4(2)).
As a consequence of breach of the requirement of plain intelligible language, 
the Directive confirms the principle of interpretation in dubio contra stipula-
torem. The interpretation most favourable to the consumer shall prevail. The 
Directive also states the obvious, that this rule shall not apply in collective injunc-
tion proceedings. It can of course not be a defence in such proceedings that the 
most favourable interpretation of an unclear term is not to be considered unfair. 
An objective interpretation allows for more frequent prohibition of unintelligible 
or ambiguous terms.31
Third, the main remedies and legal consequences of unfairness are defined by 
the Directive. The sanctions are both individual contract law remedies, as well as 
collective preventive measures. 
As to contract law proper, the Directive states that unfair terms shall not be 
binding on the consumer (Art. 6(1)). The preventive measures again are defined 
through a phrase well-known from other directives. The Member States shall 
ensure that adequate and effective means exist to prevent the continued use of 
unfair terms in consumer contracts (Art. 7(1)). The provision expressly requires 
the acceptance of organizational action (Art. 7(2)) and includes business associa-
tions that recommend the use of standard terms in the sphere of possible defend-
ants (Art. 7(3)). The provisions on remedies will be described in somewhat more 
detail later (see ‘The next step: A procedural Jack-in-the-box’), as the proce-
dural law context has become a focal area for European courts and the CJEU in 
Europeanising the unfair contract terms agenda.
The section on remedies also contains a rule related to choice of law, to 
strengthen the mandatory, non-exclusion nature of the Directive. Member States 
are obliged to take necessary measures to ensure that the consumer does not 
lose the protection of the Directive by virtue of the choice of the law of a non-
Member country, if the contract has a close connection with the territory of the 
Member States. This vague provision allows for various national interpretations. 
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However, the vagueness cannot be removed through more precise national rules. 
‘Close connection’ may be concretised by means of presumptions only, not by a 
combination of predetermined criteria.32 As case law is scarce, it is hard to assess 
the harmonisation effect and the consumer protection value of this provision, and 
it will not be dealt with further in this chapter.
The fact that the fairness assessment of the Directive cannot be applied to 
contract terms that have been individually negotiated, to terms that relate to the 
definition of the main subject matter of the contract and to terms relating to the 
adequacy of the price and remuneration does not preclude, because of the mini-
mum nature of the Directive, national fairness rules that cover individual terms, 
the main subject matter of the contract as well as the price.33 
The continuing existence of a large variety of solutions in Europe has troubled 
the Commission. A project for a turn into a more harmonised legal landscape was 
started. The plans for a Consumer Rights Directive were elaborated, consolidat-
ing both unfairness legislation, as well as other consumer contracts legislation, 
in one maximum harmonisation directive.34 However, as to the issue of unfair 
contract terms, the basic starting points of the Member States were so different, 
based on deep ideological commitments, that no sufficient agreement could be 
reached. With regard to the very different approaches in the various Member 
States (above, see ‘The Unfair Contract Terms Directive as a European compro-
mise’) and the fairly nationally geared practice based on the Directive (below, 
‘Back to national culture’) this result is not surprising.
The only result of this exercise regarding unfair terms was a new informa-
tion provision in the Directive on Consumer Rights.35 Article 32 provides that 
a Member State that adopts more stringent provisions on unfair terms than pre-
scribed by the Directive shall inform the EU Commission thereof. In particular 
such information should be given on provisions extending the unfairness assess-
ment to individually negotiated contractual terms or to the adequacy of the 
price or remuneration or lists of contractual terms considered to be unfair. The 
Commission shall ensure that this information is accessible to consumers and 
traders, inter alia, on a dedicated website and shall inform the other Member 
States and the Parliament. The goal of this provision seems to be transparency. 
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The businesses and consumers of the Union should be aware of the various pos-
sibilities legally to interfere against unfairness of core terms within the Member 
States. But the value is obviously reduced by the fact that it covers only new 
national provisions. Therefore, the main aim of the information requirement 
might be the creation of a light incentive against new provisions going further 
than the Directive. But this is, of course, far from the original maximum harmo-
nisation goal of the project.
The failed attempt to reform the Directive, resulting only in a notification 
duty, shows that the turn towards full harmonisation noted as one theme of this 
book has exceptions. The Unfair Contract Terms Directive rather indicates a 
sensibility towards basic national legal convictions. As will be shown in next sec-
tion, this is reflected in case law of the CJEU as well. In addition, one might even 
claim that recent case law concerning the Directive indicates a commitment of 
the Court towards the original consumer protection-driven thinking rather than 
the ethos of market integration, expressed in the development of the Directive 
towards a more actively used consumer protection measure (see sections ‘Steps 
towards a free-standing consumer protection measure’ and ‘The next step: 
A procedural Jack-in-the-box’).
Back to national culture
A basic tension in the case law concerning the Unfair Contract Terms Directive 
arises in the relationship between European provisions on unfairness and national 
contract law provisions concerning the rights and obligations of the parties under 
a contract. As the latter are not harmonised it is difficult to develop a detailed 
European practice on unfair terms, recognizing that one of the arguments to 
take into account in the assessment on unfairness is the extent to which the term 
to be evaluated differs from the non-mandatory default rules of national law to 
be applied to the contract. The assessment of whether a term increases the obli-
gations of the consumer or limits the rights of the consumer in an unfair man-
ner requires knowledge of what obligations or rights the consumer would have 
without the term, and that knowledge is normally found in national law. This 
point of departure is natural in the Continental context, where often detailed 
non-mandatory default rules are understood as an essential part of the rules of 
the contractual relationship, but also from a common law perspective it has been 
argued that ‘default rules have a key role to play’.36
In many cases, the CJEU has been quite sensitive to this tension between the 
European and the national domains. References back to national law are numer-
ous. The Court acknowledges the variety of European legal cultures in the appli-
cation of the Directive. Not only does the minimum harmonisation character of 
the Directive allow various solutions for the Member States, but, according to 
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the practice of the CJEU, national variations are unavoidable also in the detailed 
application of the common rules.
This attitude can be seen in rulings concerning the delimitations of the scope 
of the Directive. For example, on the limitation of the scope not to cover con-
tractual terms which reflect mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions (Art. 
1(2)), the CJEU has repeatedly stated that it is for the national court to deter-
mine whether a term reflects the content of a mandatory statutory or regulatory 
provision.37
A similar approach is taken towards the delimitation of scope mentioned in 
Art. 4(2). In jurisdictions where the scope of the fairness rule is delimited in the 
way that the Directive foresees, it is to a great extent left to the national courts 
to evaluate whether a certain term relates to the main subject matter of the con-
tract. In Árpád Kásler,38 dealing with a term in a foreign currency loan agree-
ment, according to which the currency selling rate was applied for the purpose 
of calculating the repayment instalments, the CJEU found, as to the question 
whether this term could be considered to relate to the main subject matter of the 
contract, that ‘it is for the national court to ascertain having regard to the nature, 
general scheme and stipulations of the contract and its legal and factual context, 
that that term lays down an essential obligation of that agreement which, as such 
characterises it’.
The tension between European unfairness regulation and national contract 
law of course is most visible in the unfairness assessment itself, in the application 
of the general clause in Art. 3(1) and its concretising general clause in Art. 4(1). 
Consequently, also in this core area of the Directive, much of the assessment of 
unfairness is left to the national courts. 
The landmark case in which the role of national assessment is very clearly 
stated is Freiburger Kommunalbauten.39 According to this decision, the national 
court had to decide whether a contractual term in a building contract requiring 
the whole of the price to be paid before the performance by the seller or supplier 
could be regarded as unfair. The CJEU here emphasised that in the assessment of 
unfairness the consequences of the term under applicable law had to be taken into 
account and that therefore consideration should be given to the national law. So 
even though the CJEU could interpret the general criteria defining the concept 
Unfair contract terms 143
40 Freiburger Kommunalbauten, para 22.
41 See e.g. C-76/10 Pohotovosť s.r.o. v Iveta Korčkovská [2010] ECR I-11557 (penalty clause 
in credit agreement) and C-472/10 Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v Invitel Távközlési 
Zrt. ECLI:EU:C:2012:242 (term on unilateral amendment of fees for a service).
42 Case C-415/11 Mohamed Aziz v Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya, Tarragona i Manresa 
(Catalunyacaixa) ECLI:EU:C:2013:164, para 76. So also C-226/12 Constructora 
Principado SA v José Ignacio Menéndez Álvarez ECLI:EU:C:2014:10. See on both cases 
below in ‘Steps towards a free-standing consumer protection measure’.
43 Mohamed Aziz, para 66.
44 Joined cases C-240/98 to C-244/98 Océano Grupo Editorial SA v Roció Murciano 
Quintero and Salvat Editores SA v José M. Sánchez Alcón Prades, José Luis Copano Badillo, 
Mohammed Berroane and Emilio Viñas Feliú [2000] ECR I-4941.
45 Freiburger Kommunalbauten, para 23.
46 C-137/08 VB Pénzügyi Lízing Zrt. v Ferenc Schneider [2010] ECR I-10847 (jurisdiction 
clause must be regarded as unfair, in so far as it causes significant imbalance), C-243/08 
Pannon GSM Zrt v Erzsébet Sustikné Győrfi [2009] ECR I-4713 (national court to 
determine).
of unfair terms, ‘it should not rule on the application of these general criteria to 
a particular term, which must be considered in the light of the particular circum-
stances of the case in question.’40 Therefore, it is for the national court to decide 
whether the term is to be regarded as unfair.
This line of reasoning is followed up in other cases.41 Even in the landmark 
cases for developing a European doctrine of unfairness, for example Mohamed 
Aziz,42 the Court starts its conclusion by noting that the concept of ‘significant 
imbalance’ has to be ‘assessed in the light of an analysis of the rules of national 
law’ in order to determine to what extent the consumer is placed in a less favour-
able position. In its reasoning the Court noted it as being ‘clear’ that the national 
court had to determine the fate of the contractual term under scrutiny, whilst the 
CJEU could only provide guidance.43 
However, case law of the CJEU is not completely coherent in this respect. 
In the well-known Océano case,44 the CJEU had declared a jurisdiction clause, 
according to which the court at the seller’s place had jurisdiction in respect of all 
disputes arising from the contract, unfair, instead of leaving that assessment to the 
national court. This triggered an explanation by the court in the case Freiburger 
Kommunalbauten, in which the Court basically referred to the obvious character 
of the unfairness of the jurisdiction clause, being solely to the benefit of the seller 
and containing no benefit in return for the consumer, which made it unneces-
sary to assess it in relation to national law.45 Later case law on similar jurisdiction 
clauses, however, seems ambivalent, bringing the assessment even of these clauses 
at least in principle under the main rule that the evaluation of unfairness of con-
crete terms should be made by the national court.46 But the CJEU may give fairly 
detailed guidance on the assessment of such clauses, as well as other clauses in 
the Annex.
The eagerness to strike more or less directly at one-sided jurisdiction clauses 
may relate to the fact that the CJEU has been particularly active in safeguarding 
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the procedural rights of consumers when applying the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive. A similar attitude seems to be prevailing in Sebestyén47 in which the 
CJEU left the assessment of unfairness of an arbitration clause to the national 
court to determine, but at the same time gave very concrete criteria for the 
assessment of such an arbitration clause which most likely would lead to a find-
ing of unfairness. The extensive use of the Directive to support the consumer 
procedurally is more closely described below (see ‘The next step: A procedural 
Jack-in-the-box’).
In any event, the general rule remains paramount. According to the practice 
of the CJEU, the assessment of the unfairness of a specific term shall be made by 
the national court, taking into account both all the circumstances of the case and 
the national legal context which the term is a part of. However, this acknowl-
edgement of the national legal context has, during later years, been accompanied 
by a growing willingness of the CJEU to concretise the assessment, to establish 
more concrete criteria for the application of the general clauses, but – at least 
until now –48 still respecting the national assessment of particular terms. This slow 
emergence of pieces of a European doctrine of unfairness is described in the next 
section of the chapter.
National courts have gladly made use of the leeway that the Freiburger 
Kommunalbauten doctrine offers them to make their own assessments of unfair-
ness. In Europe, despite the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, fairness decisions 
are still to a large extent made at the national level. And with differing basic 
ideologies one can certainly not expect identical practical results. Courts from dif-
ferent jurisdictions naturally read the general clauses of the Directive in the light 
of their traditional national doctrines.49 It will be interesting to see whether and 
how the gradual emergence of Europeanised principles, as analysed in the next 
section, will be received by European national courts, used to making concrete 
assessments of unfairness quite independently.
One good illustration, among others, of the difficulties to come is given by the 
much-cited English case First National Bank,50 in fact decided before Freiburger 
Kommunalbauten. The decision and reasoning of the House of Lords indicate 
a preference for avoiding too much Europeanisation of the issue, even though 
the Court accepted the European starting point. Not only was the concrete 
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assessment of the unfairness of a term kept at the national level (although argu-
ably there should have been made a reference to the CJEU), but the assessment 
criteria were further elaborated nationally. In the words of Lord Bingham: 
If the meaning of the test were doubtful, or vulnerable to the possibility 
of differing interpretations in differing member states, it might be desir-
able or necessary to seek a ruling from the European Court of Justice on 
its interpretation. But the language used in expressing the test, so far as 
applicable in this case, is in my opinion clear and not reasonably capable of 
differing interpretations.… The requirement of good faith in this context is 
one of fair and open dealing. Openness requires that the terms should be 
expressed fully, clearly and legibly, containing no concealed pitfalls or traps. 
Appropriate prominence should be given to terms which might operate dis-
advantageously to the customer. Fair dealing requires that a supplier should 
not, whether deliberately or unconsciously, take advantage of the consumer’s 
necessity, indigence, lack of experience, unfamiliarity with the subject mat-
ter of the contract, weak bargaining position or any other factor listed in or 
analogous to those listed in Schedule 2 of the regulations. Good faith in this 
context is not an artificial or technical concept; nor, since Lord Mansfield was 
its champion, is it a concept wholly unfamiliar to British lawyers. It looks to 
good standards of commercial morality and practice.
The ease with which Lord Bingham finds the general clause not allowing for dif-
fering interpretations in differing Member States is surprising. And so is the self-
evident way in which the more concrete criteria for applying the fairness test are 
described. But the case shows very clearly the tensions between national context 
and Europeanised application of the Directive.51 The possible striving towards a 
European doctrine on unfairness will certainly clash with national doctrines, so 
far acknowledged to have relatively much leeway by Freiburger Kommunalbauten 
and subsequent case law.
A part of the Directive that directly relates to the assessment of concrete terms 
is the Annex. It enumerates 17 cases of terms which may be regarded as unfair. 
However, as the Annex only contains an indicative and non-exhaustive list of 
potentially unfair terms (Art. 3(3)), it has not become a vehicle for developing a 
substantive European doctrine on unfairness. The CJEU has clearly stated that 
the indicativeness of the list implies that a term on the list does not necessarily 
have to be deemed unfair and, on the other hand, that the absence of a term from 
the list does not prevent it from being considered unfair.52 Therefore it is up to 
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the Member States how to implement the list, whether by legislation or, as in the 
Nordic countries, through a description of the list in the travaux prèparatoires, 
as long as the way of implementation offers a sufficient guarantee that the public 
can obtain knowledge of it.53 
This does not mean that the list in the Annex lacks importance. It is certainly, 
at least in some jurisdictions, used in practice for example as a kind of a check list. 
The Annex also seems to have increasing relevance even in CJEU case law. Even 
though the CJEU tends to leave decisions on particular terms to national courts, 
it nevertheless, and to a growing extent, makes reference to particular terms in 
the Annex in its reasoning.54 One may foresee the CJEU gradually generating 
a European understanding of the list.55 It should be noted, however, that even 
in the case that has been referred to as a landmark in the move towards a more 
Europeanised doctrine of unfairness, Mohamed Aziz,56 the CJEU expressly stated 
that the Directive must be interpreted as meaning that the Annex contains only 
an indicative and non-exhaustive list of terms which may be regarded as unfair.
The interventions of the CJEU are not the only judicial means for affect-
ing the level of harmonisation of court practice related to the Unfair Contract 
Terms Directive. One might also foresee what could be called a ‘free movement 
of legal ideas’ directly across the national borders.57 The various national courts 
could learn from each other. In order to facilitate such learning processes the 
Commission sponsored an extensive collection of cases – both cases from the time 
before the Directive and cases applying the legislation based on the Directive – 
which were published freely available on the web as CLAB Europe.58 However, 
the relatively abstract and sometimes even unintelligible level of reporting in com-
bination with the large amount of materials of varying quality that was received 
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were probably the reasons why this material never seemed to have any impact. 
The project is now closed.59 There still seems to be little horizontal movement of 
unfairness reasoning across the European borders. The Directive has so far not 
functioned as a catalyst for such an indirect harmonisation effect.
Summing up, it is easy to see that the Directive so far has not even in its 
heartland – in which the differences following from the minimum character of 
the Directive and its scope of application should be less prominent – been able to 
introduce a joint European approach to the issue of unfair contract terms. The 
idea of an area in which standard conditions could move freely across the borders, 
with similar legal consequences, has not materialised. Seen from the perspective 
of free movement of terms, the Directive is a failure. Still, if the Directive con-
tributes to the removal of what one could call fairness-based hidden traps60 for 
those doing cross-border trade, it has achieved something. And from a consumer 
protection point of view, the fairly strong emphasis on the national context is 
probably commendable, bearing in mind the variations in consumer culture and 
consumer expectations between the Member States.61 
In fact, one may even assume that the Directive in one way works against the 
free movement of standard conditions. It has been argued that the requirement 
concerning intelligibility of terms implies that the consumer should receive them in 
an intelligible language, such as the mother tongue of the consumer.62 If this is the 
case, terms would not be able to move freely across the borders without translation.
Steps towards a free-standing consumer protection measure
There is a certain emphasis on national law on the European unfair contract 
terms scene, following both from the minimum character of the Unfair Contract 
Terms Directive, and from the application of the Directive by the CJEU. 
However, there is another side of the coin as well. In much decision-making 
concerning the Directive, a focal issue is the balancing between the necessary 
relationship to national law and legal culture and the striving for a genuinely 
autonomous European understanding of unfairness. It seems that the European 
side of the balance has been given more weight in the more recent case law of the 
CJEU. The Court is said to have kissed awake the ‘Sleeping Beauty’.63 There is 
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a growing number of signs of a turn towards the development of more common 
European standards. 
It should, however, be emphasised that even such decisions that are attempt-
ing to develop genuinely European principles contain clear national references, 
both on substance and procedure. The question is not an either-or issue, it is a 
question of how to balance the national and the European assessment. Now the 
materials on the European side of the balance seem to be increasing. The CJEU 
has found it necessary to expressly recognise the European side of the balance:
Article 267 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that the jurisdiction of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union extends to the interpretation of the 
concept of ‘unfair term’ used in Article 3(1) of Council Directive 93/13/
EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts and in the annex 
thereto, and to the criteria which the national court may or must apply when 
examining a contractual term in the light of the provisions of that Directive, 
bearing in mind that it is for that court to determine, in the light of those 
criteria, whether a particular contractual term is actually unfair in the circum-
stances of the case.64
An often-cited landmark case showing the readiness of the CJEU to start building 
a genuinely European unfairness test is Mohamed Aziz.65 As mentioned before, 
however, even in this case the CJEU first noted the need for basing the significant 
imbalance test on an analysis of national law. But the Court then continued:
in order to assess whether the imbalance arises ‘contrary to the requirement 
of good faith’, it must be determined whether the seller or supplier, dealing 
fairly and equitably with the consumer, could reasonably assume that the 
consumer would have agreed to the term concerned in individual contract 
negotiations.
Here the CJEU introduced a new, truly European, standard for assessing the 
fairness of a term, a hypothetical test concerning what the consumer might agree 
to. One could call the test, for example, a possible agreement test, reflecting what 
could be called a ‘reasonable supplier standard’.66 According to this test the stand-
ard of acceptable, fair terms should be defined with reference to what a consumer 
would have agreed to in individual contract negotiations. The test also includes 
an assessment of the behaviour of the seller or supplier. The decisive issue is what 
the business could reasonably assume about the readiness of the consumer to 
accept the term.
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The possible agreement test introduced by the CJEU in a way overcomes 
the discussions on whether, in addition to substantive unfairness, the Directive 
requires procedural unfairness as well to trigger the sanctions of the Directive. In 
other word, is it sufficient that the content of a term is significantly imbalanced, 
or does the consumer have to show some breach of good faith in the procedures 
leading to the contract as well?67 The possible agreement test, asking what the 
business could assume, at a first glance seems to imply a procedural approach to 
good faith. On a closer reading, however, it rather underscores the substantive 
approach, as it asks what the business ‘could reasonably assume’, underlining 
that there must be some substantive limits to what can be assumed. The focus is 
not on what the business actually assumed, but on what it had good reasons for 
assuming. 
Other examples of more recent cases in which the CJEU has attempted to con-
cretise European principles for the assessment of unfairness can be mentioned. 
Some statements are rather obvious, like the requirement that in the unfairness 
assessment, the court must take account of all the other terms of the contract.68 
Others contain clarifications that obviously deepen and delimit the understand-
ing of the approach to unfairness established by the Directive. In Constructora 
Principado,69 for example, the Court ruled that ‘significant imbalance’ according to 
the Directive does not require significant economic impact on the consumer, not 
even with regard to the value of the transaction. It suffices that the term leads to a 
serious impairment of the legal situation of the consumer, as compared to relevant 
national law.
These decisions do introduce elements of a free-standing European doctrine of 
unfairness. Still the development of more concrete guidelines for the assessment 
of unfairness does not as such run counter to the Freiburger Kommunalbauten 
doctrine, according to which the national courts should make the concrete assess-
ment of the term under dispute against the backdrop of national law. In principle, 
the balance between the European and the national levels, as sketched in the 
previous section, is not undermined by these decisions.
However, in some recent cases the CJEU has added weight to the European 
side of the balance. Without directly proclaiming a particular term to be unfair, 
the Court has engaged in an extensive analysis of the criteria that have to be 
taken into account in the national decision concerning that term. The criteria are 
described in such detail that there is not very much left for national evaluation.
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A good example is the case Banco Popular Español,70 in which the CJEU 
underlined which arguments it considered to be of decisive importance, even 
though it left the final assessment to the national court: 
Article 3(1) and (3) of Directive 93/13 and Points 1(e) and (g) and 2(a) of the 
annex thereto must be interpreted as meaning that, in order to assess the unfair-
ness of a contractual term accelerating the repayment of a mortgage, such as 
that at issue in the main proceedings, the following are of decisive importance:
•  whether the right of the seller or supplier to cancel the contract unilater-
ally is conditional upon the non-compliance by the consumer with an 
obligation which is of essential importance in the context of the contrac-
tual relationship in question,
•  whether that right is provided for in cases in which such non-compliance 
is sufficiently serious in the light of the contractual term and amount of 
the loan,
•  whether that right derogates from the rules applicable in the absence of 
agreement between the parties, so as to make it more difficult for the 
consumer, given the procedural means at his disposal, to take legal action 
and exercise rights of the defence, and
•  whether national law provides for adequate and effective means enabling 
the consumer subject to such a contractual term to remedy the effects of 
the unilateral cancellation of the loan agreement.
It is for the national court to make such an assessment on the basis of the 
specific circumstances of the case before it.
Also in some other recent cases the CJEU has attempted to steer the decision-
making of the national court in quite some detail.71 
Some features of an emerging European doctrine of unfairness may indeed be 
visible in the practice of the CJEU, as described here. They improve and refine 
Unfair contract terms 151
72 Chapter 2, pp.67–69; also Chapter 1, pp.27–31
73 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, Recital 18, referring to case law based on C-210/96 
Gut Springenheide GmbH and Rudolf Tusky v Oberkreisdirektor des Kreises Steinfurt - Amt 
für Lebensmittelüberwachung [1998] ECR I-4657.
74 C-453/10 Jana Pereničová, Vladislav Perenič v SOS financ, spol. s r. o. ECLI:EU:C:2012:144. 
See also C-76/10 Pohotovosť s.r.o. v Iveta Korčkovská [2010] ECR I-11557, according to 
which a failure to mention the APR according to the Consumer Credit Directive may be 
a decisive factor in the assessment whether a term is written in plain intelligible language 
according to the Unfair Contract Terms Directive.
75 And in the other direction, the use of unfair terms may constitute an unfair commercial 
practice, S Orlando, ‘The use of unfair contractual terms as an unfair commercial practice’. 
ERCL 7 (2011), pp.25–56.
76 C-26/13 Árpád Kásler, Hajnalka Káslerné Rábai v OTP Jelzálogbank Zrt ECLI:EU:C: 
2014:282, para 74.
the yardstick given to the national courts, when they make the final concrete 
assessment of the term in dispute. If this is the case, the following question is 
obvious: what kind of yardstick does the CJEU offer? What kind of consumers 
are protected by the Unfair Contract Terms Directive?
As described elsewhere in this volume,72 the ‘average consumer’ protected 
by the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive is a person who is believed to be 
‘reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect … as inter-
preted by the Court of Justice’.73 Is that the approach to be taken also when 
applying the Unfair Contract Terms Directive?
In Pereničová,74 the CJEU expressly analysed the issue of the relationship 
between the Unfair Contract Terms Directive and the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive. In this case, the alleged unfair practice consisted of a mis-
leading indication of the annual percentage rate of charge, whilst the issue con-
cerning the unfairness of terms related to the cost of the loan. According to the 
Court the unfairness of the commercial practice is to be seen as one element 
among others on which the assessment of the unfairness of the terms can be 
based.75 However, the unfairness of the commercial practice does not have a 
direct effect on the validity of the credit agreement. In other words, the relation-
ship between the two Directives is not direct and automatic, but indirect, related 
to the general assessment of unfairness. If the commercial practice is unfair, this 
is just an additional argument, but not more, for considering a term related to 
the practice unfair.
This does not, of course, mean that the approach towards the fairness yard-
stick could not be similar in relation to both Directives. Also in the case law 
concerning the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, reference is made to ‘the aver-
age consumer, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and 
circumspect’.76 However, when the CJEU then attempts to define what one may 
expect from such a consumer more precisely, it does not seem to be very demand-
ing. Whilst in relation to commercial practices, a consumer is supposed to have 
at least given some thought, e.g. to the content of advertisements, and not just 
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looked at their headings, a consumer is not supposed to have thoroughly read and 
tried to understand the standardised terms under scrutiny. As the Court seems to 
presuppose, quite rightly, that the consumer in most cases has no choice as to the 
terms offered, the requirements related to what the consumer should understand 
seem downplayed in its case law concerning the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. 
The difference in approach may be explained by the fact that for example in the 
Árpád Kásler case the focus is on the meaning of ‘plain intelligible language’ 
rather than ‘fairness’ as such.
As a starting point, also in connection with this Directive, the CJEU takes 
consumer autonomy seriously. This is reflected in the possible agreement test, 
as defined in the case Mohamed Aziz.77 The decisive test, according to this deci-
sion, is whether the business ‘could reasonably assume that the consumer would 
have agreed to the term concerned in individual contract negotiations’. But the 
consumer is here a very hypothetical figure. The yardstick focuses on what a con-
sumer reasonably would have agreed to, if the consumer would have had a chance 
to individually negotiate the term – a chance that in most cases the consumer 
does not have. So in fact, even though the possible agreement test pays tribute to 
the autonomous and active consumer, negotiating the terms, in fact it introduces 
a relatively objective and substantive test on the fairness of terms, the basic ques-
tion being: how much deviation from background law to the detriment of the 
consumer is it reasonable to accept? 
Even in cases in which the Unfair Contract Terms Directive clearly indicates 
a role for the active understanding of the consumer, by requiring terms to be 
drafted in plain, intelligible language (Art. 4(2) and Art. 5), the CJEU has shown 
considerable understanding for the weakness of the consumer in this respect. The 
hurdle for the transparency test to be fulfilled has been put relatively high. 
In Árpád Kásler78 and Van Hove,79 Art. 4(2) of the Directive, according to 
which terms on the main subject matter and the price are outside the scope of the 
unfairness test if they are drafted in plain intelligible language, the transparency 
test was given an interpretation bringing it much further than covering a purely 
linguistic understanding of the terms. The terms and their real consequences 
should also be economically understandable to the consumer. The terms should 
not only be ‘grammatically intelligible to the consumer’, but the specific func-
tioning of the term and the relationship to other terms of the contract should be 
set out transparently ‘so that that consumer is in a position to evaluate, on the 
basis of clear [precise], intelligible criteria, the economic consequences for him 
which derive from it.’80 The active consumer should have real tools to evaluate 
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the consequences of the terms. The consumer is not believed to be so circum-
spect that a pure grammatical intelligibility of the terms would be sufficient. 
To the extent possible, the information provided should neutralise information 
asymmetry between the parties.81
The CJEU has stated the requirement concerning enhanced intelligibility also 
in the assessment of procedural unfairness as an element of applying the gen-
eral clause of the Directive. In RWE,82 the Court said it to be of fundamental 
importance whether a contract in which an undertaking reserved the right to vary 
the charge for supply of gas ‘sets out in transparent fashion the reason for and 
method of those charges, so that the consumer can foresee, on the basis of clear, 
intelligible criteria, the alterations that may be made’. The Court here seems to 
interpret the transparency requirement as a duty to disclose certain information, 
to support the active consumer.83 
Looking at the case law from 2010 onwards, the CJEU is obviously striv-
ing to create at least some genuinely European principles concerning unfair-
ness, to at least somewhat counterbalance the necessary national elements of 
the assessment. The content of the decisions also seems to indicate relatively 
ambitious goals as to the level of consumer protection. Both the ‘possible 
agreement test’ of Mohamed Aziz, introducing what is probably a relatively 
strict substantive requirement, and the cases turning the transparency require-
ment into a kind of duty of disclosure, probably going beyond what a circum-
spect consumer would expect, show a commitment from the Court to deliver 
real consumer protection in this area. The Unfair Contract Terms Directive 
is treated as a useful vehicle for improving the position of consumers. This 
tendency is strengthened by further CJEU activism in the area of remedies 
and procedure which is more closely looked at in the next section. The ‘rea-
sonably circumspect’ consumer demands more transparency when the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive applies, and there are good reasons for this line of 
reasoning.84
Even though the developed duty of disclosure is there to support the decision-
making power of the active consumer, the relatively strict substantive approach 
in many of the principles indicates that the CJEU here has distanced itself from 
the strong information model predominant in other areas of European consumer 
law. The development could well be described as a gradual move towards a more 
insurance-like, welfarist approach to the issue of unfair contract terms. However, 
it is difficult to find explicit endorsement of such thinking in existing case law of 
the CJEU. 
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The next step: A procedural Jack-in-the-box
As described in the previous section, the CJEU seems to have been eager to 
enforce consumer protection by developing relatively advanced principles for the 
assessment of unfairness and transparency. With regard to the number of cases, 
however, the scene is not dominated by these rulings concerning substantive 
issues. The ECJ has been even more active, and one may even say legally creative, 
in safeguarding and developing the remedies against unfairness and protecting the 
procedural position of the consumer trying to enforce his or her rights according 
to the Directive. The Court has taken the requirement concerning adequate and 
effective means (Art. 7) and the general European principle of effectiveness very 
seriously in this context. 
This has meant two things. First, the CJEU has adopted a relatively forceful 
interpretation of the remedies included in the Directive (Art. 6 and 7), including 
for example a punitive element in the private law consequences of unfairness. 
Second, in order to safeguard the rights of the consumer under the Directive, 
the CJEU has moved into the heartland of civil procedure. It has turned the 
Directive into an instrument to fix new kinds of consumer protection issues, in 
particular in the area of procedural law. From the perspective of what one could 
expect on the basis of a contract law directive this turn can be regarded as so 
surprising that it could be called a very illustrative example of a – positive – Jack-
in-the-Box effect.
As to the private law remedies, the Directive (Art. 6(1)) prescribes that unfair 
terms shall not be binding on the consumer and the contract shall continue to 
bind the parties, if it is capable of continuing without the unfair terms. This 
implies that the unfair term cannot be adjusted by the Court, but should be com-
pletely disregarded. In case the continuation of the contract without the unfair 
term would lead to unfairness against the business, this should not be remedied. 
In this sense the Directive contains a punitive element directed against the busi-
ness. If the business uses unfair terms, it has to carry the risk that the contract 
becomes unfair against the business when these terms are eliminated. Such a 
punitive element is assumed to increase the preventive effect of the Directive.85
This understanding of the Directive was prevailing already after it was adopted.86 
The CJEU has several times emphasised this interpretation.87 National legislation 
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that allows a court to revise the content of a term that it has found unfair is 
considered to be precluded by the Directive.88 If a penalty clause, for example, 
is considered to be unfair, the court cannot reduce the amount of the penalty, 
but has to exclude the application of that clause in its entirety.89 Moreover, if the 
cumulative effect of several terms is unfair, then all the terms found unfair should 
be excluded.90 In case the contract cannot continue without any term on the 
issue, however, the national court may substitute the term with a supplementary 
provision of national law.91 
In a recent case, the CJEU has also ruled out national case law that would 
limit the restitutory effects of a finding of unfairness to amounts overpaid after 
the court decision.92 This decision can have huge economic consequences for 
businesses that might be facing considerable claims for repayment after a decision 
on unfairness.
In Art. 7 the Directive requires the Member States to ensure that adequate and 
effective means exist to prevent the continued use of unfair terms. Such means, 
according to the Directive, have to include provisions according to which ‘per-
sons or organisations, having a legitimate interest under national law in protect-
ing consumers,’ may take action before courts or administrative bodies to prevent 
the continued use of unfair terms. Such collective action may also be directed 
jointly against a number of businesses from the same economic sector or their 
associations which recommend the use of the terms.
It is not surprising that the CJEU has strived to safeguard the efficiency of 
the collective instrument of prevention as well.93 The Court has, for example, 
accepted far-reaching legal effects of such collective proceedings. Even though 
one may assume that an injunction against further use of an unfair term would 
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be the natural remedy in this context, the Court has accepted that the term is 
declared invalid in an action for injunction and, furthermore, that this effect 
includes consumers who were not party to the injunction proceedings, if the deci-
sion is taken by a body that according to national legislation can produce effects 
with regard to all relevant consumers.94 On the other hand, however, a collective 
action should not prevent consumers from bringing individual actions, if they 
want to dissociate themselves from the collective action.95 The impact of collec-
tive actions may be extended to identical contract terms used by traders who were 
not subject to a collective action which held that the term was unfair and which 
have been included in a national public register of unfair terms. This is subject to 
the proviso that a trader not party to the collective action resulting in the inclu-
sion on the register is able to challenge the conclusion that the terms used by 
that trader are equivalent to the term on the register.96 ‘Equivalent’ here seems 
to mean the substantive effect of the term rather than literal correspondence.97 
The CJEU has also insisted on having all parts of the provisions on collective 
enforcement of the Directive duly implemented. Italy was required by the Court 
to set up procedures that also could be directed against entities only recommend-
ing the use of unfair terms, without actually using them themselves.98 
However, the emphasis on the effectiveness of collective proceedings has not 
hindered the CJEU from recognising national procedural rules concerning such 
proceedings.99 
As noted above, the willingness of the CJEU to enhance the effect of the 
Unfair Contract Terms Directive has led to even more creative decisions in recent 
case law. It has brought the Court into areas of law when applying the Directive 
that one would not directly expect the Directive to have an impact on. 
In its case law, the CJEU has not only emphasised the active role of the con-
sumer as a contractual party. It has also made an effort to safeguard the procedural 
position of the consumer. Protection against unfairness in contract law is ineffective 
if the consumer does not have a reasonable possibility procedurally to plead that 
a term is unfair. So from the demand for fair contract terms there has been only a 
short step to a demand for fair procedure. This is a rather surprising effect of the 
Directive, as one could hardly foresee that a European directive dealing with unfair 
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contract terms suddenly might be used by the CJEU to reshape national proce-
dural laws. But this is what the Court has done, and in quite a long line of cases.
The CJEU, for example, has used the Directive against certain aspects of 
national procedural law on enforcement proceedings. One of the most-discussed 
cases also in this respect is, again, Mohamed Aziz.100 The case discusses Spanish 
procedural law, according to which the debtor could not object to the unfairness 
of a term of a loan agreement in mortgage enforcement proceedings. Such objec-
tions could be put forward only in separate declaratory proceedings. So what 
did the CJEU do, to protect the consumer against unfair terms? It declared that 
legislation to be in conflict with the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, as long 
as the court before which declaratory proceedings have been brought could not 
grant interim relief, in particular, the staying of the enforcement proceedings. In 
other words, the CJEU prescribed a new procedural remedy: it required a pos-
sibility of staying of the enforcement proceedings so that the possible unfairness 
could effectively be assessed. The basic message is that effectiveness requires that 
the decision-maker at some stage of the procedure should have a real opportunity 
to assess the fairness of the contract. The effectiveness of the Directive is under-
mined, if, for example, the consumer can face an enforcement order for payment 
without any fairness assessment during the proceedings.101
In particular the CJEU has attempted to downplay national requirements on 
procedural activity of the consumer. In order to make the Directive effective the 
Court has in several contexts demanded that the national court takes into account 
the possible unfairness of terms of its own motion. It is interesting to note that also 
in this context the CJEU seems to downplay standards of confident, active, and 
circumspect consumers, and admit that the consumer is likely to make omissions in 
the procedural setting as well. A functioning system of consumer protection should, 
therefore, allow courts to act on their own motion, at least in certain situations. In 
particular in common law countries, where judges less actively manage cases, this 
is startling, but the emphasis on courts acting on their own motion probably goes 
further than what has been the case in many continental jurisdictions as well.102
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The classic case is Cofidis,103 in which the CJEU ruled that a national time-
limit for the court’s power to set aside unfair terms of its own motion or following 
a plea by the consumer was precluded by the Directive. According to the Court, 
such a procedural rule would render the application of the protective rules in the 
Directive excessively difficult. This does not, of course, mean, however, that all 
procedural time-limits are forbidden by the Directive.104
The focus in Cofidis was predominantly on the issue concerning time limits. In 
other cases, there has been more emphasis on the power – and even duty105 – of 
the court to react on its own motion.106 This can early be seen in cases attempting 
to safeguard sufficient procedural options of the consumer. Already in Océano107 
the CJEU ruled that a national court should be able to determine of its own 
motion whether a jurisdiction clause was to be regarded as unfair. Similarly, 
according to Asturcom,108 a national court in an action for enforcement of an 
arbitration award made in the absence of the consumer is required to assess of 
its own motion the fairness of the arbitration clause – but only if the court under 
national law can make such an assessment in similar actions of a domestic nature. 
The readiness of the CJEU to assist the consumer, when questioning an arbitra-
tion clause, can be seen also in Mostaza Claro,109 according to which it should be 
possible for a national court to assess whether an arbitration clause was void and 
annul the arbitration award, even though the consumer had not pleaded invalid-
ity in the arbitration proceedings.
Such emphasis on the active role of the court is not, however, limited to issues 
of jurisdiction only. The CJEU has clearly in general terms underlined that the 
protection by the Directive should cover cases in which a consumer fails to raise 
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the unfairness of the term, for example because of unawareness or fear of costs. 
Therefore ‘[t]he national court is required to examine, of its own motion, the 
unfairness of a contractual term where it has available to it the legal and factual ele-
ments necessary for that task. Where it considers such a term to be unfair, it must 
not apply it, except if the consumer opposes that non-application.’110 The fairness 
for example of a penalty clause111 and a clause on interest on late payments112 should 
therefore be assessed by the court of its own motion. The court that has found a 
term unfair should also, without waiting for any application of the consumer, draw 
all the consequences of the finding and assess whether the contract can continue 
without the term.113 However, the requirement that the legal system should sup-
port the consumer more or less on its own motion is of course not unlimited. The 
CJEU has emphasised that ‘the principle of effectiveness cannot be stretched so far 
as to make up fully for the total inertia on the part of the consumer concerned’.114
The assistance of the court may be required during various stages of the 
 procedure. According to the CJEU, the court must be able to assess the fairness 
of the term of its own motion at any stage of the proceedings.115 In an appeal con-
cerning the validity of terms, the court should have the power to examine grounds 
for invalidity, if clearly apparent from what was submitted at first instance, and 
assess of its own motion the unfairness of the terms.116
In the light of this case law, the CJEU seems, to a certain extent, to underline the 
active role of national courts, requiring the courts to take unfairness into account of 
their own motion, as an important part of a European unfairness doctrine supposed 
to effectively protect the consumer. However, this does not mean that the Court 
has disregarded national procedural law. At least in principle, the Court has sub-
jected the active role of the courts to an understanding of what national law might 
accept. The Court has expressly recognised the principle of procedural autonomy 
of the Member States, but by noting that the procedural rules must not be less 
favourable for the consumer than those governing similar domestic actions (the 
principle of equivalence), it has been able to carry through a relativized demand for 
national courts to move of their own motion. If the court under internal procedural 
rules has the power to examine of its own motion whether a term is contrary to 
national rules of public policy, it must assess of its own motion the unfairness of 
160 Unfair contract terms
117 See e.g. C-168/05 Elisa María Mostaza Claro v Centro Móvil Milenium SL [2006] ECR 
I-10421, paras 35–38 and C-488/11 Dirk Frederik Asbeek Brusse, Katarina de Man 
Garabito v Jahani BV ECLI:EU:C:2013:341, para 44.
118 Similar references to procedural autonomy, the principle of equivalence and the 
principle of effectiveness are given, e.g. in C-168/05 Elisa María Mostaza Claro v 
Centro Móvil Milenium SL [2006] ECR I-10421, para 24, C-618/10 Banco Español de 
Crédito, S.A. v Joaquín Calderón Camino ECLI:EU:C:2012:349, para 46, C-415/11 
Mohamed Aziz v Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya, Tarragona i Manresa (Catalunyacaixa) 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:164, para 50, C-488/11 Dirk Frederik Asbeek Brusse, Katarina de 
Man Garabito v Jahani BV ECLI:EU:C:2013:341, para 42, C-8/14 BBVA SA, formerly 
Unnim Banc SA v Pedro Peñalva López, Clara López Durán, Diego Fernández Gabarro 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:731, para 24 and C-49/14 Finanmadrid EFC SA v Jesús Vicente Albán 
Zambrano, María Josefa García Zapata, Jorge Luis Albán Zambrano, Miriam Elisabeth 
Caicedo Merino ECLI:EU:C:2016:98, para 40.
119 C-40/08 Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL v Cristina Rodríguez Nogueira [2009] ECR 
I-9579 and C-76/10 Pohotovosť s.r.o. v Iveta Korčkovská [2010] ECR I-11557. Still the 
decisions have important repercussions on consumer arbitration law, see M Ebers, ‘From 
Océano to Asturcom: Mandatory consumer law, ex officio application of European Union 
law and res judicata’. European Review of Private Law 18 (2010), p.823.
120 C-397/11 Erika Jőrös v Aegon Magyarország Hitel Zrt. ECLI:EU:C:2013:340.
121 See also C-32/14 ERSTE Bank Hungary Zrt v Attila Sugár ECLI:EU:C:2015:637, 
accepting the national role of a notary issuing an enforcement clause without review of 
unfairness.
122 C-567/13 Nóra Baczó, János István Vizsnyiczai v Raiffeisen Bank Zrt ECLI:EU:C:2015:88. 
See also C-34/13 Monika Kušionová v SMART Capital a.s. ECLI:EU:C:2014:2189.
terms according to the Directive. In the reference to internal procedural opportu-
nities the Court has equalled the protection based on the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive with public policy117 which limits the restrictions on courts acting on their 
own motion that might follow from national law. In addition, it is said to follow 
from the principle of effectiveness that national rules are acceptable only if they do 
not render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise of rights con-
ferred by the Community legal order (the principle of effectiveness).118
The CJEU has also respected national arbitration law: with regard to an action 
concerning the enforcement of an arbitration award (issued without the partici-
pation of the consumer), it has prescribed that the court can set aside of its own 
motion an unfair arbitration clause or assess the unfairness of a penalty clause 
applied in the award – in fact set aside the arbitration award – only if it can 
carry out such an assessment in similar actions of a domestic nature, according 
to national procedural rules.119 And the power of an appeal court to examine of 
its own motion the fairness of terms is to be used ‘under its internal procedural 
rules’.120 These bows towards national procedural law are easy to understand and 
do not contravene the general approach.121 
There are also other decisions on national procedural rules in which such rules 
have been accepted, provided that they do not make the exercise of the rights of 
consumers excessively difficult. Whether this is the case has to be assessed by the 
national court.122 
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In this long line of cases the CJEU has performed an interesting balancing 
act, formally endorsing the procedural autonomy of the Member States, but at 
the same time developing European procedural principles aimed at strengthen-
ing the procedural position of the consumer in cases related to unfair contract 
terms. Such an active developing of European procedural principles, in particular 
concerning the ability of the national court to act of its own motion, has almost 
by necessity forced the Court to move further into the heartland of procedure 
and describe in more detail how the court should proceed when taking up the 
unfairness issue of its own motion. In Banif123 the CJEU, after having ascertained 
the right of the national court to declare a term invalid of its own motion, found 
it necessary in the operative part of the judgment to refer to the principle of audi 
alteram partem and therefore require the national court to inform the parties that 
it of its own motion had found a term unfair and invite the parties to set out views 
on that matter before the decision on validity was taken. This is a quite interest-
ing case of detailed steering of national procedures, in view of the procedural 
autonomy of the Member States.
The activity of the CJEU in the area described in this section of the paper, 
on issues of procedure, underscores how the Unfair Contract Terms Directive 
has become an important vehicle for the Court in an endeavour to build a 
Europeanised, but nationally anchored legal consumer protection policy. It is 
not surprising that many of these cases have dealt with issues related to credit 
and mortgage that have become acute because of the financial crisis. Some have 
therefore interpreted case law in this area as a judicial answer to the problems that 
the crisis has led to for European citizens: ‘Mr Mohamed Aziz and the thousands 
of Spanish homeowners who stand behind the Aziz-case highlight the macro-
economic dimension of household debt in our economies.’124 Looking at the 
cases, it is easy to agree that the consumer problems related to the financial cri-
sis have strongly contributed to the recent development of a case law in which 
the effectiveness of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive is taken seriously. In 
Mohamed Aziz the Court expressly underlined that the mortgaged property was 
the family home of the consumer and that he faced definitive and irreversible 
loss of his dwelling.125 The problems related to foreign currency mortgages in 
some of the Member States of Central and Eastern Europe have in a similar way 
promoted enforcement-related unfair terms litigation from those countries. The 
economic and financial crisis has led the CJEU to play a particularly important 
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role in developing unfair contract terms law.126 In addition to the numerous cases 
mentioned here, there is a considerable number of similar cases pending at the 
CJEU.
The line adopted by the CJEU, by scrutinising the procedural situation of the 
consumer, has forced European law to think of fairness more broadly than prob-
ably was anticipated. Fairness according to the Unfair Contract Terms Directive is 
not just about a fair balance of rights and obligations of the consumer under the 
contract, but also about how the legal order can safeguard the procedures for the 
consumer to obtain such a fair balance. 
Conclusions and ways forward
The history of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive and the case law evolved 
around it offer a good illustration of the tension between national needs, inter-
nal market needs and consumer protection goals. This Directive shows that the 
European turn towards further integration based on maximum harmonisation at 
the expense of high consumer protection standards that recognise local needs is 
not a coherent process that would be adopted without exceptions. In fact, the 
narrative told in this chapter rather demonstrates the opposite: in this area there 
is a continuing sensitivity towards national standards as well as an aspiration to 
reach effective consumer protection on a relatively high level.
Like many of the consumer protection directives from the time when the EU 
started building a European consumer law, the Unfair Contract Terms Directive 
is a minimum harmonisation directive. This situation has not been uncontested. 
The general drive towards maximum harmonisation included a plan to adopt 
a general maximum directive on consumer rights, in which the unfair contract 
terms rules would be included. However, because of resistance from several 
Member States this plan did not succeed. Only a small remnant of the debate 
was included in the Consumer Rights Directive Art. 32, in the form of a Member 
State obligation to inform about such new legislation that makes use of the mini-
mum character of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (see ‘The main content 
and goals of the Directive’ in fine). With regard to unfair contract terms the move 
towards maximum harmonisation has not been successful.
This is not, however, the only way in which national needs are recognised. 
Also in the case law of the CJEU, much decision-making power has been left to 
the national courts, which explicitly should take into account the national legal 
setting in making their assessments. Even though the CJEU has set some general 
criteria to define unfairness, it has usually left the assessment of the particular term 
at stake to the national court. This is reasonable, and perhaps even inevitable. As 
long as background contract law is not harmonised one cannot introduce a com-
pletely harmonised fairness doctrine. 
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In recent case law, however, there are indications of a certain shift towards 
increasing Europeanisation of the issue. The CJEU has started to build a col-
lection of European tests for determining unfairness. The ‘possible agreement 
test’ in Mohamed Aziz, directing the court to look at what the business could 
reasonably assume the consumer to agree to, is probably the best example. The 
CJEU has also in other respects concretised its guidance to the national courts 
to be used in their fairness assessment. However, even in such cases that clearly 
introduce at least elements of a genuinely European doctrine of unfairness, the 
final assessment of the particular term at hand is left to the national court. In the 
cases the necessity to make the concrete fairness assessment on the background of 
national law is still recognised, at least in principle.
Looking ahead one should not, however, understand the national and 
European assessments only as opposites where the increasing weight of one 
decreases the importance of the other. Rather one should see them both as vital 
parts of a European discourse on unfairness. Even with the necessary national per-
spective included and retained, the explicit European protection against unfair-
ness increases the transparency of legal reasoning in the European system. Even 
though Europe does not have a joint fairness doctrine, European contract law can 
have a shared fairness discourse. Such a discourse, at least in the long run, could 
make the whole system more transparent. It would facilitate the free movement 
of legal ideas, increasing the learning potential of European consumer law. It 
would bring to the fore the various forms of fairness reasoning behind traditional 
contract law doctrines and thereby both make the system more efficient, focusing 
of open rather than covert tools of fairness control, and increase legal foresee-
ability at the European level. For businesses and consumers it would – at least 
somewhat – increase the possibilities to know and understand the working of 
contract law in different Member States. 
Also, with regard to the level of consumer protection the emerging elements 
of a free-standing European unfairness doctrine in the case law of the CJEU 
seem to differ from the general tendency of EU consumer law. The Court does 
not seem to make as high demands on the consumer’s circumspectness in com-
parison to some other areas of consumer law (see ‘Steps towards a free-stand-
ing consumer protection measure’). The interpretation of the transparency test 
in the Unfair Contract Terms Directive has been relatively consumer-friendly, 
focusing on what is economically understandable for the consumer rather than 
just on grammatical intelligibility. And more importantly, the possible agree-
ment test in Mohamed Aziz is much more substantive, as it asks what one reason-
ably could assume that a purely hypothetical individually negotiating consumer 
would accept.
Summing up, it seems that the locally sensitive consumer protection focus of 
the Unfair Contract Terms Directive has been maintained, and even developed 
further in case law of the CJEU. This chapter does not confirm one of the main 
theses of our book, on the tendency towards increased maximum harmonisation. 
It rather illustrates the exception to the rule. It shows that there is still room also 
for a consumer-oriented, culturally sensitive European consumer policy.
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This impression of a consumer protection-sensitive CJEU is enhanced when 
looking at the rather abundant case law related to enforcement and procedural 
issues (see ‘The next step: A procedural Jack-in-the-box’). The Court has been 
actively engaged in protecting the procedural position of the consumer in order 
to strengthen the effects of the Directive. It has proceeded far into the heart-
land of procedural law, much further than one at the outset would expect the 
Directive to reach. The case law concerning the Directive illustrates very well the 
drive towards improving the enforcement of European consumer law. In par-
ticular it shows the willingness of the Court to use the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive as an instrument to mitigate the harsh consequences for the consum-
ers of the European financial crisis, in their relationships to the banks and other 
creditors. However, at least formally, this intrusion into procedural law is usually 
done together with a rider referring to what is possible according to national law.
The relatively positive assessment of the present state of law does not rule 
out further improvements of the situation from the point of view of consumer 
protection. The goals could be made clearer, underlining insurance-like welfarist 
thinking and also consumer transaction cost arguments. One of the key issues 
in discussing the understanding of the fairness test is the relationship between 
substantive and procedural fairness, that is between the fairness of the substantive 
content of the contract and the fairness of the contracting procedure. In an insur-
ance-like approach the emphasis would be on substantive fairness. In Mohamed 
Aziz, the CJEU – through the ‘possible agreements’ test – indeed seems to favour 
a relatively substantive assessment, but admittedly the case is open to more proce-
dural interpretation as well. The substantive test could be made even clearer. One 
might, for example, explore the possibilities of building further on the principle of 
legitimate expectations, traditionally regarded as one of the guiding principles of 
EU private law127 and performing well in the insurance-covered area of products 
liability. In fact, already in the preparation stage of the Directive the proposal was 
made that a term should be considered unfair if it ‘causes the performance of the 
contract to be significantly different from what the consumer could legitimately 
expect’.128 In fact the ‘possible agreement test’ offered by the CJEU seems to be 
quite close to the legitimate expectations test, but it focuses more clearly on the 
contracting situation, as the present wording of the Directive requires. If given 
a clearly substantive interpretation this test might therefore appear more focused 
than the relatively vague legitimate expectation test.
As the reasoning and ruling should be more geared towards the substantive 
content rather than the contracting procedure, one might also question the 
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limitations of scope of the Directive. The limitation to terms which have not been 
individually negotiated has been criticised not only from a consumer protection 
point of view, but also with regard to the difficulties of drawing the exact borders 
of the exclusion and the possibilities for traders to exploit the situation.129 The 
same kinds of criticism can be directed towards the exclusion of the main subject 
matter of the contract (and perhaps to some extent towards the exclusion of the 
price as well). From this point of view the attempt of the CJEU to narrow the 
effect of the limitation through a rather demanding understanding of the concept 
‘plain, intelligible language’ in Árpád Kásler and Van Hove can be seen as a small 
step in the right direction.
Even when the substantive fairness is emphasised, the present Directive 
retains important elements of a procedural approach, as the assessment of 
unfairness is expressly directed to look at the situation when the contract was 
made. In Art. 4(1), the court is asked to look at all the circumstances attend-
ing the conclusion of the contract, ‘at the time of conclusion of the contract’. 
Situations in which the application of the contract may become unfair because 
of subsequently arising circumstances are not covered. For coping with such 
situations the court has to look at other doctrines like the German doctrine of 
Geschäftsgrundlage and the English doctrine of frustration (even though it is 
not directed at unfairness). However, in principle it would be possible to bring 
such situations under the fairness regime as well. This is the case in Nordic law, 
in which the focus is on assessing the fairness of the consequences of apply-
ing a term, irrespective of whether the unfair consequences are related to the 
circumstances prevailing when the contract was made or to later changes.130 In 
particular in a contractual landscape in which long-term relationships play an 
important role, this would be a way to legally recognise the particular needs 
relating to such relationships.131 In a long-term relationship it can easily seem 
very impractical to direct the assessment of unfairness to be based on a combi-
nation of circumstances prevailing maybe years back, when the relationship may 
have developed and changed in many ways after the time of conclusion. For 
consumers, the fairness of such long-term relationships, e.g. regarding credit, 
tenancy and basic services may be of decisive importance both for their econ-
omy and well-being.
The suggested improvements of the European unfair contract terms regime are 
of minor importance. Even as it stands the Unfair Contract Terms Directive has 
proven to be a useful tool for developing European consumer protection. It has 
certainly been noted internationally among lawyers and law drafters modernising 
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their contract law.132 To some extent this may contribute to the emergence of 
a European brand that enhances trust in European businesses as actors that do 
not use unbalanced and unintelligible small print to advance their position in an 
unfair manner.
In the creation of the European fairness brand the more general path-break-
ing function of the Directive has been important as well. Through the Directive 
mechanisms for dealing with unfair contract terms have been introduced as 
themes for the general contract law discourse in Europe. Having been accepted 
by the European legislator, unfair contract terms rules based on the Directive 
have been included in the Principles of European Contract Law (the so called 
Lando Principles)133 as well as in the Draft Common Frame of Reference,134 and 
in both collections they have been extended to cover business-to-business rela-
tionships as well. These collections, again, have had and have an influence on the 
development of national contract law in various corners of Europe. In this way 
the principle of fairness has already become quite broadly recognised in European 
contract law, contributing to the general European fairness brand. 
From a pure consumer protection point of view one might see a danger in 
extending protection against unfairness to business-to-business relationships as 
well, as this could imply a dilution of the protection of consumers. However, 
experience from Nordic law, with a broad general fairness approach, does not 
support such fears. A well-functioning fairness regime allows the court to take 
into account the status of the various parties as one factor to include in the assess-
ment of unfairness. The acceptance of a more general fairness approach might 
even lower the hurdle for fairness-based decisions in consumer contract law.
5 Consumer sales
Introduction
No book about consumer law would be complete without a discussion about 
the way the law regulates contracts for the sale of goods to consumers – after 
all, sales contracts are the paradigm contract type. EU legislation dealing with 
central aspects of consumer sales contracts has been in place since 1999, when 
the Consumer Sales Directive (99/44/EC) (‘CSD’) was adopted. Although 
the Directive itself has remained in force in (almost entirely1) unamended form 
since then, there have been several attempts to develop further the law on con-
sumer sales contracts. This is why this area of law is an interesting case study not 
only of the EU’s approach to regulating the substance of a particular type of 
consumer contract, but also the EU’s varying approaches to legislation, and the 
limits to this: repeated attempts to change the level of regulation contained in 
the Consumer Sales Directive with a view to encouraging greater cross-border 
contracting on the part of consumers and traders alike have clashed with national-
level interests. This was largely caused by a desire to shift from minimum to maxi-
mum harmonisation. The Consumer Sales Directive goes to the heart of private 
law, which might explain the reluctance of the Member States to accept more 
extensive regulation at the EU level.
Intriguingly, the number of references to the CJEU for preliminary rulings 
on the interpretation of the Consumer Sales Directive has been surprisingly low; 
there have been no more than a handful of such requests. This is in sharp con-
trast to the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, where there have been numerous 
references.2
This chapter will therefore examine the area of consumer sales contracts from a 
number of perspectives. To begin, there will be an initial overview of the Directive, 
covering (i) its scope, (ii) the requirement that goods must be in conformity with 
 1 A minor amendment was made by the Consumer Rights Directive (2011/83/EU) which 
inserted a new Article 33 which requires Member States to notify the Commission about 
the adoption of new and more stringent provisions, i.e. new national law rules which 
exceed the minimum standard laid down in the Consumer Sales Directive.
 2 See Chapter 4.
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Maastricht Journal 15 (2008), p.433; P Rott, and E Terryn, ‘The proposal for a directive on 
consumer rights: No single set of rules’. Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 17 (2009), 
p.456; and H Micklitz and N Reich “Crónica de una muerte annunciada: The Commission 
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consumer rights: A step forward’ (2010) 18 European Review of Private Law p.103.
the contract, (iii) remedies for non-conformities and (iv) guarantees. The rel-
evant provisions which supplement those of the CSD and the Consumer Rights 
Directive (2011/83/EU) will also be discussed. 
The discussion of the CSD will trace a number of the themes. In particular, 
this chapter will concentrate on the following aspects:
Single market vs consumer protection 
As will be seen, the Consumer Sales Directive is a minimum harmonisation direc-
tive which introduced a general conformity requirement and several remedies.3 
The underlying intention was a common baseline to promote consumer con-
fidence.4 Generally speaking, the CSD’s minimum harmonisation status means 
that Member States are permitted to adopt or maintain more protective rules, 
although the extent to which this provides carte blanche to depart from the pro-
visions of the CSD is not without controversy. For example, Rott has argued 
Member States should not use minimum harmonisation as a justification for side-
stepping provisions from a directive which had been carefully negotiated during 
the legislative procedure (such as the remedial hierarchy in Art. 3 of the Directive). 
This is because this would effectively undermine the agreement reached through 
the EU’s legislative process.5 Although interesting, it seems that minimum har-
monisation has generally been regarded as allowing Member States rather more 
freedom than Rott’s position would suggest.
In the proposal for the Consumer Rights Directive, an attempt was made to 
make the rules on consumer sales subject to a maximum harmonisation stand-
ard, with some modifications. However, this was criticised by the majority of 
legal scholars6 and failed to gain political acceptance. It seemed that maximum 
harmonisation of consumer sales law would be going too far for both consumer 
lawyers and national governments. A particular stumbling block was the nature 
of the remedial scheme, which would have excluded the ability of a consumer to 
terminate a contract immediately even where the seriousness of a non-conformity 
might have justified this. 
At the same time as work on the Consumer Rights Directive was in progress, 
the European Commission had sponsored work on a far more ambitious project: 
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an initiative in the field of European Contract Law. When it became clear that the 
rules on consumer sales contracts would not be changed by the Consumer Rights 
Directive, the focus shifted, and the development of new rules on consumer sales 
contracts became the first concrete legislative step for introducing a more exten-
sive set of Contract Law rules at the European level. This was the proposal for a 
Common European Sales Law (CESL).7 There were some obvious differences of 
approach when compared to the existing Consumer Sales Directive: (i) there was 
a wider range of topics and more rules, which were also more detailed; (ii) CESL 
would have been optional rather than automatically applicable; (iii) it focused on 
cross-border transactions, rather than establishing a single set of rules applicable to 
all consumer sales contracts; and (iv) the chosen legislative instrument was a regula-
tion rather than a directive. This alternative approach also did not succeed, and the 
proposal for CESL was eventually withdrawn in December 2014. A third attempt 
to extend the regulation of consumer sales contracts was made in December 2015, 
with a new directive proposed to cover the distance and online selling of tangible 
goods,8 and a separate proposal on the supply of digital content.9 These proposals 
revert to the use of directives, and also seek to pursue a maximum harmonisation 
standard. At the time of writing, neither proposal had become law yet.
The EU brand of consumer protection 
One critique which can be made of both the Consumer Sales Directive and the 
initiatives to enhance or replace it (especially CESL and the December 2015 
distance sales proposal) is that the starting point seems to have been focused on 
what legal rules might be palatable from a national perspective so as to adopt an 
EU-level set of rules. For example, the Consumer Sales Directive was inspired 
by provisions of the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods 1980 
(CISG),10 which had been ratified by most Member States (although not the UK 
and Ireland). This seemed to smooth the path towards adopting the Consumer 
Sales Directive because its fundamental approach was already familiar to (most) 
national legal systems. The proposal for CESL drew on the DCFR, which was 
the product of a detailed comparative law exercise to derive a best solution based 
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on the various rules found in the national laws of the EU Member States. And 
the December 2015 proposals largely harvest their rules from the ruins of CESL. 
A problem with this approach is that the main concern was to have a common 
set of rules, but insufficient care was taken to develop rules which would be suit-
able for consumer sales contracts in the Single Market. It seems that there has 
been little appetite at the EU level to consider whether this approach is the best 
way of providing rules that will encourage consumers and traders to take greater 
advantage of the potential offered by the Single Market, or whether an alterna-
tive approach, perhaps one which is much more principles-based and steps away 
from very detailed, technical rules,11 would be more successful and could in turn 
create a legal framework that would be a positive feature of the EU’s consumer 
protection brand. 
EU approach to consumer protection at risk of being 
insufficiently protective 
One of our key arguments is that the EU’s approach to consumer protection risks 
under-protecting consumers because of its overarching purpose to create a level 
playing field to promote the use of the Single Market. A key problem with several 
areas of EU consumer law, including the area of consumer sales contracts, is that 
the objective of EU legislation frequently appears to overemphasise the desire to 
have common rules irrespective of their substantive content, which often means 
that EU legislation might fall short of providing proper solutions to the chal-
lenges consumers face in the Single Market. This is clearly apparent from Recital 
5 of the Consumer Sales Directive, which states that ‘the creation of a common 
set of minimum rules of consumer law, valid no matter where goods are pur-
chased within the Community, will strengthen consumer confidence and enable 
consumers to make the most of the internal market’. The focus seems to be on 
having a common set of rules, but not necessarily one that tackles specific issues 
affecting cross-border contracts.
At times, a stronger problem-focused approach might be advisable, and legal 
rules could be better designed to reflect the specific issues that might arise when 
it comes to shopping in the Single Market. It often seems that one reason for the 
current approach is to ensure that EU rules work best within the national legal 
systems of the majority of Member States, but it does not follow from this that 
the EU rules are the best rules for the Single Market. For example, one aspect 
which the EU has repeatedly chosen not to pursue is the introduction of direct 
producer liability, i.e. making a manufacturer of goods liable for non-conformity 
of those goods.12 This is in contrast to the imposition of liability for injuries or 
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210 final, p.12. For the arguments in favour, see R Bradgate and C Twigg-Flesner, 
‘Expanding the boundaries of liability for quality defects’ (2002) 25 Journal of Consumer 
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13 See Chapter 7.
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property damage caused by defective goods under the Product Liability Directive 
(85/374/EEC).13
The challenge of parallel regimes
The EU has toyed with the idea of parallel regimes as an alternative to the one-
size-fits-all approach of harmonisation used thus far. CESL would have introduced 
different regimes for domestic and cross-border sales. Following the withdrawal 
of CESL, the focus appears to have shifted to online/distance as against in-store 
sales. The notion of parallel regimes should be approached with a high degree 
of caution due to the risk of confusion this might create.14 Any arguments in 
favour of this approach need to be strong and clear, and the rules adopted need 
to be clearly suited for their respective contexts. There may be instances where 
specific rules for cross-border problems are needed, in which case there should 
be no hesitation to introduce these. However, for most aspects of consumer sales 
contracts, the same rules will be appropriate for both domestic and cross-border 
sales. For instance, the standard of quality mandated by the legal rules should be 
the same. Indeed, in line with our idea of an ‘EU consumer law brand’, it would 
be desirable to have a clear objective quality requirement applicable to all types of 
consumer sales contracts.
The Consumer Sales Directive
In this section, we will examine the rules from the Consumer Sales Directive and 
the additional rules relevant to consumer sales contracts provided by the more 
recent Consumer Rights Directive.
Scope and definitions 
Sale 
According to Article 1(1), the Directive’s objective is ‘the approximation of the 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States on cer-
tain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees in order 
to ensure a uniform minimum level of consumer protection in the context of 
the internal market.’ Its focus is therefore on contracts for the sale of consumer 
goods, and does not extend to other types of supply transactions which are also 
commonly encountered in the consumer context, such as hire-purchase contracts 
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or contracts of exchange (barter). Bearing in mind that the CSD primarily focuses 
on the legal requirements as to the quality of goods (‘conformity with the con-
tract’15) and associated remedies, this narrow focus on certain categories of con-
tracts under which goods are supplied to consumers seems unduly restrictive. As 
the CSD is a minimum harmonisation directive, Member States are free to extend 
its provisions to other types of supply contracts.
Indeed, there is no definition of ‘sale’ in the Consumer Sales Directive, which 
leaves its scope somewhat imprecise. A definition of ‘sales contract’ can be found 
in the Consumer Rights Directive, which provides that “‘sales contract’ means any 
contract under which the trader transfers or undertakes to transfer the ownership 
of goods to the consumer and the consumer pays or undertakes to pay the price 
thereof, including any contract having as its object both goods and services”.16 
However, the definition from the Consumer Rights Directive does not apply to the 
provisions of the Consumer Sales Directive – despite the intentions of the Acquis 
Review to standardise definitions across the various consumer law directives. The 
CRD definition would not cover contracts of hire or hire-purchase, or barter.
However, the Consumer Sales Directive includes a provision to the effect that 
certain contracts involving the supply of goods should be included within the 
notion of a contract for the sale of consumer goods. They are ‘contracts for the 
supply of consumer goods to be manufactured or produced’,17 and contracts for 
the supply and installation of goods ‘if installation forms part of the contract of 
sale … and the goods were installed by the seller or under his responsibility’.18
The inclusion of contracts for the supply of consumer goods to be manufac-
tured or produced in the notion of sale essentially means that a contract is one of 
sale whenever a finished product is supplied to a consumer. As a result, a contract 
for a supplier to produce and supply a finished product are regarded as a sale of the 
finished product. This broad notion of ‘sale’ in Art. 1(4) will clearly cover a situ-
ation where a supplier provides both labour and materials to produce a finished 
item to be supplied to a consumer. Moreover, on the basis of Article 2(3) (dis-
cussed below), it must also cover a situation where at least some of the materials 
used by the supplier to make the finished product are provided by the consumer. 
The more difficult situation is where all of the materials are provided by the 
consumer and the supplier merely produces the finished product. Intuitively, 
one might think that this type of contract would be for a service, i.e. producing 
the finished item from the materials supplied by the consumer.19 However, it is 
equally possible to regard this contract as one for ‘the supply of consumer goods 
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to be manufactured or produced’. This would mean that the supplier making the 
finished product would be liable for any non-conformities in the finished product 
in the same way as a seller of goods. This would be subject to the restriction that 
there would be no liability for any lack of conformity which originates in the mate-
rials supplied by the consumer: Article 2(3) states that ‘there shall be deemed not 
to be a lack of conformity for the purposes of [the Directive] if … the lack of con-
formity has its origin in materials supplied by the consumer’, which clearly covers 
circumstances where some or all of the materials used by the supplier to make the 
finished product – whether based on a standard design or custom-made to the 
consumer’s requirement – are supplied by the consumer. The situation becomes 
yet more complicated when the consumer also supplies the design which the sup-
plier is to use for making the finished product. Intuitively, one might think that 
the supplier should not be liable in such a situation (although there may be a duty 
to warn the consumer about a defective design in tort law). Nevertheless, Art. 
1(4) seems sufficiently broad to cover a situation where the consumer supplies 
the design for the finished product. It is possible that the supplier’s liability for 
non-conformity might similarly be restricted by Art. 2(3) as it would where the 
consumer supplied the materials from which the finished product is to be made, 
but this would require a broad interpretation of the word ‘materials’ in Art. 2(3). 
Recent technological advances have made this a topical issue: consumers are 
now able to design products using computer-aided design (CAD) software and to 
have these designs converted into physical items by utilising 3D-printing technol-
ogy, often provided by a professional printing service. At present, the extent to 
which a 3D-printing service business might be liable for non-conforming goods 
is unclear, and there is at least a plausible argument that the Consumer Sales 
Directive would apply (by virtue of Art. 1(4)), but with some uncertainty whether 
liability under that Directive would be restricted through the application of Art. 
2(3). It seems that clarification of this point and possible adjustments to the 
Directive might be needed. It is suggested that Art. 2(3) could be clarified to 
include designs supplied by a consumer, which would then, in turn, ensure an 
appropriate balance between the interests of consumers and sellers when it comes 
to goods 3D-printed to the consumer’s design.20
Consumer
A consumer is ‘any natural person who, in the contracts covered by [the] Directive 
is acting for purposes which are not related to his trade, business or profession’ 
(Art. 1(2)(a)). This is a slightly narrower definition of consumer than the defi-
nitions found in other directives. In particular, the Consumer Rights Directive 
defines a consumer as a person who ‘is acting for purposes which are outside his 
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24 C-149/15 Sabrina Wathelet v Garage Bietheres & Fils SPRL ECLI:EU:C:2016:840.
trade, business, craft or profession’ (Art. 2(1) CRD). This is a more generous 
definition than that under the CSD. Under the CSD, the fact that goods are 
bought for a purpose which has some connection to the buyer’s professional 
activity will mean that the buyer is not treated as a consumer.21 The CRD did not 
amend the definitions of key terms such as ‘consumer’ in earlier directives such as 
the CSD. In practical terms, however, Member States can apply the slightly wider 
definition from the CRD to these national rules implementing earlier directives 
to ensure consistency.
Seller
In a similar vein, the definition of ‘seller’ is also narrower in the CSD than cor-
responding definitions elsewhere. Thus, the CSD defines ‘seller’ as ‘any natu-
ral or legal person who, under a contract, sells consumer goods in the course 
of his trade, business or profession’ (Art. 1(2)(c)).22 By way of contrast, in the 
Consumer Rights Directive, a trader (which is now the preferred terminology) 
is defined as ‘any natural person or any legal person, irrespective of whether pri-
vately or publicly owned, who is acting, including through any other person act-
ing in his name or on his behalf, for purposes relating to his trade, business, craft 
or profession’.23 The definition in the CSD requires a closer connection between 
the seller’s professional activities and the particular contract than the Consumer 
Rights Directive.
In Wathelet,24 the CJEU has held that the definition of ‘seller’ also includes a 
trader acting as an intermediary seller on behalf of a private individual where the 
trader has not informed the consumer that he is acting on behalf of a private indi-
vidual. The consumer in Wathelet had bought a second-hand car from a garage 
which it sold on behalf of a private individual, but it had not told the consumer 
that this was the case. The consumer consequently assumed that the garage was 
the actual seller and selling the car in the course of its trade. The CJEU held that 
a seller has to disclose the fact when it is acting as an intermediary on behalf of 
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a private individual, because the consumer would otherwise not know whether 
he or she is protected by the rules on consumer sales law. This decision provides 
an important clarification on an issue which had not been addressed expressly in 
the definition of ‘seller’. Its implications could stretch beyond the context of the 
CSD; increasingly, goods are sold via online platforms,25 which are used by both 
private and professional sellers. Many platforms make it clear that they are acting 
as an intermediary only, but should they omit to do so, then Wathelet indicates 
that the platform could be liable as a seller under the CSD.
Taken together, the effect of the definitions of ‘consumer’ and ‘seller’ results 
in a narrower scope of the CSD compared to other directives. As already noted, 
it is unfortunate that the definitions in the CSD were not aligned to those found 
in the CRD (something on which agreement might have been possible because it 
would only have involved standardising essential definitions), but Member States 
can easily correct this by applying the wider definitions from the CRD.
Ex officio application
We need to note at this stage the significance of the ruling in Faber v Autobedrijf 
Hazet Ochten.26 The facts of this case will be discussed below, but the case is 
important for a more general point. The CJEU was asked whether a national 
court should of its own motion consider whether the rules implementing the 
CSD should be applied to a particular case where one party is a consumer and the 
other a seller/trader even if the consumer has not sought to rely on their con-
sumer rights. The CJEU gave an affirmative answer, holding that a national court 
which either already has the information necessary to determine whether con-
sumer law applies, or could obtain this by asking for clarification, should deter-
mine whether a buyer under a contract of sale qualifies as a consumer. This ruling 
follows in the vein of decisions under other directives, particularly the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive,27 which seek to ensure that consumers can benefit 
from the protection of consumer law even if they are unaware of this.28 It is a fur-
ther indication that the ex officio doctrine should now be regarded as an integral 
element of EU consumer law.29
Consumer goods
Next, the Directive defines ‘consumer goods’ as ‘any tangible movable item’ with 
the exception of (i) goods sold by execution or otherwise by authority of law, 
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(ii) water and gas when not ‘put up for sale’ in a limited volume or quantity, and 
(iii) electricity (Art. 1(2)(b)). Any type of goods can be ‘consumer goods’, but 
electricity is not goods, nor is gas or water supplied through the utility network. 
However, water or gas sold in a fixed quantity in a separate container will be 
within the definition of ‘consumer goods’. Moreover, goods must be tangible 
and movable, which excludes sales of immovables such as land and houses from 
the scope of the Directive. The Directive does not consider the position of digital 
content, despite the fact that the status of computer software/digital content 
as goods (or otherwise) had been much debated when the Directive was being 
adopted.30 It is only recently that the EU has moved towards adopting legislation 
which would cover contracts for the supply of digital content in a way that cor-
responds with the regulation of contracts for the supply of goods.31
Article 1(3) of the Directive gives Member States the option of excluding 
second-hand goods sold at public auction where consumers have the opportunity 
of attending the sale in person from the scope of the definition of ‘consumer 
goods.’ Many, but by no means all, Member States have utilised this provision. 
This restriction only applies to auctions which a consumer can attend in person, 
and auctions conducted purely over the internet are not within the scope of this 
exclusion. Conversely, this exclusion will apply as long as individuals have the 
opportunity of attending in person, irrespective of whether they actually attend. 
Conformity with the contract requirement
The central obligation of the CSD is that the seller must deliver goods which are 
in conformity with the contract of sale. According to the Directive’s recitals, ‘the 
principle of conformity with the contract may be considered as common to the 
different national legal traditions’32 of the EU Member States. The CSD itself 
was influenced by the provisions of the CISG, which was regarded as offering 
a common starting point for most Member States as many of them had ratified 
the Convention at the time when the CSD was proposed – although the UK and 
Ireland both had not ratified the CISG. The conformity with the contract in Art. 
2 CSD is clearly inspired by Art. 35 CISG.33
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It is worth noting that in its Green Paper on Guarantees for Consumer Goods 
and After-Sales Services,34 the Commission had proposed that goods should be 
required to conform to the consumer’s ‘legitimate expectations’, described as ‘a 
dynamic concept to be assessed taking all of the circumstances into account and, 
notably, the provisions of the contract, the presentation of the product, the price, 
the brand, the advertising or any information provided on the product, the nature 
of the product, its purpose, the laws and regulations concerning the product, and 
other features’.35 A test along these lines would have focused more explicitly on 
the expectations of a consumer, and might therefore have been more suitable 
for the specific objectives pursued by the CSD. It would also have been similar 
to the test for ‘defectiveness’ found in the Product Liability Directive which is 
based on consumer expectations.36 However, it seems that a safer way of reaching 
agreement on the text of the CSD was to build on familiar concepts, and so the 
‘conformity with the contract’ requirement familiar both to most national legal 
systems and CISG-contracting states was chosen.
Article 2(1) therefore imposes a duty on the seller to deliver goods which are 
in conformity with the contract, and, as will be seen below, Art. 3 provides a 
range of remedies for circumstances when the seller has delivered goods which 
are not in conformity. 
Time for assessing conformity: Delivery and risk
Delivery
The seller’s duty under Art. 2(1) is to deliver the goods, and to deliver goods 
which are in conformity with the contract. However, the CSD is silent on two 
important issues: (i) there is no definition of ‘delivery’, leaving it unclear what the 
seller has to do to have delivered the goods; and (ii) no remedies are provided 
for circumstances when the seller does not deliver at all. This gap in the CSD was 
subsequently filled by the Consumer Rights Directive. According to Art. 18 (1) 
CRD, delivery requires that a trader transfers ‘the physical possession or control 
of the goods to the consumer’. Article 18 further specifies that, unless otherwise 
agreed, delivery has to occur no later than 30 days from the date of conclusion 
of the contract. If the trader fails to deliver on time, the consumer can set a new 
deadline for delivery, and failure to comply with this new deadline would entitle 
the consumer to terminate the contract (Art. 18(2)). However, if the original 
date was essential, or if the trader has refused to deliver, then the consumer is 
entitled to terminate the contract immediately. Following termination, the trader 
has to reimburse any sums already paid ‘without undue delay’ (Art. 18(3)). 
This addition provides some clarity as to the meaning of delivery, and is quite 
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consumer-friendly in that the moment of delivery is shifted to the point where 
the consumer acquires physical possession of the goods. However, the possibility 
that delivery may occur when a trader ‘transfers … control of the goods’ to the 
consumer creates some difficulty where the goods are given to a third-party car-
rier. At that point, the carrier could be regarded as having physical possession of 
the goods subject to the consumer’s control. If that were so, then a trader could 
not be held responsible for any delays or delivery problems caused by the carrier, 
as the trader had already fulfilled his obligation to transfer control of the goods. 
However, according to Recital 51, a ‘consumer should be considered to have 
control of the goods where he or a third party indicated by the consumer has access 
to the goods to use them as an owner, or the ability to resell the goods’.37 This 
suggests that handing goods over to a carrier would not amount to delivery even 
if the consumer might be regarded as being in control under otherwise applicable 
domestic law, because the carrier would not be a third party ‘indicated by the 
consumer’. This view also seems supported by the way the rules on the passing of 
risk treat the fact that goods are handed over to a carrier (see below). So overall, 
the provisions on delivery are consumer-friendly, but this could have been set out 
in a more straightforward manner.
Passing of risk
The Consumer Rights Directive also deals with the passing of risk – an issue 
which had been left untouched by the CSD.38 According to Art. 20 CRD, the 
risk of loss or damage to the goods will pass from trader to consumer in one of 
two ways:
1 The consumer (or a third party indicated by the consumer) has acquired the 
physical possession of the goods; or
2 On delivery to a carrier if that carrier had been chosen by the consumer and 
the chosen carrier was not one offered by the trader.39 
As with the provisions on delivery, this is quite a consumer-friendly rule. Generally, 
risk will transfer to the consumer with physical possession of the goods. The one 
exception is where a consumer rather than the trader has chosen a carrier – which 
would treat such a carrier in the same way as any other ‘third party’ indicated by 
the consumer. However, in the case of most online sales, the carrier options will 
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be offered by the trader, and so risk will not pass to the consumer until transfer 
of physical possession. As noted above, the notion of delivery should be analysed 
in the same way, with the effect that risk and delivery go together and take place 
once physical possession is transferred to the consumer. This is therefore a rule 
which is consumer-friendly and particularly helpful for goods ordered online – 
including from a trader in another Member State. In that sense, this is a small but 
noteworthy rule which is helpful for cross-border sales contracts.
Elements of conformity
The over-arching requirement in Art. 2(1) is that goods must be in conformity with 
the contract, which means that the terms of the contract themselves stipulate what 
the quality and fitness for purpose of the goods should be. The starting point in the 
CSD is therefore in line with party autonomy and the freedom of the contracting 
parties to agree on the particular requirements regarding those goods. In short, 
Art. 2 prioritises the subjective agreement of the parties, instead of laying down a 
fixed quality expectation which all goods must meet. The ‘reasonable expectations’ 
test suggested in the Green Paper would have been closer to a more objective test. 
The choice of a subjective test might have been made because this seemed familiar 
to most of the Member States, and those that preferred a more objective standard 
(such as the UK) could retain this based on the minimum harmonisation standard 
of the Directive. It does raise the question of what the function of a ‘conformity’ 
requirement should be, however: should this be simply a way of reinforcing the 
contractual agreement reached by the parties, or should it be an objective quality 
standard which all goods must meet? A purely subjective test based on agreement 
between the parties might fit party autonomy and freedom of contract best, but 
it does not reflect the realities of modern-day consumer contracts. So it would 
have been preferable to adopt a more objective quality standard,40 which would 
also have supported the development of a European brand of consumer protec-
tion. Indeed, the EU could have been bold here and set an objective standard that 
goods have to be of ‘reasonable quality’, or ‘satisfactory quality’.41
Admittedly, to a large extent, the CSD deals with the fact that in the case of 
most consumer sales contracts, there will be limited, if any, discussion between 
seller and consumer about specific conformity requirements. Article 2(2) CSD 
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establishes a rebuttable presumption that the goods are in conformity with the 
contract if the requirements listed in paragraphs (a)–(d) are satisfied. However, 
Art. 2(2) does not require that the goods must comply with all the requirements 
in Article 2(2). The presumption of conformity created by Article 2(2) is rebut-
table, which means that goods which satisfy Article 2(2) could nevertheless be 
found not to be in conformity with the contract. Thus, Recital 8 states that ‘in 
order to facilitate the application of the principle of conformity with the contact, 
it is useful to introduce a rebuttable presumption of conformity with the contract 
covering the most common situations’ and ‘that presumption does not restrict 
the principle of freedom of contract’, before emphasising that ‘in the absence of 
specific contractual terms … the elements mentioned in this presumption may be 
used to determine the lack of conformity of the goods with the contract’. This 
suggests that the terms of the contract can both supplement and indeed displace 
the criteria in Art. 2(2). Furthermore, goods can still be regarded as being in con-
formity with the contract despite the fact that not all of the criteria in Art. 2(2) 
have been met. This is confirmed in Recital 8, which states that ‘the elements 
mentioned in the presumption are cumulative; … if the circumstances render 
any particular element manifestly inappropriate, the remaining elements of the 
presumption will nevertheless apply’, which suggests that there will be instances 
when not all four elements of the presumption should be considered. 
There are four elements to Article 2(2), which will now be considered in turn. 
Compliance with description and sample: 
The first element of the presumption in Article 2(2)(a) is that the goods ‘comply 
with the description given by the seller and possess the qualities of the goods which 
the seller has held out to the consumer as a sample or a model’. There are two sepa-
rate aspects to this element: first, compliance with the description given by the seller; 
and second, possessing the qualities of a sample or a model shown to the consumer. 
There are a number of uncertainties about the first aspect (description). It is 
not clear which descriptive words would be taken into account, and then to which 
degree the goods must correspond with that description. One might assume that 
description will cover descriptive words that relate specifically to the goods. These 
could be words identifying the nature of the goods and their central features, as 
well as descriptive words on technical features of the goods which are mentioned 
in the contract. However, descriptive words which do not directly identify the 
features of the goods would not be relevant.42 
In addition, Art. 2(2)(a) talks of descriptions ‘given by the seller’. However, 
in the consumer context, goods sold are generally packaged by the manufacturer, 
and any descriptive words are more likely to have been given by the manufac-
turer. However, it can be assumed that the seller is effectively deemed to adopt 
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the description given by the manufacturer as his description, and so any relevant 
descriptive words on the packaging can be said to have been ‘given by the seller’. 
If there is an error in the description on the packaging, a seller can rely on Art. 
2(3) to evade liability in this regard by making the consumer aware of the error 
and by providing a correct description.
The reference to goods possessing the qualities which the seller has held out 
as a sample or model is also important, because it can cover instances where a 
consumer has bought goods having seen a display model in-store. The model is 
on display in a shop but the consumer buys a packaged version of those goods. 
It also covers situations where a consumer is given a sample (e.g. a swatch for a 
carpet) to demonstrate what the goods look like.
Fitness for buyer’s particular purpose
The second element of the presumption is that the goods must be ‘fit for any 
particular purpose for which the consumer requires them and which he made 
known to the seller at the time of conclusion of the contract and which the seller 
has accepted’.
It seems that this is quite a strict requirement in that for the presumption to 
arise, the goods must be fit for the consumer’s purpose, rather than merely that 
they must be reasonably fit for that purpose. There are two conditions relevant to 
this element: first, the consumer must have made the particular purpose known 
to the seller ‘at the time of the conclusion of the contract’, and second, the seller 
must have ‘accepted’ the consumer’s purpose. The first condition should be easy 
to satisfy by the consumer simply stating to the seller – which in practice would 
be a shop-assistant – the purpose for which the goods are required.43 The second 
condition is more problematic, because it requires that the seller must ‘accept’ the 
purpose made known by the consumer. In particular, it is not clear if this requires 
that the seller expressly assents, or if proceeding with the sale having been made 
aware of the consumer’s purpose would suffice. So the difficult situation might 
be where the seller does not expressly respond to the consumer who has stated 
that the goods are required for a particular purpose, especially in the case of a 
shop-assistant who does not have relevant expertise. This second condition could 
therefore operate in a way that might disadvantage a consumer, unless a prag-
matic reading of this condition prevails and proceeding with a transaction after 
the consumer has stated his particular purpose suffices to constitute ‘acceptance’. 
This would certainly be the appropriate approach when the seller has the relevant 
expertise. Furthermore, one needs to bear in mind that it would be for the con-
sumer to show that the purpose was made known to the seller and that the latter 
accepted this, which could pose practical difficulties.
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Goods are fit for the purposes for which goods of the same type 
are normally used
The third element is that goods must be fit for normal purposes. Once again, 
there is some uncertainty whether this requires absolute fitness, or if reasonable 
fitness (‘it’s good enough’) will suffice. The yardstick for establishing fitness is in 
respect of purposes for which goods of the same type are ‘normally used’, which 
seems to focus on the manner in which consumers use goods, even if they were 
not commonly supplied for such a purpose. A common example is a screwdriver, 
which is supplied for screwing screws into wood, but are also frequently used to 
open tins of paint. If a seller wishes to exclude such uses (which are normal but 
perhaps not among the purposes for which the goods are supplied), then a clear 
warning or statement to that effect should achieve this.
Quality and performance
The fourth element in Article 2(2)(d) is that the goods must show the quality 
and performance which are normal in goods of the same type and which the 
consumer can reasonably expect, given the nature of the goods and taking into 
account any public statements on the specific characteristics of the goods made 
by the seller, the producer or his representative, particularly in advertising or 
labelling. This element is the only one which explicitly alludes to the consumer’s 
reasonable expectations, and there are two factors by which such expectations 
are shaped: the nature of the goods, and public statements made by the seller or 
producer, including in advertising. 
The phrase ‘the nature of the goods’ is somewhat vague. Recital 8 includes 
the statement that ‘the quality and performance which consumers can reason-
ably expect will depend inter alia on whether the goods are new or second-
hand’, and so the nature of the goods as being ‘second-hand’ or ‘ex-display’ will 
have a bearing on establishing what consumers might reasonably be entitled to 
expect. However, one should assume that obvious quality features flowing from 
the nature of the goods are clearly within the consumer’s reasonable expectations: 
foodstuffs should be suitable for consumption (but need to be stored properly 
and consumed in a timely manner), books should be readable and a hammer 
should withstand being used for driving a nail into wood. 
A more significant inclusion is the reference to advertising and similar public 
statements. Advertising by its very nature is designed to influence consumers 
into buying particular goods and/or particular brands, and any expectation of 
quality shaped through such advertising should be taken into consideration in 
assessing whether goods are in conformity with the contract.44 However, liabil-
ity for non-conformity falls on the seller, and so there is some recognition that 
Consumer sales 183
45 Cf. the list of factors in s.9(3) of the UK’s Consumer Rights Act 2015, which were 
introduced into UK law in light of reform proposals made by the Law Commissions to 
make sales law more suitable for consumer sales: see Law Commissions, Sale and Supply of 
Goods (HMSO, 1987).
46 Cf P Rott and C Glinski, ’Umweltfreundliches und ethisches Konsumverhalten im 
harmonisierten Kaufrecht’ (2003) Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht p.649.
the seller should not be liable for expectations created by all the public state-
ments made by someone other than that seller. Article 2(4) therefore allows the 
seller to escape liability for public statements about the goods if he can show 
that (a) he was not, and could not reasonably have been aware of the statement; 
or (b) at the time of conclusion of the contract the statement had been cor-
rected; or (c) the consumer’s decision to buy the goods could not have been 
influenced by the statement. The first two of these reasons focus on the seller’s 
position: liability is avoided where the seller could not have been aware of the 
public statement, or where the seller can show that the statement had been cor-
rected when the contract was entered into. The latter reason does not require 
that the seller corrects the statement himself, nor does it require that the seller 
shows that the consumer was aware of the correction. The third reason will turn 
on the context of the particular contract of sale and whether the statement was 
influential in the consumer’s decision to purchase. Such influence may be absent 
where the consumer was not aware of the public statement before concluding 
the contract, or where the statement was clearly so exaggerated that it could 
not have been intended to shape the consumer’s expectations as to quality and 
performance.
Finally, a number of factors which might be important for a consumer are not 
included explicitly in Art. 2. These include factors such as durability and freedom 
from cosmetic or minor defects.45 However, these are likely to be matters which 
would be covered by the consumer’s reasonable expectations as to quality under 
Art. 2(2)(d), and so they are covered implicitly. A more difficult issue is the treat-
ment of consumer expectations regarding the manufacturing process for goods.46 
This includes whether goods were made in an environmentally sustainable man-
ner, as well as the absence of forced labour or child labour in the manufacturing 
process. A seller with a public commitment to selling only ethically-sourced goods 
might be held responsible for a non-conformity if goods have been manufactured 
in conditions of forced labour. However, it might be questioned whether this is 
an issue for a general conformity standard – it might be more appropriate to deal 
with issues such as this in separate measures.
Limitations on the conformity requirement
Article 2(3) provides for two instances when the seller can escape liability for a 
non-conformity even though the goods otherwise fail to be in conformity with 
the contract. The first is that there is deemed to be no lack of conformity if, at the 
time the contract was concluded, the consumer was aware of the non-conformity 
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or could not reasonably have been unaware of it. The obvious way in which a 
seller can avoid liability for any lack of conformity or defect is by pointing this 
out to the consumer. It should also cover instances where a non-conformity is 
obvious from looking at the goods. However, this limitation is phrased in unnec-
essarily vague terms. Asking whether a consumer was ‘aware’ invites unnecessary 
discussion as to what is required for such awareness, and in particular, whether 
anything short of pointing-out a specific matter or something obvious on an 
examination carried out by the consumer would suffice. Reasonable awareness of 
a non-conformity seems a looser notion than having a non-conformity pointed 
out by the seller or a matter obvious by looking at the goods. This particular 
provision seems more favourable towards the seller than the consumer, but in any 
event, its vagueness is not appropriate in the context of a consumer transaction, 
where clearer and more straightforward rules are preferable.
A second limitation arises in respect of a contract for the supply of goods to 
be manufactured or produced by the seller. As noted, under such a contract, the 
conformity requirement applies to the finished goods supplied under the con-
tract. However, Article 2(3) provides that there is deemed not to be a lack of 
conformity where such lack ‘has its origin’ in materials supplied by the consumer. 
This was considered earlier.47 
Installation of goods and conformity
One provision of the Directive which introduced a consumer-friendly provision 
is Article 2(5), which deals with the installation of goods and applies in two cir-
cumstances; the first is where the contract includes a requirement that the goods 
supplied are to be installed by the seller or ‘under his responsibility’. Here, any 
lack of conformity resulting from incorrect installation ‘shall be deemed to be 
equivalent to lack of conformity of the goods’. In effect, it would not be sufficient 
for the seller to argue that he acted with due care and skill in installing the goods 
if the installation was nevertheless not sufficient to ensure that the goods meet the 
contractual requirement of conformity. 
Second, where goods are installed by the consumer and a lack of conformity 
results from incorrect installation which is due to ‘a shortcoming in the instal-
lation instructions’, then this will also be a non-conformity for which the seller 
is liable. There is a lack of clarity about the ambit of the word ‘installation’, 
because its natural English meaning does not extend to goods which have to be 
assembled.48 The word used in the German language version of the Directive 
is ‘Montage’ which has a broader meaning and covers assembly. So the word 
‘installation’ should be interpreted broadly to include both installation in its 
main meaning (e.g. connecting a washing-machine to the plumbing system in 
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the consumer’s home) and the assembly of goods from their components. In 
both cases, the installation instructions must be such as to enable the consumer 
to install the goods correctly. The question arises by which standard it should be 
determined whether there are ‘shortcomings’ in the instructions. Although not 
spelled out in the Directive, it would seem that if an average consumer could not 
follow the instructions and install the goods correctly, then this should mean that 
there are shortcomings in the instructions. 
The burden of proof
It is not entirely clear from the Directive as to who has the burden of proof in 
respect of a question of non-conformity – does the consumer have to establish 
that there was a non-conformity, or is the onus on the seller to show that the 
goods are conforming? This question arises because Article 2 presents the con-
formity requirement in terms of a rebuttable presumption, which suggests that 
once a consumer has alleged that the goods are not in conformity, it would be 
for the seller to show that the criteria of conformity are met. If the seller succeeds 
in doing so, the burden then falls on the consumer to rebut the presumption 
of conformity, e.g. by showing that the goods fail to comply with some other 
express requirement of the particular contract. In Faber, the CJEU observed that 
‘the onus is, in principle, on the consumer to furnish the evidence that a lack of 
conformity exists and that that lack of conformity existed at the time when the 
goods were delivered.’49 This would suggest that the initial onus is on the con-
sumer, but leaves open whether the consumer has to establish a non-conformity 
as against the criteria in Art. 2(2).
Reversed burden of proof
The point at which the conformity of the goods with the contract is assessed 
is the point of delivery, but any lack of conformity will not become apparent 
for some time thereafter. As explained above, it would be for the consumer 
to prove that a lack of conformity existed at the relevant time. However, Art. 
5(3) reverses that burden during the first six months after the date of delivery, 
and introduces a presumption that any lack of conformity which appears within 
six months is deemed to have existed at the time of delivery. It would then be 
for the seller to rebut this presumption by showing that the lack of conformity 
raised by the consumer did not exist at the time of delivery. Art. 5(3) states that 
this will be also the case where this presumption would be incompatible with the 
nature of the goods, or the nature of the lack of conformity. The former might 
be relevant, e.g. in respect of perishable goods which are expected to last for less 
than six months. 
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The operation of the burden of proof rule was explored in the Faber ruling.50 
Ms Faber bought a second-hand car from Hazet in May 2008. In September 
of the same year, the car caught fire whilst being driven by Ms Faber, and was 
severely damaged. The wreckage of the car was taken to a scrapyard, where it was 
kept until the following May. It was then scrapped. A few days later, Ms Faber 
brought an action against Hazet for compensation. As part of that claim, she tried 
to have an expert report into the cause of the fire prepared, but the experts were 
unable to do so as the car had been scrapped. One of the questions referred by 
the national court concerned the matters a consumer had to establish in order 
to invoke the reversed burden of proof. The CJEU held that a consumer had to 
show (i) that a lack of conformity existed, and (ii) that the lack of conformity 
materialised within 6 months.51 Once the consumer has established these points, 
it will not be necessary for the consumer to prove that the non-conformity was 
present at the time of delivery (when the seller’s obligation arises).52 Moreover, a 
consumer is not required to show what caused the lack of conformity, nor does 
he have to prove that the non-conformity can be attributed to the seller.53 This 
is significant in that the CJEU effectively makes it clear that establishing liability 
for a non-conformity does not involve any fault-based element. The seller then 
has to prove that the lack of conformity was not present at the time of delivery, 
but rather arose as a result of something that happened after the goods had been 
delivered to the consumer.
Remedies for non-conformity
Article 3 provides for four remedies if the goods are not in conformity with the 
contract. Here, the Directive reflects the influence of the Continental legal tradi-
tion of trying to keep a contract alive when there has been a breach.54 The primary 
focus of the remedies is therefore to ensure that the contract is performed, with 
termination (‘rescission’) a remedy of last resort only.
The relationship between the various remedies is a complex one. There is a 
two-stage hierarchy of remedies in Article 3: at the first stage, the consumer is 
entitled to require the seller to repair or replace the goods. The second stage 
is engaged if neither of these remedies is available, or if the seller fails to com-
plete the requested remedy within a reasonable period of time or without sig-
nificant inconvenience to the consumer. The intention behind the remedial 
scheme therefore is to ensure performance of the seller’s contractual obligations. 
However, because of the minimum harmonisation character of the CSD, it has 
been possible for Member States to retain other remedies such as the possibility of 
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permitting a consumer to terminate the contract immediately rather than having 
to give the seller an opportunity to repair or replace the goods first.55 Moreover, 
the CSD does not contain any provisions dealing with the relationship of the 
remedies in Art. 3 with any potential claim for damages – which might be relevant 
for dealing with consequential losses caused by non-conforming goods. This has 
the potential to cause difficulties in practical terms, because often, consumers 
will have suffered direct and quantifiable losses arising from and in addition to 
the non-conformity of the goods, but whether these are recoverable depends on 
national law.
Stage 1: Repair or replacement
Initially, the consumer’s choice is between repair and replacement. ‘Repair’ is 
defined as ‘in the event of lack of conformity, bringing consumer goods into 
conformity with the contract of sale’ (Article 1(2)(f)). It has been argued that 
[o]bviously, this does not mean that they have to be in a brand-new state. 
The definition requires repair, which is so effective that the goods com-
pared to the requirements of the contract would have been acceptable 
originally.56 
Presumably, what is meant is that repair must cure the lack of conformity which 
existed in the goods when they were delivered. A problem with the definition of 
repair is that goods might have several latent causes of lack of conformity, which do 
not manifest at the same time. Assume one of these manifests and it is successfully 
repaired by the seller, but then a second non-conformity appears. On a strict applica-
tion of the definition of repair, the seller’s repair has not been successful because of 
the further lack of conformity which arose subsequently. This is potentially prob-
lematic because a failure to repair the goods could entitle the consumer to move 
to the second-stage remedies, although this would not seem appropriate where a 
new problem arises. It is therefore suggested that the definition of ‘repair’ should 
be interpreted as requiring the seller to resolve the particular lack of conformity the 
consumer has complained about, and when a second non-conformity manifests, then 
this should not mean that the consumer can immediately proceed to the second-
stage remedy. One omission from the CSD to note here is that there is no indication 
as to how many separate non-conformities a consumer should have to put up with.
There is no definition of ‘replacement’, but presumably this means substi-
tuting the non-conforming item with an identical, but conforming item (e.g. a 
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camera with a damaged lens can be replaced with a camera with an undamaged 
lens). This remedy might therefore not be available where the goods in question 
are unique.
Either remedy must be provided free of charge, which refers to ‘the necessary 
costs incurred to bring the goods into conformity, particularly the cost of post-
age, labour and materials’.57 
The consumer has the right to choose between repair and replacement, but 
this is subject to two restrictions: first, a consumer cannot require the seller to 
repair or replace the non-conforming goods if the chosen remedy is impossible or 
disproportionate.58 So when a consumer choses one of repair or replacement, it is 
first necessary to consider whether it is possible to provide that remedy, and then 
whether it is proportionate in comparison to the other remedy, assuming that the 
other remedy would also be possible. Importantly, it is only permissible to com-
pare repair with replacement and vice versa, but not to compare repair with, e.g. 
price reduction.59 This is in line with the focus of Art. 3 on prioritising the perfor-
mance of the contract. However, it might be seen as creating a risk for unfairness, 
because both repair and replacement might be significantly more expensive to the 
trader than price reduction, which might be a more appropriate remedy.60 
Impossibility
A consumer’s chosen remedy will not be available if it is impossible to provide 
this. Repair may be impossible for several reasons. First, the lack of conform-
ity might be so severe that repair could not bring the goods into conformity. 
Second, repair might also be impossible if spare parts required are not available. 
A seller might also argue that repair is not possible because it would be uneco-
nomical to try and repair the goods, e.g. because of the costs of labour or a lack 
qualified staff able to repair the goods. However, this should not be regarded as 
a question of impossibility; rather, such economic considerations might be rele-
vant in considering whether repair would be disproportionate when compared to 
replacement (see below – note that disproportionality of repair can only be con-
sidered relative to the alternative remedy of replacement).61 A further difficulty 
arises where the goods have had to be installed and then a non-conformity arises, 
either in the goods themselves or as a result of the installation (including where 
the incorrect installation was by the consumer and resulted from a shortcoming in 
the installation instructions). In order to repair the goods, the seller would have 
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to uninstall and subsequently re-install the goods, which could be problematic if 
the consumer bought goods for self-installation. However, of itself, this should 
not mean that repair is impossible. 
The instances when replacement will be impossible are also likely to be rare. 
It should not be regarded as impossible simply because the item in question is 
no longer in the seller’s stock, as long as a replacement could be obtained by the 
seller from another supplier. If this would be too costly, then the seller would 
have to show that replacement would be disproportionate as compared to repair. 
On the other hand, it seems that replacement will generally be impossible in the 
case of second-hand goods. Recital 16 states that ‘the specific nature of second 
hand goods makes it generally impossible to replace them’, although this does 
not necessarily mean that replacement would always be impossible when it comes 
to second-hand goods. As there is no definition of ‘replacement’ in the Directive, 
it is unclear whether a replacement item has to be identical. If it is necessary that 
the goods have to be replaced with an identical item, then replacement would 
only be possible where an identical substitute is available, and with second-hand 
goods, this will usually not be so.62 
It seems that there will be few circumstances where either remedy will be 
‘impossible’, which reflects the underlying objective to ensure that the seller per-
forms his contractual obligations. However, even though a remedy is possible, it 
might still be unavailable if it is ‘disproportionate’. 
Disproportionality
Assuming that both repair and replacement are possible, the seller may yet wish 
to resist the consumer’s request for one of these by arguing that providing this 
remedy would be disproportionate. Article 3(3) provides that a remedy is deemed 
to be disproportionate ‘if it imposes costs on the seller which, in comparison with 
the alternative remedy, are unreasonable’. In applying this test, three factors are 
to be taken into account: 
1 the value the goods would have had if they had been in conformity with the 
contract,
2 the significance of the lack of conformity and 
3 whether the alternative remedy could be completed without significant 
inconvenience to the consumer. 
According to Recital 11, this is an objective test. However, it is important to 
note that the costs of a particular remedy are not considered in isolation in order 
to assess whether it would be disproportionate, but have to be compared with 
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the costs of the alternative remedy. It is clear from the location of the dispropor-
tionality test in Article 3(3) that the comparator remedy will always be repair or 
replacement. In Weber and Putz,63 the CJEU was asked whether the dispropor-
tionality test was one of ‘relative’ or ‘absolute’ disproportionality, i.e. could repair 
only be regarded as disproportionate when compared to replacement (and vice 
versa), or could repair/replacement be disproportionate without comparison to 
the alternative remedy. The Court held that ‘Article 3(3) defines the term “dis-
proportionate” exclusively in relation to the other remedy, thus limiting it to 
cases of relative lack of proportionality.’64
In applying the disproportionality criterion, it needs to be considered which of 
repair or replacement is going to be less costly for the seller to provide. However, 
as there will inevitably be some difference in cost between repair and replacement, 
the fact that one is cheaper than the other will not make the more expensive 
remedy disproportionate. The threshold in the CSD is that the costs of the more 
expensive remedy must be significantly higher.65 
In addition, the costs to the seller have to be balanced against the other factors. 
The second is the value the goods would have had if there was no lack of conform-
ity. In the case of low-value goods, the cost of repair would probably significantly 
exceed the market value of the goods (not least because of the cost of labour and 
parts required), and so repair would probably be disproportionate when compared 
to replacement. Conversely, with high-value goods, even an expensive repair might 
not be disproportionate when compared to replacement. The significance of the 
lack of conformity is also relevant. For example, if the lack of conformity renders 
the goods essentially useless but easily repairable, then even an expensive repair 
will be justified where the goods are of high value, whereas replacement would be 
more appropriate for low-value goods. Also, if a lack of conformity is so severe that 
repair would be very cumbersome, then replacement might be better.
The final factor is the degree of inconvenience caused to the consumer by the 
particular remedy. This allows for the interests of the consumer to be balanced 
against the costs for the seller of providing a remedy. A classic example is a wash-
ing machine that has broken down. Usually, the cost of repair will be cheaper 
than replacing the machine, and the respective costs would mean that replace-
ment would be considered disproportionate. However, if it will take a long time 
to effect a repair (e.g. because of the difficulties of sourcing spare parts), then the 
inconvenience to the consumer would be significant, and this could shift the bal-
ance in favour of replacement.66 
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Disproportionality and installation
The difficulties that might arise where goods have been installed and then a non-
conformity is discovered have already been noted. What happens when a con-
sumer has bought goods and installed these correctly himself, or a third party did 
so, but a lack of conformity is subsequently discovered in those goods and they 
need to be replaced? Two questions arise: (i) who has to bear the cost of replace-
ment; and (ii) if the cost falls on the seller, do the additional costs of replacing 
non-conforming goods render replacement disproportionate? This was the issue in 
Weber and Putz.67 In Putz, the consumer had bought a dishwasher online, and had 
paid a third party to install this, but discovered afterwards that the dishwasher was 
faulty and had to be replaced. The facts in Weber were perhaps more unusual; the 
consumer had bought floor tiles from a builders’ merchant and laid these himself 
before discovering cracks in the glaze which meant that the tiles had to be replaced.
The CJEU had to consider whether the seller had to uninstall the non-con-
forming goods installed and install the replacement or bear the cost of removal 
and reinstallation, despite the fact that seller had not been required to install the 
goods under the sales contract. The Court reasoned that precluding the con-
sumer from recovering the cost of uninstalling the faulty goods and installing 
the replacement would mean that an additional financial burden would fall on 
the consumer which would not have arisen had the goods been in conformity 
when delivered. In the Court’s view, this would mean that replacement would 
not be ‘free of charge’, contrary to Article 3(4). Also, it would be a significant 
inconvenience for the consumer if the goods were not removed and reinstalled. 
However, in both cases, the sellers argued that they should not be compelled to 
replace the goods because of the significant additional cost of uninstalling the 
non-conforming goods, and then installing conforming goods. In Weber, the tiles 
had cost approximately €1,380, but the full cost of replacing them would amount 
to €5,830. As mentioned above, the Court held the sellers could only invoke 
disproportionality of replacement when compared to repair (but repair was not 
in issue in these cases). The Court came up with a difficult solution to this issue; 
on the one hand, it held that a seller cannot refuse to replace goods because the 
cost of this is disproportionate in view of the value of the goods without a lack 
of conformity and the significance of the lack of conformity. On the other hand, 
the Court then develops an additional criterion for the seller’s benefit in that the 
consumer’s right to reimbursement of the cost of uninstalling non-conforming 
goods and installing the replacement could be limited to a proportionate amount. 
In justifying this, the CJEU observes that Article 3
aims to establish a fair balance between the interests of the consumer and 
the seller, by guaranteeing the consumer, as the weak party to the contract, 
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complete and effective protection from faulty performance by the seller of 
his contractual obligations, while enabling account to be taken of economic 
considerations advanced by the seller.68
However, there is then another proviso added by the Court in paragraph [76], 
where it states that any reduction to a proportionate amount should not ‘result in 
the consumer’s right to reimbursement of those costs being effectively rendered 
devoid of substance’. 
This leaves the national courts with a complex balancing act between a range 
of different factors which takes into account the respective interests of consum-
ers and traders. However, it also illustrates starkly the impact of harmonisation 
of only selected aspects of a particular area: the CSD covers most of the relevant 
remedies, but one important one has been omitted – damages. There is no indica-
tion what the relationship between damages and the CSD remedies should be. It 
seems that the complexity of the ruling in Weber and Putz is the result of two dis-
tinct issues not being kept separate: the right to free-of-charge replacement, and 
the right to claim damages for consequential losses. A less complicated solution 
which the CJEU could have adopted would have been to say that the additional 
costs incurred for uninstalling and reinstalling the goods should be recoverable as 
damages in national law.69 This could be subject to a clarification that the prin-
ciple of effectiveness (effect utile) requires national law not to preclude damages 
on this basis outright, but could apply criteria of foreseeability and remoteness 
to ensure that the seller would not incur disproportionate costs.70 In Weber and 
Putz, this would have provided a better solution, and it would have avoided the 
complex interpretation adopted by the CJEU to get to the same result. As the 
CSD is a minimum harmonisation measure, it remains possible for the Member 
States to clarify their national laws to reflect this ruling whilst adopting clearer 
rules on this point – had the CSD been a maximum harmonisation measure, then 
there would have been no means of clarifying the legal position in national law.
Provision of remedy within reasonable time and without inconvenience
Once the consumer has chosen between repair and replacement, Article 3(3) 
requires that this is provided within a reasonable time and without any significant 
inconvenience to the consumer. If the seller fails to do so, the consumer can 
move to the second-stage remedies of rescission of the contract or reduction 
of the price (Article 3(5)). However, it is not clear if, assuming both repair and 
replacement were available, whether the consumer could ask for a replacement 
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if repair has not been satisfactorily effected, or vice versa, before proceeding to 
the second-stage remedies.71 It is suggested that this should be possible, not least 
because that would be in accordance with the performance-focused approach to 
remedies in the CSD. 
It is also not clear whether the consumer can request a stage two remedy 
in anticipation of the seller’s failure to provide repair or replacement within a 
reasonable period of time or without significant inconvenience. The wording of 
Article 3(5) suggests that the consumer has to wait, because it is phrased in terms 
of the seller not having ‘completed’ the requested remedy. However, if there is 
no doubt that the seller will not comply, the consumer should not have to wait 
until a reasonable time has expired, but should be able to move immediately to a 
‘second stage’ remedy sooner. 
Relevant factors for establishing whether repair or replacement were provided 
within a reasonable period and without significant inconvenience are the nature 
of the goods and the purposes for which the consumer required them. For exam-
ple, it would probably be a significant inconvenience if it took two months for a 
washing machine to be repaired/replaced.
Payment for using goods before replacement
A question which arose in the Quelle case72 was whether a consumer who returns a 
non-conforming item to be replaced under Article 3 can be required to pay to the 
seller a sum of money as compensation to reflect the fact that the consumer might 
have had use of the goods for a period of time before their replacement. The 
rationale for this would be that the consumer will have used the goods for a while 
and therefore have had some benefit, and then receives a new item as replacement. 
In this case, the consumer had bought a cooker which she had used for 18 months 
or so before it broke down. She asked for a replacement, which was provided, but 
the seller requested that the consumer pay a sum of money for using of the appli-
ance prior to its return. German law provided for this, but the compatibility of the 
German rule was challenged before the CJEU. As discussed below, a consumer 
who returns goods after rescinding the contract is entitled to a refund, but this 
can be subject to a deduction to reflect the period of time during which the con-
sumer used the goods. It was argued that this should also be the case when goods 
are returned to be replaced, but the CJEU rejected this, holding that a consumer 
could not be required to pay compensation of this kind when non-conforming 
goods are replaced. As a result, consumers are entitled to receive a conforming 
item by way of replacement without having to pay any additional charges.73
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Stage two: Price reduction or rescission
If neither repair nor replacement cure the lack of conformity, or neither is available, 
the consumer can instead request a partial or full refund of the price paid by ask-
ing for price reduction or rescission. According to Art. 3(5), this is possible where
a the consumer is entitled to neither repair nor replacement;
b repair or replacement is available but the seller has not completed the repair 
or replacement within a reasonable time;
c repair or replacement is available but the seller has not completed the repair 
or replacement without significant inconvenience to the consumer.
It can be seen that ‘significant inconvenience to the consumer’ is a criterion rele-
vant both to Article 3(3) in assessing whether repair or replacement is ‘dispropor-
tionate’, and here in considering the availability of rescission and price reduction. 
For the purposes of Article 3(3), this criterion has to be applied with a degree of 
speculation, as this is done before repair or replacement are attempted. In con-
trast, the same criterion in Article 3(5) applies with the knowledge of whether 
an attempt to repair or replace was effected without significant inconvenience. It 
could be questioned whether rescission would be an appropriate remedy if repair 
or replacement has successfully cured the lack of conformity, albeit by causing 
significant inconvenience. This situation might be better dealt with by awarding 
damages for the inconvenience caused, but as the CSD does not deal with dam-
ages, this alternative is not available.
Price reduction
One of the stage-two remedies is price reduction. The Directive does not pro-
vide any guidance on how the amount of any price reduction should be calcu-
lated. This could be either a flat-rate deduction based on the difference between 
(i) the value the goods would have had had they conformed to the contract 
and (ii) the value of the goods as delivered; or a proportionate reduction of the 
purchase price, in the same ratio as the value of the goods as delivered bears 
to the value they would have had, had they conformed to the contract. As 
these remedies are based on the CISG, it would seem that the proportionate 
reduction approach should be applicable here, too.74 The following examples 
illustrate this:75
Example 1: A buys a smartphone for £100. Had it been in conformity with the 
contract, it would have been worth £100, but as delivered, it is defective 
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and worth only £80. A proportionate price reduction would mean that the 
consumer would have to pay 80/100 of the contract price, i.e. the price 
reduction would be £20. 
Example 2: Assume the same facts as in Example 1, but now a smartphone in 
conformity with the contract would, in fact, have been worth £120 (so the 
consumer paid less for the phone than its value). The proportionate reduc-
tion approach would require the consumer to pay 80/120, which is £66.66, 
and so the price reduction would be £33.34. 
Example 3: Finally, assume that a smartphone in conformity with the con-
tract would have been worth only £90, but the consumer paid £100 for it. 
The proportionate reduction approach would require the consumer to pay 
80/90, i.e. £88.89, and so the price reduction would be £11.11.
Rescission
A remedy of final resort is rescission, although this is not available where the 
lack of conformity is minor (Article 3(6)). There is no guidance on when a lack 
of conformity will be minor. This could cause practical difficulties if a consumer 
would like to rescind a contract, e.g. for cosmetic defects. There would then 
be scope for disagreement as to when a non-conformity is minor. However, a 
consumer would only be able to seek rescission if repair and replacement are 
not available or once they have been attempted and failed. Many minor lacks of 
conformity can be cured by repair (or sometimes replacement), so if rescission is 
considered, it will be because the seller has failed to repair or replace the non-
conforming item within a reasonable time or without a significant inconvenience. 
If the non-conformity is minor, the consumer would then only receive a price 
reduction but that would seem an appropriate outcome.
However, the question of whether a lack of conformity is minor could create 
difficulties for a consumer who brings a claim only for rescission and that claim fails 
because the lack of conformity is minor. In Hueros,76 the CJEU held that in such 
circumstances, a court should be able to substitute price reduction as an appropri-
ate remedy even though the consumer had not pleaded this as an alternative.
Generally, a consumer who rescinds the contract is entitled to a refund of the 
purchase price, but as already alluded to above, Recital 15 states that Member 
States may provide that account may be taken of the use the consumer has had 
of the product, i.e. there might be a deduction-of-use allowance and a consumer 
may not get back the full purchase price. There are two reasons for such a rule: 
(i) the consumer may have had the goods for a considerable period of time before 
the lack of conformity manifested; and (ii) the value of goods returned after some 
time will have depreciated significantly. However, such a rule also adds to the 
complexity of the remedial scheme, because it will necessitate consideration of (a) 
196 Consumer sales
77 Cf. K Zweigert and H Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, 3rd ed (Oxford 
University Press, 1998), Chapter 36.
78 In the UK, for example, the limitation period is six years from the date of the breach (i.e. 
the time of delivery in the case of a consumer sales contract): Limitation Act 1980, s.5.
whether the seller should make a deduction at all and (b) if so, what the amount 
of the deduction should be. 
Also, whilst the CSD is silent on this, it is likely that a pre-condition to exercis-
ing rescission is that the consumer is able to return the non-conforming product, 
unless this is not possible because of the lack of conformity. Until there is a CJEU 
ruling on this point, this matter is left uncertain.
Consequential losses/damages
The discussion on Weber and Putz highlighted the fact that the CSD does not 
address the relationship of the remedies in Article 3 with the national rules regard-
ing damages. However, damages will be important because often, consumers will 
not only seek a remedy to deal with the non-conformity of goods itself, but also 
seek compensation for consequential losses beyond the immediate non-conform-
ity. The circumstances in which it is possible to award damages for consequential 
losses (and also for the direct loss instead of one of the other remedies) are left to 
national law. Here, one can also identify quite significant variations in the way the 
Member States deal with the availability of damages as a remedy. In the common 
law countries, damages are available for all breaches of contract, and are preferred 
to other remedies such as specific performance. Other jurisdictions will not award 
damages solely because there was a breach of contract, but will also require that it 
is demonstrated that the seller was somehow at fault in bringing about the breach 
of contract.77
Other key provisions
Two-year time limit for liability
Under the CSD, the liability of the seller is limited to any lack of conformity 
which becomes apparent within a period of two years from the date the goods 
were delivered (Art. 5(1)). The consumer will have to prove that any lack of 
 conformity which arises during this period was present at the time of delivery 
(subject to the presumption discussed below). This period is different from a limi-
tation period which sets the time-limit for commencing legal action, but Art. 5(1) 
postulates that such a limitation period must not be shorter than two years. This 
means that there is a minimum period of two years in respect of both the seller’s 
liability and the right to take legal action, although the latter can be longer – i.e. 
the limitation period could be three years or even longer.78 In addition, because 
of the minimum harmonisation character of the CSD, Member States could also 
extend the two-year period required by Art. 5(1). Moreover, Member States are 
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given the option to allow the parties to agree on a shorter period of liability for 
second-hand goods (although this cannot be less than one year).79 
Optional notification period
Member States are given the option of introducing a requirement that a con-
sumer must notify the seller within a period of two months, starting on the date 
when he discovered the lack of conformity. This option was initially utilised by 
just over half of the Member States.80 It is debatable whether a provision such 
as this should be included in a consumer law measure.81 On the one hand, such 
a rule encourages swift action by a consumer who has discovered a lack of con-
formity and ensures that a remedy can be provided without delay. On the other 
hand, it could have the effect of depriving a consumer of his ability to obtain 
a remedy at all because a rule such as this could create scope for arguments 
between sellers and consumer as to whether a consumer delayed notifying the 
seller whenever a non-conformity arose more than two months after delivery. 
Whilst a consumer can benefit from the reversed burden-of-proof for six months, 
it creates an additional hurdle for the consumer to establish that notification was 
made on time.
In Faber, the CJEU provided additional guidance as to the amount of detail 
a consumer should be expected to provide if he is required to give notice of a 
non-conformity. The Court first held that the essence of this obligation is merely 
to notify the seller that a lack of conformity has been discovered. However, the 
consumer cannot be required to identify the cause of the lack of conformity, 
because of ‘his weak position vis-à-vis the seller as regards the information relat-
ing to the qualities of those goods and to the state in which they were sold’.82 
The approach taken by the CJEU here reflects the classic assumption that rules 
on non-conformity are fundamentally designed to deal with the informational 
asymmetries between seller and consumer with regard to the goods. However, 
this seemingly clear guidance is somewhat undermined by the CJEU when it goes 
on to state that
in order for the notification to be of use to the seller, it must include a certain 
number of particulars — the degree of precision of which will necessarily 
vary depending on the specific circumstances of each case — relating to the 
nature of the goods in question, the wording of the contract of sale in respect 
of those goods and the way in which the alleged lack of conformity became 
apparent.83
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Whilst the last point – the way in which the non-conformity materialised – is 
uncontroversial, it may prove more difficult for a consumer to refer to the rel-
evant elements of the contract of sale. It would surely be sufficient for the con-
sumer to state what the goods are, when they were bought, and what the lack of 
conformity forming the basis of the complaint is. Any other requirements for the 
notification would make it unnecessarily difficult for a consumer as it would allow 
a trader to claim that inadequate notice of the non-conformity had been given 
(as, indeed, was the situation in Faber).
Guarantees
In addition to the conformity requirement and associated remedies, the CSD 
also contains a number of rules regarding ‘guarantees’, i.e. voluntary undertak-
ings given by a retailer or manufacturer in respect of the goods.84 EU terminol-
ogy has been inconsistent in this regard, as the phrase ‘commercial guarantee’ is 
sometimes used to refer to these guarantees, and contrasted with the notion of 
a ‘legal guarantee’ which is in fact the conformity requirement. Indeed, this was 
the case in the Green Paper, which contained a number of proposals for the regu-
lation of guarantees. Primarily, these focused on disclosure of clear information 
about the scope of any guarantee offered. It was also proposed that where the 
required information was not given, a ‘default’ guarantee would have applied. 
There was also a suggestion for a European Guarantee which would have pro-
vided identical cover in all the Member States of the European Union, and that 
where goods were sold through a defined distribution network, all the members 
of the network would have had to honour relevant guarantees. Finally, guaran-
tees should have provided consumers with benefits above the protection con-
sumers have through their legal rights. Few of these ideas made it into the final 
version of the CSD.85
In the CSD, ‘guarantee’ is defined as 
any undertaking by a seller or producer to the consumer, given without extra 
charge, to reimburse the price paid or to replace, repair or handle consumer 
goods in any way if they do not meet the specifications set out in the guaran-
tee statement or in the relevant advertising.
The CSD is therefore only concerned with guarantees given free-of-charge, and 
its rules do not apply to guarantees which consumers are asked to pay for. It 
applies to guarantees given by both the seller and the ‘producer’ of the goods. 
‘Producer’ has an extended meaning for the purposes of the CSD and includes 
the manufacturer, importer into the Union or own-brander of the goods who by 
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placing his name, brand, etc. on the goods purports to be their producer (Article 
1(2)(d)). 
Moreover, the definition covers not only guarantees provided on a document 
enclosed with the goods, but also those mentioned in advertising. This makes it 
clear that statements in advertising are potentially relevant to the overall scope of 
any guarantee offered and, any undertakings given in general advertising could be 
treated as a guarantee. Of course, not all advertising statements will be regarded 
as being part of a guarantee, because a guarantee must be an ‘undertaking’ by the 
seller or manufacturer in respect of the goods. 
Article 6 then introduces a number of rules on guarantees. A crucial provision 
is Article 6(1) which states that:
A guarantee shall be legally binding on the offerer under the conditions laid 
down in the guarantee statement and the associated advertising. 
This confirms unequivocally that guarantees are to be legally binding, and whilst 
the Directive is silent on the legal nature of their enforceability, it is assumed that 
the intention was for this to be contractual. This means that the provisions of the 
Unfair Terms Directive apply to the terms and conditions on which guarantees 
are provided. 
Several further points can be made: first, only the person giving the guarantee 
(known as ‘the offerer’) is bound by it, and a consumer can only enforce the 
guarantee against the offerer. This could create difficulties where the guarantee 
envisages that a retailer will handle claims under the guarantee on behalf of the 
manufacturer (which is a common arrangement for certain categories of goods). 
It might be that in such circumstances, the retailer is treated as an agent acting on 
the manufacturer’s behalf, although from a consumer’s perspective, this could be 
confusing. Second, it is unclear from Article 6(1) as to who can enforce the guar-
antee against the offerer. Art. 6(1) does not restrict the benefit of a guarantee to 
the initial purchaser, but it also does not expressly mention that it is transferable 
to subsequent owners of the goods. 
The offerer is bound by the guarantee ‘under the conditions laid down in 
the guarantee statement and the associated advertising’. A difficulty arises where 
a guarantee is mentioned in advertising, but the guarantee statement enclosed 
with the goods fails to include aspects of the guarantee referred to in advertising. 
By virtue of Article 6, any such additional aspects would also be binding on the 
offerer, but there is no indication how conflicts between the guarantee statement 
and the associated advertising should be resolved. The most appropriate solution 
would be to adopt a contra proferentem approach and let the combination of 
aspects most favourable to the consumer prevail. 
Guarantees will only bind the offerer under the conditions set out in the guar-
antee and the relevant advertising. There are two potential interpretations of 
‘conditions’ in this context: first, it may cover the steps a consumer has to take 
before he is entitled to benefit from the guarantee, e.g. registering the purchase 
or guarantee with the offerer. Provided such requirements are clear and not too 
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onerous, then the guarantee will only be binding once they have been fulfilled. 
Second, ‘conditions’ can also be the terms and conditions on which the guarantee 
is provided. This includes terms setting out the length of the guarantee period, 
how to claim under the guarantee, charges for parts and labour, matters relating 
to the goods not covered by the guarantee (e.g. consumables), or maintenance 
requirements. All of these conditions are set by the offerer, subject to the applica-
tion of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. 
The only clear restriction applies via Article 7, which provides that the rights 
of consumers under sales law cannot be restricted or excluded in any way, which 
means that it would not be permissible to use a guarantee to exclude the oper-
ation of Articles 2 and 3 of the CSD. Moreover, Article 6(2) requires that a 
guarantee states ‘that the consumer has legal rights under applicable national 
legislation governing the sale of consumer goods and make clear that those rights 
are not affected by the guarantee’, which entails that guarantees cannot have the 
effect of restricting consumer rights under sales law.
Article 6(2) further requires that the guarantee document
set[s] out in plain intelligible language the contents of the guarantee and the 
essential particulars necessary for making claims under the guarantee, notably 
the duration and territorial scope of the guarantee as well as the name and 
address of the guarantor.
The requirement that the guarantee set out the consumer’s rights in ‘plain, intel-
ligible language’ is familiar from the Unfair Terms Directive, but it is unclear 
whether the same extended meaning developed in CJEU case law in that context 
would apply here, too.86 Consistency of approach would suggest that this should 
be so. Also, Art. 6(4) gives Member States the option to require that guarantees 
are drafted in one or more of the official languages of the European Union. 
Generally, Article 6(2) is rather vague. It is not clear what might be the ‘con-
tents’ of the guarantee other than those items mentioned in Art. 6(2) (duration, 
geographical scope, and the name and address of the guarantor). Presumably, it 
extends at least to details of what is covered as well as any restrictions or condi-
tions. Similarly, it is not clear what the ‘essential particulars’ for making a claim 
under the guarantee are. 
Article 6(3) then provides that
On request by the consumer, the guarantee shall be made available in writing 
or feature in another durable medium available and accessible to him.
The purpose behind this provision is not obvious, although it seems to be a spe-
cific instantiation of the information-based approach popular in many areas of EU 
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consumer law. Allowing consumers to read guarantees arguably gives them the 
opportunity to compare guarantees given on products made by different manu-
facturers and take this into account as part of their decision-making process. This 
is reflected in Recital 21, in which it is claimed that guarantees are one aspect on 
which manufacturers (and sellers) may compete, and in order to promote such 
competition, consumers are encouraged to compare guarantees given with simi-
lar goods before deciding on a purchase. Also, Article 6(3) is not limited to the 
pre-purchase context – so it could also be helpful if a consumer has misplaced the 
guarantee document but needs it to bring a claim. 
Finally, Article 6(5) states that a failure to comply with the requirements in 
Article 6 does not affect the validity of a guarantee and consumers can still rely on 
it. A guarantee document which does not include the details required by Article 
6(2), will therefore nevertheless be legally binding – but as it will potentially be 
difficult to figure out what the terms and conditions of the guarantee are, this 
might not be that helpful a provision. There are no other sanctions envisaged 
in the directive other than the possibility of enforcement using the Injunctions 
Directive (cf. Art.10 CSD).87
Towards a more coherent sales law … or not?
The CSD was adopted in 1999 and had a far-reaching impact on some national 
legal systems. Although its basis in the CISG has made it perhaps less difficult 
to manage for those jurisdictions which have ratified the convention, there were 
still significant challenges. In Germany, for example, the need to implement the 
CSD was the trigger for a much more detailed review of the civil code.88 In the 
UK, the creaking and heavily-patched Sale of Goods Act was further amended 
to introduce the new remedies of repair and replacement into the Act for con-
sumer sales contracts, but the initial implementation was far from successful,89 
not least because the focus on ensuring performance of the contract through the 
primacy accorded to the remedies of repair and replacement sat rather uneasily 
with the common law’s general reluctance to consider specific performance as a 
remedy for breach of contract. The minimum harmonisation standard afforded 
some leeway to the Member States to integrate the provisions of the CSD with 
their existing rules on sales contracts. However, an inevitable consequence of 
this was that even after the implementation of the CSD in all the Member States, 
there remained significant variations between the national laws in respect of 
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the matters harmonised by the CSD.90 With the European Commission keen 
to pursue maximum harmonisation, there have been a number of attempts to 
reform the CSD.
Reforming the CSD: Attempt 1
At the European level, the Acquis Review which was launched in 2005 sought to 
identify whether the CSD had achieved its goal of harmonising consumer sales law, 
and the extent to which its minimum harmonisation standard meant that there 
continued to be variations. A study for the European Commission found that 
there were noticeable variations between the Member States after the implemen-
tation of the CSD, many of which were the result of both the regulatory options 
included in the directive and the fact that its minimum harmonisation standard 
left room for Member States to retain more protective rules. The Commission 
deduced from this that continuing variations between domestic consumer sales 
law required reform which would convert the CSD and other directives to a maxi-
mum harmonisation standard.91 Its thinking was set out in the Green Paper on the 
Review of the Consumer Acquis, published in February 2007.92 In this, a range of 
issues were proposed for reforming the existing rules on consumer sales contracts, 
both with regard to scope and points of detail.93 One controversial matter raised 
for discussion was whether there should be direct liability of a producer for non-
conforming goods. This was discussed in the report on the implementation of the 
Consumer Sales Directive, which ruled out any action in this regard.94 
The proposal for a directive on consumer rights95 contained a separate chap-
ter dealing with sales contracts,96 including some provisions familiar from the 
CSD, but also some significant modifications. Some of these were very techni-
cal and were probably a result of the intention to move towards a maximum 
harmonisation directive. Thus, the chapter on sales would not have applied to 
any spare parts replaced by a trader to repair non-conforming goods, and as for 
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mixed-purpose contracts involving both goods and services, it would only have 
applied to the goods elements. Also, new provisions on delivery and passing of 
risk were proposed, and, as already discussed above, these are the only provisions 
from the proposal which survived in the final version of the CRD.
The rules on conformity with the contract remained virtually unchanged from 
the CSD. However, whilst the remedies from the CSD were retained, it was pro-
posed that the trader should have the choice between repair and replacement, 
not the consumer. Perhaps by way of balance, it was also suggested (in proposed 
Article 26(4)) that the “consumer may resort to any [available] remedy [if]: (a) 
the trader has implicitly or explicitly refused to remedy the lack of conformity 
[implicit] meaning that ‘the trader does not respond or ignores the consumer’s 
request’ (Recital 42); (b) the trader has failed to remedy the lack of conformity 
within a reasonable time; (c) the trader has tried to remedy the lack of conform-
ity, causing significant inconvenience to the consumer; (d) the same defect has 
reappeared more than once within a short period of time”. 
The shift to maximum harmonisation also entailed additional rules on the 
operation of the existing two-year liability period. Thus, it was proposed that if 
the trader had previously replaced the goods, the two-year period would start 
from the time of replacement (Article 28(2)). In addition, the previously optional 
requirement that the consumer must notify the trader of the lack of conformity 
within two months would have been turned into a firm rule. 
There is no need to go into any more detail here, because almost all the provi-
sions on sales contracts (except for those on delivery and passing of risks) were 
eventually deleted from the Directive during its legislative stages, not least because 
it turned out to be impossible to find a consensus between the Member States on 
these provisions. In addition, there had been other developments which meant 
that any changes to the rules on consumer sales had moved to an altogether dif-
ferent level: the proposal for a Common European Sales Law.
The Common European Sales Law
In 2001, the European Commission issued a Communication on European 
Contract Law,97 in which it invited views on whether EU legislation on con-
tract law should be considered. In light of the responses received to this initial 
Communication, the Commission refined its views in follow-up documents in 
2003 (A More Coherent European Contract Law – an Action Plan)98 and 2004 
(European Contract Law and the Revision of the Acquis: The Way Forward).99 At 
the core of this process was a huge academic project to create what has become 
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known as the ‘Draft Common Frame of Reference on European Contract Law’,100 
or DCFR for short. The idea for the DCFR was that it would be a toolbox provid-
ing principles and rules of contract law, which might then in turn be the basis for 
more detailed legislation on European Contract Law.101 Following the publication 
of the DCFR, the Commission issued a further Green Paper,102 and established an 
expert group to produce a more focused common frame of reference on contract 
law from the DCFR.103 The expert group’s output was not a common frame of 
reference, but instead a so-called ‘feasibility study’ for an optional instrument. 
This, in turn, became the proposal for a Common European Sales Law (CESL).104 
There were several interesting aspects of the proposal for CESL.105 It would 
have been introduced by means of a regulation rather than a directive, thereby 
obviating the need for Member States to adopt legislation to transpose it into 
domestic law. Instead, the effect of CESL would have been to introduce a paral-
lel set of legal rules for sales contracts into the laws of the Members States, with 
the intention that parties would have had a choice between the existing rules of 
the applicable domestic law or the rules from the CESL. The proposal covered 
contracts for the sale of goods as well as for the supply of digital content, and 
would have applied in respect of contracts where one party was a business and the 
other either a consumer or a small or medium-sized enterprise (SME). Moreover, 
CESL would have been limited to cross-border contracts only.106 It was designed 
as a so-called ‘optional instrument’, i.e. consumers and traders would have been 
given the choice between CESL and the national law which would be applica-
ble in accordance with the provisions of the Rome-I Regulation.107 Although 
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presented as an option for both consumer and trader, in reality, the only person 
making that choice would have been the trader, so optionality would have been 
limited.108 However, the idea of the optional instrument is interesting in terms 
of the creation of a European Brand of Consumer Protection.109 The choice in 
favour of applying the optional instrument would have been made by clicking on 
a so-called ‘blue button’110 on the trader’s website. The notion of the ‘blue but-
ton’ soon took hold in the discussions surrounding CESL, although this was not 
enough to secure the adoption of CESL.
In terms of coverage, CESL would have been much more comprehensive than 
any directives adopted by the EU thus far. Its objective was to provide a much 
more comprehensive sales law to cover the making of a contract, the respective 
obligations of seller and buyer and corresponding remedies, and related matters 
such as unfair terms and prescription periods. There were a total of 186 substan-
tive Articles in 18 chapters, and a separate chapeau regulation provided the rules 
detailing the envisaged scope of application. 
However, CESL received a somewhat lukewarm reception, with some 
Member States arguing that the proposal was not compatible with the princi-
ple of subsidiarity.111 The European Parliament suggested many amendments as 
well as a restriction of scope to cross-border consumer contracts concluded at a 
distance.112 In December 2014, the European Commission withdrew the pro-
posal for CESL, but also indicated that it had not been abandoned completely.113 
In its Digital Single Market Strategy,114 the European Commission announced 
plans to modernise consumer protection rules for online and digital purchases, 
indicating that there would be two initiatives, one on harmonised EU rules for 
online purchases of digital content, and a second on ‘a focused set of key manda-
tory EU contractual rights for domestic and cross-border online sales of tangible 
goods.’115 At that stage, it remained unclear how this would be achieved; one 
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option might have been to amend the proposal for CESL but restrict its scope 
to online contracts. However, in the end, the Commission decided that the way 
forward would be to revert to harmonisation by directives.
Reforming the CSD: Attempt two
In December 2015, the European Commission issued proposals for two new 
directives,116 one in respect of online sales of tangible goods,117 and a second for 
the supply of digital content.118 If adopted, these directives would be of a maxi-
mum harmonisation standard. This is somewhat surprising, because the fate of 
the sales proposals in the Consumer Rights Directive suggests that there is little 
appetite on the part of the Member States for the full harmonisation of aspects of 
substantive private law, and the lack of support for CESL indicates that this posi-
tion is unlikely to have shifted significantly. At the very least, this puts a big ques-
tion mark over the chances of the proposal for the online sales of goods proposal, 
not least because it seems to overlap with the existing directives on consumer 
sales and consumer rights.
Alongside these proposals, the European Commission also launched a so-
called ‘fitness check’ of EU consumer law measures (REFIT).119 This is, in effect, 
another review of the consumer acquis, which might result in proposals for reform 
of the existing directives. It is not due to report until the second half of 2017, 
so at the time of writing, it is unclear whether there will be major changes to the 
current rules on consumer sales.
Influence beyond sales law
The Consumer Sales Directive introduced a set of remedies which prioritise 
the performance of the trader’s contractual obligations by requiring the seller 
to repair or replace goods which are not in conformity with the contract in 
the first instance. This performance-oriented approach to remedies has since 
found its way into other areas, notably the revised Package Travel Directive 
(2015/2302/EU) (‘PTD’). This Directive deals with a range of issues regard-
ing package travel contracts. A package is a combination of at least two differ-
ent travel services (defined as including accommodation, carriage of passengers, 
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vehicle hire and other tourist services120).121 Under Art. 13 PTD, the organiser 
(defined as a trader who combines and sells/offers for sale packages either 
directly or through another trader122) is responsible for the performance of 
package. A traveller123 is required to notify the organiser of the package with-
out undue delay of ‘any lack of conformity which he perceives during the per-
formance of a travel service’.124 The use of the phrase ‘lack of conformity’ is 
interesting, because it mirrors the language used in the CSD; however, it does 
not seem to sound right in the context of a package travel contract. It has been 
given a separate definition as ‘a failure to perform or improper performance 
of the travel services included in a package’.125 It would have been clearer to 
use the phrase ‘non-performance’ or ‘improper performance’ rather than ‘lack 
of conformity’. The parallels with the CSD are more apparent still when one 
considers the specific remedies. Thus, Art. 13(3) PTD obliges the organiser 
to ‘remedy the lack of conformity’, unless this (a) is impossible; or (b) would 
entails disproportionate cost, taking into account (i) the extent of the lack 
of conformity and (ii) the value of the travel services affected. Where either 
of these provisos applies, Art. 14(1) PTD provides for an ‘appropriate price 
reduction’ for the period of travel during which there was a lack of conformity, 
unless this lack was attributable to the traveller. The parallels with the criteria 
found in Art. 3 CSD are easily seen. 
In some instances, the organiser may be required to provide what could broadly 
be described as ‘substitute performance’, or ‘replacement’ in CSD language: Art. 
13(5) PTD stipulates that if a significant proportion of the travel services cannot 
be provided as agreed, the organiser has to offer suitable alternative arrangements 
of equivalent or higher quality to ensure the continuation of the package. If it 
is of lower quality, then the organiser has to provide an appropriate price reduc-
tion. The traveller can reject this alternative only if is not comparable to what was 
originally agreed, or if the price reduction is inadequate.126
However, there are also improvements to the remedial scheme in the PTD 
when compared to that in the CSD. Thus, Art. 13(4) PTD states that if the 
organiser does not remedy the lack of conformity within’a reasonable period set 
by the traveller’, the traveller may do so himself and request reimbursement of 
any necessary expenses from the organiser. This provision therefore clearly estab-
lishes the right of the traveller to take action themselves and subsequently seek 
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reimbursement from the organiser – a matter not provided for in Art. 3 CSD. 
Moreover, the traveller does not have to set a time limit if the organiser refuses to 
provide a remedy or an immediate remedy is required.127
The PTD also provides for a right of termination, but only in circumstances 
where the lack of conformity ‘substantially’ affects performance of the package, 
and the organiser has failed to remedy this within reasonable period set by travel-
ler. Where this is the case, the traveller may terminate the contract and request 
a price reduction or compensation, as appropriate.128 This is akin to the right 
to rescind the contract under the CSD, which is subject to the proviso that the 
lack of conformity is not ‘minor’.129 If package includes carriage of the traveller, 
the organiser has to repatriate travellers with equivalent transport without undue 
delay and at no extra cost to traveller.130
The remedies in the PTD offer a further improvement in comparison to the 
CSD by including an entitlement to compensation: Article 14(2) grants the trav-
eller an entitlement to ‘appropriate compensation … for any damage which the 
traveller sustains as a result of any lack of conformity’. Such compensation also 
extends to ‘non-material damage, such as compensation for loss of enjoyment’.131 
Although this does not provide a comprehensive rule on damages claims (ques-
tions such as remoteness are not addressed directly and may require clarification 
by the CJEU), it is significant because it is an express recognition of the place of 
damages/compensation in a performance-oriented remedial regime.
Taken as a whole, the remedial regime in the Package Travel Directive has 
all the elements of the performance-oriented approach of the CSD – there are 
elements of correcting performance (repair), substitute performance (replace-
ment), price reduction and termination. It is an improvement because of the 
explicit inclusion of an entitlement to compensation for damages. Although the 
extent to which compensation may be recoverable is not fully spelled out, Art. 14 
PTD contains a number of limitations on the right to compensation. The PTD’s 
more comprehensive system of remedies could be a template for any changes that 
might be made to the CSD as part of the REFIT exercise.
Conclusions
This chapter illustrates a number of the more problematic features of EU con-
sumer law. First, it was suggested that the focus has, thus far, been on the intro-
duction of rules on consumer sales for the sake of having common rules, rather 
than with a sufficiently clear focus on the specific issues that arise in the context 
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of consumer sales contracts within the Single Market. The CSD introduces rules 
on conformity and associated remedies, but they are rather more complex than 
one might like for consumer sales contracts, and one can question whether these 
rules really help to boost consumer confidence in the way intended.132 The sub-
sequent attempts to reform EU rules on consumer sales – first in the original 
proposal for the Consumer Rights Directive and then in the ill-fated proposal for 
a Common European Sales Law – demonstrate that there is a considerable degree 
of political resistance to further EU-level regulation of sales contracts. A possible 
explanation for this is that sales contracts remain the paradigm contract type and 
therefore at the heart of national contract law regimes. Some harmonisation has 
been achieved, but the complexity of these rules – especially Art. 3 on remedies – 
raises the question whether this directive has really helped to improve consumer 
protection. One is certainly tempted to point to the very small number of CJEU 
cases on the Directive over the last two decades (at the time of writing, there 
had only been five substantive cases, as well as some on non-transposition) and 
conclude that national courts are reluctant to provide the CJEU with too regular 
an opportunity for using its rulings as a vehicle for extending the reach of EU law 
into the depths of domestic contract law. 
This raises the inevitable question of why the EU has struggled so much with 
adopting a coherent set of legal rules on consumer sales contracts which could 
facilitate cross-border shopping by consumers. One answer might be that the 
EU legislature has approached this challenge from the wrong angle: instead of 
pursuing any kind of harmonised set of rules to level the playing field,133 it should 
have identified the specific problems for consumers posed by the cross-border 
shopping environment. This might have resulted in clearer rules on conformity 
and remedies, but even more so have encouraged the Commission to take more 
seriously the need to develop innovative solutions. The reluctance towards the 
introduction of direct producer liability – and perhaps even network liability– 
stands out as a major missed opportunity for providing EU-level rules that could 
support consumers seeking to participate in cross-border shopping.
At the time of writing, the EU is committed to reviewing all of the EU con-
sumer acquis to check whether it is still fit for purpose.134 Although the findings of 
this exercise and details of any potential follow-up action are not yet known, one 
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would hope that this exercise might provide the opportunity to think carefully 
about what sort of aspects of cross-border shopping require EU action, and what 
might be appropriate solutions to address the problems consumers face. In this 
regard, it needs to be borne in mind that the way consumers buy goods is under-
going a major transformation through the digital revolution and the emergence 
of new business models.135 This development could make it even more urgent 
to come up with rules on consumer sales which are fit for this new environment 
– and such rules need to be much more problem-focused then the rules in the 
current CSD. Hopefully, REFIT will be more than merely another attempt to 
shift from minimum to maximum harmonisation without at the same time fun-
damentally reforming the substance of the CSD.
6 Consumer and mortgage credit
Introduction
General introduction
Consumer credit has been regulated by the EU since 1986.1 The first measure 
was rather modest, but a much more wide-ranging Directive was adopted in 
2008.2 A directive regulating mortgages was added in 2014.3 
Chapter themes
Harmonisation
This is a good topic in which to explore the maximum harmonisation debate. 
A push to maximum harmonisation was a plank of the 2008 Consumer Credit 
Directive reforms. By contrast, in the mortgage area the maximum harmonisa-
tion ambitions were limited to the field of pre-contractual information and cal-
culation of the Annual Percentage Rate of Charge (APRC). This more limited 
approach seems preferable. APRCs need to have the same meaning in all the 
Member States if consumers are meaningfully to compare deals across borders. 
Common documentation may make it easier for businesses to trade across bor-
ders, allow non-local consumers to compare with similar documents from their 
home state and reduce to some extent the impact of language barriers. However, 
more extensive harmonisation in this area seems unjustified. The impact of some 
rules will be marginal to the workings of the internal market. Credit is a com-
plex area in which uniformity will be hard to achieve and is often linked to local 
traditions and cultures. Even in the field of information some local variations 
may be valuable. 
The loss of local flexibility caused by adopting maximum harmonisation 
does not seem justified with a product like consumer credit, and even more so 
 1 Directive 87/102/EEC on consumer credit (1987) OJ L42/48.
 2 Directive 2008/48/EC on credit agreements for consumers (2008) OJ L133/66.
 3 Directive 2014/17/EU on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential 
immovable property (2014) OJ L60/34.
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mortgages, as there are a lot of factors encouraging consumers to purchase in 
familiar national markets. Local factors such as traditions of use of credit and 
familiarity with established forms of protection push in favour of national regu-
lation. Equally, the dynamism of the credit market may call for agile regulatory 
responses at the national level without the straightjacket of a European regime. 
Even where maximum harmonisation has been adopted in the field of con-
sumer credit, its assistance to the internal market is limited, because there are so 
many factors requiring creditors still to look to local regulation: issues regard-
ing scope; exemptions; minimum harmonisation provisions; local discretion built 
into the directive; and, open-textured terms subject to interpretation according 
to local traditions and national implementation styles, particularly where the 
national rules go into more detail than the European rules. In practice, the need 
to have national legal advice is unlikely to be a major issue for creditors as their 
investment in products sold across borders will usually be substantial and legal 
costs will be built into their planning. 
The market for cross-border credit is small and there have been no calls for a 
separate regime for cross-border credit sales. This is certainly not an area where 
the ‘brand Europe’ is used to export the product. Little European consumer 
credit will be sold outside the European borders. Equally we doubt these laws 
will have much impact on state laws beyond Europe as credit laws are usually 
detailed and based on national traditions. Positive aspects, such as moves towards 
responsible lending practices, may be seen as part of a trend underpinned by 
international standards.4
Information
Credit law is also a rich terrain for exploring the information model of consumer 
protection. The pattern adopted by the EU very much conforms to the tradi-
tional model that values quantity of information over quality. The insights of 
behavioural economics have not been embraced to gear information disclosure 
to the particular needs of different types of lending situations and borrowers. 
Personalised disclosure is not addressed and the use of warnings is limited and 
 4 OECD, G20 High-level Principles on Financial Consumer Protection (OECD, 2011), 
https://www.oecd.org/g20/topics/financial-sector-reform/48892010.pdf [accessed 22 
March 2016]; The World Bank, Good Practices for Financial Consumer Protection (The 
World Bank, 2012), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTFINANCIALSECTOR/
Resources/282884-1339624653091/8703882-1339624678024/8703850-13400267 
11043/8710076-1340026729001/FinConsumerProtection_GoodPractices_FINAL.pdf 
[accessed 22 March 2016]; FinCoNet, FInCoNet report on responsible lending (FinCoNet, 
2014), http://www.finconet.org/FinCoNet-Responsible-Lending-2014.pdf [accessed 22 
March 2016]; Consumers International, Responsible Lending: An International Landscape 
http://www.consumersinternational.org/media/1412472/ciresponsiblelending_
finalreport_06-11-13.pdf [accessed 7 July 2016]. Often these reports take a broader view 
of responsible lending than is taken in this work and include all aspects of the regulatory 
and supervisory regime.
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perhaps lacking in sophistication and hence impact. The EU interventions on 
information disclosure and warnings, if linked to maximum harmonisation, 
potentially impede the freedom of national authorities to develop helpful infor-
mation obligations and warnings based on local needs and customs. There are 
only a few nods in the direction of recognising the life-time nature of many credit 
and mortgage contracts may require ongoing communication.5 
In brief the basic approach to information policy in EU credit law seems 
rather unimaginative. It also risks stifling national initiatives and experimenta-
tion that could then be shared between regulators. The underlying policy is very 
much one of promoting transparency and information to allow a free market to 
generate offerings from which informed consumers can select. There are only a 
few glimpses of a more imaginative policy that ensures consumers understand 
the information and that creditors take some responsibility to lend responsibly. 
These are fairly modest and ultimately in most market situations fail to chal-
lenge the freedom-of-contract model by introducing a more co-operative ethic 
that requires the creditor to take into account the interests of consumers.6 For 
example, the duty to inform is enhanced by an obligation to provide adequate 
explanations, but this stops short of requiring the creditor to counsel against 
taking the credit even where that would be in the consumer’s best interests. The 
major  control derives from the credit-worthiness test, but this focuses on afford-
ability and not on whether the loan is in the consumer’s best interest. Only in the 
mortgage sector, when advisory services are offered, do the interests of consumers 
need to be to the fore in lending practices.
Risk sharing
Credit is about risk sharing. The cost of credit reflects in part the risk of default 
amongst the consumers of that particular product. Those who do not default 
subsidise those who do. Social institutions like credit unions specifically seek to 
provide for such cross-subsidisation.7 Consumer protection rules that ensure 
creditors better assess consumers should lead to less cross-subsidisation if credi-
tors are better able to assess the risk of particular consumers. This may ironically 
lead to less solidarity amongst consumers i.e. less risk sharing. 
One way of sharing risk is to mandate core protections which apply to every-
one so all benefit from the mandatory rules. There are, however, in EU credit law 
 5 L Nogler and U Reifner, Life Time Contracts: Social Long-term Contracts in Labour, 
Tenancy and Consumer Credit Law (Eleven International Publishing, 2014).
 6 R Brownsword, “‘Good faith in contracts’ revisited”. (1996) 49 Current Legal Problems 
p.111. Signs of a more co-operative ethic in this vein have begun to emerge in the CJEU’s 
jurisprudence on unfair terms, Case C-415/11 Mohamed Aziz v Caixa d’Estalvis de 
Catalunya, Tarragona i Manresa (Catalunyacaixa) ECLI:EU:C:2013:164. See Chapter 
4, p.148.
 7 See for example, G Griffiths and G Howells, ‘Britain’s best kept secret – an analysis of 
credit unions as an alternative source of credit’ (1991) 14 Journal of Consumer Policy 
p.443.
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only a few restrictions on the form of the contractual agreement. Another means 
is to control what products can be offered so that the vulnerable cannot be left 
exposed to particularly risky products. Again, there are few examples of this at EU 
level. There is, for example, no EU usury law. The effects of such laws are debat-
able. They can exclude consumers from the market.8 However, creditors may also 
still decide to lend to some consumers at lower rates than previously. Finally, risk 
can be shared by mitigating the impact of default, through mechanisms like the 
UK’s time order9 that allow debt rescheduling, or ultimately by debt forgiveness 
in bankruptcy. These have not been addressed legislatively at the EU level. The 
EU prefers to focus on perfecting the market and to rely on individual responsi-
bility of consumers and traders. However, the nature of credit and the unpredict-
able incidents of normal social life require protection for consumers when things 
go wrong and the credit contract cannot be completed as planned.
Credit use in the EU
The level of consumer credit usage varies greatly across Europe depending on 
economic conditions and cultural attitudes to credit. The UK, Spain, Germany, 
France, Italy and Poland accounted for more than 80% of the total consumer credit 
outstanding in December 2008.10 In Cyprus, outstanding consumer credit was 
25% of the GDP, whereas in Latvia, Netherlands, Lithuania, Hungary, Estonia, 
Luxembourg and Slovakia it was less than 5%.11 Between 2009 and 2011 con-
sumer credit debt as a percentage of GDP dropped from 9.1% to 8.2%. Cyprus 
still leads the way with 19%, followed by Greece with 15% and then Hungary and 
the United Kingdom with 14%.12 
In 2014, outstanding residential mortgage debt in the EU stood at 
€6,909,057m, equal to 49.6% of EU GDP. By far the highest amounts of debt 
were in the UK (€1,666,902m) and Germany (€1,237,410m); whilst, as a per-
centage of GDP, mortgage debt varied dramatically within the EU from 114.0% 
 8 D Cayne and M Trebilcock ‘Market considerations in the formulation of consumer 
protection policy’  (1973) 23 Univ of Toronto LJ p.396 and for a more recent review of 
arguments see I Ramsay “’To heap distress upon distress?’ Comparative reflections on 
interest rate ceilings” (2010) 60 The University of Toronto Law Journal p.707.
 9 Consumer Credit Act 1974, s. 129.
10 GHK, Final Report – Establishment of a Benchmark on the Economic Impact of the Consumer 
Credit Directive on the Functioning of the Internal Market in this Sector and on the Level of 
Consumer Protection (GHK, 2009), 22; http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/rights/
docs/ccd_benchmarking_study_en.pdf [accessed 12 March 2016]. See also W Kösters, 
S Paul and S Stein, An Economic Analysis of the EU Commission’s Proposal for a New 
Consumer Credit Directive (Essen, 2004) which showed the UK had large growth in credit 
during 1990s bringing it up to the top of the consumer credit league along with Germany.
11 European Commission, Report on the Implementation of Directive 2008/48/EC on Credit 
Agreements for Consumers COM (2014) 259 final, 11; Final Report – Establishment of a 
Benchmark on the Economic Impact of the Consumer Credit Directive on the Functioning of 
the Internal Market in this Sector and on the Level of Consumer Protection (GHK, 2009).
12 COM (2014) 259 final, 11.
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in Denmark to far lower levels in the new Member States, with Romania having 
lowest figure at 6.7%.13
The aim of the EU consumer policy in this field has not necessarily been to 
increase credit consumption; rather, it has sought to promote competition and 
ensure consumers have a transparent choice on fair conditions. However, easier 
access to credit may be a by-product of its liberal regulatory approach. It has opened 
markets up so that credit has become available in all Member States in more popu-
lar forms through firms skilled in advertising and marketing. The fact consumer 
credit use has dropped in recent times is probably due to external factors in the 
wake of the financial economic crisis rather than anything related to the Directives. 
How much credit is good for a society is a much-debated topic.14 There is a 
risk of over-consumption of credit as individuals find it hard to compare the value 
of immediate access to money against the long term cost of repayment of capital 
plus interest.15 There is a general trend in many Member States towards credit 
being necessary to maintain expected standards of living. This process known as 
‘financialization’16 can be productive17 but can also increase risks.
Cross-border trade
There is relatively little cross-border selling of credit.18 Instead businesses have 
moved to consumers by setting up subsidiaries or branches and often purchasing a 
local vehicle.19 This practice makes one wonder whether maximum harmonisation 
13 European Mortgage Federation, Hypostat 2015 (European Mortgage Federation 2015); 
http://www.hypo.org/PortalDev/Objects/6/Files/Hypostat_2015.pdf [accessed 22 
March 2016].
14 TA Durkin, G Elliehausen, ME Staten and TJ Zywicki, Consumer Credit and the American 
Economy (Oxford University Press, 2014); G Bertola, R Disney and C Grant (eds) The 
Economics of Consumer Credit (MIT Press, 2006). J Niemi et. al., “‘Wannabe WAGS’ and 
‘credit binges’: The construction of overindebtedness in the UK” in J Niemi, I Ramsay and 
WC Whitford (eds), Consumer Credit, Debt and Bankruptcy (Hart, 2009).
15 D Laibson, A Repetto and J Tobacman, ‘A Debt Puzzle’, in P Aghion, R Frydman, J Stiglitz, 
and M Woodford (eds), Knowledge, Information and Expectations in Modern Economics: In 
Honor of Edmund S. Phelps (Princeton University Press, 2003).
16 C Poppe, Financialisation of social welfare – the role of credit and financial counselling 
for social inclusion and exclusion (SIFO 2011), 3; http://www.sifo.no/files/Project_
Description.pdf [accessed 12 March 2016].
17 U Reifner, “‘A call to arms’ – for regulation of consumer lending”, in J Niemi, I Ramsay 
and WC Whitford, Consumer Credit, Debt and Bankruptcy (Hart, 2009); I Ramsay, 
‘Consumer credit regulation after the fall: International dimensions’ (2012) J Eur Cons 
and Market Law p.24 helpfully reviews some of the theories of consumer credit. These 
include viewing it as a form of lifecycle model of consumption, loans making up for gaps 
in wages or as the fuel for excessive  consumerism.
18 Final Report – Establishment of a Benchmark on the Economic Impact of the Consumer 
Credit Directive on the Functioning of the Internal Market in this Sector and on the Level of 
Consumer Protection (GHK 2009), pp.40–41, which states that in 2008 67% of respondents 
to the GHK survey say they do not engage in cross-border lending. 
19 Ibid.
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is really needed in this sector. Although consumer credit regulatory rules are one 
barrier to cross border trade, others are often influential such as language and cul-
ture, consumer preference for local providers, local tax laws, national anti-money 
laundering regulation, debt recovery practices and insolvency laws.20 
There are some potential consumer gains if credit markets can be made more 
competitive. For instance, the average APRC21 in 2008 was 31% in Estonia and 
only 7% in nearby Finland.22 However, there are also risks attached with liberali-
sation. Where consumers have experimented with credit in different currencies, 
typically the Swiss franc, strong fluctuations in currencies have brought their own 
problems for consumers.23 Foreign-currency loans can be for domestic transac-
tions. The risk of currency fluctuation exists in any cross-border consumer credit 
agreement where the consumer contracts in a currency other than their own. 
Their complexity can also be problematic for consumers to understand.24 This 
risk is of course eliminated within the Eurozone for loans in euro.
Despite the limited cross-border trade in consumer credit, there has been a lot 
of rhetoric about opening up the consumer credit markets. This was even encour-
aged by some consumer groups, particularly in the new Member States, where 
competition was weak. Maximum harmonisation was seen as a tool to achieve 
greater cross-border trade. But, it is unlikely to be very effective, given the other 
factors pulling consumers towards local creditors.
The mortgage market is even more distinctly national in character than the 
general consumer credit market and has a very limited internal market dimension. 
National traditions vary greatly as regards the financing of home ownership and 
natural human conservatism intensifies the propensity to prefer products from the 
national market. There are sound reasons why consumers should play safe with 
such important investments. Borrowers and lenders both seem more comfortable 
working within familiar frameworks. Lenders in particular fear the ‘adverse selec-
tion’ problem, whereby only borrowers who have struggled to find a loan in the 
local market will seek one from another state. Only if loans are being promoted in 
the consumer’s state and the lending is subject to their state’s laws do consumers 
20 Ibid. Interestingly the implementation of the Consumer Credit Directive in France was 
part of a package of reforms also including insolvency law, S Charlton, National Report 
on the Transposition of the Consumer Credit Directive in France (European Legal Studies 
Institute, 2012).
21 See below.
22 Final Report – Establishment of a Benchmark on the Economic Impact of the Consumer 
Credit Directive on the Functioning of the Internal Market in this Sector and on the Level of 
Consumer Protection (GHK, 2009).
23 Such foreign-currency loans can be either from foreign or national creditors. See P Yeşin, 
‘Foreign Currency Loans and Systemic Risk in Europe’ [2013] Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis Review p.218 available at https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/ 
13/03/219-236Yesin.pdf [accessed 7 July 2016]. 
24 Such loans have been subject to litigation in the CJEU where the Court has used unfair 
terms law to require they be intelligible to the consumer: see Case C-26/13 Árpád 
Kásler, Hajnalka Káslerné Rábai v OTP Jelzálogbank Zrt ECLI:EU:C:2014:282 and Case 
C-96/14 Jean-Claude Van Hove v CNP Assurances SA ECLI:EU:C:2015:262.
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seem interested in looking at new products.25 In smaller Member States with 
limited market offerings there may be some advantages to looking across borders. 
The Commission concedes that the level of cross-border sales is less than 1%.26 
Even after citing a study it commissioned listing advantages that could be derived 
from integrating markets,27 the Commission sagely noted:
Limits to the potential for integration should however be acknowledged. 
The influence of factors such as language, distance, consumer preferences, or 
lender business strategies cannot be underestimated.28 
Understandably, therefore some Member States were unenthusiastic about the 
need for a directive regulating mortgages. 
History of EU regulation 
The EEC ventured into the field of consumer credit at a fairly early stage in the 
development of the consumer acquis. Perhaps because it was adopted at this early 
stage29 – combined with the inherently challenging task of regulating in this area – 
Council Directive 87/102/EEC when adopted in 1986 had limited ambitions.30 
Its minimum harmonisation character meant that the impact on Member States’ 
laws with sophisticated consumer credit regimes was limited or non-existent, the 
latter being the case with the United Kingdom. 
In 1995 and 1996 reports were published on the operation of the Directive with 
a summary of reactions to the 1995 paper being published in 1997.31 As Recital 
25 London Economics, The Costs and Benefits of Integration of EU Mortgage Markets (London 
Economics, 2005) pp.8–9 and chapter 5.
26 Commission, Mortgage Credit in the EU COM (2005) 327 final, para 11. 
27 Suggested benefits were an increase in GDP by 0.7% and private consumption by 0.5% and 
lowering interest rates by up to 47 basis points i.e. reducing interest payable on 100,000 
euro loan by 470 euro per year: The Costs and Benefits of Integration of EU Mortgage 
Markets ( London Economics, 2005). Mercer, Oliver Wyman and the European Mortgage 
Federation put the benefits at 0.12–0.24 of EU GDP in Simon Low and others, Study on 
the Financial Integration of European Mortgage Markets (Mercer, Oliver Wyman and the 
European Mortgage Federation, 2013).
28 Commission, White Paper on the Integration of EU Mortgage Credit Markets COM (2007) 
807 final, 2.
29 Other early directives such as that on doorstep-selling were similarly rudimentary, see 
Directive 85/577/EEC on contracts negotiated away from business premises (1985) 
L372/31.
30 Directive 87/102/EEC on consumer credit (1987) OJ L42/48.
31 Commission, Report on the Operation of Directive 87/102/EEC for the Approximation 
of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning 
Consumer Credit COM (95) 117 final; Commission, Report on the Operation of Directive 
90/88 Amending Directives 87/102 (as amended by Directive 90/88) for the Approximation 
of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning 
Consumer Credit COM (96) 79 final; Commission, Report on the Operation of Directive 
87/102 for the Approximation of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the 
Member States Concerning Consumer Credit COM (97) 465 final.
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3 of Directive 2008/48/EC32 indicates, these revealed substantial  differences in 
 regulation between states, with Member States using consumer protection mecha-
nisms outside the scope of the 1987 Directive based on their national legal and 
economic circumstances. Following the modern trend in favour of maximum har-
monisation, the differing mandatory national provisions were cited as a reason to 
favour full harmonisation. They were said to ‘restrict consumers’ ability to make 
direct use of the gradually increasing availability of cross-border credit’.33 The 
reform process was, however, protracted. A proposal was published in 2002,34 
which after a couple of modified drafts35 finally emerged as the 2008 Directive. This 
is less radical than the 2002 draft, for example, with respect to responsible lend-
ing, the removal of a ban on door-to-door selling, the exclusion of equity release 
schemes and surety agreements, the narrowing of the definition of total costs of 
credit and the application of a light information regime to certain loans, such as 
overdrafts.36 It was still far more extensive than the first Consumer Credit Directive.
The Commission started a process of looking at ways of removing barriers to 
the internal market for mortgages in 2003 and published a Green Paper in 200537 
and White Paper in 2007.38 These culminated in Directive 2014/17/EU on credit 
agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property (hereafter 
Mortgage Credit Directive).39 This is a classic example of the EU intervening for 
consumer protection in an area that is undoubtedly of great importance to con-
sumers (as for most consumers home purchase is their most important decision) 
and where there is a need for good practice (and plenty examples of bad practice). 
However, the internal market justifications are less compelling.
As the Mortgage Credit Directive was being developed, Europe suffered the 
global financial crisis which in part was based on poor mortgage lending prac-
tices particularly in the subprime market and the subsequent toxic securitisation 
of the resulting debt.40 This highlighted the need for good responsible lend-
ing standards and sensitive handling of default cases. Absent effective specific 
32 Directive 2008/48/EC on credit agreements for consumers (2008) OJ L133/66.
33 Directive 87/102/EEC, Recital 4. 
34 Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Harmonisation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States 
Concerning Credit for Consumers COM (2002) 443.
35 Commission, Amended Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Harmonisation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of 
the Member States Concerning Credit for Consumers Repealing Directive 87/102/EC and 
Modifying Directive 93/13/EC COM (2004) 747; Commission, Modified Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Credit Agreements for Consumers 
Amending Council Directive 93/13/EC COM (2005) 483. 
36 S Franken, ‘The political economy of the EC Consumer Credit Directive’ in J Niemi, 
IRamsay and WC Whitford, Consumer Credit, Debt and Bankruptcy (Hart, 2009).
37 COM (2005) 327 final.
38 COM (2007) 807 final.
39 Directive 2014/17/EU.
40 C. Peterson, ‘The political economy of consumer credit securitization: Comparing predatory 
lending in home finance in the US, UK, Germany and Japan’ in in J Niemi, I Ramsay and WC 
Whitford, Consumer Credit, Debt and Bankruptcy (Hart, 2009).
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regulations, the Unfair Contract Terms Directive has been called upon to  provide 
remedies in mortgage cases.41 There have also been soft law regulator-driven ini-
tiatives at the European and international level to address these concerns. At 
the international level the Financial Stability Board on 18 April 2012 passed its 
Principles for Sound Residential Mortgage Underwriting Practices and on 13 June 
2013 the European Banking Authority adopted an Opinion on Good Practices for 
Responsible Mortgage Lending and Good Practices for the Treatment of Borrowers 
in Mortgage Payment Difficulties. These were taken into account when develop-
ing the Mortgage Credit Directive.42
Philosophy underpinning the Directives
The Directives formally seek to promote the internal market in consumer and 
mortgage credit.43 The default rule underpinning the Directives’ philosophy is 
freedom of contract. There are, for example, no bans on practices such as the 
sale of credit on the doorstep that existed in some Member States. Only limited 
controls exist on the substance of agreements and default procedures are only 
controlled in the mortgage context, and even then only in a limited manner.
Disclosure rules lie at the heart of the Directives – in advertising and at the pre-
contractual and contractual stages. They seek to ensure that consumers can chose 
in an informed way from as wide a range of products as possible, whilst ensuring 
that lending is undertaken responsibly. However, even with access to so much 
mandatory information, it can be difficult for consumers to determine which offer 
best suits their needs or indeed whether taking out credit at all is in their best 
interest. Credit offers can involve a highly complex range of terms affecting the 
price and involves risks that many consumers find difficult to understand and 
compare. Consumers will frequently be over-optimistic about their use of credit 
and, for instance, discount penalties they hope not to pay and concentrate on 
low headline rates.44 There are few requirements to use warnings to alert con-
sumers to risks. A permissive approach to marketing gives businesses leeway to 
promote their products and the multiplication of offers makes the task of making 
an informed choice even more challenging.45 The limited controls can be seen as 
41 See Case C-415/11 Mohamed Aziz v Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya, Tarragona i Manresa 
(Catalunyacaixa) ECLI:EU:C:2013:164. 
42 See the Mortgage Credit Directive, Recital 3.
43 Consumer Credit Directive, Recital 6; Mortgage Credit Directive, Recital 2.
44 O Bar-Gill, Seduction by Contract: Law, Economics, and Psychology in Consumer Markets 
(OUP, 2012), p.10.
45 These are some of the lessons from behavioural economics: see the special issue of Journal 
of Consumer Policy, ‘Behavioural economics, consumer policy and consumer law’. J 
Consum Policy 34 (2001), pp.271–398; A Duggan and I Ramsay, ‘Front end approaches 
to access to justice: The example of consumer credit’ in M Trebilcock, A Duggan and L 
Sossin (eds), Improving Access to Justice for the Middle Class (University of Toronto Press, 
2012); M Muynck, ‘Credit cards, overdraft facilities and European consumer protection: A 
blank cheque for unfairness?’ (2010) European Review of Private Law p.1187.
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encouraging consumption of credit with the risk that it increases collective ‘bads’ 
such as over-indebtedness. 
To balance this, some national regulators are adopting a ‘treat your customer 
fairly’ principle. There are a few provisions in that direction in the Directives, such 
as the duty to provide adequate explanations and to check creditworthiness – but 
these do not go so far as to require the creditor to have the debtor’s interest to 
the fore. Only in the mortgage context, where advisory services are provided, do 
creditors, credit intermediaries or appointed representatives have to act in the 
best interest of their consumer.46
The Directives focus on regulating the transacting process with limited regula-
tion of the substance of the agreement, no regulation of default procedures (save 
to a limited extent in the mortgage context) and few post-contractual obligations. 
Certain aspects of the agreement are regulated such as the right to early repay-
ment and, in the consumer credit context, joint and several liability for goods sup-
plied under linked agreements. For mortgages there are some controls on types of 
agreements that are high risk, such as foreign-currency loans or loans at variable 
rates, but these involve setting out ways of providing such contracts rather than 
proscribing them. Member States can give additional guidance or set limits on, for 
example, loan-to-value or loan-to-income ratios.47 The Directives themselves have 
few controls on the substance of the agreement. There is no substantive control 
through usury laws or product regulation. Modern thinking based on behavioural 
economics whereby consumers would default to a ‘vanilla product’ unless they 
explicitly opt into more complex products was not part of the discussions.48 
Scope 
Consumer Credit Directive
The definition of ‘credit agreement’ in the Consumer Credit Directive is intended 
to be broad and functional so as to future-proof against product innovation49 
and covers a ‘deferred payment, loan or similar financial accommodation’.50 The 
recitals explain that the scope of harmonisation is determined by the Directive’s 
definitions.51 Significantly, the definition of consumer is limited by the traditional 
formula to a ‘natural person who, in transactions covered by this Directive, is 
acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business or profession.’52 Thus, 
46 See below.
47 Recital 55 to the Mortgage Credit Directive. 
48 A Duggan and I Ramsay, ‘Front end approaches to access to justice: The example of 
consumer credit’ in M Trebilcock, A Duggan and L Sossin (eds), Improving Access to 
Justice for the Middle Class (University of Toronto Press, 2012).
49 Consumer Credit Directive, Recital 7.
50 Ibid.,  Art. 3(c). There is an exception where goods or services of the same kind are always 
paid by instalment e.g. a newspaper account or gym membership.
51 Consumer Credit Directive, Recital 10.
52 Ibid.,  Art. 3(a).
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regulation of all loans to businesses are left to national law. Surety agreements are 
also not covered, although they were included in the initial proposal.53 
Art. 2 lists 12 exclusions from the scope of the Directive. These are quite 
broad, for instance agreements for less than 200 or more than 75,000 euro; 
mortgages; hire or leases; pledges; various categories of free or low-interest loans; 
and, credit agreements that are part of settlements reached in court or before 
statutory bodies. Member States can of course, as a matter of national law, extend 
the Directive’s rules to transactions not within its scope.54
Mortgage Credit Directive
The Mortgage Credit Directive applies to credit agreements (a) secured by a 
mortgage or by another comparable security commonly used in a Member State 
on residential immovable property or secured by a right related to residential 
immovable property; and (b) credit agreements the purpose of which is to acquire 
or retain property rights in land or in an existing or projected building.55 The 
latter type of lending where no security is provided is quite rare.56 Most home 
purchase loans operate by way of mortgage, but in some countries, such as France 
and Belgium, home loans use personal guarantees.57 
The definition is rather broad. The underlying policy issue is whether such 
lending should be under the general consumer credit laws or a specific mortgage 
regime. The Directive, for instance, requires that second-charge mortgages be 
treated in the same manner as first-charge mortgages. There is explicit recogni-
tion that the regime adopted has followed that of the Consumer Credit Directive 
in order to ensure a consistent framework.58
Certain types of lending are excluded from the Directive.59 From a policy per-
spective, the most important exemption is for equity release schemes that are often 
53 Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the Harmonisation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member 
States Concerning Credit for Consumers COM [2002] 443 final. In C-208/98 Berliner 
Kindl Brauerei AG v Andreas Siepert (2000) ECR I-1741 it had been excluded from being 
classed as a credit agreement and in C-45/96 Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank AG 
v Edgar Dietzinger [1998] ECR I-1199 guarantees were not covered by the Doorstep-
selling Directive unless linked to a credit contract that was within scope. Rott argues 
that there is an internal market justification for regulating in guarantees because bank 
consumers do not have property and so the third-party guarantee has become a common 
surety and it is sensible to introduce common rules for what are in effect integral parts of 
many credit transactions: P Rott, ‘Consumer guarantees in the future Consumer Credit 
Directive; Mandatory ban on consumer protection’ (2005) 13 European Review of Private 
Law p.383.
54 K Sein, ‘Transposition of the new Consumer Credit Directive in Estonia’ (2012) 20 
European Review of Private Law p.435.
55 Mortgage Credit Directive, Art. 3(1).
56 Mortgage Credit Directive, Recital 18.
57 London Economics (n 26) 1, 12–13.
58 Consumer Credit Directive, Recital 20.
59 Ibid.,  Art. 3(2).
222 Consumer and mortgage credit
known as ‘lifetime mortgages’. These are products where in return for a lump sum 
or periodic payment the creditor is repaid from a future sale of the property on 
the happening of a specific event e.g. death.60 Similarly, home reversion schemes, 
where all or part of the property is sold to a reversion company in exchange for 
a lump sum or periodic payments, are excluded. These do not need many of the 
normal consumer credit protection measures; for instance, affordability is not an 
issue since there are no repayments and loss of a home on default is not at stake. 
However, such schemes do raise significant distinct consumer protection concerns, 
especially as they are often targeted at elderly potentially vulnerable consumers. 
Consumers need to consider if these complex products are the best option for 
them and their family and there is a risk they are placed in jeopardy should they 
breach any of the contractual rules. Protection in these instances has to be afforded 
at the national level. However, if any such schemes require the regular repayment 
of capital they will not be exempt from the Mortgage Credit Directive.
Other exemptions cover employer loans that are interest free or at lower than 
the prevailing APRC; interest-free loans; overdrafts repayable within one month; 
settlements from court or statutory bodies; and, free-of-charge deferments of 
existing debts.
Member States are given a discretion to exclude certain loans.61 Bridging loans 
can be excluded. The same applies to loans by credit unions and loans under a 
statutory provision for a general-interest purpose at free or lower than the pre-
vailing interest rate, so long as there are alternative arrangements concerning 
advertising and pre-contractual information. Where mortgage security is used, 
but not to acquire interests in the residential property, the rules on advertising 
and pre-contractual information can be replaced by the rules in the Consumer 
Credit Directive. 
So-called buy-to-let mortgages can also be excluded. The rationale for this 
exclusion is that the debtor’s home is not at risk on default (at least not by virtue 
of sale of the property) and they are often purchased for profit motives. Indeed 
many would have been excluded in any event as they are purchases for renting 
at a profit, and consumer is defined in the same way as under the Consumer 
Credit Directive in a manner which would exclude such small business operators. 
Only in situations where home-owners find themselves in circumstances requir-
ing them to let out property, for instance if they could not sell their house or it 
was inherited would they be consumers within the scope of the Directive. 
No avoidance of rules
As with most consumer protection rules, the rights granted to consumers by 
both Directives cannot waived by them.62 The consumer credit rules cannot be 
60 See U Reifner, S Clerc-Renaud, Elena Pérez-Carrillo, A Tiffe and M Knobloch, Study on 
Equity Release Schemes in the EU (Institüt für Finanzdienstleistungen e.V., 2009).
61 Mortgage Credit Directive, Art. 3(3).
62 Consumer Credit Directive, Art. 22(2); Mortgage Credit Directive, Art. 41(a).
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avoided by choice of third-country law if the credit agreement has a close link to 
one or more Member States.63 The drafters of the Directives were also astute to 
the craftiness of contract drafters and so provided that the consumer rights could 
also not excluded even if the agreement was integrated into one which because of 
its character or purpose would be outside the scope.64
Running and regulating credit businesses 
Consumer credit
In many European states the Central Bank plays an important role in regulating 
creditors; whereas in others a public consumer protection authority has this role, 
such as the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). These authorities can have 
a significant impact on the actual conduct of business through the standards they 
set down. For instance, the license requirements in the United Kingdom permit 
practices to be condemned even though strictly legal and codes of conduct devel-
oped by such authorities can set high standards. The Consumer Credit Directive 
is not prescriptive as to the form, but simply requires supervision or regulation 
of creditors by a body or authority independent of financial institutions.65 Unlike 
the first proposal, it contains no obligation to require registration and the duties 
of the regulatory body are not spelt out. The European Banking Authority also 
has responsibilities for promoting transparency, simplicity and fairness in the mar-
ket for consumer financial products or services.66
There is a separate obligation to ensure there are adequate and effective out-
of-court dispute resolution procedures.67 There is also the typical rule about 
Member States needing to ensure compliance by having penalties which are 
‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’.68
Mortgages
There can be several parties involved in supplying mortgages. Mortgage prod-
ucts are often sold through complex trading structures. Creditors will frequently 
use intermediaries or appointed representatives to supply them with customers.69 
Credit intermediaries are allowed by the Mortgage Credit Directive and made 
subject to regulatory requirements.70 Member States can decide to allow them 
63 Ibid.,  art 22(4); There is no similar provision in Mortgage Credit Directive.
64 Ibid.,  art 22(3); Mortgage Credit Directive, Art. 41(a).
65 Ibid.
66 Regulation 1093/2010/EU establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European 
Banking Authority) (2010) OJ L331/12, Art. 9. 
67 Consumer Credit Directive, Art. 24. 
68 Ibid.,  Art. 23.
69 Creditors are responsible for actions of their credit intermediaries and any appointed 
representative of themselves or a tied intermediary; credit intermediaries are responsible 
for the actions of their appointed representative: Mortgage Credit Directive, Arts. 29, 31.
70 See Mortgage Credit Directive, Arts. 30, 33, 34. 
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to have appointed representatives.71 There is a passport provision to allow them, 
subject to certain constraints, to operate throughout the Union.72 
The scope for advice may vary depending upon the relationship of the inter-
mediary and creditors. A broker may be able to select the best market offering for 
the consumer; whereas some intermediaries may be tied to certain creditors or 
have incentives to provide products from certain business. Face-to-face sales will 
offer different opportunities for advice than sales through websites. Business have 
to state whether advisory services are being provided and whether the selection 
will be from their range of products or from across the market.73 Where advisory 
services are offered, advisors need to act in the best interest of the consumer and 
obtain sufficient information, consider a sufficiently large number of products 
and recommend suitable credit agreements.74 As the term ‘advisor’ might lead 
consumers to assume they will be offered impartial advice in their best interests, 
Member States retain the freedom to prohibit such terms.75
The Mortgage Credit Directive is more demanding in its controls of the 
mortgage industry than the Consumer Credit Directive. It specifically requires 
Member States to have a competent authority with sufficient investigative and 
enforcement powers and adequate resources.76 They must also promote con-
sumer financial education.77 The competent authorities are under an obligation 
to co-operate with one another.78 
Member States must ensure creditors, intermediaries or appointed representa-
tives have appropriate levels of knowledge and competence.79 Host states80 must 
establish minimum requirements based on Annex III principles concerning the 
products, law, purchasing process, security valuation, land registers, market, busi-
ness ethics, assessment of creditworthiness, financial and economic competence. 
States can rely on professional qualifications and experience and may have dif-
ferent requirements for levels and types of actor. Thus, it is recognised that a 
salesperson needs different requirements to the person who designs the products.
All these actors are subject to a requirement to act honestly, fairly, transparently 
and professionally and are required to take account of the rights and interests 
71 Ibid.,  Art. 31.
72 Ibid.,  Art. 32.
73 Ibid.,  Arts. 22(1), (2).
74 Mortgage Credit Directive, Art. 22(3).
75 Ibid.,  Recital 63.
76 Ibid.,  Art. 5.
77 Ibid.,  Art. 6.
78 Ibid.,  Arts. 36–37.
79 Ibid.,  Art. 9(1).
80 Where creditors act in more than one state these standards are fixed by the home state, with 
the host state retaining the right to establish its own minimum standards in specific areas 
i.e. law, purchasing process, land register and local market: Ibid.,  Art. 9(3)(ii).
81 Ibid.,  Art. 7(1). Taking account of consumer interests is different from having to take their 
interests into account, which is only required when advisory services are offered: see Ibid., 
Article 22(3).
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of the consumers.81 In the past, criticism has centred around the way staff or 
 intermediaries or appointed representatives are remunerated. The  pressure to 
meet targets and commission scheme incentives was blamed for over-selling and 
the promotion of inappropriate products.82 Principles are set out which seek to 
avoid conflicts of interest and to support sensible risk management.83 Any infor-
mation provided under Directive obligations must be supplied free of charge.84
As with the Consumer Credit Directive, Member States must provide sanc-
tions that are ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’85 and ensure there are 
appropriate and effective complaints and redress mechanisms for out of court 
settlements of disputes.86
Harmonisation 
Introduction
Competition in the European consumer credit markets is more likely to be 
increased by creditors establishing a presence in more Member States than by 
foreign firms selling credit products across borders. Nevertheless, the Consumer 
Credit Directive’s recital emphasises the need for consumer to enjoy a ‘high and 
equivalent level of protection … to create a genuine internal market’.87 Maximum 
harmonisation is the order of the day in the field of consumer credit, but there are 
some significant exceptions to this.88 
82 International Financial Consumer Protection Organisation (FinCoNet), Report on 
Sales Incentives and Responsible Lending (FinCoNet, 2016), http://www.finconet.org/
Report_Sales_Incentives%20_Responsible_Lending.pdf [accessed on 2 March 2016]; 
BEUC, Financial Supervision in the EU – a Consumer Perspective (BEUC, 2011), http://
www.beuc.eu/publications/2011-00396-01-e.pdf [accessed 2 March 2016]; BEUC, 
Protecting Consumer Interests in the Retail Financial Services Area: Need for Independent 
and Efficient National Supervisors Everywhere in the EU (BEUC, 2011), http://www.
beuc.eu/publications/2011-09879-01-e.pdf [accessed 2 March 2016]; Consumers 
International, Responsible Lending: An International Landscape (Consumers International, 
2013), http://www.consumersinternational.org/media/1412472/ ciresponsiblelending_
finalreport_06-11-13.pdf [accessed 2 March 2016]; Consumers International, Risky 
Business: The Case for Reform of Sales Incentives Schemes in Banks (Consumers International, 
2014), http://www.consumersinternational.org/media/1529404/sales-incentivereport_
riskybusiness_final2_151014.pdf [accessed 2 March 2016]; Which?, Here to Help? Bank 
Staff Reveal the Truth about Working for Britain’s Big Banks (Which?, 2012), http://www.
which.co.uk/documents/pdf/our-research-on-banking-staff-pdf- 305345.pdf [accessed 2 
March 2016]; Which?, ‘Is Your Bank Mis-selling?’ Which? Magazine (September 2015), 
pp.52–54. 
 83 Mortgage Credit Directive, Arts. 7(2)–(4).
 84 Ibid., Art. 8.
 85 Ibid., Art.38
 86 Ibid., Art. 39.
 87 Ibid., Recital 9.
 88 A useful discussion in line with our approach is given by O Cherednychenko, ‘Full 
harmonisation of retail financial service contract law: A success or a failure?’ in S Grundmann 
and Y Atamer (eds), Financial Services, Financial Crisis and General European Contract 
Law (Kluwer Law International, 2011).
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Full harmonisation is limited by the scope of the Directive. Member States 
remain free to extend the provisions of the Directive to operations not covered 
by the Directive or indeed to maintain or introduce more protective measures 
outside its scope. Issues not covered by the Directive can continue to be regu-
lated by national law, subject to the general Community law e.g. on the free 
movement of goods and services.89 Within the scope of the Directives, Member 
States are in some areas expressly given the freedom to decide whether to apply 
selected provisions. Furthermore, there are several cases where Member States 
are expressly allowed to maintain or introduce more protective rules or are 
granted a discretion. There is also a risk of fragmentation resulting from the 
use of general terms that are interpreted according to national traditions and 
contexts. The Commission has even noted open wording was used to enable 
Member States to adjust the directive to their legal culture and market situa-
tion.90 The more limited the scope and the greater the number of exceptions, 
the less difference there is between minimum and maximum harmonisation.91 
The presence of so many factors means that businesses will need to have local 
advice and so maximum harmonisation in this form cannot remove all barriers 
to trade. Our argument is that convergence is useful as it makes trading environ-
ments familiar, but there should not be a pretence that the rules can be treated 
as identical and applied without reference to local conditions. Moreover, some 
flexibility may be desirable to meet local conditions and to allow for regulatory 
experimentation.
Factors limiting maximum harmonisation under the 
Consumer Credit Directive
Measures outside the Directive’s scope
The scope of the Consumer Credit Directive has already been analysed.92 Any 
credit supplied outside the scope remains subject to national law. Equally any 
legal rules not covered remain subject to national law. Thus national usury or 
fairness controls or rules on procedures on default would continue to apply. In 
the United Kingdom for instance, the rules on default notices, time orders allow-
ing debt to be rescheduled, protection for goods from being repossessed under 
hire-purchase agreements where a third of total price has been paid, the exten-
sive recently introduced post-contractual information duties and rules govern-
ing unfair relationships will be unaffected. Similarly, Member States’ usury laws 
remain in place. The Directive also has some specific rules on what is inside and 
outside its scope.
 89 C-602/10 SC Volksbank România SA v Autoritatea Naional pentru Protecia Consumatorilor 
- Comisariatul Judeean pentru Protecia Consumatorilor Clrai [2012] 3 CMLR 45.
 90 COM (2014) 259 final (n 14), 8.
 91 B Gsell and HM Schellhase, ‘Vollharmonisiertes Verbraucherkreditrecht – Ein Vorbild 
für die weitere europäische Angleichung des Verbrauchervertragsrechts?’ [2009] 
Juristenzeitung p.20.
 92 See above, pp.220–221.
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Recital 18 states: ‘Member States should remain free to regulate information 
requirements in their national law regarding advertising which does not contain 
information on the cost of the credit.’ The UK has retained certain rules on the 
basis that since they do not relate to the cost of credit they are outside the scope 
of the Directive.93 This applies to the rule requiring in many instances disclosure 
of a postal address.94 The UK also continues to place controls on how certain 
restricted statements can be used e.g. ‘overdraft’, ‘interest free’, ‘no deposit’, ‘loan 
guaranteed’ or ‘pre-approved’, or ‘gift’, ‘present’ or any similar expressions.95 
The UK has interpreted the Directive as giving the right to regulate aspects other 
than the cost and denies it simply provides the power to extend Art. 4 regulation 
(that sets out the standard information in advertisements) to advertisements that 
do not give the interest rate or any figures relating to costs.96 On a literal reading, 
this interpretation seems strained, but the recital is ambiguous. It does not make a 
clear distinction between which advertisements can be regulated and what aspects 
of the advertisements should be regulated.
Recital 9 specifically mentions the limited scope of measures covered as a rea-
son why Member States are able to maintain or introduce national provisions on 
matters of joint and several liability of creditor and seller or service provider;97 
rules regulating the cancellation of goods or services contracts if the consumer 
exercises his right to withdraw from a credit contract and return of goods;98 and, 
minimum periods before reimbursement can be required after being demanded 
under open-ended credit agreements.99 In some cases there is a specific reference 
back to national law to flesh out the provisions. One example is as regards the 
proof needed for notification of withdrawal from a contract.100
Partial exemption
Member States may decide not to apply some of the Directive’s provisions to 
certain agreements. For instance, agreements entered into by various social lend-
ers such as credit unions or where the agreement is rescheduled because a con-
sumer is in default.101 Concerning overdrafts, there are options as regards the 
inclusion of the APR in the standard information to be included in advertising, 
 93 Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, Consultation on Proposals 
for Implementing the Consumer Credit Directive (Department for Business Enterprise 
and Regulatory Reform, 2009), para 2.8; http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file50962.pdf 
[accessed 22 March 2016].
 94 Consumer Credit (Advertising) Regulations 2010, S.I. 2010/1970, Reg 4(1)(b). and 10.
 95 Ibid., Reg 9.
 96 Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, Consultation on Proposals 
for Implementing the Consumer Credit Directive (Department for Business Enterprise 
and Regulatory Reform, 2009), para 2.36; http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file50962.pdf 
[accessed 22 March 2016].
 97 Consumer Credit Directive, Art. 15(3).
 98 Ibid., Recital 35. 
 99 Ibid., Recital 9.
100 Ibid., Art. 14(3)(a).
101 Ibid., Arts. 2(5), (6).
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pre-contractual information and contract agreements.102 Member States may 
provide that the right of withdrawal can be disapplied to contracts concluded by 
notary.103 The rules on early repayment can be made subject to a national thresh-
old of not more than 10,000 euro in any 12 month period 104 and the amount 
of compensation increased if creditors can prove losses were higher than set by 
the formula.105
Minimum harmonisation provisions
Express licence is given to Member States with respect to specific rules to  maintain 
or introduce national provisions. In some cases, this is contingent upon there 
having been pre-existing national rules.106 Examples include
•• national rules requiring APRC to be shown in advertising which does 
not indicate an interest rate or figures relating to any cost of credit to the 
consumer can be maintained without triggering the standard disclosure 
requirements;107
•• national rules regarding the validity of the conclusion of credit agreements;108 
•• rules modifying withdrawal periods in those states that already had a 
rule that funds could not be made available until a specified period had 
expired;109
•• rules on creditor’s compensation under the right of early repayment.110
Besides these, there are also certain other rules that give Members States a discre-
tion to depart from the Directive. Thus, whilst Art. 3(n)(i) limits ‘linked credit 
agreements’ to credit exclusively financing the supply of specific goods, Recital 
10 allows the Directive’s provisions to be applied to credit where the financing of 
such purchases is only the partial reason for the credit. Also Member States can 
maintain or introduce prohibitions on creditors requiring a debtor in connection 
with the credit agreement to open a bank account or take out another ancil-
lary service or to pay the costs associated therewith.111 Any national requirement 
102 Ibid., Arts. 4(2)(c), 6(2), 10(5)(f). The favoured status of creditors providing overdrafts 
is criticised in M Muynck, ‘Credit cards, overdraft facilities and European Consumer 
Protection: A blank cheque for unfairness?’ (2010) European Review of Private Law p.1187 
as they are a seductive way for creditors to accumulate debt and in his opinion overdrafts 
are increasingly ‘disguised’ instalment credit.
103 Consumer Credit Directive, Art. 14(6).
104 Ibid., Art. 16(4)(a).
105 Ibid., Art. 16(4)(b).
106 Ibid., Arts. 8(1) and 14(2).
107 Ibid., Art. 4(1).
108 Ibid., Art. 10(1).
109 Ibid., Art. 14(2).
110 Ibid., Art. 16(4).
111 Ibid., Recital 22. Where such combined offers are possible the consumers should be 
informed of their compulsory nature and where possible the costs included in the total 
cost of the credit.
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to consult databases when assessing creditworthiness can be maintained.112 The 
Directive is also without prejudice to national laws providing for joint and several 
liability between seller/supplier and creditor.113 National law can also establish a 
period within the withdrawal period during which the performance of the con-
tract cannot begin.114
Member States must make use of the Standard European Consumer Credit 
Information (SECCI) form in Annex II to comply with the pre-contractual 
information requirements in Art. 5.115 However, for overdrafts and certain other 
specific credits suppliers have the freedom to choose whether to make use of 
the European Consumer Credit Information (ECCI) form in Annex III. Ten 
states have made the ECCI mandatory for these agreements, although there 
does not seem to be any specific legal base permitting this in the Directive.116 
The rules seem to leave it to the supplier to decide whether to use the ECCI 
for overdrafts.
Member States’ discretion
Members States have a discretion as to how to implement certain provisions. 
Thus Member States can determine the extent and the conditions under which 
remedies should be available against creditors where the seller or supplier has not 
properly redressed any non-conformity.117 The potentially binding character of 
pre-contractual information and the period during which the creditor is to be 
bound to it is also left to the Member States.118 
Open-textured wording
The Directive also uses open-textured wording to allow discretion. Examples of 
this are:
•• the concept of ‘insignificant charges’ with regard to credit agreements under 
which credit has to be repaid within three months;119
•• ‘in good time’ with regard to the provision of pre-contractual information;120
•• ‘adequate explanations’ that the creditor and credit intermediaries are under 
a duty to provide;121
112 Ibid., Art. 8(1).
113 Ibid., Recital 38.
114 Ibid., Art. 14(7).
115 See pp.273–276.
116 COM (2014) 259 final (n 14) 9.
117 Consumer Credit Directive, Art. 15(2).
118 Ibid., Recital 25.
119 Ibid., Art. 2(f).
120 Ibid., Arts. 5(1) and 6(1).
121 Ibid., Art. 5(6). 
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•• ‘sufficient information’ with regard to the obligation to assess the creditwor-
thiness of the consumer;122
•• ‘sufficient increase’ in total amount of credit with regard to the obligation to 
re-assess the creditworthiness of the consumer;123
•• ‘significant overrunning’ of a current account;124 
•• ‘fair and objectively justified compensation’ for early repayment.125
These terms range from quite technical matters, such as what amounts to ‘insig-
nificant charges’ through to concepts that really determine the level of protection, 
such what is understood by ‘adequate explanations’ or ‘sufficient information’ to 
assess creditworthiness. Cherednychenko claims these implicit discretions pose 
a serious risk to full harmonisation.126 Where rules are not tightly drawn and 
instead merely set down a general approach using open-textured terms, there 
is a risk differences emerge by stealth. Cherednychenko also suggests that the 
impact of the rules might vary depending upon whether they are implemented 
into financial supervision legislation or into the Civil Code.127 
Conclusions on consumer credit harmonisation
Many creditors will have a mixed portfolio of products, some of which fall exclusively 
within the scope of the Directive and others outside. To the extent that the objective 
is to give creditors the confidence to sell across borders, the existence of dual regimes 
is likely to be problematic. It will be for national authorities to decide the extent to 
which products outside the Directive are brought under the same rules.
Within the scope of the Directive, there are significant areas where Member 
States have lost the freedom to provide any greater protection that that provided 
by the Directive: these concern aspects such as information duties, calculation 
of the APRC, right of withdrawal and conditions for early repayment (subject 
to allowed variances). However, there are many exemptions, references back to 
national law, discretions and use of broad discretionary concepts. It will be hard 
for any creditor to have faith that they can act in another Member States much 
more easily after the Directive without risk of falling foul of some national rule or 
national interpretation of an EU-inspired rule. Indeed even beyond the examples 
of potentially different national approaches listed above, it seems clear that the 
implementation of many of the rules will require detailed national regulations 
122 Ibid., Art. 8(1).
123 Ibid., Art. 8(2).
124 Ibid., Art. 18(2).
125 Ibid., Art. 16(2).
126 O Cherednychenko, ‘Full harmonisation of retail financial service contract law: A success 
or a failure?’ in S Grundmann and Y Atamer (eds), Financial Services, Financial Crisis and 
General European Contract Law (Kluwer Law, International 2011), p.240.
127 Ibid., p.242. Whilst common law countries do not have civil codes the distinction between 
general law and specialist financial services law is known.
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that will afford plenty of scope for different interpretations to emerge. There are 
likely to be differences emerging from legislative styles. The United Kingdom, for 
instance, will continue to use a very detailed form of implementing regulations 
covering more aspects than might be the case in other Member States.
A Commission report found that it was hard to assess the impact on the inter-
nal market of the choices made by the Member States where they had made 
regulatory choices to diverge from the Directive. One suspects this is because the 
differences were marginal and indeed cross-border credit is itself a marginal activ-
ity. This underlines that this is one area where maximum harmonisation is per-
haps not appropriate or at least not a high priority. Moreover, it removes a lot of 
the scope for Member States to react to local issues or test out solutions that best 
suit local needs. Warnings are a prime example. Their messages are best geared to 
local conditions. However, use of warnings may be restricted unless they can be 
said to lie outside the scope of the Directive.
Minimum harmonisation (mainly) of mortgages
The Mortgage Credit Directive is more circumspect than the Consumer Credit 
Directive as regards interference with national rules. The basic rule is minimum 
harmonization.128 Maximum harmonisation is limited to pre-contractual infor-
mation duties and the use of European Standardised Information Sheet (ESIS, 
the equivalent of the SECCI) and the calculation of the APRC.129 This limited 
approach to maximum harmonisation is justified due to the different national 
markets, products and procedures for granting mortgage credit.130
Information is the main consumer protection paradigm
Introduction
Information is a key element of the consumer protection strategy in the 
Consumer Credit and Mortgage Credit Directives.131 There was a deliberate 
policy to apply similar approaches to both consumer credit and mortgage credit 
in order to promote a consistent consumer protection framework.132 The duties 
are found in the advertising, pre-contractual, contract and to a limited extent 
post-contractual stages.
The provision of information in advertising and during the pre-contractual 
stage allows the consumer to make a more informed choice. The limited power of 
information to turn the consumer into a rational homo economicus are well known 
128 Mortgage Credit Directive, Art. 2(1).
129 Ibid., Art. 2(2).
130 Ibid., Recital 7.
131 An emphasis on information rights had already been present in the first Directive: see S 
Grundmann ‘European contract law(s) – of what colour?’ (2005) 1 European Review of 
Contract Law pp.198–201. 
132 Mortgage Credit Directive, Recital 20.
232 Consumer and mortgage credit
from the behavioural economic literature133 and apply with particular force in 
this area.134 At one level the very decision to take out credit is affected by the 
human preference for (and hence over-valuation of) immediate gratification and 
the downplaying of the long-term costs of repayment.135 Moreover, credit is a 
complex product that few consumers understand well. Their judgement may be 
affected by matters such as ease of dealing with a particular creditor or the repay-
ment schedule, rather than being based on the real cost of borrowing.136 They 
may be over-optimistic about their ability to repay and so either face default 
charges they had not expected or have to take out roll-over loans. They might 
have anticipated being able to repay earlier and then fail to do so and thus pay 
more interest than anticipated. 
These factors are hard to correct through disclosure alone. Nevertheless, there 
may still be some value to such disclosures. They at least afford consumers the 
opportunity to make comparisons if they want to. Also the disclosures can be 
checked by authorities and consumer groups for compliance with legal rules. The 
contractual document rules provide the consumer with a record of what has been 
agreed. The post-contractual rules can help the consumer keep track of their affairs.
Describing the costs of credit
Although complaint data about consumer credit across the EU is limited, it seems 
one of the main concerns is transparency of interest rate rises, fees and other 
charges.137 Unsurprisingly price figures prominently in the information obliga-
tions. The Consumer Credit Directive refers to three key terms: the borrowing 
rate, total cost of credit and the annual percentage rate of charge (‘APRC’).138 
The Mortgage Credit Directive cross-references to the borrowing rate and total 
cost of credit and has its own annex calculating the APRC.139 
133 Cf. Chapter 1.
134 See C Garcia and W Van Boom, Information disclosure in the EU Consumer Credit 
Directive: Opportunities and limitations (Rotterdam institute of Private Law Working 
Paper, 8 December 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1538111 [accessed on 12 March 
2016]; O Bar-Gill, Seduction by Contract: Law, Economics, and Psychology in Consumer 
Markets (OUP, 2012), p.10.
135 This is known as hyperbolic discounting and involves valuing proximate utilities more than 
distant ones: see Durkin et al., (n. 14) pp.152–155.
136 I Crow, G Howells and M Moroney, ‘Credit and debt: Choices for poorer consumers’ in 
G Howells, I Crow and M Moroney (eds), Aspects of Credit and Debt (Sweet & Maxwell, 
1993), pp.11–51.
137 GHK, Final Report – Establishment of a Benchmark on the Economic Impact of the Consumer 
Credit Directive on the Functioning of the Internal Market in this Sector and on the Level of 
Consumer Protection (GHK 2009), vi.
138 There is a tension between giving the consumer information on as many dimensions of the 
credit offer as possible without confusing him with too many terms: the first proposal had 
unhelpfully also included the ‘total lending rate’ meaning the sums levied by the creditor 
expressed as an annual percentage of the total amount of credit.
139 Mortgage Credit Directive, Arts. 4(13), (15), (16) and Annex I.
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The Consumer Credit Directive definitions will be used. The borrowing rate 
refers to the ‘rate of interest expressed as a fixed or variable percentage applied on 
an annual basis to the amount of credit drawn down.’140 However, this may not 
reflect the true cost of interest if other charges are added on and it may depend 
upon the intervals at which the money is repaid. This is why it is important to also 
have the APRC which is the ‘total cost of credit’ (TCC) expressed as an annual 
percentage rate.141 The ‘total cost of credit’ is defined as ‘all the costs including 
interest, commissions, taxes and any other kind of fees which the consumer is 
required to pay in connection with the credit agreement and which are known to 
the creditor except for notarial costs; costs in respect of ancillary services relating 
to the credit agreement, in particular insurance premiums, are also included if, in 
addition, the conclusion of a service contract is compulsory in order to obtain it 
on the terms and conditions marketed.’142 
This is a fairly inclusive definition, which makes it less susceptible to manipu-
lation than the US equivalent.143 However, firms may prefer to raise revenue 
through default charges than interest, because charges for non-compliance are 
not included in the TCC. Given the tendency of consumers to be over-optimistic 
about repayment, creditors can rely on recovering some additional money by 
means of such default charges. The function of price disclosure is to allow con-
sumers to make comparisons and hence promote competition, though a second-
ary effect may be to alert consumers to the cost of borrowing which may cause 
them to show restraint.144
The 1987 Directive had left most decisions about the total charge for credit 
and method of calculating the APR to Member States. Obviously, it is impor-
tant in a cross-border context to have this figure calculated in a consistent man-
ner so valid comparisons can be made between prices. Thus, steps were taken 
to harmonise the calculations, even before the latest revision of the Directive. 
Directive 90/88/EEC145 had sought greater harmonisation, but had allowed 
Member States a transition period to retain their existing formula. A common 
formula was introduced by Directive 98/7/EC146, but this still did not tackle 
the problem of a substantial amount of the costs facing consumers (estimated 
to be around 30%) not being figured into the APR.147 Insurance premiums were 
140 Ibid., Art. 3(j).
141 Ibid., Arts. 3(i), 19 and Annex I as amended.
142 Ibid., Art. 3(1)(g).
143 Bar-Gill, Seduction by Contract (n. 43).
144 A Duggan and I Ramsay, ‘Front end approaches to access to justice: The example of 
consumer credit’ in M Trebilcock, A Duggan and L Sossin (eds), Improving Access to 
Justice for the Middle Class (University of Toronto Press, 2012), p.114. 
145 Directive 90/88/EEC (1990) OJ L61/14.
146 Directive 98/7/EC (1998) OJ L101/17.
147 U Reifner and others, Harmonisation of Cost Elements of the Annual Percentage Rate of 
Charge (DG SANCO contract No. AO-2600/97/000169, Hamburg, 17 March 1998), 
http://iff-finanzierungsratgeber.de/index.php?id=1129 [accessed 12 March 2016].
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the most problematic. The definition in the 2008 Directive is more inclusive and 
the position is now much improved.148 It includes all costs which the consumer 
is obliged to pay. Though issues surrounding, for example, payment protection 
insurance demonstrate there may in practice continue to be lack of clarity by con-
sumers as to the voluntary nature of any insurance or other charges.
The complex nature of the APRC is illustrated by the fact a further amend-
ment had to be made subsequent to the 2008 Directive.149 It is not uncommon 
for it to be alleged that the APRC has been incorrectly calculated. The CJEU has 
confirmed this can amount to an unfair commercial practice, but this will only be 
one factor to be taken into account in assessing whether it is an unfair term.150
Advertising
Consumer credit
Article 4 of the Consumer Credit Directive sets out the information obligations 
in relation to advertising. Unlike the Mortgage Credit Directive it does not con-
tain its own general rule that advertising and marketing should be fair, clear and 
not misleading, but rather is content to cross-reference to the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive.151 Its provisions focus on the standard information that in 
certain situations needs to be provided. 
These information requirements are more extensive than under the 1986 
Directive, which had merely required the APR be disclosed. More information 
about the credit has to be given along with details of any compulsory ancillary 
service, such as insurance. However, these obligations only arise where there is 
an indication of an interest rate or other figure relating to the costs of credit.152 
It is common practice for many payday lenders to avoid mentioning price and 
focus on the friendliness and flexibility of the service. There are, for instance, no 
controls on the use of cartoons, comedy, upbeat feelings or trivialisation of tak-
ing out loans in credit advertisements. These are common features of sub-prime 
advertising that merit control. Equally controls might be useful on advertising 
that focuses on speed and ease of application process. There are no particular 
rules requiring qualification criteria to be spelt out or that certain terms such 
148 G Soto, Study on the Calculation of the Annual Percentage Rate of Charge for Consumer 
Credit Agreements (European Commission Directorate-General Health and Consumer 
Protection, 2009) http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/docs/study_APR_en.pdf 
[accessed 12 March 2016].
149 Directive 2011/90/EU providing additional assumptions for the calculation of the annual 
percentage rate of charge (2011) OJ L296/35.
150 Case C-453/10 Pereniová and Pereni v SOS financ spol. s r. o. [2012] 1 CMLR 28. 
151 See Directive 2005/29/EC, Recital 18. See Chapter 2.
152 Some Member States require the inclusion of the APRC in advertisements. Art. 4(1) para 
2 makes it clear that the obligations in Art. 4 do not automatically arise just because such 
national rules require disclosure of APRC in advertising if there is no mention of an interest 
rate or any figures relating to the cost of the credit. This is understandable so as not to 
impose the full obligations as a consequence of a more limited national rule.
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as ‘pre-approved’, ‘interest free’ or ‘bad credit no problem’ be prohibited.153 
Given the limited scope of the Directive on this topic, a lot of advertising regula-
tion remains subject to the general EU rules on unfair commercial practices or 
national laws.
There are some national rules, often in Codes of Conduct, on these aspects. 
The extent to which they withstand review will depend on whether these comply 
with the requirements of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive,154 which is a 
maximum harmonisation standard. 
The Directive does not require the advertised rates reflect the rate actually 
charged. In practice, screening of applicants may lead to different rates being 
offered. One condition is that the example given must be a representative exam-
ple. Differences may emerge as Member States implement this rule in different 
ways. The United Kingdom Regulations155 stipulates a 51% rule to determine the 
representative APR. i.e. the advertiser must expect 51% of concluded agreements 
to be at the advertised rate. This produces a class of representative agreements out 
of which the advertiser must determine, based on reasonable expectations, which 
of the agreements in that class is representative.156 
Given the variety of advertising media, it may be challenging to comply with 
these rules in contexts as varied as text messages, phone calls, radio, TV and web-
sites. Unlike the position for pre-contractual information, there are no special 
rules for voice-telephony and means of communication at a distance that do not 
enable compliance with general rules.157 States may leave this to the suppliers to 
work out or set in place guidance, as has happened in the United Kingdom.158 
This is another area in which one can see national practices might diverge.
Mortgage credit
Advertising plays less of a role for mortgage credit than for general consumer 
credit. Nevertheless, there is a general principle that advertising and marketing 
should be fair, clear and not misleading and should not create false expectations 
regarding the cost or availability of credit.159 There is also an obligation to provide 
standard information in similar circumstances as there is for consumer credit.
153 C Garcia and W Van Boom, Information Disclosure in the EU Consumer Credit Directive: 
Opportunities and Limitations (Rotterdam Institute of Private Law Working Paper, 8 
December 2009), p.26.
154 See Chapter 2.
155 Consumer Credit (Advertisements) Regulations 2010 (CCAR 2010), Regs 1(3), 5. 
Previously it had a 66% requirement. 
156 See, Department for Business Innovation and Skills (BIS), Guidance on the Regulations 
Implementing the Consumer Credit Directive (August 2010), 22; https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/422707/bis-10-1053-
consumer-credit-directive-guidance.pdf [accessed 12 March 2016].
157 Arts. 5(2)(3) and 6(4) Consumer Credit (Advertisements) Regulations 2010, S.I. 
2010/1970. 
158 BIS Guidance on the regulations implementing the Consumer Credit Directive (August 
2010), p.26.
159 Mortgage Credit Directive, Art. 10. 
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Detailed advertising rules often place obligations of disclosure in relation to 
specific products, but for mortgages there is also an obligation to provide more 
general information about the full range of available products.160 An obligation 
to provide this general information is imposed on creditors, tied intermediaries or 
their appointed representative. Member States can extend this obligation to non-
tied credit intermediaries.161 This information, in addition to detailed information 
on the creditor and product, must include a general warning about the conse-
quences of non-compliance with the commitment linked to the credit agreement. 
Member States can also require other types of warning, though any such rules 
should be notified to the Commission without delay.162 
Pre-contractual
Consumer credit
Pre-contractual information duties owed by creditors or, where applicable, credit 
intermediaries are set out in Art. 5 of the Consumer Credit Directive.163 Their 
express rationale is to enable consumers to compare offers.164 Therefore, it is sensi-
bly required that the information must be provided in good time before the con-
sumer is bound. However, it is difficult to see how this can be a strong requirement 
necessarily providing a period of reflection as often credit contracts for practical 
reasons are entered into quickly and it is hard to see how ‘good time’ can be given 
any more stringent meaning than simply prior to the contract becoming binding. 
Indeed some implementing laws merely refer to the information being given before 
the consumer is bound.165 The burden of proving the information rules have been 
complied with is a matter for national law, but the CJEU has made it clear that 
the burden cannot be placed on the consumer nor can the burden effectively be 
reversed by including in a standard form contract a clause by which the consumer 
confirms they have been provided with the information.166 
Up to 19 substantive pieces of information are required including those cov-
ering aspects of the cost of credit (with the APRC and total amount payable 
being illustrated by means of representative example), various warnings and infor-
mation on consumer rights. An attempt has been made to ease compliance for 
creditors and to make the information available to consumers in an accessible 
and consistent manner by mandating (Art. 5) or encouraging (Art. 6) the use 
of Standard European Consumer Credit Information (SECCI) in the form pro-
vided in Annexes II and III.167 The information must be provided on paper or on 
160 Ibid., Recital 38.
161 Ibid., Art. 13. 
162 Ibid., Art. 13(2).
163 Specific rules are set out for overdrafts and certain specific credit agreements in Art. 6.
164 Mortgage Credit Directive, Recital 19.
165 COM (2014) 259 final (n 14) 8.
166 C-449/13 CA Consumer Finance SA v Ingrid Bakkaus and Others ECLI:EU:C:2014:2464.
167 Consumer Credit Directive, Art. 5(1) says the information ‘shall be provided by means of the 
SECCI’. Cf. Art. 6(2) where it provides that it may be provided by means of SECCI. A reduced 
set of information is required where voice telephony communication is used: Art. 5(2).
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another durable medium. If the means of distance communication used does not 
make this practical then the SECCI form should be given immediately after the 
conclusion of the contract. 
The SECCI provides a safe harbour against claims of non-compliance with 
the information duties, but has been criticised from both a trade and consumer 
perspective. Criticism of the SECCI is that it is too long and detailed to allow 
consumers easily to compare costs.168 There have also been criticisms about the 
lack of clarity concerning the difference between the borrowing rate and APR, 
the information on the costs in case of late payment and the procedure for early 
repayment.169 Also, the warnings about what might happen in ‘worst-case scenar-
ios’ are still relatively weak; for instance, the risk factors for default like divorce or 
unemployment might have been flagged-up.170 The argument of some creditors 
that the SECCI unduly increases creditor costs is not very persuasive as creditors 
can relatively easily accommodate information obligations. More concerning is 
the fear that the form’s complexity will impact on consumers, who will find it 
hard to understand.171 
Using information to improve consumer choices depends not only on the 
content of the information required, but also upon the form and timing of its 
provision.172 Even with requirements that the information be provided in good 
time prior to the contract there is a risk that the consumer is psychologically 
committed to the deal before being provided with the information so that it has 
only a limited impact. The amount of information that has been included in the 
SECCI and the staid manner in which it has been presented leaves the measure 
open to criticism that the lessons of behavioural economics have not been taken 
on board. As a record of the agreement, having plenty of detail is fine and indeed 
desirable, but if the intention is to affect consumer decision-making there could 
be a better focus on key terms being presented in a more digestible format. There 
are risks to this focussed approach and there may well be disagreements about 
which elements are essential. This is one of the difficulties of operationalising the 
insights of behavioural economics. The position would be mitigated if Member 
States could experiment with approaches, but this is prevented by the maximum 
harmonisation approach.
168 Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Implementation of the Consumer Credit Directive 
(European Parliament, 2012), pp.31–32.
169 C Garcia and W Van Boom, Information Disclosure in the EU Consumer Credit Directive: 
Opportunities and Limitations (Rotterdam institute of Private Law Working Paper, 8 
December 2009), p.13 citing OPTEM; Qualitative Study through the 27 EU Member States 
on Pre-Contractual Information for Financial Services (European Commission, 2008).
170 S Grundmann and C Hofmann, ‘EC financial services and contract law – developments 
2007–2010’ (2010) European Review of Contract Law pp.467, 479.
171 M Muynck, ‘Credit cards, overdraft facilities and European consumer protection: A blank 
cheque for unfairness?’ (2010) European Review of Private Law pp.1227–8.
172 C Garcia and W Van Boom, Information Disclosure in the EU Consumer Credit Directive: 
Opportunities and Limitations (Rotterdam institute of Private Law Working Paper, 8 
December 2009).
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Mortgage credit
Prior to the Mortgage Credit Directive, there had been a Code of Conduct agreed 
between the European Consumers Association and the European Credit Sector 
Association, which was supported by an EU Recommendation on pre-contractual 
information.173 The standard information rules for mortgages in the Directive 
parallel those for consumer credit, but are adapted to mortgage credit. There are 
some additional rules based on the nature of mortgage credit. For instance, it 
must be stated that the credit will be secured by mortgage or comparable security. 
There is an obligation to mention the identity of the creditor, or where applicable 
the credit intermediary or appointed representative.
For mortgages, all types of businesses dealing with consumers must provide 
personalised information on paper or another durable medium through the ESIS 
(the equivalent of SECCI).174 This must be provided without undue delay after 
the consumer has provided necessary information on his needs, financial situation 
and preferences and in good time before the consumer is bound by any credit 
agreement or offer. There have also been criticisms of the wording of ESIS and 
the UK government has amended some wording e.g replacing ‘exit charge’ with 
‘early repayment charge’. The Government felt unable to do more and even this 
change might be questionable.175
In some countries, mortgage offers can be binding on the creditor: in such cases 
an ESIS must be provided with the binding offer if one has not been provided pre-
viously or the characteristics of the offer have changed. Member States can require 
the ESIS be provided prior to a binding offer in which case a second ESIS will only 
be required if the terms change.176 This would not seem to capture indicative offers 
or ‘decisions in principle’, but could include binding offers subject to conditions so 
long as a blanket right to re-underwrite the loan was not reserved.177
Credit intermediaries and appointed representatives must also provide infor-
mation about themselves, including most significantly whether they are tied, offer 
advisory services and details of fees payable by consumers or any commission.178 
Contractual document
The contractual document itself serves the purpose of providing a record of 
what was agreed. Surprisingly, there are no rules on this in the Mortgage Credit 
173 Commission Recommendation on pre-contractual information to be given to consumers 
by lenders offering home loans (2001) OJ L69/25.
174 Special rules apply for voice telephony communications: Mortgage Credit Directive, Art. 
14(10).
175 Financial Conduct Authority, Implementation of the Mortgage Credit Directive and the 
New Regime for Second Charge Mortgages, Feedback to CP14/20 and Final Rules (PS15/9, 
Financial Conduct Authority March 2015) 13.
176 Mortgage Credit Directive, Art. 14(4).
177 Financial Conduct Authority (n 183) 13.
178 Mortgage Credit Directive, Art. 15.
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Directive. One can only assume this is because this might interfere with national 
conveyancing practices. 
Consumer credit agreements must be drawn up on paper or another durable 
medium.179 There is again an extensive list of up to 22 information obligations. 
The Directive states that all contracting parties should receive a copy, but it might 
have been better to have made it clear that a duty is imposed on the creditor to 
provide the consumer and any surety with a copy of the agreement – that was 
surely what was intended. The documents need not be a single document, but 
if reference is made to any other document such as general terms and conditions 
this should also be given to the consumer before the contract is entered into 
and be on paper or another durable medium.180 Surprisingly there is no general 
indication as to when the contracts should be provided to the consumer, but 
the Austrian implementing law requires this to be without undue delay, which 
seems a sensible rule.181 But it does seem like an obligation undertaken at the 
time of contracting or immediately after the contract has been concluded. There 
is no requirement the document be signed but the CJEU has confirmed national 
law can require this.182 The CJEU has held that failure by a lender to include in 
the credit agreement all the required information may be penalised by Member 
States by forfeiture of entitlement to interest and charges where the failure to 
provide such information may compromise the ability of a consumer to assess the 
extent of his liability.183 There is no obligation to provide subsequently a dupli-
cate agreement on request, though national laws on this point would seem to be 
outside the scope of the Directive and therefore unaffected by any maximum har-
monisation effect. The United Kingdom also continues to have the form require-
ment that the consumer sign the agreement and this will usually be in a signature 
box. These rules of course undermine the objective of allowing the same form 
and procedures to be used across Europe.
The European Court has held that to promote consumer protection the ex offi-
cio doctrine applies to the information obligations. The national court must check 
of its own motion they have been complied with and establish the consequences 
under national law. These must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.184
Post-contractual
The continuing information duties take account of the fact that credit is a long-
term social contract.185 Debtors need to be kept informed of the progress of the 
179 Consumer Credit Directive, Art. 10(1).
180 C-42/15, Home Credit Slovakia as v Biroova ECLI:EU:C:2016:842.
181 Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Implementation of the Consumer Credit Directive 
(European Parliament, 2012), p.34.
182 C-42/15, Home Credit Slovakia as v Biroova ECLI:EU:C:2016:842.
183 C-42/15, Home Credit Slovakia as v Biroova ECLI:EU:C:2016:842.
184 C-377/14, Radlinger and another v Finway AS, [2016] 3 C.M.L.R. 28.
185 L Nogler and U Reifner, Life Time Contracts: Social Long-term Contracts in Labour, 
Tenancy and Consumer Credit Law (Eleven International Publishing, 2014).
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relationship. There is a lot that could be done to influence consumers’ post- 
contractual behaviour through information. Such information because of its 
more personalised nature might be expected to have an impact on individuals. 
For instance, information could be provided on interest paid annually on credit 
cards or default fees paid on loans.
The Consumer Credit Directive has not been demanding as regards post-
contractual information obligations. It only imposes very specific and limited 
post-contractual information obligations.186 It includes an ongoing obligation in 
consumer credit contracts to provide an amortisation table where there is a capital 
amortisation of a credit agreement of fixed duration.187 There is also an ongoing 
duty to inform on paper or durable medium about changes in the borrowing 
rate before the change enters into force. However, parties can agree to do this 
by notice being provided periodically where the change is caused by a change in 
a reference rate.188 There is a similar duty to inform about changes in borrowing 
rate in relation to overdrafts as well as an overarching duty to provide information 
on the state of the account.189 Where current accounts can overrun, information 
on the borrowing rate and applicable charges should be provided in the initial 
agreement and on a regular basis.190 Where there is a significant overrunning for 
more than a month, the creditor should inform the consumer of the amounts, 
applicable borrowing rate and any penalties, charges or interest.191
There is scope to use technology to enhance consumer knowledge of how 
they are using products. In the context of overdrafts, for instance, technology 
could be used to warn consumers when they would be using an overdraft facility 
and the costs associated with it. This would allow them to decide in an informed 
manner whether to proceed. There is a lot of scope for innovation in information 
duties taking account of the lessons of behavioural economics, but the Directive 
is rather traditional in its approach.
The Mortgage Credit Directive contains post-contractual obligations only 
in relation to foreign-currency loans.192 It suggests the need for a review of 
rights and obligations at the post-contractual stage should be part of any future 
review.193
Credit intermediaries
Credit intermediaries need to indicate whether they work exclusively for one 
or more creditors or are independent.194 Any fees payable to the intermediary 
186 Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Implementation of the Consumer Credit Directive 
(European Parliament, 2012), p.8.
187 Consumer Credit Directive, Art. 10(3).
188 Ibid., Art. 11.
189 Ibid., Art. 12.
190 Ibid., Art. 18(1).
191 Ibid., Art. 19.
192 Mortgage Credit Directive, Art. 23. 
193 Ibid., Recital 81.
194 Consumer Credit Directive, Art. 21(a).
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must be disclosed on paper or another durable medium before the agreement is 
 concluded195 and any fee communicated to the creditor to calculate the APRC.196
Moving beyond information – adequate explanations and 
creditworthiness 
Adequate explanations
Providing consumers with information is a pre-requisite to informed consumer 
decision-making. The Directive sets out detailed obligations. These are over and 
above the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’s obligation not to omit mate-
rial information the average borrower needs to make an informed decision. Such 
passive provision of information may still not be enough for consumers to gain 
a proper understanding of a complex product like credit. Consumers may need 
advice to understand the information and possibly how it relates to their par-
ticular circumstances. For most credit products consumers will not actively seek 
advice, beyond perhaps consulting a comparison website.197 They are more likely 
to seek advice (and that advice is more likely to be independent) in the case 
of investment services198 and mortgage credit. With credit, any advice is likely 
to come from the creditor, though possibly an intermediary might be involved. 
Third-party (independent) advice is more common in the mortgage market.
The Consumer Credit Directive places on creditors199 a duty to provide ade-
quate explanations so the consumer can assess whether the proposed agreement 
meets their needs.200 Where appropriate, this should involve explaining the pre-
contractual information, the essential characteristics of the proposed agreement 
and the special effects they may have on the consumer including the consequences 
of default in payment. Member States are given wide scope to adapt the assistance 
given and who gives it depending on the circumstances in which the agreement 
is offered, who it is offered to and the type of credit. For instance, the United 
Kingdom has embraced within this an obligation to explain the right of with-
drawal.201 Often these explanations will be given in writing and the obligation 
195 Ibid., Art. 21(b).
196 Ibid., Art. 21(c).
197 European Banking Authority, Financial Innovation and Consumer Protection – An Overview 
of the Objectives and Work of the EBA’s Standing Committee on Financial Innovation 
(SCFI) in 2011–2012 (European Banking Authority, 2012), pp. 17–18 https://www.eba.
europa.eu/documents/10180/15962/EBA-BS-2012-003-Financial-Innovation-and-
Consumer-Protection--Overview-of-EBA-work-in-2011-2012.pdf [accessed 22 March 
2016]. This found that consumers welcomed comparison sites but were concerned about 
their independence, whether they collected enough information to give tailored advice and 
whether quality factors as well as price could be factored into the equation.
198 Directive 2004/39/EC on markets in financial instruments (2004) OJ L145/1.
199 Credit intermediaries might play a role in this but creditors should ultimately be responsible 
for ensuring the explanations and advice are given: BIS (n 162) 30.
200 Consumer Credit Directive, Art. 5(6).
201 BIS, Guidance on the regulations implementing the Consumer Credit Directive (August 
2010), p.32.
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may not go far beyond the provision of the required information in the docu-
mentation, but in appropriate circumstances it may be necessary to give an oral 
explanation. The CJEU has acknowledged the explanations can be given orally, 
but seems to view this with some caution stating ‘the possibility cannot be ruled 
out that those explanations may be given orally by the creditor to the consumer 
in the course of an interview’.202 In appropriate cases personal counselling should 
not be viewed as second best and can be effective if done with consumer welfare 
in mind. In the United Kingdom this requirement has been interpreted as requir-
ing the consumer to be told to consult disclosed information. 
However, the thrust of this provision is still for the most part about making 
the information transparent. It stops short of requiring creditors in appropriate 
cases to counsel a consumer against taking out the loan. It merely requires advice 
on the use of credit in particular circumstances that are reasonably foreseeable 
or specifically made known. For instance, it might require an explanation that a 
particular loan was not suitable for long-term borrowing.203 It seeks to enhance, 
but does not challenge, the autonomy of the consumer. If the consumer is to be 
dissuaded by the creditor from entering a contract deemed not to be in his best 
interest it will have to be on the basis of national laws giving the responsible lend-
ing provisions a substantive content.204
There is also a duty to provide adequate explanations under the Mortgage 
Directive205 This extends to explaining, if products are bundled, whether they can 
be terminated separately and the implications of doing so.206
In the next section we consider the creditor’s duty to assess the borrower’s 
creditworthiness. The provision of adequate information can be given before that 
assessment is carried out so that the consumer can decide if that is the right type 
of loan. However, the assessment may reveal the need to adapt the explanations 
that had been given.207
Creditworthiness assessment
Consumer credit
Article 8 requires that creditors need to assess creditworthiness, both when mak-
ing the initial loan and when significantly increasing the total amount of credit, 
on the basis of sufficient information, which may where appropriate be obtained 
202 C-449/13 CA Consumer Finance SA v Ingrid Bakkaus and Others ECLI:EU:C:2014:2464.
203 BIS Guidance on the regulations implementing the Consumer Credit Directive (August 
2010), p.30.
204 T Jørgensen, ‘Credit advice’ (2012) 4 European Review of Private Law p.961. Cf. 
Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Credit 
Agreements relating to Residential Property COM (2011) 142 final.
205 Mortgage Credit Directive, Art. 16.
206 Ibid., Art. 16(1)(d).
207 C-449/13 CA Consumer Finance SA v Ingrid Bakkaus and Others ECLI:EU:C: 
2014:2464.
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from the consumer. Credit reference agencies are in practice very important.208 
However, there is no formal requirement in the Directive to consult them. 
Creditors can in appropriate cases rely solely on information provided by the 
debtor, though the courts will hopefully be vigilant when assessing whether that 
alone is sufficient information.209 
Member States whose legislation requires consultation of relevant databases 
can retain any such existing requirement. There is an ancillary provision requiring 
Member States to allow non-discriminatory access by creditors in other Member 
States to databases for assessing creditworthiness. However, the nature and 
extent of databases varies across the Union with some, for example, only includ-
ing negative credit history, whereas others include positive so-called ‘white-data’. 
Practices will continue to vary. There are no supervision arrangements for credit 
registers, but the Mortgage Credit Directive does raise the prospect of examin-
ing the need for such.210 If a database consultation leads to the rejection of the 
application the consumers should be informed immediately and without charge 
of the result and the particulars of the database consulted.211
The Directive’s creditworthiness test is creditor-focused, as it concentrates on 
the ability to repay. A more ambitious responsible lending test might be broad 
enough to cover consideration of whether taking on the borrowing is in the con-
sumer’s interest.212 It might be thought that the interest of creditor and borrower 
coincide as creditors do not want loans to be unpaid, but creditors can engage 
in a cycle of extending credit and generating profit from consumers placed in 
a ‘sweatbox’ where they pay interest and penalty charges at a sufficient level to 
make the loan profitable regardless of whether it is eventually repaid.213 This can 
impact severely on consumers. As the European Coalition for Responsible Credit 
and Debt on our Doorstep explains:
If someone is likely to repay but cannot afford it, then we can only assume 
that this means that the borrower will either default on other financial com-
mitments (for example, rent or Council Tax, or on other credit commit-
ments that they have) or else will have to reduce their regular expenditures 
to a degree which would be harmful to themselves or other members of their 
household (for example, by living in cold homes or cutting back or reducing 
expenditure on food).214
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Mortgages 
Member States are also under an obligation in relation to mortgages to ensure 
creditors assess creditworthiness and only extend credit when the obligations are 
likely to be met.215 The provisions are rather brief in the body of the Directive, 
focusing mainly on procedure. One aspect that is specifically mentioned is that 
the assessment should not predominantly rest on the value of property exceeding 
the credit.216 The value of the property is of course crucial in such lending deci-
sions and provision is made for national standards to be set down for property 
valuation by Member States to ensure impartial and objective valuations.217 The 
recitals expand on this duty to assess.218 For instance, future rental income might 
be taken into account when offering buy-to-let mortgages, but the  availability of 
a guarantor should not lead the lender to ignore a credit-worthiness assessment 
that a consumer is not likely to be able to repay. Member States are allowed to 
set limits on loan-to-value ratios or loan-to-income ratios and are encouraged 
to implement the FSB’s Sound Residential Mortgage Underwriting Practices.
In assessing creditworthiness, access to databases is important. Member States 
should ensure this is on a non-discriminatory basis.219 Consumers should be 
advised in advance that a database is to be consulted.220 Creditors should specify 
the information and independently verifiable evidence the consumer needs to 
provide.221 Provision of incomplete information should not be a ground for ter-
minating the agreement222 unless the consumer knowingly withheld or falsified 
information.223
If an application is rejected the consumer should be informed without delay, 
and where applicable told that it was based on automatic processing of data. If it 
resulted from consulting a database the creditor should inform him of the result 
of that consultation and the particulars of the database consulted.224 The Data 
Protection Regulation allows subjects to object to decisions being based solely on 
automatic decision-making including profiling.225
The obligations are more consumer protection-centred where, in relation to 
mortgages, creditors, credit intermediaries or appointed representatives offer 
advisory services.226 They must then act in the best interests of consumers and this 
215 Mortgage Credit Directive, Art. 18. This also applies to any significant increase in credit 
not included in original assessment: Art. 18(6).
216 Ibid., Art. 18(3). 
217 Ibid., Art. 19
218 Ibid., Recitals 55-62.
219 Ibid., Art. 21.
220 Ibid., Art. 18(5)(b).
221 Ibid., Art. 20.
222 Ibid., Art. 20(3) and Recital 58. 
223 Ibid., Art. 20(4).
224 Ibid., Art. 18(5)(c).
225 Regulation EU 2016/679: OJ L119/1, Art. 22(1). Credit consumers are specifically 
mentioned in Recital 21.
226 Ibid., Art. 22.
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includes obligations to obtain necessary information regarding the consumer’s 
personal and financial situation, his preferences and objectives so as to enable 
the recommendation of suitable credit agreements and must involve surveying a 
sufficiently large number of their products or, if they are not tied, those products 
that are on the market.
Moving beyond explanations towards responsible lending?
The Directive’s approach to responsible lending is typical of EU consumer con-
tract law which focuses on procedure rather than controlling the substantive 
content of the contract. One of the novel features of the original proposal to 
amend the Consumer Credit Directive in 2002 was the inclusion of a provision 
on responsible lending.227 This concept was at that time only known in the legal 
orders of Netherlands and Belgium228 though France had fairly extensive rules 
going in the same direction.229 
The first proposal had been far stronger in this respect than the final directive. 
For instance, the advice function had extended to establishing which of their 
products offered ‘the most appropriate type and total amount of credit taking 
into account the financial situation of the consumer, the advantages and disad-
vantages associated with the product proposed, and the purpose of the credit.’230 
There had been no proposal that the creditor should be obliged to advise that 
other suppliers may be more appropriate; it would have been merely a duty to 
select the best product from amongst their range. At one level that seems reason-
able; who would want to give business away? But this is a segmented  market and 
one policy objective is to encourage consumers to find cheaper sources of credit. 
It does not seem unreasonable to require those traders working in the niche sec-
tors of high-risk lending to alert consumers that they might not need to turn to 
their high-cost sector. If they are offering expensive credit to inappropriate con-
sumers that is a sign that the market is not working effectively. It may, however, 
227 COM(2002) 443 (n 36), Art. 9.
228 I Ramsay, ‘Consumer credit regulation after the fall: International dimensions’ (2012) 
J Eur Cons and Market Law p.33 notes there are also international models such as in 
Australia (Australian National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009, s 129) and South 
Africa (South Africa National Credit Act 2005, s 80).
229 Consumers had to fill in a ‘fiche de dialogue’ setting out their financial situation, creditor’s 
staff had to be trained in how to help complete this form and give adequate explanations 
and there were case-law developed duties to warn (devoir de mise en garde) and a prohibition 
on excessive loans (interdiction d’octroi de prêts excessifs): see Charlton (n 22).
230 COM (2002) 443 (n 36), Art. 6(3). Grundmann and Hoffmann went so far as to say 
that such a rule would have ‘abolished the very principles of European contract law’ as 
the national remedy would have, in their opinion, relieved the debtor of any obligation 
to repay a credit he should not have taken out: S Grundmann and C Hofmann, ‘EC 
financial services and contract law – developments 2007–2010’ (2010) European Review 
of Contract Law p.480. However, it is not clear that such a stark consequence is required. 
The sanction could have been a regulatory one or merely to pay only the costs of the more 
appropriate loan or to cancel the interest but require some of the capital to be repaid.
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be complicated to find criteria to trigger individual alerts that products are inap-
propriate and so it may be necessary for this to be a general warning. That of 
course runs the risk of it becoming ritualised. There is also a risk that if consum-
ers seek to shop around for cheaper credit and are turned down, those refusals 
might in themselves be a reason why their credit rating is adversely affected.
The earlier proposal had also required assessment of whether the consumer 
could reasonably be expected to discharge their obligations under the agree-
ment.231 This would have addressed the issue of whether the creditworthiness 
assessment was creditor or debtor-focused, and required such an assessment to be 
made in a more consumer-centred manner.
There is no longer any provision in the directive headed ‘responsible lend-
ing’. This phrase has been moved to Recital 26 which talks of ‘member states 
taking appropriate measures to promote responsible practices during all phases 
of the credit relationship’ and about it being important ‘that creditors should 
not engage in irresponsible lending or give out credit without prior assessment of 
creditworthiness.’ There is no longer a duty to lend responsibly. It is the obliga-
tion to assess creditworthiness which remains. 
Can Member States go beyond this creditworthiness concept and retain (in the 
case of Netherlands and Belgium) or introduce affordability into the responsible 
lending concept? In 2006, the United Kingdom had, in advance of the Directive, 
included within the criteria for assessing the grant of a credit license conduct 
which appeared to the then-Office of Fair Trading to involve irresponsible lend-
ing.232 The OFT (now FCA) guidance233 seemed to have tried to avoid the maxi-
mum harmonisation argument by separating out assessments of credit-worthiness 
and assessments of affordability and having only direct legal consequences flow 
from breach of the former under s. 55B Consumer Credit Act 1974. However, as 
guidance impacts on licensing obligations it is unclear if this argument is water-
tight. The UK government’s consultation on implementation had argued that 
some element of assessment of affordability was implicit in Art. 8 save for all but 
the smallest loans.234 Recital 26 of the Consumer Credit Directive, which calls on 
Member States to promote responsible lending practices, might be used to flesh 
out Art. 8 and support such national practices, but it would have been better if 
the right of Member States to have responsible lending/affordability rules had 
been made more explicit. There is at least an argument that given the decision 
to adopt a creditworthiness approach this pre-empts any more stringent national 
standards. Hopefully, such a restricted reading would not prevail, but the lack of 
any express mention of the freedom to go beyond its provisions may be read as 
restricting the freedom of Member States.
231 COM (2002) 443 (n 36), Art. 9. 
232 Consumer Credit Act 2006, s 25(2B).
233 Office of Fair Trading, Irresponsible Lending – OFT Guidance for Creditors (Office of Fair 
Trading, 2009).
234 Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Consultation on Proposals for 
Implementing the Consumer Credit Directive (Department for Business Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform, 2009), para 5.7.
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Consequences
A strong responsible lending regime would have three stages: (i) information 
 collection, (ii) assessment and (iii) consequences for taking action inconsistent 
with the assessment. The Directives deal with only (i) and (ii). It is unclear whether 
breach of the Directives gives rise to any private law claim such as for damages or 
avoidance of the contract.235 It is generally assumed that any additional sanction 
for the assessment not being properly undertaken or complied with should be a 
matter for national law. These national rules must, however, be effective. French 
rules which replaced the contractual rate with a statutory rate that was increased 
by 5%, if debts were not repaid within two months, were not deemed sufficient by 
the CJEU. On the facts of the case referred, they imposed only a minimal sanction 
on the creditor and on other facts could even make him better-off.236
What should happen if a creditor concludes it is not in the best interest of the 
consumer to enter into the agreement? One would hope the creditor would refuse 
to enter into the agreement and supervisory authorities would sanction creditors 
who failed to do so. However, in Norway, which has one of the most advanced 
regimes of responsible lending, there is only a duty to advise against a particular 
course of action, Failure to give an adequate notice permits the courts to miti-
gate the obligation to a limited extent; but in practice this has been conserva-
tively applied with claims normally only being reduced by half.237 Grundmann 
and Hoffmann argue that in fact the Directive’s conception of the obligation is 
simply a requirement the consumer be advised and leaves it to the consumer to 
decide whether or not to enter into the agreement.238
Conclusion
In many respects the Directives’ provisions fall short of a responsible lending 
regime. The focus is still on informed choice with limited obligations on creditors 
to consider the interests of consumers. Only in the mortgage context where advi-
sory services are offered is there a duty to act in the best interests of consumers.239 
The Mortgage Credit Directive requires a report by March 2019 assessing the 
wider challenges of private over-indebtedness directly linked to credit activity.240 
Although stated to be comprehensive review and, where appropriate, leading to 
legislative proposals, it is unclear how broad the scope will be. It will, however, 
include discussion of the need for supervision of credit registers and the possibil-
ity for the development of more flexible and reliable markets.
235 K Sein, ‘Transposition of the new Consumer Credit Directive in Estonia’ (2012) 20 
European Review of Private Law p.440.
236 Case C-565/12 LCL Le Credit Lyonnais SA v Kalhan ECLI:EU:C:2014:190.
237 T Jørgensen, ‘Credit advice’ (2012) 4 European Review of Private Law pp.980–982.
238 S Grundmann and C Hofmann, ‘EC financial services and contract law – developments 
2007–2010’ (2010) 467 European Review of Contract Law p.481.
239 Mortgage Credit Directive, Art. 22(3)(d).
240 Ibid., Art. 45.
248 Consumer and mortgage credit
The right of withdrawal – completing the information 
protection paradigm
Consumer credit
The right of withdrawal is not the invention of the EU, but has become a pillar of 
its policy.241 Its extension to consumer credit contracts marks an important con-
firmation of the importance of this right from the EU legislator’s perspective. Art. 
14 gives the consumer 14 days to withdraw242 from the credit agreement from 
the conclusion of the contract or, if later, the day when the consumer receives 
the correct contractual documentation.243 Where existing national law relating 
to linked credit agreements provides that funds could not be made available for 
a period of time, Member States can provide that the withdrawal period can be 
reduced to this period at the explicit request of the consumer.244 As the right of 
withdrawal is linked to the provision of contractual documentation, this gives the 
consumer a long-term right of withdrawal where there has been non-compliance 
with information duties. This is contrary to the Consumer Rights Directive, which 
puts an outer limit of one year on the right to reject.245 This right of withdrawal 
does not apply where there is an existing right to withdraw under the Distance 
Marketing of Financial Services Directive or the Doorstep-selling Directive.246 
Member States can also provide for contracts concluded through the services of 
notaries to be exempted, subject to certain conditions.
To exercise the right of withdrawal, the consumer must notify the creditor 
within the withdrawal period.247 The question of proof of notification is left to 
national law, but any notification on paper or other durable medium that is avail-
able and accessible to the creditor is treated favourably as being within the dead-
line if dispatched before it expired. This means that, for example, putting a letter 
in the post within the period is sufficient, even though it may have no chance of 
being received within the withdrawal period. Obviously in such circumstances 
241 See Chapter 3, pp.115–125.
242 The German implementing law has been criticised for giving an alternative remedy of 
allowing the goods to be returned instead of revoking the contract. This can be too 
limited a remedy as the credit contract may stay in place or be too generous – and thus 
breach maximum harmonisation principle – as goods contracts are not always cancelled: 
See European Parliament (IMCO), Implementation of the Consumer Credit Directive 
(2012), p.36.
243 Consumer Credit Directive, Art. 14(1). The French implementing law may be problematic 
in this respect as it provides the period runs from the consumer’s declaration to be bound 
by contract, but the lender has seven days to give notice that he will lend the money, see 
Charlton (n 22).
244 Consumer Credit Directive, Art. 14(3).
245 See Chapter 3.
246 Consumer Credit Directive, Art. 14(5). The Doorstep-selling Directive is repealed by the 
Consumer Rights Directive which excludes financial services, including credit from its 
scope: see Peter Rott, ‘Renationalisation of direct selling – the impact of the new Consumer 
Rights Directive on Financial Services’ (2012) ERA Forum p.35.
247 Consumer Credit Directive, Art. 14(3)(a).
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the notification cannot be available and accessible to the creditor until received. 
However, this must be the correct interpretation otherwise the reference to dis-
patch would be meaningless.
Funds can be paid to the consumer straightaway, though Member States are 
entitled to keep in place some existing restrictions.248 Also national law may con-
tinue to set a period during which performance of the contract may not begin.249 
A consumer who withdraws from a credit contract has to pay back the capital and 
interest within 30 days.250 The interest is at the borrowing rate. Sometimes, on 
payday loans for instance, the interest can be very high and have already increased 
the sum to a figure consumers cannot pay back. Nevertheless, this provision 
seeks to strike a balance between consumers who regret the decision they have 
made and creditors who have loaned money expecting a certain return. At least it 
restricts the impact of high-interest loans to a limited period and allows 30 days 
for alternative funds to be secured. 
It is a moot point whether the right to withdraw is lost if the money is not 
repaid within 30 days.251 The Directive simply proceeds on the assumption that 
the money will be repaid. It might be argued that if the condition of returning 
the money is not fulfilled, the consumer has failed properly to exercise the right 
and it is lost. However, there is a risk that it is vulnerable consumers, who take 
out extortionate loans they cannot afford to repay, that are left with onerous and 
unsuitable contracts. The better view is to see the repayment as a consequence 
of the exercise of the right of withdrawal – that accords with the wording of Art. 
14(3), which talks about what needs to be done after exercising the right.252 The 
consumer is also no longer bound to any ancillary service relating to the credit 
agreement, such as insurance, if it was provided by the creditor or by a third party 
on the basis of an agreement with creditor.253 
In the context of the mis-selling of credit on the doorstep, German experience 
had shown that the cancellation of the credit element under doorstep-selling 
law may not assist if the underlying contract remained in force.254 Strangely, the 
248 This exception applies to where the member states had prohibited the advancing of funds 
under a linked credit agreement. If this option is taken the member state can also reduce 
the withdrawal period to the period in their law.
249 Consumer Credit Directive, Art. 14(7). In France for example the consumer cannot make 
the funds available until 7 days after the consumer accepts the contract on pain of a 30,000 
euro fine: Code de la consommation, Art. L. 311-14 and L. 311-50.
250 Consumer Credit Directive, Art. 14(3)(b).
251 K Sein, ‘Transposition of the new Consumer Credit Directive in Estonia’ (2012) 20 European 
Review of Private Law 435 p.442 and C Wendehorst, ‘Die neue Verbraucherkreditrichtlinie: 
Rücktritt, Kündigung , vorzeitige Rückzahlungen’ (2009) Ősterreichisches BankArchiv p.34 
both suggest this question needs to be referred to the European Court of Justice.
252 BIS, Guidance on the Regulations Implementing the Consumer Credit Directive (August, 
2010), p.51.
253 Consumer Credit Directive, Art. 14(4). Ancillary service means a service offered to the 
consumer in conjunction with the credit agreement: Art. 4(4).
254 P Rott, ‘Linked contracts and doorstep selling’ in The Yearbook of Consumer Law 2007, 
(Ashgate, 2007)
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Directive does not address this issue, but rather leaves this as a matter of national 
law along with associated questions such as those concerning the return of the 
goods, which might include whether there should be any compensation for the 
use of goods.255 German law now provides in s. 358(2) of BGB that withdrawal 
from a credit agreement automatically cancels a linked agreement. However, Sein 
is correct to state this should be at the option of the consumer, though the con-
ditions for exercising that option, such as how long the consumer has to exercise 
the option, need to be established.256
The Directive has rules on linked agreements, but only makes a link as 
regards the right of withdrawal where the purchase agreement is cancelled under 
Community law.257 Then the consumer will no longer be bound to a credit agree-
ment. This provision might have been better placed in the Directives granting 
those specific rights of withdrawal. It would have been fairer to consumers to 
have also provided that in linked agreements the purchase agreement is cancelled 
if the right of withdrawal for the credit agreement is exercised rather than leaving 
this to national law.
Mortgage credit
The equivalent provisions for mortgages are strangely not set out in a separate 
provision, but rather form part of the pre-contractual information duties. There 
must be a seven-day period during which the consumer can consider the offer.258 
Due to different traditions within the Member States, this can be either a reflec-
tion period before the formal conclusion of the contract or a withdrawal period. 
From a harmonisation perspective, it is unfortunate that a common approach was 
not possible as between reflection and withdrawal periods, but perhaps this is an 
indication of strong national traditions that are not yet ripe for full harmonisation.
If a reflection period is chosen, the offer shall be binding on the creditor during 
that period and the consumer can accept the offer at any time during that period. 
Member States are free to provide that the offer cannot be accepted for a period not 
exceeding the first ten days of any reflection period. This, however, is the excep-
tion and the general rule is to allow the consumer to proceed within the reflection 
period. Also, to promote legal certainty it can be provided that this period and 
any right of withdrawal shall cease where the consumer undertakes any action that 
results in the creation or transfer of property, makes use of the funds obtained or 
transfers the funds to a third party. It is peculiar that the Directive mentions these 
255 Consumer Credit Directive, Recital 35.
256 K Sein, ‘Transposition of the new Consumer Credit Directive in Estonia’ (2012) 20 
European Review of Private Law p. 442.
257 Consumer Credit Directive, Art 15(1). Recital 37 makes it clear this does not affect 
the position where a national right to withdraw is exercised or there has been breach of 
national rules requiring a signed contract before any commitment to supply or payment 
can be made.
258 Ibid., Art. 14(6).
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detailed rules Member States can adopt only in Recital 23 and not within the main 
provision. There is also no provision, for instance, about the return of funds if they 
had been forwarded during the reflection or withdrawal period. Normal practice by 
mortgage lenders would presumably be to wait until the withdrawal period expired 
before releasing funds. Also, national rules may bring the period to an end if funds 
are used. The lack of detail on effects of withdrawal may not therefore be serious in 
practice but could helpfully have been addressed. 
Restrictions on contractual freedom
Introduction
Freedom of contract is a highly-prized value. There are no general EU-wide con-
trols on the types of credit product that can be supplied. There is a philosophical 
debate between those who argue any product control will stifle the creativity of 
the market to deliver products best-suited to consumer needs and those who see 
this heterogeneity as obfuscating the market and hindering transparency as well as 
allowing some products which are likely to harm consumers. Credit products may 
not be like some physically unsafe products, which are always likely to cause harm. 
Nevertheless, some credit products carry such risks that they can be deemed so 
unsafe they should be removed from the market. Others believe that even high-
risk products should be available to informed and advised consumers. The EU 
is not unaware of these arguments, but has preferred to leave to Members States 
the power of decision on sensitive issues such whether to impose limits on loan-
to-value or loan-to-income ratios.
The Directives also do not seek to impose any controls on interest rates. There 
is no European usury law. Such controls can be viewed as product bans to the 
extent they exclude certain lending. They also affect the socialisation of risk to the 
extent creditors lend to a pool of consumers at a lower rate when previously they 
were are prepared to pool lower and higher-risk consumers. One rare example of 
risk sharing considered below are the rules making creditors liable for the failures 
of suppliers under linked agreements.
Variable rates are allowed, and there is no control on the grounds for varia-
tion. Though the CJEU seems disposed to subject the terms allowing variation to 
assessment for fairness.259 As regards mortgages, Member States must ensure that 
any indexes or reference rates used for variable rates are clear, accessible, objective 
and verifiable.260 Historical records must be kept by the providers of indexes or 
creditors. There are also obligations to inform about any change in the borrowing 
rate.261 A similar duty to inform applies for consumer credit.262 
259 In the credit context see C-143/13 Matei v SC Volksbank Romania SA ECLI:EU: 
C:2015:127 building on C-472/10 Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v Invitel Távközlési 
Zr ECLI:EU:C:2012:242. 
260 Mortgage Credit Directive, Art. 24. 
261 Ibid., Art. 27.
262 Consumer Credit Directive, Art. 11.
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The Directives allow the market a wide degree of freedom, but at the margins 
some controls are imposed. Tying of products is not allowed, but bundling is.263 
Foreign currency loans are permitted, but subject to certain conditions to provide 
a measure of protection.264
Credit and particularly mortgage products are so complex that it can be 
hard for consumers to determine what they should bargain for. Moreover most 
credit products are offered on standard-form contracts. Consumers are therefore 
unlikely to appreciate what they should bargain over and in any event be unable 
to negotiate individual terms. Some rules exist therefore that, whilst not restrict-
ing the essential elements of the products available, seek to balance the rights 
on technical issues which the consumer would not think to consider or indeed 
be able to influence in the open market. Examples are the rules on early repay-
ment,265 termination of open-ended agreements266 and assignment considered 
below.267 In similar vein, Member States may also prohibit or impose restrictions 
on consumer payments prior to the conclusion of the agreement.268
Early repayment
Consumers often want to pay off a loan early either because their circumstances 
change or they have found a better deal. This is also seen as being important to 
increase competition in the market.269 Both the Consumer Credit Directive270 and 
Mortgage Credit Directive271 enshrines their right to do so, either in full or par-
tially. However, the Member States can require the mortgage consumer to have 
a legitimate interest in doing so during a fixed-rate period.272 
However, creditors also have legitimate demands for compensation as they will 
receive less than anticipated. Art. 16(2) of the Consumer Credit Directive pro-
vides they should receive fair and objectively justified compensation. This right 
only applies where the early repayment is during a period when the rate is fixed. 
The costs recovered must be directly linked to early repayment. Thus the 
United Kingdom considers closing administrative costs are not recoverable as 
they would have been payable in any event. Instead it cites as recoverable the loss 
if interest rates had dropped since the agreement was taken out so any relending 
would be less profitable.273 One suspects there will be different national inter-
pretations of ‘fair and objectively justified compensation’. The amount should 
263 See pp.255–256.
264 See p.255.
265 See p.252.
266 See p.254.
267 See pp.254–255.
268 Mortgage Credit Directive, Art. 7(5).
269 Mortgage Credit Directive, Recital 66.
270 Consumer Credit Directive, Art. 16(1). Some limited exceptions are set out in Art. 16(3).
271 Mortgage Credit Directive, Art. 25.
272 Ibid., Art. 25(5).
273 BIS, Guidance on the Regulations Implementing the Consumer Credit Directive (August, 
2010), p. 62. 
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in any event not exceed 1% of amount repaid early if the agreement at time of 
repayment had more than one year to run or 0.5% if there was less than one year 
left. Moreover, it should not, in any event, exceed the interest that would have 
been paid.
Attitudes of Member States to this provision varied. Some were less open to 
providing compensation and so it is provided that Member States can remove the 
right below a threshold that cannot be more than 10,000 euro per year.274 Others 
would be more generous to creditors and are therefore allowed to provide that 
creditors may exceptionally claim higher compensation than allowed for in the 
Directive if greater loss can be proven. This is a good example of the Directive 
trying to harmonise in the face of different national traditions. It certainly under-
mines the maximum harmonisation principle, but probably does not seriously 
affect the prospects of cross-border supply of credit. 
The Mortgage Credit Directive likewise requires that any fair and objective 
compensation must be for costs directly linked to the early repayment.275 There 
are no fixed limits for compensation under the Directive, but it must not exceed 
the financial loss to the creditor. Member States can provide levels it must not 
exceed or provide that it is not allowed for a certain period.
In the mortgage context, upon request the creditor should provide the 
information to allow the consumer to consider the early repayment option.276 
Member States may provide conditions for the exercise of the right, for instance, 
 concerning the timing of the exercise of the right, differences depending on types 
of borrowing rate or the circumstances when it can be exercised. 
Linked agreement
For there to be a linked credit agreement, the consumer credit must have financed 
the supply of specific goods or a specific service.277 The supply and credit agree-
ments must be a commercial unit either because they are provided by the same 
person; or, a creditor gets the supplier to conclude or prepare the agreement; or, 
the specific goods or specific service are specified in the credit agreement. Previous 
case law under the former Directive, which had a different structure, had held that 
a line of credit could form a linked agreement even if the goods or services had not 
been specified in advance.278 This would also seem possible under the new rules as 
the line of credit can be identified with specific goods or services when the credit is 
called upon and specification of goods or services in the credit contract is just one 
means of establishing there was a commercial unit. Credit cards would normally 
fall outside the definition as though specific goods or services are bought with 
274 Consumer Credit Directive, Art. 16(4)(a).
275 Mortgage Credit Directive, Art .25(3)
276 Ibid., Art. 25(4).
277 Consumer Credit Directive, Art. 3(n). The relationship between the creditor and supplier 
need not be exclusive: see decision on former directive, C-509/07 Luigi Scarpelli v NEOS 
Banca SpA [2009] ECR I-3311.
278 C-429/05 Rampion and Godard v Franfinance SA [2007] ECR I-8017.
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the credit, they are neither specified in the credit contract nor does the supplier 
always conclude or prepare the credit agreement. However, where the suppliers do 
prepare the contract, as in case of store cards, then linked transactions could arise.
The definition of linked credit agreement is crucial to the rights when exercis-
ing a Community right of withdrawal.279 Also in a linked agreement the consumer 
can pursue remedies for non-supply or lack of conformity against the creditor if 
he has failed to obtain satisfaction from the supplier.280 It is left to Member States 
to determine the extent and conditions for invoking the remedies. The Recital 
makes it clear that this does not prevent consumers relying on more extensive 
joint and several liability rights under national laws, such as s. 75 of the UK’s 
Consumer Credit Act 1974. That Act is also broader in covering any breach of 
contract and also under a separate provision misrepresentations.281
Termination of open-ended credit agreements
By their nature open-ended credit agreements, such as standing overdrafts or 
credit cards, do not have a set expiry date. Art. 13 provides consumers with 
the right to terminate such contracts free of charge at any time, unless a period 
of notice has been agreed which in any event should not be more than one 
month.282 
A creditor’s right to standard termination must have been provided for in the 
contract. Termination is possible on paper or other durable medium and there 
must be atleast two months’ notice.283 In addition, for objectively justified reasons 
creditors may (so long as it is provided for in the contract) terminate the con-
sumer’s right to draw down further on an open-ended credit agreement. The rea-
sons for such termination should be provided on paper or other durable medium, 
where possible before termination or at least immediately afterwards. No reasons 
need be given if provision of such information is prohibited by Community leg-
islation or is contrary to public policy or security: one can imagine this applies 
to money-laundering and suspected terrorist activities.284 If the creditor fails to 
provide for such rights it seems he will be unable to terminate the agreement for 
any reason. This seems rather strict.
Assignment
If a creditor assigns his rights the consumer retains the right to plead against 
the assignee any right he had against the original creditor, including set-off.285 
279 Consumer Credit Directive, Art. 15(1).
280 Ibid.,  Art. 15(2).
281 Consumer Credit Act 1974, s 56.
282 Consumer Credit Directive, Art. 13(1). The United Kingdom has introduced the possibility 
for the creditor to require this to be in writing: see Consumer Credit Act 1974, s 98A(1).
283 Ibid., Art. 13(1).
284 Ibid., Art. 13(2).
285 Ibid., Art. 17(1). 
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The consumer should be informed of any assignment unless the original creditor 
agrees to service the credit.286
Foreign currency mortgages
One of the riskiest products is a mortgage in foreign currency. These may look 
like dream deals if the currency offers a lower interest rate, but can turn into 
nightmares if currency fluctuates dramatically in the wrong direction. For the 
purposes of the Mortgage Credit Directive foreign currency loans are defined as 
credits in currency other than that of the Member State in which the consumer is 
resident. Loans in the currency of the consumer’s state of residence will only be 
foreign currency loans if the consumer receives income or holds the assets from 
which the credit is to be repaid in another currency.287 So a British Pensioner 
with a euro mortgage on a Spanish home being repaid out of a UK sterling pen-
sion would have a foreign currency loan. In practice many such loans were issued 
in Eastern Europe in Swiss francs and there has been considerable fallout from 
the consequences of the Swiss franc rising sharply in value. There are numerous 
examples of consumer detriment from such loans. These have led to national 
legislation and litigation which has also reached the CJEU. The CJEU has shown 
itself sympathetic to arguments that borrowers had not had the details of the 
arrangements fully explained to them.288 
The Directive offers one palliative, namely the right for the consumer to con-
vert the loan into an alternative currency that has some connection to the con-
sumer through residence, income or assets.289 This is essentially a tactic to stop 
things getting any worse. It is supported by obligations to warn the consumer if 
the amounts owed become more than 20% higher due to currency variations and 
to mention the right to convert to an alternative currency. Member States are 
given greater scope to regulate such loans.290 These national rules might include 
caps on the increase due to fluctuations or the use of warnings. In any event the 
Directive requires, where there is no limit to the exchange-rate risk, that the ESIS 
should include an illustrative example of the impact of a 20% fluctuation.291
Tying and bundling
Given the range of products and services involved in mortgages it has become a 
frequent practice for suppliers to bundle them into one package. This gives the 
trader the advantage of selling more products and usually the consumer ben-
efits from a lower overall price than if they had been bought separately. The 
Directive’s approach is to allow bundling of this type, but not normally to allow 
286 Ibid., Art. 17(2).
287 Ibid., Art. 28(4).
288 Case C-26/13 Kásler v OTP Jelzálogbank Zrt. ECLI:EU:C:2014:282. 
289 Mortgage Credit Directive, Art. 23.
290 Ibid., Art. 23(5) and Recital. 30.
291 Ibid., Art. 23(6).
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tying i.e. the products should be available to be purchased separately and their 
purchase should not be made the condition of offers.292 
Tying is only allowed in specific circumstances where it is justified to provide 
means of payment, additional security or the pooling of resources.293 Member 
States may permit creditors to require consumers to hold an insurance policy, but 
the creditor must accept a policy from a supplier other than his preferred supplier 
if it offers equivalent cover. Interestingly, in light of the above discussion on the 
general lack of product restrictions, Member States can standardize, wholly or in 
part, insurance policies to facilitate comparison.294
Arrears and foreclosure
The security offered by a mortgage is key to lending decisions and also a factor 
in reducing rates compared to unsecured lending. Member States must ensure 
security is enforceable.295 Where consumers are in default Member States can allow 
creditors to charge default fees, but these must be either no more than required to 
compensate for the costs incurred or must be capped.296 It is possible for the agree-
ment to provide that return or transfer of the security or proceeds of sale is suffi-
cient to repay debt. Where debtors are in trouble, creditors must be encouraged to 
exercise reasonable forbearance before initiating foreclosure proceedings.297 Sales, 
where the amount recovered affects the consumer’s debt, must be undertaken in 
a manner to enable the best-efforts price to be obtained.298 After sale any further 
repayment required should be made under a scheme that protects consumers. 
The EU therefore puts a protective framework in place, but if the consumer 
needs to move into bankruptcy this remains subject to national law. Despite 
undertaking studies which have prompted calls for EU intervention299 the EU 
has resisted acting in the personal bankruptcy field.300 However, it is now pro-
posing to amend the Regulation on Insolvency proceedings to include per-
sonal insolvency.301 Nevertheless it is disappointing that the EU has not issued 
292 Ibid., Art. 12 and Recitals. 24–25.
293 Ibid., Art. 12(2).
294 Ibid., Recital. 25.
295 Ibid., Art. 26(1).
296 Ibid., Art. 28(3).
297 Ibid., Art. 28(4).
298 Ibid., Art. 28(5).
299 For an early example, see N Huls Overindebtedness of Consumers in the EC Member States: 
Facts and Search for Solutions (Story-Scientia, cop. 1994); G Betti, N Dourmashkin, MC 
Rossi, V Verma and Y Yin (2001). Study of the Problem of Consumer Indebtedness: Statistical 
Aspects. (Commision of European Union No. B5-1000/00/000197), http://www.iaclaw.
org/Research_papers/iff_OverindebtednessandConsumerLaw.pdf [accessed 26 Oct 2012]; 
U Reifner, N Huls, J Niemi-Kiesiläinen, and H Springeneer, (2003), Study on the Legislation 
Relating to Consumer Overintebtedness in all European Union Member States. 
300 There is a Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Recommendation (2007) 8E 
on Legal Solutions to Debt Problems and it is left to member states whether personal 
insolvency is within Insolvency Regulation 2000 OJ [2000] L160/1: J Niemi, ‘Consumer 
insolvency in the European legal context’ (2012) 35 Journal of Consumer Policy p.443.
301 COM (2012) 744 final.
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a recommendation giving Member States encouragement to promote consumer 
protection through modern bankruptcy laws. This might have strengthened the 
trend that already exists in many States for more consumer-friendly bankruptcy 
procedures. The Commission is obliged to issue a comprehensive report on the 
wider challenges of private over-indebtedness directly linked to credit activity.302
Looking forward
Credit is likely to remain a local product. Even if maximum harmonization is 
needed in some areas of consumer protection to promote cross-border sales, this 
is not one of them. It is unlikely that the EU will step back from its current maxi-
mum harmonization approach to consumer credit, but it should at least resist 
taking further steps forward and in particular should refrain from extending that 
approach to mortgage credit. 
There are certain key areas where flexibility needs to be built in to the legal 
systems. Warnings are one such aspect of regulation. They need to be geared to 
local conditions and cultures. To the extent Member States do not currently have 
freedom to develop their own warning regimes, they should be allowed to. 
Credit is also a classic area calling out for the application of behavioural econom-
ics insights. Again warnings are one area to which these insights can be applied. 
Information duties are another. Both need to hit the mark if they are to be effec-
tive. Forms like the SECCI and ESIS need to be revised so their format gives 
impact and the information that is most relevant is selected out and made promi-
nent. The need to tailor this to local needs might require more diversity being 
brought in even in this heartland of the maximum harmonization philosophy. 
Information might also be provided in a more personalised manner showing, 
for example, how a consumer is likely to use or has used credit, e.g. showing on 
credit card statements interest and charges paid in last year. 
Indeed there is much scope for the development of post-contractual rules. 
However, we do not want to fall into the trap of the EU mandating such rules. 
Those that are fundamental might be introduced as minimum harmonization 
requirements, but on the whole the Commission could use something akin to the 
open method of co-ordination to share experiences and promote best practice. 
There are several areas of credit law which the EU does not touch. In particu-
lar it imposes relatively few controls on the substance of the agreement; where 
this is a debated topic often it leaves these questions for the Member States. This 
is not a bad policy. EU law might fix minimum standards where there is consen-
sus and in other areas prompt Member States to engage with the issues in ways 
which make sense for the local context. Credit is not a product or service that 
needs the European brand for export, but the EU does need to protect its own 
citizens to help them gain the advantages of credit without suffering the effects of 
overdosing on a potentially dangerous product.
302 Mortgage Credit Directive, Art. 45.
7 Product liability and safety
Introduction
General introduction – distinguishing product liability 
and product safety
The right to safety is probably the most important consumer concern.1 It is 
assured through a mixture of regulatory and private law rules. Product safety laws 
are upstream regulatory rules that seek to prevent dangerous products from being 
marketed or to remove them before they cause harm. Technical harmonisation 
and conformity assessment play a major role in developing standards in particular 
sectors, but the main focus in this chapter will be on the General Product Safety 
Directive.2 This is the centrepiece of EU consumer safety law. It ensures broad 
and effective controls on all consumer products circulating in the market by cov-
ering all products not under sectoral directives3 and making a range of regulatory 
powers available for all products. By contrast, product liability laws are down-
stream rules that compensate for harm caused by unsafe products. Although pri-
marily intended to provide compensation for harm caused by unsafe products, the 
rules can also have a deterrent effect as the risk of paying compensation should 
promote safer product design, production and marketing. The EU has been less 
involved with service liability and safety.4
Chapter themes
A good example of European branding
Consumer safety has long been a primary concern of the EU.5 Consumer safety 
has become a major concern in modern times as technology creates more 
 1 It was one of the four basic rights in Presidents Kennedy’s famous 15 March 1962 speech 
to US Congress, subsequently known as the Consumer Bill of Rights: text available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9108; [accessed 1 December 2016]. It has 
been consistently a part of EU consumer protection programmes and action plans.
 2 General Product Safety Directive 2001/95/EC (2001) OJ L 11/4.
 3 A well-known example is Directive 2009/48/EC on the safety of toys (2009) OJ L170/1.
 4 See below, pp.266–267.
 5 Europe has amassed many regulations governing food safety, which merit detailed 
consideration in their own right and are therefore not covered in this volume. For a 
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review of early development see: EU Commission, The General Principles of Food Law 
in the European Union, 30 April 1997, COM (97) 176 final; See also A Alemanno ed, 
Foundations of EU Food Law and Policy: Ten Years of the European Food Safety Authority, 
(Routledge, 2014) and B van der Muelen (ed), EU Food Law Handbook, (Wageningen 
Academic Publishers, 2104).
 6 A major push was made following the adoption of Council Resolution 85/C 136/01 of 
7 May 1985 on a new approach to technical harmonisation and standards: OJ 1985 C 
136/1: see G Howells, Consumer Product Safety, (Ashgate, 1998), Chapter 2.
 7 D Hansom, CE Marking, Product Standards and World Trade, (Edward Elgar, 2005).
 8 Council Directive 85/374/EEC on the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products: 
OJ 1985 L 210/29.
 9 G Howells, Comparative Product Liability (Ashgate,1991); M Reiman, ‘Product liability in 
a global context: The hollow victory of the European model’. European Review of Private 
Law 11 (2003), p.128; A McDougall and P Popat, International Product Law Manual 
(Wolters Kluwer, 2011); J Kellam, Product Liability in the Asia-Pacific, 3rd ed (Federation 
Press, 2009); L Nottage and S Thanitcul, Asean Product Liability and Consumer Product 
Safety Law (Winyuchon, 2015).
10 G Howells and M Mildred, ‘Is European product liability more protective than the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability?’ (1998) 65 Tennessee Law Review p.985; 
David Owen, Product Liability Law, 2nd ed (West, 2005).
exciting consumer products, which, however, can also carry increased risk. Mass 
production also means the effects of unsafe products can be widespread. The 
modern regulatory state has seen itself as having a role in protecting its citizen 
from harmful products. This applies to everyday consumer products just as much 
as it does to high-risk products such as asbestos, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, con-
traceptives, protective devices, airplanes or automobiles. 
Some of the first European interventions concerning safety were indirect 
through the development of common technical standards, which helped assure 
minimum safety standards for key product sectors.6 But the adoption of a General 
Product Safety Directive placed Europe at the forefront of modern safety laws. The 
CE marking is a visible symbol of EU standards being complied with. Consumers 
may not always be well informed about the CE marking. They may not under-
stand its meaning or wrongly consider it to be a safety mark like the German GS 
mark. In fact, it merely indicates compliance with EU new approach directives. 
But in international trade it has become a strong symbol of the European regula-
tory regime.7 
Equally, the European form of strict product liability introduced by the Product 
Liability Directive8 has inspired reform in many regions of the world.9 This is some-
what surprising as product liability in the US was the most developed and might 
have been expected to have been the model states looked to. However, the noto-
riety of US product liability law and its high profile negative impact on certain sec-
tors caused many states to shy away from adopting its rules. In many respects the 
European substantive rules are stricter than the US rules, especially after reforms 
in the US Restatement (Third) of the Law of Torts: Product Liability.10 Rather 
it was US procedural rules and damages law that in practice impacted heavily on 
American industry (class action, non-pecuniary damage levels, care costs and puni-
tive damages). European product liability laws have, by contrast, caused relatively 
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11 M Reimann, ‘Liability for defective products at the beginning of the twenty-first century: 
Emergence of a worldwide standard’ (2003) 51 American Journal of Comparative Law 
p.751; J Kellan and L Nottage, ‘Europeanisation of product liability in the Asia-Pacific 
region: A preliminary empirical benchmark’ (2008) 31 Journal of Consumer Policy p.217; 
D. Campbell, International Product Liability (LLP Publishing, 1993).
12 Directive 92/59/EEC on general product safety.
13 See e.g. Chapter 2 on the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive.
14 See below.
15 See below.
few problems for trade. This has made them more palatable to governments and 
industry and facilitated their spread around the globe.11 
Product liability and safety laws have been influential in branding Europe as a 
region producing reliable, quality products. These laws are the leading example 
of European success in exporting its consumer regime. Not only are the EU rules 
regarded as models for other legislators, but the generally high standards set 
underpin confidence in European products. 
Strong emphasis on maximum harmonisation
This is an interesting topic to explore the maximum harmonisation theme. The 
rationale for technical harmonisation rules adopting maximum harmonisation is 
clear. These rules seek uniformity to remove barriers to free circulation. It is not so 
obvious that this should be applied to the more general obligations in the General 
Product Safety Directive as higher national levels of protection may not require 
specific modifications of products. Apparently even within the Commission opin-
ions were divided on whether the first Directive12 was maximum in character, 
but it now seems clear that the General Product Safety Directive is treated as 
being maximum. Importantly, the European rules leave room for legislators to 
take actions against products that pose a danger to consumers, even if they are 
formally complying with the law. This safeguard approach has not been applied to 
EU maximum harmonisation laws dealing with consumer economic interests.13 
This is something that might be regretted.
The CJEU has also confirmed that the Product Liability Directive is a  maximum 
harmonisation measure.14 That seems hard to justify from a policy perspective as 
differences in liability laws have only a marginal impact on decisions to market 
across borders. One only has to look to the USA for an example of a region with 
different state product liability laws that do not appear unduly to restrict trade. 
There are in any event exceptions to the maximum harmonisation principle on 
the face of the Directive. Significantly it does not affect the ability to rely on vari-
ous liability regimes in place when the Directive was adopted.15
A balance between information and substantive socialisation of risk
Consumer information plays an important role in protecting consumers’ safety. 
The instructions and warnings provided with products are factors to be taken 
into account when assessing safety. However, there is also a recognition that 
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16 U Beck, Risk Society (Sage, 1992).
17 Recital 2.
18 General Product Safety Directive Art. 2(b). 
19 G Priest, ‘The current insurance crisis and modern tort law’ (1987) 96 Yale Law Journal 
pp.1585–1586.
there should be some limits on the extent to which producers can rely on such 
techniques. Modern society brings with it increased risks.16 Producers need to 
take responsibility for their products and this may involve their redesign rather 
than mere warning. For unavoidable risks, there seems to be an acceptance that a 
degree of socialisation of risks is necessary. This is not always spelt out and possi-
bly is too radical for many rule makers to follow through to its logical conclusion. 
This debate on socialisation of risk is most evident in the product liability field 
where the Directive’s recital states: 
Whereas liability without fault on the part of the producer is the sole means 
of adequately solving the problem, peculiar to our age of increasing techni-
cality, of a fair apportionment of the risks inherent in modern technological 
production.17
However, determining what is a fair apportionment of those risks is an open ques-
tion that has not been fully explored, yet alone answered. Nevertheless, some degree 
of sharing of risks has been accepted. The policy behind the Directive also assumes 
that producers will be deterred from producing products where they would be 
liable to pay compensation that exceeded their profits. Thus some risks (products) 
should be excluded from the market. In product safety law, similar controls are 
exerted by the rule that any risk should the minimum compatible with the prod-
uct’s use.18 These rules should impact on the range of products consumers can 
choose from compared to an unregulated market. Such controls do not mandate 
product design, but place limits on the designs that can be marketed. Some com-
mentators note the potentially regressive impact on poorer consumers of laws that 
require safety features which make products more expensive.19 Poorer consumers 
are therefore priced out of access to the products, or at least price rations their access 
to them in a way that affects them more than the affluent consumer. However, the 
standards only establish minimum levels of safety. Provided these are pitched as lev-
els where fundamental safety issues are at stake, this should be seen as an important 
protective safeguard for the poor to prevent them being exposed to products that 
can pose a serious risk. If there was freedom to risk using products posing serious 
risk merely because the risk was warned against, the welfare of consumers might be 
lowered as they might not be able accurately to assess the risks involved.
Enforcement
Enforcement has been given priority in the safety field. From the first General 
Product Safety Directive there was the requirement on Member States to 
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20 Directive 92/59/EEC (1992) OJ L 228/24, Art. 5.
21 (2008) OJ L 218/30.
22 See COM (2013) 78 final.
23 The then-Commissioner Kuneva made her position clear when she said ‘there will not be 
any (class action). Not in Europe, not under my watch.’ (Speech on 10 November 2007, 
Lisbon).
24 (1976) OJ C 241/9.
25 Council Directive 85/374/EEC on liability for defective products: (1985) OJ L 210/29.
26 Council resolution a new approach to technical harmonisation and standards (1985) OJ C 
136/1.
27 CEN is European Committee for Standardisation.
28 (2008) OJ L 218/21.
have an enforcement authority for consumer safety.20 Regulation (EC) No 
765/200821 required Member States to entrust market surveillance authori-
ties with the powers, resources and knowledge necessary for the proper per-
formance of their tasks. A notable feature of the latest reform proposals22 is the 
proposed requirement that Member States satisfy the Commission they have 
properly resourced their authorities and given them sufficient powers to survey 
the market. By contrast, product liability actions have depended upon national 
civil litigation cultures. The EU has resisted introducing measures requiring 
class actions. That would help promote product liability litigation. In part, the 
reluctance to mandate such reforms was because the Commission was scared 
away from replicating the US experience where class actions have been consid-
ered to fuel litigation.23
History
In 1976 the Council of Europe issued the Strasbourg Convention on Products 
Liability in regard to personal injury and death. In the same year the European 
Commission published its first proposal for a directive on product liability,24 but 
it was not adopted until 1985.25 
In the product safety field there had been early attempts to promote technical 
harmonisation, but these had been difficult to adopt due to the need to deal with 
particular products individually and to seek unanimity. As part of the push for 
the Single European Market the pace of adopting technical standards increased 
under the new approach directives.26 These now cover categories of products and 
set down safety expectations as broad standards. Annexes contain essential safety 
requirements which are fleshed out in CEN27 standards. 
The new legislative framework for the marketing of products comprises:
a Regulation (EC) 764/200828 laying down procedures relating to the appli-
cation of certain national technical rules to products lawfully marketed in 
another Member State. This seeks to ensure technical rules in non-harmo-
nised areas do not unduly impede trade. 
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29 (2008) OJ L 218/30.
30 (2008) OJ L 218/82.
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assessment services can lead to a race to the bottom.
32 (1992) OJ L 228/24.
33 (2001) OJ L 11/4.
34 See Proposal for a Regulation on Consumer Product Safety COM (2013) 78 final (hereafter 
‘CPS Regulation Proposal’).
35 Proposal for a Regulation on Market Surveillance of Products COM (2013)75 final (hereafter 
‘Market Surveillance Regulation Proposal 2013’). 
36 Removing the discretion of Member States to exclude primary agricultural produce and 
game: see Directive 1999/34 amending Council Directive 85/374/EEC (1999) OJ L 
141/20.
b Regulation (EC) No 765/200829 setting out accreditation and market 
surveillance requirements relating to the marketing of products and in par-
ticular setting out the criteria for national accreditation bodies and general 
principles for the CE marking. 
c Decision 768/2008/EC30 setting a common framework for the marketing 
of products which sets out requirements for conformity assessment and rules 
on affixing the CE mark.31 
In addition to sectoral measures, in 1992, the EU adopted the first General 
Product Safety Directive (92/59/EEC).32 This was a horizontal directive 
intended to cover products outside the scope of vertical harmonisation measures. 
Even for products covered by specific vertical regulations, it sought to ensure a 
full range of measures was available. Many of the specific laws had, for instance, 
no provisions on matters such as notification of risks.
In 2001 consumer safety regulation was overhauled and a new General Product 
Safety Directive 2001/95/EC adopted.33 The EU should be applauded for its 
work revising the General Product Safety Directive to clarify concepts, fill gaps 
that had been identified and to increase coherence. Currently there is a new reform 
package proposed that seeks to revise the General Product Safety Directive34 and 
introduce a market surveillance package providing a common framework for 
enforcement.35 It is unfortunate these measures have not (yet) been adopted, but 
the Commission has shown its desire to keep the law in this area modernised. It is 
understood that the major stumbling block with the current reform proposals is 
over a proposed requirement to show the country of origin. This is not directly a 
safety issue and it is unfortunate it is holding up valuable reforms. 
The ongoing reform of product safety laws contrasts with the Product Liability 
Directive. It has had only one minor amendment36 since it was adopted. This may 
be because the Product Liability Directive has been relatively uncontroversial in 
practice and no one wants to rock the boat by proposing reforms that might 
destablise the equilibrium. Equally, it could be because enforcement has been 
privatised and personal injury lawyers do not have sufficient incentives to lobby 
for reform of an area of practice that is niche and high risk. Perhaps it is because 
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37 See European Commission, Evaluation of the Directive 85/374/EEC concerning liability 
for Defective Products (2016), http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/roadmaps/
docs/2016_grow_027_evaluation_defective_products_en.pdf [accessed 24 October 
2016].
the Directive is the responsibility of the Internal Market Directorate-General, 
currently DG GROWTH – Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship, and 
SMEs. The Commission was also strongly of the view that it was an internal 
market rather than primarily a consumer protection measure. This was needed 
to justify its legal base. Many measures in the consumer field share a common 
legal base linked to the establishment and functioning on the internal market. 
However, product liability perhaps has a weak justification for such a base as its 
impact on cross-border trade is at best indirect. Having its home in a Directorate 
with more pressing internal market issues may make its review less of a pressing 
priority for the relevant Commissioner. However, there has now recently been 
a move to consider reviewing the Directive, with the impetus being the need to 
make it relevant to the digital age and the Internet of Things.37
Maximum harmonisation
Technical harmonisation is one area in which maximum harmonisation seems 
justified as its objective is to promote the free circulation of goods by not allowing 
national divergences in standards to act as barriers to trade. However, the new 
approach directives achieve this in a very sophisticated way that both promotes 
diversity and safeguards consumer protection. Products have to meet a safety 
standard that is fleshed out through essential safety requirements. The surest 
means of compliance is to satisfy approved European (CEN) standards as trans-
lated into national standards. However, producers remain free to meet the essen-
tial safety requirement through alternative means. Importantly, even if a product 
is deemed to meet the required standard there is a safeguard clause allowing 
action to be taken against products that pose a threat to safety. 
This is a model that might have inspired a broader more flexible approach to 
maximum harmonisation in other areas, such as unfair commercial practices. It 
might be classed as soft or flexible maximum harmonisation. It offers a safe har-
bour way of complying with obligations, but rather than imposing a specifica-
tion standard that demands a certain production method is used (or not used), it 
favours a performance standard that gives producers the freedom to choose how to 
achieve the required level of safety. It nudges producers to use the preferred means 
of compliance through the inducement of legal protection if the standard approach 
is used. However, consumer protection is equally safeguarded by allowing action 
to be taken in situations where risks materialise despite compliance with rules.
The need for maximum harmonisation is less clear when applying a general 
safety standard, but after some initial doubts, even with differences within the 
Commission, it seems clear that the General Product Safety Directive is a maximum 
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38 Art. 3(4) of Directive 2001/95/EC.
39 Art. 7(e) and Art. 15(1)(b).
40 Art. 16(1).
41 This was removed by Directive 1999/34/EC (1999) OJ L 141/20.
42 Art. 5 prescribes joint and several liability and Art. 8 no reduction in producer liability 
even if the damage is also caused by the act or omission of a third party, but leaves it to 
national law to govern matters concerning the rights of contribution and recourse. The 
rules on damages in Art. 9 are without prejudice to national provisions relating to non-
material damage. The limitation rules in Art. 10 do not affect Member States’ rules on the 
suspension or interruption of the limitation period.
43 See C-52/00 Commission v France [2002] ECR I-3827, paras 17–20; C-154/00 
Commission v Greece [2002] ECR I-3879, paras 13–16; C-183/00 González Sanchez v 
Medicina Asturiana SA [2002] ECR I-3901, paras 26–29.
44 C-52/00 Commission v France [2002] ECR I-3827. On this see also later decision of 
C-402/03 Skov AEG v Bilka Lauprisvarenhus A/S [2006] 2 CMLR 16. The Court was 
not influenced by Point 2 of the minutes of 1025th meeting of the Council of Ministers of 
25 July 1985 which stated: ‘With regard to the interpretation of Articles (3) and (13), the 
Council and the Commission are in agreement that there is nothing to prevent individual 
Member States from laying down in their national legislation rules regarding liability 
for intermediaries, since intermediary liability is not covered by the Directive. There is 
further agreement that under the Directive the Member States may determine rules on the 
harmonisation directive. Once again there is a safeguard clause to protect con-
sumer safety in circumstances where a product complies with the criteria of the 
general safety requirements, but there is evidence that it is still dangerous.38
The Product Liability Directive provides for an additional parallel liability 
regime to those already existing at the time the Directive was adopted. Art. 13 
provides:
This Directive shall not affect any rights which an injured person may have 
according to the rules of the law of contractual or non-contractual liability 
or a special liability system existing at the moment when this Directive is 
notified.
The preservation of existing regimes, by Art. 13, has itself been used as an 
argument that the Directive is maximum in character. Otherwise it is suggested 
there would be no need for the express preservation of these rights. Also, as 
particular matters have been left to the option of Member States (i.e. the devel-
opment risks defence,39 ceiling on damages for personal injury40 and originally 
the exclusion of primary agricultural produce and game41) or particular issues 
have been left expressly to national law42, the assumption is that as regards 
other matters there is maximum harmonisation. The CJEU has confirmed that 
the Product Liability Directive should be viewed as a maximum harmonisation 
directive.43 The Court was also influenced by the lack of a minimum harmo-
nisation clause and Recital 1 which made out the economic internal market 
case for harmonisation. These CJEU decisions have concerned some impor-
tant issues such as the refusal in Commission v France44 to allow national law 
266 Product liability and safety
final mutual apportionment of liability among several liable producers (see Article 3) and 
intermediaries.’
45 C-52/00 Commission v France [2002] ECR I-3827 and C-154/00 Commission v Greece 
(2002) ECR I-3879.
46 C-285/08, Moteurs Leroy Somer v Dalkia France [2009] ECR I-4733.
47 C-495/10, Centre Hospitalier Universitaire de Besançon v Thomas Dutrueux and Caisse 
Primaire d’Assurance Maladie du Jura [2011] ECR I-14155.
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to impose similar liability to producer liability on suppliers. In the same case it 
was also held that whilst there was a freedom to remove the development risks 
defence, a halfway house imposing more conditions on the use of the defence 
was not allowed. But this maximum harmonisation approach has also extended 
to relatively minor rules such as the need to continue the €500 threshold on 
property damage.45 
González Sanchez v Medicina Asturiana was more concerned with the inter-
pretation of Art. 13. The CJEU refused to accept any national rules that could 
be seen as imposing a general strict product liability regime different to that laid 
down in the Directive. Member States can maintain their existing general rules 
and any specific regime in place. What they cannot do is develop competing 
regimes focused on strict product liability. Thus general rules of law like negli-
gence and sale of goods law can be applied as well as specific regimes such as that 
established in Germany for drugs by the Pharmaceutical Act 1976. What cannot 
be maintained are systems that apply a distinct strict product liability regime that 
is not limited to a particular sector. 
The maximum harmonisation effects of the Directive only extend as far as the 
scope of the Directive. Thus, in Moteurs Leroy Somer v Dalkia France,46 national 
law could continue to apply where the damage was caused to property intended 
for professional use. Such damages were outside the scope of the Directive. 
Equally a national system requiring public healthcare establishments to pay com-
pensation, even when they are not at fault, for damage sustained by a patient as 
a result of the failure of equipment or products used in the course of treatment 
was not incompatible with the maximum harmonisation scope. It had a different 
base of liability and did not affect liability of producers under the Directive.47 It 
also does not impact on national regimes that enable information on the adverse 
effects of pharmaceutical products to be obtained, even if this impacts on product 
liability litigation practice.48 
Scope of consumer safety laws
Definition of product 
Relationship with service liability and safety regulation
As their names suggest, both the Product Liability Directive and General 
Product Safety Directive relate to products and not services. One of the 
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50 (2006) OJ L 376/36.
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55 Certainly contaminated blood has been subject to litigation under the Directive: A v 
National Blood Authority (2001) 3 All ER 289 and Scholten v The Foundation Sanquin 
of Blood Supply  Rb Amsterdam 3 February 1999, NJ 1999, 621: reported on Product 
Liability Forum Database.
weaknesses of EU consumer safety law is that it fails to address services in a 
systematic manner. There had been a proposal for a directive on service liabil-
ity.49 It would not have introduced strict liability, but merely have reversed 
the burden of proof for negligence liability. However, it was not adopted. 
Directive 2006/123/EC on services in the internal market50 contains mecha-
nisms requiring Member States to provide mutual assistance and to alert other 
Member States about risks51 as well as a requirement that providers of ser-
vices that present a direct and particular risk carry insurance.52 The EU has 
only adopted the occasional soft law rules relating to service safety.53 However, 
some Member States have when implementing the EU product safety directives 
extended them to cover to services.54
The line between service and product liability is particularly debated to the 
context of the General Product Safety Directive. The crucial issue is whether 
the products remain controlled by the service provider, and hence are part of a 
service, or are used by the consumer. Recital 9 makes it clear that the Directive 
extends to ‘products that are supplied or made available to consumers in the 
context of service provision for use by them.’ Thus a supermarket trolley or gym 
equipment would be included in the consumer safety regime, but a shampoo 
applied by a hairdresser would be excluded as it remained under the control of the 
professional. The Directive’s Recital makes it clear that the safety of the equip-
ment used by service providers and the equipment on which consumers ride or 
travel if operated by the service provider belong to service safety and are excluded 
from the scope of the Directive. 
Products covered
The Product Liability Directive covers all moveable products even if incorporated 
into another moveable or an immoveable. Human body parts and blood would 
seem to be covered despite some religious objections.55 The original option 
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60 S Whittaker, ‘European product liability and intellectual products’. 105 Law Quarterly 
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Directive to software’ (2001) 34 Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern 
Africa p.188.
61 Act of 25 February 1991 on defective product liability, Art. 2.
given to Member States to exclude primary agricultural produce and game was 
removed in 1999.56 
The General Product Safety Directive applies to all products,57 unless there 
is a specific Community provisions with the same objective.58 Where an issue is 
properly addressed in a sectoral rule, then that specific rule takes priority. But the 
General Product Safety Directive acts as a safety net for risks not covered in specific 
regulations or to provide obligations like notification and reporting obligations if 
not found in the specific regulations. The complexity of the relationship between 
the GPSD and sectoral rules is evident in the forty page Guidance Document on 
the Relationship Between the General Product Safety Directive and Certain Sector 
Directives with Provisions on General Safety.59 This Guidance concedes there is 
much scope for interpretation about what the Directive means when it refers to 
‘aspects and risks or categories of risks’ not covered by the specific rules, as well as 
room for debate on whether the rules have the same objective. 
The CPS Regulation Proposal 2013 tries to draw a clearer distinction. It is 
helped by the Market Surveillance Regulation Proposal 2013 applying to all 
products covered by Community legislation. The general provisions in Part One 
of CPS Regulation Proposal 2013 set out the general safety requirement which 
would apply even to products covered by other EU harmonised legislation. Such 
products are only exempted from the following chapters that implement the gen-
eral provisions. However, there would be a presumption of safety as regards risks 
covered by Union-harmonised legislation designed to protect human health and 
safety so long as those requirements were conformed with. 
Incorporeal products
The Product Liability Directive specifically covers electricity. This has led to 
debate as to whether other incorporeal products are excluded. The most impor-
tant debate has been around software and digital products.60 The only country 
to have addressed this issue directly in its implementing legislation is Belgium, 
which restricts the definition of product to tangible movables, thus excluding 
software.61 Whether this is in line with the Directive is debateable. At one time, 
it was common to draw a distinction between software supplied on a durable 
medium, such as a compact disc, and programmes that were simply downloaded. 
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The physical nature of the disc encouraged some commentators and judges to 
treat the former as products. But as it has become more common to simply make 
software available for downloading the appeal of this distinction has faded. A 
more rational distinction turns on whether software is standardised or bespoke. 
There might be some value in equating off-the-peg software with a mass-pro-
duced product and viewing bespoke products as an individualised service. The 
same rationales for strict liability might then apply to the mass-produced stand-
ardised software. However, artisan goods are not treated any differently under 
the Directive as compared to standardised products. A more convincing dis-
tinction is between software which undertakes actions itself and software that 
produces information which is then acted upon by a person. The latter sort of 
information-producing software requires human intervention to use it and argu-
ably is similar in quality to the information found in a book and so should not be 
subject to strict liability. However, if software directly has a material output, such 
as operating a heating system or cooker in your home or helping land a plane, 
then it seems valid to treat it as a product and subject it to strict liability. These are 
likely to be component parts for which the producer of the final product would 
be liable for in any event. 
The debate on this issue has not been as strong in relation to the General 
Product Safety Directive, but similar issues might arise. In the sales context, a 
separate category of conformity rules is being created for digital goods.62 Some 
similar clarification could usefully be provided in relation to safety and liability. 
Limited to consumer products?
The General Product Safety Directive only covers products intended or likely 
under reasonably foreseeable conditions to be used by consumers. It had pre-
viously been unclear whether so-called migrating products (commercial prod-
ucts that came to be used by ordinary consumers) were included. Problematic 
cases had included surveyors’ laser pens, large fireworks intended for commer-
cial displays and heavy-duty DIY hire equipment. They are now clearly included 
as the Directive clarifies that products cover those ‘intended for consumers or 
likely, under reasonably foreseeable conditions, to be used by consumer even if 
not intended for them.’ By contrast, the Product Liability Directive applies to all 
products. The limitation of damages to property used for private use or consump-
tion is discussed below.63
Damages recoverable  
The Product Liability Directive provides that liability for damage caused by death 
and personal injuries and damage or destruction of property is covered. Damages 
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can sometimes be difficult to categorise. For instance, the CJEU left it to the 
national court to decide whether damage to a kidney about to be transplanted 
was personal injury or property damage.64 
Property damage does not include damage or destruction of the defective 
product itself: that is seen as the province of sales law. Also there is a thresh-
old of 500 ECU. Most Member States treat this like an insurance deductible, 
but the UK and Netherlands rules provide that once the threshold is exceeded 
the amount can be recovered in full.65 This approach seems preferable given the 
policy rationale is to avoid disputes over small amounts. 
The damaged property must also be of a type ordinarily intended for private 
use or consumption and actually used by the injured person mainly for those pur-
poses. A commercial product is subject to the Directive and may create liability 
for personal injury or damage to a consumer product. However, any harm caused 
by any product to commercial products is excluded. If a product catches fire and 
damages a work computer and a PlayStation, only damages for the latter are 
recoverable. Damage to commercial products is outside the scope of the Directive 
and subject to national law.66 
Parties liable 
Product liability
The Product Liability Directive channels liability towards the producer. This 
contrasts with the US approach of making all those in the supply chain poten-
tially liable. It has the advantage of economic efficiency, as there is no need 
for several parties to insure against the same risk. However, it risks leaving the 
consumer without a defendant if the producer is insolvent. The producer can be 
the manufacturer of a component or a finished product or the producer of any 
raw material.67 
The choice of producer as the main focus of liability was probably due to 
the producer normally having most control over the product’s safety and often 
being a wealthier defendant than many retailers. However, those assumptions 
are not always correct. In part this is recognised by the extension of the definition 
of producer to cover a person who by putting their name, trade mark or other 
distinguishing feature on the product presents themselves as its producer.68 This 
might capture large stores who own-brand their products. Although, they may 
be able to escape liability by appropriate labelling making it clear they are not 
the producer. Celebrity endorsements would not normally make the personal-
ity liable as they would not be seen as presenting themselves as the producer. 
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Importers into the Community will also be deemed to be producers.69 Liability 
attaches to the first party to import into the Union, meaning there might still not 
be a target defendant in the consumer’s home state. In fact, it is even possible that 
the importer into the EU is established outside the EU. The General Product 
Safety Directive is more concerned to find a responsible person in the consumer’s 
home state.
Suppliers have a subsidiary liability under the Product Liability Directive.70 
The Skov case71 makes it clear that Member States cannot increase their liability 
beyond the extent allowed for in the Directive by making the supplier liable for 
defects. Supplier liability will arise if the producer cannot identify the producer or 
the person who supplied him within a reasonable time. In the case of imported 
products, the importer must be identified even if the producer is indicated. 
Presumably this is because the producer will be outside the EU. 
In Aventis Pasteur SA v OB,72 the English distributor of a vaccine manufac-
tured by its French parent company had been wrongly sued and the claimant 
wanted to substitute the proper defendant outside the ten-year-long stop period. 
The Directive has both a three-year limitation period and a ten-year-long stop 
from when the product was put into circulation.73 One basis the CJEU found for 
making the subsidiary potentially liable was that it had not, of its own initiative 
and promptly, disclosed the name of the producer. This seems to be in conflict 
with the United Kingdom implementing law which requires there to have been 
an express request. It was in truth an attempt to prevent the companies ben-
efitting from the corporate structures used by groups of companies. The CJEU 
would also exceptionally allow substitution if the producer had directed the sup-
plier to supply the product.
General product safety
The GPSD distinguishes between producers, who bear the full force of the 
responsibilities under the Directive and distributors who have the lesser duty to 
act with care to help ensure compliance. Producer covers similar groups as under 
the Product Liability Directive. The producer74 is the manufacturer, but only 
when established in the Community. This is because of the need to have a person 
within the EU to take enforcement action against; if the manufacturer is not 
established in the Community the producer is the manufacturer’s representative 
or the importer. The producer can also be a person who presents himself as the 
manufacturer by affixing to the product his name, trade mark or other distinctive 
69 Art. 3(2).
70 Art, 3(3).
71 Discussed below.
72 C-358/08 ECR [2009] I-11305. This litigation had already been to the CJEU on the 
same issue – see C-127/04 O’Byrne v Sanofi Pasteur MSD (2006) ECR I-1313.
73 Art. 10.
74 Art. 2(e).
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mark. A reconditioner is also stated to be a producer. Other professionals can be 
producers in so far as their activities may affect the safety properties of a product. 
This might cover someone who stores products or assembles them. Distributors 
are professionals in the supply chain who do not affect the safety properties of 
the product.75 
Enforcement action can be taken against producers, distributors and any 
other person where this is necessary to avoid risks arising from the product. 
The emphasis on local enforcement is seen in the particular mention of action 
being taken against the party responsible for the first stage of distribution on the 
national market.76
Substantive safety standards – protection by information 
and warnings vs socialisation of risk 
General standards – consumer expectations vs risk: utility
The Product Liability Directive premises liability on the presence of a defect. 
A defect exists when the product does not provide ‘the safety which a person is 
entitled to expect.’77 All the circumstances should be taken into account, including: 
a the presentation of the product; 
b the use to which it could reasonably be expected that the product would be put; 
c the time when the product was put into circulation. 
However, an English judge, Burton J in A v National Blood Authority,78 held that 
all the circumstances meant only all the relevant circumstances. This is perhaps 
self-evident but his conclusion as to what were relevant was quite radical. He held 
relevant circumstances did not include the avoidability of the harmful characteris-
tic – i.e. impossibility or unavoidability in relation to precautionary measures; the 
impracticality, cost or difficulty of taking such measures and the benefit to society 
or utility of the product (except possibly where there has been full disclosure and 
the risk was, and ought to have been, accepted).79 This approach was deemed 
necessary to prevent the discussion collapsing back into negligence-style analysis 
and requiring the claimant to spend a lot of resources on evidence. It was also 
justified by the presence of the development risks defence, which protected the 
producer against specific types of unavoidable harm due to the lack of scientific 
knowledge. 
The Directive establishes a liability based on consumer expectations and 
Burton J in A v National Blood Authority favoured the approach set out by 
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Dr Bartl under which the judge acts as the appointed representative of the 
public at large.80 The consumer cannot expect products to be free of risk, but 
can expect to have his legitimate expectations met. These should be judged 
objectively. This objectivisation of the standard is intended to counter the 
criticism of the consumer expectation standard in the US, which is in some 
applications considered to be overly subjective. It also seems to rule out a strict 
application of a risk:benefit analysis, but in practice this may come back into 
the frame when analysing what are legitimate safety expectations; particularly 
for design defects.
The literature, and even some Member States laws,81 distinguish between dif-
ferent types of defects. A basic distinction is between a manufacturing defect where 
the defective product differs from the intended design and design defects where 
the product is claimed intrinsically not to offer sufficient safety.82 Manufacturing 
defects might arise because of a construction error or due to imperfect materi-
als. Design defects might be further categorised according to whether the actual 
design is flawed or the problem lies with instructions for use or inadequate warn-
ings. The US has revised its Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability and 
now draws distinctions between these categories of defect on the face of its law 
and restricts true strict liability to manufacturing defects.83 The EU Directive 
applies the same standard to all defects. However, in practice it is easier to find 
an improperly made product fails to meet expectations of safety than to chal-
lenge a design. Designs involve polycentric decisions balancing safety against per-
formance, efficiency, aesthetics and cost. The safest product may simply not be 
acceptable for other reasons. There will often need to be trade-offs. In evaluating 
design choices risk and utility are likely to play some role. Stapleton and Newdick 
consider this goes so far as to mean strict liability collapses back into a form of 
negligence.84 However, one does not have to be so pessimistic and yet still agree 
with the extra-judicial comments of a Law Lord that some kind of risk:utility 
balancing would have to be undertaken. 85
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The General Product Safety Directive defines a safe product in order to set 
minimum levels for entry into the marketplace. Often failure to meet this standard 
will lead to some form of criminal or administrative sanction, but in some systems 
like the French it is merely an organising concept for remedial powers, such as those 
allowing dangerous products to be removed from the market.86 In this regulatory 
field the standard of safety is not based on expectations, but rather on the seemingly 
more objective requirement that the product does not ‘present any risk or only the 
minimum risks compatible with the product’s use’.87 However, just as expectations 
are made objective by the judges using the public at large as their yardstick when 
assessing what are reasonable expectations, so equally are risks measured against 
what is acceptable – so long as this is consistent with a high level of protection.88 
The product liability and product safety standards may in practice not be far apart.
Any product deemed unsafe under the General Product Safety Directive 
should be classed as defective in product liability law. The minimum standard 
should be that products meet the level required for lawful circulation in the mar-
ketplace. However, it is possible to imagine products that carry the minimum 
acceptable risks still being considered defective as they did not offer the expected 
level of safety. Drugs might, for example, still be justifiably marketed despite hav-
ing side effects that affect some users. Product liability can be viewed as a mecha-
nism to compensate the unfortunate victims whose injury comes at the expense 
of the majority, who benefit from the product without suffering the side effects. 
A classic example is aspirin; it has undoubted benefits and its withdrawal would 
be unjustified despite some random users suffering from internal bleeding. Sadly 
the theoretical rationale for the Product Liability Directive is unclear; without a 
clearer indication of policy it is doubtful whether in such cases the courts would 
impose liability. At best the court might be willing to find liability if the public 
had not been made sufficiently aware of the danger.
Compliance with standards
Compliance with standards is not a defence under product liability. There is a very 
narrow defence where mandatory public regulations have been complied with, 
but it only applies where the defect was due to compliance.89 It will be rare for 
compliance to require a product to be made in a way that is defective. There have 
been calls for a pre-emption defence, but this has even been rejected for drugs 
in US.90 A more subtle argument is that regulations, standards or approvals from 
regulatory bodies represent the expectations of safety of the community at large. 
Therefore a potential argument is that compliance can indirectly lead to a finding 
86 G Howells, Consumer Product Safety, (Ashgate, 1998), Chapter 6.
87 Art. 2(b)
88 The general safety requirement also requires the reasonable consumer expectations 
concerning safety to be taken into account; Art. 3(3)(f).
89 Art. 7(d).
90 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009), but on modified devices, see Riegel v Medtronic 
552 U.S. 312.
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of lack of defect as these are indicators of what safety can be expected. However, 
such determinations are made for different reasons than civil liability. They may 
not have benefitted from full disclosure of risks and may become outdated.91 
The General Product Safety Directive’s general product safety requirement 
is deemed satisfied when there is compliance with national rules.92 There is a 
presumption of compliance when it conforms to voluntary national standards 
transposing European standards.93 Beyond that a range of other standards, 
recommendations and codes of good practice should be taken into account.94 
However, significantly, even if this deference to standards approach leads to a 
product being deemed safe, competent authorities are not barred from taking 
measures to restrict the product’s marketing or requiring its withdrawal or recall 
where there is evidence it is dangerous.95
Socialisation of risk
The Product Liability Directive proudly asserts that ‘liability without fault on 
the part of the producer is the sole means of adequately solving the problem, 
peculiar to our age of increasing technicality, of a fair apportionment of the risks 
inherent in modern technological production.’96 However, it gives few clues as 
to what amounts to a fair apportionment. Strict liability is clearly not absolute 
liability. Several defences are allowed97 and liability is premised on the defeating 
of reasonable expectations, thereby implying a limit to the circumstances where 
mere harm being caused by a product can lead to liability. Similarly, the General 
Product Safety Directive does not preclude all risk. It is merely concerned to keep 
risk within acceptable limits.
National courts when assessing defectiveness in product liability have adopted 
wide divergences in approach. In A v National Blood Authority98 Burton J was 
keen to show that the Directive was indeed intended to strike a different approach 
from negligence. Other courts have slipped back into negligence analysis. Indeed, 
several academic commentators have argued this is inevitable given the formu-
lation of defectiveness in the Directive.99 This would be regrettable. Clearly 
91 M Mildred, ‘Pharmaceutical products: The relationship between regulatory approval and 
the existence of a defect’ (2007) 18 European Business Law Review p.1267.
92 Art. 3(2) para 1.
93 Art. 3(2)para. 2.
94 Art. 3(3).
95 Art. 3(4).
96 Recital 2.
97 Art. 7 provides defences for not having put product into circulation; defect not existing 
when put into circulation; product not sold or supplied for economic purpose nor 
manufactured or distributed in course of business; defect being due to compliance with 
mandatory regulations; development risks defence and a defence for component part 
manufacturers where defect due to design of final product or instructions given by its 
manufacturer. The burden of proving the defence is on defendant.
98 (200s1) 3 All ER 289.  A more conservative approach has been adopted in the recent 
English case Wilkes v De Ley International [2016] EWHC 3096.
99 See n 84.
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something different from negligence was intended when the Directive was 
adopted. However, even the Commission has been guilty of slipping back into 
this traditional negligence style thinking. Its Third Report on the Directive talked 
about situations where Member States have redressed the claimant’s difficulties 
in proving fault.100 Claimants under the Directive certainly do not need to prove 
fault. Some courts have even gone so far as to find defect from the mere fact that 
a product behaved in an unexpected manner. French courts have, for instance, 
relied on a tyre exploding to presume it was defective without being concerned to 
identify the precise cause or have imposed liability where a glass window exploded 
in circumstances where the precise cause was unknown.101 
At one extreme the view could be taken that if harm is caused by a product 
behaving in an unexplained way that in itself is a defect, because the product does 
not offer the safety a consumer was entitled to expect. This would reflect a desire 
to socialise risk. At the other end of the spectrum are cases where the courts have 
required the cause of the defect to be proven. This risks slipping back into fault-
style analysis.102 In between there are positions which accept that defeating con-
sumer expectations may be in itself amount to defectiveness without the need for 
the product to be shown to be physically flawed, but still require more than mere 
harm having been caused by a product. Instead of a physical defect, defectiveness 
can be based on the producer having unduly raised of expectations of safety.103 
The problem arises when the product behaves in an unexplained manner; often 
the reason for the harm will be impossible or disproportionately expensive to dis-
cover. Sometimes the courts may use circumstantial evidence to establish defect. 
Lenze argues this was the correct approach of the Austrian Supreme Court in a 
case involving an exploding firework.104 This can be assisted by a rule like Art. 
217.6 of the Spanish Law of Civil Procedure which states that the court should 
bear in mind, when distributing the burden of proof, the availability of and ease 
of access to the evidence for each party.105 
The CJEU has recently, in Boston Scientific,106 given a strong lead that the 
Directive was intended to socialise risks by holding that a defect can exist because 
products belonging to the same group or forming part of the same production 
100 COM(2006) 496 final.
101 Decision of the Court of Appeal of Toulouse of 7 November 2000 and Decision of 
Tribunal de Grande Instance in Aix-en-Provence of 7 November 2000 see S. Whittaker, 
Liability for Products (2005), p.75.
102 Foster v Biosil [2001] 59 BMLR 185.
103 G Howells, ‘Defect in English law – lessons for the harmonisation of European product 
liability’ in D Fairgrieve (ed) Product Liability in Comparative Perspective (CUP, 2005).
104 S Lenze, ‘German product liability law: Between European directives, American 
restatements and common sense’ in D Fairgrieve (ed) Product Liability in Comparative 
Perspective (CUP, 2005).
105 J Huerta and B Muñiz, ‘Feature – an overview of product liability in Spain’ (2005) 18/5 
European Product Liability Review.
106 Joined cases C503/13 and C504/13 Boston Scientific Medizintechnik GmbH v AOK Sachsen-
Anhalt – Die Gesundheitskasse and Betriebskrankenkasse RWE ECLI:EU:C:2015:148.
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series have a potential defect. It is unclear if this is limited to high-risk products, 
like pacemakers and implantable cardioverter defibrillators, which were involved 
in the cases heard. Where such products are at potential risk of failure the ques-
tion often arises as to whether any remedial action should be treated as damage. 
In the case of such medical products, this might require an operation. The CJEU 
held that if an operation was needed to remedy the defect that should be consid-
ered as damage caused by death or personal injury.
A lack of clarity about the ultimate objectives of product liability, neverthe-
less, makes it hard to determine how much it is concerned with the socialisation 
of risk. To test this, five aspects will be analysed: the extent to which vulnerable 
groups are taken into account; responsibility for inappropriate use by the prod-
uct user; liability for inherent risks; the ability of instructions and warnings to 
exculpate defendants; and, the development risks defence. This discussion will 
mostly be about product liability, but the General Product Safety Directive is 
also relevant as it concerns what products are allowed on to the market. Liability 
socialises risk though compensation. Regulatory law restricts choices for the 
common good.
Vulnerable groups
Certain groups of consumers are often considered to be particularly vulnerable. 
For example, young and old consumers may have particular needs or face par-
ticular risks. The same might apply to groups with disabilities or those with par-
ticular allergies. Being unable to speak the local language or badly educated can 
also expose consumers to risks. Of course not all members of these groups will 
be equally vulnerable. Some elderly consumers are, for instance, very alert and 
able to protect their own interests. But there are vulnerable features which affect 
many in the class. 
The greater the socialisation of risk the more these vulnerabilities will be taken 
into account. The General Product Safety Directive requires account to be taken 
of the categories of consumers at risk when using the product, in particular chil-
dren and the elderly.107 Often the answer will be to include a warning or finesse 
instructions for use, but sometimes an adaptation may be necessary. Only rarely 
will a risk be so serious and unavoidable that a product of value to society gener-
ally will be banned due to risk to individuals. Similar steps will be required by the 
Product Liability Directive as the general public will require reasonable account 
to be taken of the safety needs of vulnerable groups. The expected steps will 
depend on the seriousness of the risk and the numbers affected. The regulatory 
and liability regimes might for policy reasons come to different solutions, with a 
product being legally marketed despite an unavoidable risk to particular consum-
ers justifying compensation. Sadly the rationale for product liability is not spelt 
out with sufficient clarity to be certain such losses are covered. However, the 
107 Art. 2(b)(iv).
278 Product liability and safety
vulnerability of consumers may be taken into account when assessing the use to 
which it reasonably be expected the product will be put. In particular, products 
aimed at children will be judged by high standards and producers of such prod-
ucts should be expected to take account of the propensity for children to act in an 
‘irrational’ way judged by adult standards.
Responsibility for inappropriate use
The General Product Safety Directive judges products under ‘under normal or 
reasonably foreseeable conditions of use’. This implies that some reasonably fore-
seeable conditions of use may not be normal.108 The Product Liability Directive 
assesses defectiveness in the product in the light of ‘the use to which it could 
reasonably be expected that the product would be put.’ This again requires that 
it is not merely the intended or prescribed purposes, but also inappropriate but 
foreseeable uses that should be considered. For example, several products are 
geared to the professional market. They may carry risks for the general public, 
but are safe in the hands of professionals. Examples might include large display-
standard fireworks that are known to be used by the general public and chemical 
compounds popular with hobby craft artists. Producers might be able to avoid 
liability by making it clear that their products are for professional use only, but 
otherwise the safety will be judged as if supplied to the general public. Liability 
might arise from inappropriate instructions or warnings. 
A problematic issue can arise where a secondary market in product accessories 
is created, e.g. for motor vehicles. It may be inappropriate to use them with the 
main product, but producers might still be under a duty to monitor the secondary 
market and warn against using certain products that are unsafe in combination 
with their product.109 
Many consumers will in fact use products in ways that are inappropriate and 
the producer has to make their products safe in so far as these uses are foreseeable. 
A simple example concerns a pair of glasses. It is clearly not intended that con-
sumer chew their glass frames; yet this is a common practice. Therefore producers 
need to ensure they do not contain allergenic or otherwise harmful substances.110 
Vulnerable groups, especially children, can be expected to use products in inap-
propriate ways. This is expressly factored into the assessment under the General 
Product Safety Directive, but would also be relevant for product liability defec-
tiveness assessment. Of course the more extreme the misuse or the more unique 
the behaviour is, the less likely it will render the product unsafe or defective.
108 Art. 2(b).
109 In a German case, decided on negligence basis, a manufacturer of a motorcycle was found 
liable in negligence for failing to supervise the accessories market when parts made by 
another producer, but aimed at his products, rendered them dangerous: (1986) NJW 
1009.
110 K Taschner and E Frietsch, Produkthaftungsgesetz und EG Produkthaftungsrichtlinie (Beck, 
1990) p. 299.
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111 Art. 2(b).
112 B Dahl, ‘Product liability in Scandinavian law’. Scandinavian Studies in Law 19 (1975), 
p.84
113 Oberlandsgericht Dűsseldorf, 20 December 2002, 14 U 99/02: M Hannes, ‘Stressing 
consumers’ responsibility, Higher Regional Court of Dűsseldorf dismisses appeal claim for 
damages against Masterfood’ (2003) 10/31 European Product Liability Review.
114 See (1992) NJW 560.
115 D Garner, ‘Cigarettes and welfare reform’ (1977) 26 Emory L.J. p.269; R Ausness, 
‘Compensation for smoking-related injuries: An alternative to strict liability in tort’. Wayne 
L. Rev. 36 (1990), p.1085; P LeBel, ‘Beginning the endgame: The search for an injury 
compensation system alternative to tort liability for tobacco-related harms’ (1997) 24 N. 
Ky. L. Rev. p.457; J Hanson and D Kysar, ‘Taking behaviouralism seriously: The problem of 
market manipulation’. (1999) 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. p.632; ‘Taking behaviouralism seriously: 
Some evidence of market manipulation’ (1999) 112 Harv. Law Rev. p.1420; ‘Taking 
Inherent risks
Products will always contain some risks. Even the most innocent product can 
be involved in accidents and for some products risk is inherent in the product’s 
functionality: that is why the General Product Safety Directive talks about ‘the 
minimum risks compatible with the product’s use’.111 Knives need to be sharp 
to cut; cars need to move at speed and, perhaps more controversially, alcohol, 
tobacco and foods with high salt or sugar content carry inherent risks to health. 
This is what Børge Dahl described as ‘system damage’.112 Typically product liabil-
ity regimes do not provide liability for such risks so long as such risks are socially 
acceptable. Controlled drugs have unacceptable risks, whereas society accepts 
those in fast food, tobacco and alcohol. 
Liability issues often turn on whether such inherent risks were sufficiently well 
known. In Brinkmann v Masterfood113 the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf 
held that consumers could not complain about the sugar in chocolate bars as they 
were taken to know that excessive consumption of sugary products could lead 
to severe health problems, such as obesity. The court contrasted the facts in the 
instant case with the toddler tea case, where liability had been imposed in negli-
gence for failure to warn of the risk of tooth decay if sweetened tea was given in 
bottles left with babies.114 That risk needed to be warned against as parents might 
understandably not be aware of it. 
The lack of liability for inherent risks results from the expectations consum-
ers are entitled to expect. If a risk is necessary and immoveable then a consumer 
may not be entitled to expect that it would be removed. So long as the product 
is socially useful, the most consumers might expect is that they are sufficiently 
warned about the inherent risk. Even this might not be necessary for very widely 
understood risks e.g. sharp knife blades.
There have been calls for liability regimes to be based solely on causation, 
particularly in the field of tobacco liability.115 This would logically impose liability 
for inherent risks. Indeed that is the policy motive behind the proposed tobacco 
regimes. This makes sense if the desire is to internalise risk. There will still be 
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a need to show how the product contributed to the damage; otherwise many 
products could actually be implicated in accidents which were in no way related to 
their characteristics.116 It might, for instance, be argued that all smoking-related 
deaths based on specific diseases should be attributed to tobacco use on policy 
grounds even if there cannot be a proven link in all cases. But it would seem 
excessive to make a knife manufacturer liable for an attack carried out with it. 
Instructions and warnings 
Instructions for use and warnings should be taken into account both in determin-
ing whether a product is safe under the General Product Safety Directive117 and 
defective under the Product Liability Directive.118 The General Product Safety 
Directive refers to ‘the presentation of the product, the labelling, any warnings 
and instructions for its use and disposal and any other indication or information 
regarding the product.’119 The Product Liability Directive simply refers to pres-
entation, but this has been taken to include instructions and warnings. Indeed, 
presentation is just one particular factor, but the standard makes it clear all, or at 
least all relevant120, circumstances should be taken into account. 
Instructions tell consumers how to use or not use the product. Products that 
carry a risk can be rendered safe by appropriate instructions. For example, a risk 
might be addressed by the instructions to use safety equipment or the advice only 
to use a product in certain situations. Incorrect instructions can also render a 
product defective; for example, the instructions may specify an unsafe manner of 
use. Thus, a particular fire extinguisher may be useful in many situations, but may 
not be safe when used on electrical appliances. It will be unsafe/defective if this 
limitation is not explained in the instructions. 
Instructions can include warnings about using the products in certain ways. 
Some warnings apply however the product is used as they refer to irremovable 
or unavoidable risks. These may affect certain types of consumers or be warnings 
about random effects. Their validity depends upon the extent to which that risk is 
socially accepted. The less easily risks are deemed social acceptable the greater the 
socialisation of the sharing of risk. Warnings should not be used to escape liability 
if the risk can be removed by a reasonable adjustment in the design.121 
In assessing warnings the insights of behavioural economics should be used 
to determine whether they have been given in the appropriate manner so as to 
behaviouralism seriously: A response to market manipulation’. Roger Williams University 
Law Rev. 6 (2000), p.259. This is understandable in the context of tobacco as by all normal 
standards this product would be defective, but for social custom.
116 Australian Law Reform Commission, Product Liability, Report No 51 (1989).
117 Art. 2(b).
118 Art. 6 refers to presentations.
119 Art. 2(b)(iii).
120 Following A v National Blood Authority (2001) 3 All ER 289.
121 Schmidt-Salzer, Produkthaftung (Recht und Wirtschaft, 1990), p.655.
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have the optimum impact. One such insight is into the problem of consumer 
information overload.122 The impact of warnings can be reduced if there are too 
many of them. Yet if there are many risks to be warned against it is likely that 
there will be a long list of warnings – see the length of side effects listed for many 
pharmaceuticals. Courts may find it difficult to condemn a producer for giving 
too many warnings, especially if the risk warned against has materialised. Good 
practice, however, might suggest that prominence be given to the most obvious 
and dangerous risks. Failure to do so or the use of poorly worded warnings may 
be the basis of liability.
In A v National Blood Authority123 Burton J raised the question of whether a 
warning is in fact an exclusion clause, which is not permitted under the Product 
Liability Directive.124 If warnings can too easily immunise producers from liabil-
ity then it would drastically reduce the degree of socialisation of risk. The best 
approach is probably to distinguish between specific warnings and too-general 
warnings that are really there just to seek to avoid liability. 125 Consumers can use 
specific warnings to assess whether they should expose themselves to an inherent 
risk that cannot be avoided if the product is to maintain its functionality or other 
desirable characteristics
Development risks
The timeframe for assessing the product’s safety is perhaps the best test of how 
far the regime socialises risk and involves a different assessment from one based 
on fault.126 This is best understood by distinguishing the state-of-the-art from the 
development risks defence. Although these terms are often used interchangeably, 
they should be distinguished. 
‘State-of-the-art’ will be used to refer to the safety expected given the current 
state of known risks at the time of supply. Thus a product with a known risk that 
was socially accepted at the time of marketing would not be considered unsafe 
just because standards moved on. Hence cars without seatbelts in the rear were 
once common. As standards developed rear seatbelts became required. This did 
not render the earlier-supplied cars without rear seatbelts unsafe, for they con-
tinue to be judged by the prevailing standards at the time of supply. 
By contrast, development risks refer to risks that were not known about at the 
time of supply, but if they had been known about would have caused the product 
to be considered unsafe, even by the then-prevailing expectations of safety. The 
122 BRE/NCC, Better Regulation Executive and National Consumer Council (2007), 
‘Warning: Too much information can harm’, London - www.bis.gov.uk/files/file44367.
pdf.
123 (2001) 3 All ER 289.
124 Art. 12.
125 G Howells, ‘Information obligations and product liability – a game of Russian roulette?’ 
in G Howells, A Janssen and R Schulze (eds) Information Rights and Obligations – a 
Challenge for Party Autonomy and transactional fairness (Ashgate, 2002)
126 N Terry, ‘State of the art evidence: From logical construct to judicial retrenchment’ (1991) 
20 Anglo-American Law Review p.285.
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most obvious example is the thalidomide drug whose teratogenic effect on the 
unborn foetus was not known about. If it had been, the product would not have 
been considered safe to use on pregnant mothers. This tragedy prompted the 
reform movement that led to the Product Liability Directive, but ironically liabil-
ity might still not be available for similar unknown risks in those Member States 
adopting the development risks defence. 
The General Product Safety Directive provides that in assessing the general 
safety requirement the state of art and technology should be taken into account.127 
Arguably this encompasses both the state-of-the-art and development risks crite-
ria. In any event, development risks might be captured by the additional relevant 
factor of taking account of the reasonable expectations concerning safety.128 In any 
event, in the safety context even if the general safety requirement is not breached 
and so, for instance, no criminal or administrative sanction can be imposed it is 
always of course possible to take remedial action to remove dangerous products.
Most discussion of this issue has centred on product liability, where the dis-
tinctions are crucial for liability. State-of-the-art considerations are inherent in 
the definition of safety itself. This specifically mentions the time when a product 
is put into circulation as a relevant circumstance.129 It goes on to provide that a 
product shall not be considered defective for the sole reason that a better product 
is subsequently put into circulation.
There is a specific development risks defence, which places the burden of proof 
on the defendant. In its first proposal the Commission had provided that:
the producer of an article shall be liable for damage caused by a defect in 
the article, whether or not he knew or could have known of the defect. The 
producer shall be liable even if the article could not have been regarded as 
defective in the light of the scientific and technological development at the 
time when he put the article into circulation.
The development risks defence was introduced against the wishes of the Commission 
in response to concerns by some Member States about the liability exposure of 
high-risk industries. The defence was, however, made optional. Only Finland and 
Luxemburg chose to drop the defence, but in Spain and Germany it does not apply 
to certain categories of products – ironically these are high-risk products! 
This background to the defence’s adoption in the Directive might justify a 
fairly narrow construction of the defence. Indeed the presence of the defence has 
been said to justify a strict assessment of defect as development risks considera-
tions are moved from the general assessment and considered in the context of the 
tightly drawn defence.130
127 Art. 3(3)(e).
128 Art. 3(3)(f).
129 Art. 6(1)(c).
130 A v National Blood Authority [2001] 3 All ER 289. Although arguably some of the same 
issues might have been addressed through assessing what reasonable expectations of safety 
were. 
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The defence applies where ‘the state of scientific and technical knowledge at 
the time when he put the product into circulation was not such as to enable the 
existence of the defect to be discovered.’131
The scope of the defence has been considered by the CJEU in Commission v 
United Kingdom.132 This involved a challenge brought by the Commission who 
argued that the United Kingdom’s implementation was overgenerous to defend-
ants. The Consumer Protection Act 1987 provided for a defence where ‘the state of 
scientific and technical knowledge at the relevant time was not such that a producer 
of products of the same description as the product in question might be expected to 
have discovered the defect if it had existed in his products while they were under his 
control’.133 This seemed overgenerous by introducing the concept of expectation 
of discoverability (rather than mere discoverability) and by linking the standard to 
categories of producers. The challenge was unsuccessful, partly because the CJEU 
felt the Commission should give more time for the courts to determine the scope of 
the defence. This seems unrealistic given the paucity of product liability case law in 
general and on development risks in particular. This in turn is explained by the high 
costs of bringing cases where scientific evidence is in question. Nevertheless, this 
was an interesting opportunity to test out competing theories of liability. As Mildred 
nicely puts it, the opposing camps in essence were fighting over whether the defence 
required ‘absolute undiscoverability’ or ‘undiscoverabilty by reasonable means.’134 
The CJEU gave some interesting comments on the scope of the defence. One 
aspect is pro-defendant by introducing the accessibility of knowledge require-
ment; the other, pro-claimant by defining knowledge to include discoveries not 
yet necessarily accepted by the majority of the scientific community.
The decision was favourable to defendants by introducing the requirement that 
the knowledge must have been accessible.135 The Advocate-General gave the infa-
mous example of an academic paper from Manchuria published in a local scientific 
journal in Chinese that could not be expected to be known about in the West.136 
This is highly problematic. Accessibility is not mentioned on the face of the 
Directive. Burton J in A v National Blood Authority137 noted that the Manchuria 
example may not always work. If the product concerned was one for which 
131 Art. 7(1)(e).
132 Case 300/95 Commission v United Kingdom [1997] ECR I-2649. See C.Hodges, 
‘Development risks: Unanswered questions’ (1998) 61 Modern Law Review p.560, 
M Mildred and G Howells, “Comment on ‘Development risks: Unanswered questions’” 
(1998) 61 Modern Law Review p.570 and G Howells and M Mildred, ‘Is European product 
liability more protective than the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product liability?’ (1998) 
65 Tennessee Law Review p.9, J Stapleton, ‘Products liability in the United Kingdom: The 
myths of reform’ 34 (1999) Texas International Law Journal p.45 and C Pugh and M 
Pilgerstorfer, ‘The development risks defence – knowledge, discoverability and creative 
leaps’ (2004) Journal of Personal Injury Law p.258.
133 S. 4(1)(e) of the Consumer Protection Act 1987.
134 M Mildred, ‘The development risks defence’ in D.Fairgrieve (ed) Product Liability in 
Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.170.
135 Paragraphs 28–29.
136 Paragraphs 23.
137 [2001] 3 All ER 289 at 326.
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Manchuria was renowned then research in that country might be highly relevant. 
He preferred the example of an unpublished document or unpublished research 
not available to the general public. However, that in itself raises the thorny issue 
of internal research. Especially in the pharmaceutical industry, producers are most 
likely to be the ones at the forefront of discoveries about the substances they use. 
Can they take advantage of the defence by simply keeping their research inacces-
sible to the public? In such circumstances they may well be liable in negligence, 
but it seems irrational not also to hold them liable under the Directive.
The CJEU decision was more favourable to claimants by holding that the 
Directive is concerned with the most advanced level of knowledge.138 It followed 
the lead of the Advocate-General, who was clear that although scientific discov-
eries may at first be criticised and viewed as being unreliable, they should nev-
ertheless remove the defence even though the goods were supplied before this 
knowledge had become generally accepted. He stressed that one isolated opinion 
can prevent a defendant from facing an unforeseeable risk. It was then for the 
defendant to decide how to react to that risk.139 Stapleton has criticised this aspect 
of the judgment as she believes that to qualify as knowledge it should be tested 
against consideration of whose ideas are relevant and the weight to be afforded. 
She seems to suggest that at least a respectable minority opinion is needed.140 
Pugh and Pilgerstorfer criticise Stapleton’s approach and suggest she is attempt-
ing to read common-law values into the judgment and prefer to place empha-
sis on the Advocate-General’s desire to include all quantifiable risks, which they 
stress he did not require to be reasonably quantifiable.141 However, this leaves the 
question of what is quantifiable? The concept of expert in the field might be used 
and it is not unrealistic to use this as a measure of whether something was knowl-
edge, even if its value was not fully recognised at the time. Normally this would 
defeat the defence once a credible source had introduced new knowledge, but 
would assuage the fears of Stapleton that producers might have liability imposed 
simply because they had not taken account of the random musings of a discred-
ited mystic.142 This would not prevent the defence being defeated in most cases 
once some questions had been raised in the scientific literature.
Once knowledge is available the defence is removed. That is why the devel-
opment risks defence is not available for manufacturing defects. The German 
Supreme Court143 rejected the application of the defence to manufacturing 
defects in a case concerning a refillable mineral water bottle that exploded. 
Burton J in A v National Blood Authority144 thought the only exception might 
138 Para 26.
139 Tesauro AG at paras 21–22. 
140 J Stapleton, ‘Products liability in the United Kingdom: The myths of reform’ (1999) 34 
Texas International Law Journal p.59.
141 C Pugh and M Pilgerstorfer, ‘The development risks defence – knowledge, discoverability 
and creative leaps’ (2004) Journal of Personal Injury Law p.258.
142 J Stapleton, ‘Products liability in the United Kingdom: The myths of reform’ (1999) 34 
Texas International Law Journal p.61.
143 (1995) NJW 2162.
144 (2001) 3 All ER 289 at para 77.
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146 102 FCR 307.
147 Analysis of the Economic Impact of the Development Risks Clause as Provided by Directive 
85/374/EEC on Liability for Defective Products (2004) available at http://ec.europa.eu/
enterprise/regulation/goods/docs/liability/2004–06-dev-risk-clause-study_en.pdf. 
148 Cour d’Appel (Court of Appeal) Paris, 23 September 2004L No 02/16712 (2005) D 
1012. This decision seems wrong and was in any event was overturned by the Cour de 
Cassation Cass civ 1e, 15 May 2007, No 05-10.234 (2007) D 1592 because the defence 
did not apply as the Directive had not been implemented in France at the relevant time. 
149 G Howells and M Mildred, ‘Infected blood: Defect and discoverability a first exposition of 
the EC Product Liability Directive’ (2002) 65 Modern Law Review p.95.
be for the first time such a defect arose. The rationale for not providing the 
defence for manufacturing defects, even where quality control systems do not 
exist of sufficient quality to detect the defect, is arguably that such failures 
are generally calculable and therefore represent the sort of socialisation of risk 
that strict product liability was intended to embrace. This approach is likely to 
prevail, but it does highlight the clumsy wording of the defence, which talks 
about enabling the existence of the defect to be discovered rather than just the 
defect per se. It also explains why the defence does not apply in situations such 
as in A v National Blood Authority, where the risk of a defect is known, but can-
not be detected. By contrast, the Dutch decision in Scholten v The Foundation 
Sanquin of Blood Supply145 held blood was not defective, because there was 
no way of ascertaining if it contained a known risk. The Australian decision 
of Graham Barclay Oysters Pty v Ryan146 had also required the defect to be 
discoverable in the particular product (oysters), but was based on the different 
wording of the Australian law, which made it clear it had to be discoverable in 
the particular product.
A Commission study by the Fondazione Rosselli concluded that the defence 
should be maintained as an important contribution to balancing the interests 
of producers and consumers. It proposed developing alternative compensation 
schemes for victims of development risks.147 There has clearly been concern at 
the differing interpretations given to the defence in national courts. Many of the 
decisions have restricted its scope, but some including one by the French Court 
of Appeal have been more lenient and allowed the defence even for a known risk 
where there was no consensus on whether it should be warned against.148 
Enforcement 
Product liability
Product liability is private law and is enforced through individual or collective 
consumer claims before the courts. There has been some increase in legal cases 
being brought, but the level varies widely across Europe with Austria perhaps 
leading the way due to the support its consumer organisation gives to bring 
claims. It has been relevant to high-profile scandals like infected blood149 and PIP 
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breast implant litigation.150 Often strict product liability is only one element of 
the litigation given the continued existence of alternative national laws151 and the 
need to engage with other issues such as potential liability of regulators. There 
has also been some substantial litigation in the field of pharmaceuticals, but it 
has been argued that many of the claims brought on a regular basis are for small 
value.152 Strict product liability seems to have become accepted, possibly, because 
it has not impacted too seriously on business risks. Having struck a balance in a 
politically sensitive area the Commission seems willing to leave well alone with its 
reports on the topic being fairly brief and essentially noting issues but preferring 
simply to monitor them.153 It forms part of tort law and on a daily basis it is now a 
matter for personal injury lawyers. The development of a Community class action 
procedure that makes more product liability litigation viable when large numbers 
of consumers are affected may be a higher priority for the private practice lawyers.
Product safety
The General Product Safety Directive has been very important in promoting a 
more consistent approach to product safety. States are charged with ensuring 
that only safe products are on the market and are required to have a  responsible 
authority to ensure compliance.154 Regulation (EC) No 765/2008155 was adopted 
partly to strengthen the controls on consumer products posing serious risks. It 
includes rules on the organisation of market surveillance and co-operation both 
between national bodies and between them and the Commission,156 the market 
surveillance measures they should take,157 how serous product risks should be 
addressed158 and rules on restrictive measures taken159 and exchange of informa-
tion.160 The Regulation does not prevent more specific measures being taken 
under the General Product Safety Directive.161 It is proposed that the Commission 
should have a stronger role in monitoring the funding of national authorities and 
150 B Van Leeuwen, ‘PIP breast implants, the EU’s new approach for goods and market 
surveillance by notified bodies’ (2013) 5 European Journal of Risk Regulation p.338.
151 Lovells, Product Liability in the European Union: A Report for the European Commission, 
February 2003, Markt/2001/11/D.
152 T Fox, Questioning the Social Desirability of Product Liability Claims, Phd 2015 University 
of Exeter available at https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/handle/10871/18742; 
accessed 22 July 2016.
153 Several official reports on the Directive have been issued: First Report: COM (95) 617 
final; Second Report: COM (2000) 893 final; Third Report: COM (2006) 496 final. Fourth 
Report: COM (2011) 547 final.
154 Art. 6.
155 OJ 2008 L 218/30.
156 Arts 17–18 and 23–26.
157 Art. 19.
158 Art. 20.
159 Art. 21.
160 Arts. 22–23.
161 Art. 15(3).
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work plans to ensure that enforcement is at an effective level throughout the 
Community.162 This is important so that harmonisation is effective in practice as 
well as in theory. 
States are required to give authorities a range of powers to both monitor the 
market and to take action with respect to products that pose risks.163 Products 
can be subject to a duty to warn if they pose risks in certain conditions 164 or 
for certain persons.165 Other prior conditions can also be imposed if the prod-
uct poses risks in certain conditions.166 Potentially dangerous products can be 
banned temporarily.167 Dangerous products can be banned,168 those on the mar-
ket ordered to be withdrawn169 and those already in the hands of consumers 
recalled.170 Authorities are required to act in a proportionate manner taking due 
account of the precautionary principle and to encourage and promote voluntary 
action by producers and distributors.171
The 1992 and 2001 Directives had adopted a bifurcated notification pro-
cedure. Serious risks are notified under the Community Rapid Information 
System (RAPEX) procedure.172 Less serious or localised actions taken by enforce-
ment authorities are handled under a separate procedure. Under the Market 
Surveillance Regulation Proposal 2013 RAPEX will become the sole notification 
procedure for all risks, but it will not cover situations where the effects of risk do 
not go beyond the Member State. 
Possibly the most important change in the relationship between regulator and 
industry arose from the duty imposed by the 2001 Directive on producers and 
distributors to notify enforcement authorities of any of their products that pose 
risks to consumers because they are incompatible with the general safety require-
ment.173 The Commission developed Guidelines on when notification is necessary 
and how it should be made.174 The current rules include an ‘isolated circum-
stances’ exemption. Under the reform package this will be replaced by exemptions 
where only a limited number of well-identified products are not safe; it can be 
demonstrated that the risk has been fully controlled and cannot any more endan-
ger the health and safety of persons or the cause of the risk is such that knowledge 
of it does not represent useful information for the authorities or public.175 
162 COM (2013) 78 final.
163 Art. 8–9. 
164 Art. 8(1)(b)(i).
165 Art. 8(1)(c). 
166 Art. 81(b)(ii).
167 Art. 8(1)(d).
168 Art. 8(1)(e).
169 Art. 8(1)(f)(i).
170 Art. 8 (1)(f) (ii).
171 Art. 8(2).
172 In 2001 Directive see Arts. 11 and 12 and Annex 2.
173 Art. 5(3) and Annex I.
174 Available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/cons_safe/prod_safe/gpsd/notifi-
cation_dang_en.pdf.
175 Art. 13(1).
288 Product liability and safety
176 Germany unsuccessfully challenged this: Germany v Council, Case C-359/92 (1994) ECR 
I-3681.
177 European Commission, More Product Safety and Better Market Surveillance in the Single 
Market for Products, COM (2013) 74 final. 
178 OJ 2008 L 218/30.
179 OJ 2008 L 218/82.
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The 1992 and 2001 Directives provided a procedure for Community decisions 
valid for up to a year to be made where there were serious risks and Member 
States took different approaches.176 This time limit has, however, proven prob-
lematic.177 The Market Surveillance Regulation Proposal 2013 would provide the 
means to act against products presenting a serious risk.
Enforcement is currently spread across three instruments: (i) the General 
Product Safety Directive, (ii) Regulation (EC) No 765/2008178 setting out the 
requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating to the market-
ing of products, and (ii) sector-specific legislation (which increasingly refers to 
Decision No 768/2008/EC 2008 on a common framework for the market-
ing of products).179 This tripartite system was criticised by the Schaldemose EU 
Parliament Report on the Revision of the General Product Safety Directive and 
Market Surveillance.180 
The Market Surveillance Regulation Proposal 2013 is the EU’s response. It 
seeks to ensure that as far as possible the same controls are applied to all products 
whether consumer or non-consumer, harmonised or non-harmonised. The Market 
Surveillance Regulation Proposal 2013 is mainly aimed at public authorities. It sets 
out the duties of market surveillance authorities, the powers they should have to 
require economic operators to take action and the power they should have to 
act themselves. It provides the Union with the power to assess measures taken at 
national level with regard to harmonised legislation in order to decide whether 
the measure is justified and therefore should be applied throughout the Union 
or unjustified and in need of being withdrawn. The RAPEX provisions will be 
included in this measure.181 It also provides for maintaining an information and 
communication system for market surveillance (ICMS)182 and for exchange of con-
fidential information with third countries and international organisations.183 There 
are provisions for co-operation and mutual assistance184 central to which is the 
European Market Surveillance Forum.185 The Commission can also assist by desig-
nating Union reference laboratories for specific products, categories or groups of 
products.186 It also has powers to finance activities assisting enforcement.187
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Way forward 
It is noticeable that the General Product Safety Directive has been revised 
substantially, whereas there has been a lack of enthusiasm to engage with Product 
Liability Directive reform that is marked. The Commission has recently put for-
ward a further package of reforms in the product safety field aimed at ensur-
ing a more harmonised and coherent approach to market surveillance generally. 
The inclusion of a country of origin requirement has proven to be devisive and 
has stalled the reform’s progress. It is not directly related to safety and should 
be less necessary if overall the controls are strengthened in practice across the 
Community. Member States should press forward with the proposed reforms that 
relate to safety and enforcement. 
The reluctance to address product liability reform may be understandable given 
the lack of vocal criticism of the regime, which can be seen as relatively protective 
by international standards. Nevertheless, the Directive is built on a compromise 
and there is a need for guidance on how the balance of apportioning risk should 
be carried out. The parties are operating in the shadow of the law and that often 
gives business tactical advantages as they can decide which cases to test to the 
full in the courts. There needs to be some way in which a consensus can develop 
about the about the way risk is apportioned and the role of socialisation of risk in 
that apportionment. Many issues are also left open by the wording of the direc-
tive and are not answered authoritatively by the case law or else are answered in 
different ways by the courts of the various Member States. The ambiguity is not 
merely around the core defectiveness concept. Some of the unsettled issues can 
be very technical; such as whether the first 500 euro threshold for property dam-
age is a deduction or threshold allowing full recovery once exceeded. National 
legislation give different interpretations. Core concepts such as ‘being put into 
circulation’ have also caused problems. Elsewhere it has been argued that such 
guidance might come from soft law.188 The ongoing evaluation of the Directive 
may be an opportunity for some clarification to be provided, and it seems this 
may be driven by the need to adapt to the digital economy.189 
This is an area where Europe has been able to export its legal ideas. Mainly this 
has been in the area of product liability, but also product safety rules have been 
taken up in many states. The CE marking is recognised in international trade as 
a symbol that represents the EU’s commitment to ensure its products meet high 
technical standards. In specific sectors the EU rules have also had influence. For 
example, the Cosmetics Directive190 was the model for the first step at harmonisa-
tion within ASEAN. It is noticeable that the EU is less well developed in relation 
to services. Service liability and safety is an area warranting more attention. 
188 D Fairgrieve, G Howells and M Pilgerstorfer, ‘The Product Liability Directive: Time to get 
soft?’ (2013) 4 Journal of European Tort Law p.1.
189 Directive 76/768/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating 
to cosmetic products (1976) OJ L 262/169, since replaced by Regulation 1223/2009 on 
cosmetic products (2009) OJ L 342/59.
190 Evaluation of the Directive 85/374/EEC concerning liability for defective products 
(http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/roadmaps/docs/2016_grow_027_evaluation_
defective_products_en.pdf) [accessed 24 May 2017].
8 EU consumer access to justice 
and enforcement
Introduction1
General introduction
As other chapters in this book demonstrate, recent decades have seen the develop-
ment of a significant body of substantive consumer laws. A frequent complaint in 
many countries is the gap between the law in books and the law in practice. This 
arises where there are insufficient institutions, resources and powers to enforce 
the public laws regulating traders’ conduct in the marketplace and individuals 
have the lack of capacity or motivation to invoke their private law rights through 
the courts. Consumer protection regimes tend to rely on a complex web of public 
regulation, private regulation and self-regulation. 
Attention is now turning to how these consumer rights can be made effec-
tive given the particular problems facing consumers, notably their typical lack 
of expertise and the low value of their claims making them reluctant to engage 
professionals or venture much effort or expense in seeking to remedy the 
problem. However, given mass consumption, small individual losses can rep-
resent significant gains to traders and those behaving badly can gain an unfair 
advantage over traders who comply with their legal obligations. Within the EU 
Member States there are various mixes of public, private and regulatory redress 
mechanisms. EU policy itself adopts a pluralist approach building on different 
traditions. The EU has taken some steps to promote certain key elements of 
reform at the national level, e.g. supporting public law enforcement, develop-
ing injunctions as a form of redress and promoting alternative dispute resolu-
tion (ADR). For the most part though it has concentrated on ameliorating the 
additional barriers consumers and the enforcers of consumer law face in the 
cross-border context.
 1 Parts of this chapter are based on ‘Consumer Law Enforcement and Access to Justice’ in 
C Twigg-Flesner (ed), Research Handbook on EU Consumer and Contract Law (Edward 
Elgar, 2017).
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Chapter themes
New emphasis on enforcement
A central theme of the book is that the EU is giving more emphasis to  enforcement.2 
This chapter concentrates on that theme. In contrast to many areas of substan-
tive law where domestic and cross-border transactions are normally subject to 
the same rules, the EU has often created parallel regimes specifically to address 
cross-border aspects of access to justice and enforcement. This has been justified 
by the need to address practical features of cross-border disputes e.g. the desire 
for clarity in rules of private international law or the need for special procedures 
not to impose unduly on national procedural autonomy. 
Use of soft law
Soft-law instruments have been frequently used in this area. The EU 
Recommendation on collective redress3 is aimed at prompting national-level 
reflection on good practice. There are also examples in this area of the EU using 
soft law to develop consensus and as a precursor to binding legislation. In the 
ADR field, for instance, there were first recommendations4 prior to the EU 
adopting binding legislation.5 
Cross-border dimension
Ironically, the need for special cross-border rules on access to justice and enforce-
ment has been created by the push to increase cross-border trade. The risks of more 
difficult enforcement of consumer law in the cross-border context is not something 
the EU always focuses on as it can detract from its goal of promoting the internal 
market. Yet there is certainly a downside in terms of enforcement and access to 
justice from increased cross-border trade. This has been recognised by the EU 
increasing its emphasis on developing redress and enforcement mechanisms. Many 
of the EU measures have focused on cross-border disputes. This has meant there 
has been a lot of regulatory activity in this field at the EU level in comparison to the 
very small number of actual cross-border sales that are problematic. This makes an 
assessment of these initiatives difficult given the marginal impact they will have in 
any event due to the limited scale of the problem they are addressing. 
 2 See Chapter 1 at pp.10–11.
 3 Commission Recommendation on common principles for injunctive and compensatory 
collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted 
under Union Law (2013) OJ L201/60.
 4 Commission Recommendation on the principles for out-of-court bodies involved in 
the consensual resolution of consumer disputes (2001) OJ L109/2001; Commission 
Recommendation 98/257/EC on the principles applicable to the bodies responsible for 
out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes (1998) OJ L115/31.
 5 Directive 2013/11/EU on alternative dispute resolution for consumer (2013) OJ 
L165/63.
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No one-size-fits-all European model
There has, to date, not been the development of a particular European brand of 
consumer protection enforcement and redress. National consumer regimes are a 
mix of regulation, private law and self-regulation; with the exact mix varying from 
state to state. At the EU level the same elements are present. 
Market regulation is seen as important by the EU, with an important develop-
ment being the requirement for Member States to establish consumer protection 
agencies6 and to furnish them with effective powers. The use of injunctions (and 
associated undertakings) is probably the most distinctive contribution of the EU 
legislature to consumer enforcement. Private enforcement is also seen as hav-
ing a role to play, but the EU has failed fully to grasp the nettle on collective 
redress,7 and has favoured alternative dispute resolution/on-line dispute reso-
lution (ADR/ODR).8 Europe has not created new ADR mechanisms, but has 
sought to build a framework around existing national bodies. It has for example 
established an ODR platform.9 ODR is an obvious choice for resolving disputes 
in the e-commerce cross-border context. However, it may be useful to reflect 
that not all cross-border solutions may be models for the domestic context. For 
example, traditional forms of ADR or small claims courts might be more effective 
in some circumstances.
Consumer enforcement – general points
The access to justice movement
Most of this book has been about the substantive EU consumer law acquis. This 
is fairly well developed. However, unless there is to be a cavern between the law 
in the books and the law in practice, consumers, consumer groups and regulators 
must be able to make use of the law. The EU has for some time recognised the 
importance of effective consumer redress and enforcement.10 In recent times, this 
has been given an increased emphasis and we anticipate work in this area will con-
tinue to be a major focus of EU activity going forward.11 The EU identified at an 
early stage that consumer redress needed a range of solutions. This is in line with 
the famous 1970s study of Cappelletti and Garth, who described three waves 
of the access to justice movement: first, providing access to the law to the poor 
i.e. the legal-aid movement; second, protecting collective ‘diffuse interests’; and 
 6 Below, p.322.
 7 Below, pp.308–310.
 8 Below, pp.311–318.
 9 Below, pp.315–318.
10 European Commission, Access of Consumers to Justice and the Settlements of Consumer 
Disputes in the Single Market COM (93) 576 final; Commission, Action Plan on Consumer 
Access to Justice and the Settlement of Consumer Disputes in the Internal Market COM (96) 
13 final.
11 European Commission, A European Consumer Agenda – Boosting Confidence and Growth 
COM (2012) 225 final, sections 3.4 and 4.3; and Regulation 254/2014/EU on a multi-
annual consumer programme for the years 2014–2020 (2014) OJ L 84/42, Art. 3(1)(c).
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the third ‘access to justice approach’ that adopts alternatives such as small claims 
procedures and ADR.12 The EU has considered or adopted measures that can be 
linked to each of these three waves. 
Special nature of consumer problems
A Eurobarometer in 2004 showed that over three-quarters of consumers never 
complained or only did so rarely.13 Many consumer claims are for small value 
and are fairly straightforward. They are normally resolved by the consumer sim-
ply complaining and obtaining redress directly from the trader.14 Legal instru-
ments like commercial guarantees can play a role in promoting such informal 
dispute resolution,15 but the law plays a limited role in such private negotiations. 
For many consumer disputes the transactions costs involved compared to the 
amounts at stake make litigation (at least by traditional means) impracticable.16 
The 2004 Eurobarometer survey found, that of the minority of consumers who 
complained, a very small minority (13%) actually took a case to court. This can 
be considered a rational attitude, because it has even been said that to litigate a 
consumer needs to have ‘super-spite’.17 
Consumers with cross-border disputes face additional problems. They may 
need to negotiate with traders at a distance, operate in foreign languages and be 
subject to foreign laws and the jurisdiction of the trader’s courts. Private inter-
national law is meant to address the last set of issues, but the difficulties faced by 
consumers in dealing with private international law serves to highlight the vulner-
ability of their position. Private international law is very complex and expensive 
to litigate. The mere raising of a private international law issue probably makes 
most consumer claims too expensive to justify litigating. A 1995 study had found 
that 10% of cross-border consumers had been dissatisfied and of these a third had 
successfully complained. However, it was not considered reasonable to pursue a 
claim for only 2000 ECU at that time (some three decades ago).18 Lawyers might 
advise consumers to bring claims if the dispute was for over 50,000 ECU, but up 
to that level costs may still equal the amount claimed.19
12 M Cappelletti and B Garth, Access to Justice (Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1978–1979).
13 European Opinion Research Group, European Union Citizens and Access to Justice – Special 
Eurobarometer 195 (Commission 2004), p.9, http://medsos.gr/medsos/images/stories/
PDF/eurobarometer_11-04_en.pdf [accessed 1 March 2016].
14 Ibid., p.11.
15 C Twigg-Flesner, Consumer Product Guarantees (Ashgate, 2003). 
16 M Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Harvard UP, 1971).
17 A Leff, ‘Injury, Ignorance and spite – the dynamics of coercive collection’. Yale LJ 80 
(1970), p.1.
18 H von Freyhold, V Gessner, EL Vial and H Wagner (eds), Cost of Judicial Barriers for 
Consumers in the Single Market (Zentrum für Europaïsche Rechtspolitik an der Universität 
Bremen, 1995) at pp.392–393, http://aei.pitt.edu/37274/1/A3244.pdf [accessed 30 
November 2015].
19 B Feldtmann, H von Freyhold and EL Vial, The Cost of Legal Obstacles to the Disadvantage 
of Consumers in the Single Market (von Freyhold, Vial & Partner Consultants, June 1998), 
pp.2 and 276, http://www.freyvial.de/Publications/egii-42.pd [accessed 30 November 
2015].
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Public enforcement and private redress 
Consumer law enforcement is further complicated as it serves two distinct func-
tions – providing individual consumers with remedies when things go wrong and 
regulating the market to prevent harm by removing rogue traders and bad prac-
tices. The former, often called consumer redress, is often associated with the access 
to justice agenda; the latter deals with public consumer regulation. However, 
the two are intertwined. Litigation (especially collective litigation), although pri-
marily about compensation can affect the conduct of traders. Judgments can set 
standards of behaviour and the threat of costly litigation can deter traders from 
infringing the law. Equally, public enforcement can pave the way for redress. 
This may be through a formal procedure, as with the French action civile, where 
parties can join criminal actions, or by regulators seeking redress for consumers. 
This may also be by a follow-on civil action as often occurs in competition law. 
Equally, regulatory action can simply provide the evidence for consumers to bring 
claims or provide political muscle to bring about settlements.
Philosophy of access to justice – courts, ADR and 
regulatory enforcement
There have been attempts in many national legal systems to make courts and 
their procedures more consumer friendly and to reduce the costs to consumers 
of accessing the courts through the introduction of small claims procedures for 
claims below certain monetary limits.20 Their success has varied. Even though 
there has been a small claims scheme introduced for cross-border disputes at the 
EU level the practical difficulties of suing across borders remain. This has con-
centrated attention on ADR21 and ODR, the latter having obvious potential in 
the cross-border context and the on-line selling environment. However, the risk 
with ADR is that the individual problems may be resolved, but the law’s formal 
development remains immune from the real-world problems. These are resolved 
in private and confidential fora. Some ADR schemes have sought to redress this 
problem by publicising decisions. Some ADR schemes have even been able to 
deal with class claims.
The largest philosophical difference is between those legal systems where 
the private law (taken to include ADR) is used to resolve both individual prob-
lems and to regulate the market and those systems where regulators have prime 
responsibility to ensure fair market practices. The former is typified by the US 
where due to punitive damages and class actions, public interest litigation plays an 
20 J Stuyck, E Terryn, V Colaert, T Van Dyck, N Peretz, N Hoekx and P Tereszkiewicz, 
An Analysis and Evaluation of Alternative Means of Consumer Redress Other than Redress 
through Ordinary Judicial Proceedings (The Study Centre for Consumer Law – Centre 
for European Economic Law, 2007) http://www.eurofinas.org/uploads/documents/
policies/OTHER%20POLICY%20ISSUES/comparative_report_en.pdf [accessed 12 July 
2016].
21 For a survey of schemes see: Stuyck et al. (above), and C Hodges, I Benöhr, and N 
Creutzfeldt-Banda, Consumer ADR in Europe (Hart/Beck, 2012).
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important role.22 Although some European states have forms of collective redress 
procedures, none have as strong a private litigation culture as the US. Such liti-
gation has at times been encouraged by the Commission, but in the consumer 
protection field, progress has been cautious and legislative measures have been 
restricted to soft-law measures. 
In many EU states regulators have played an important role in market surveil-
lance. The EU has sought to strengthen the role of national regulators, not least 
to ensure the Commission has contact points to perform the various co-ordina-
tion tasks required by EU law. 
However, the regulatory traditions vary between states. In many of the new 
Member States there were limited regulatory structures, or more accurately 
regulators that were poorly financed so that they were unable to cope with 
the workload. By contrast, some of the richer European states have strong rel-
atively well-resourced regulators. Here one thinks in particular of the Nordic 
Ombudsmen, the UK’s Consumer Markets Authority, which superseded the 
Office of Fair Trading, and the DGCCRF in France. These all have different fla-
vours and indeed in some systems like the UK have complex internal relationships 
with local or regional regulators, such as trading standards officers. In Germany, 
the main enforcement is carried out by local regulators in the Länder, but state-
financed consumer organisations also play an important role.
Consumer organisations have also been given a role in enforcing consumer 
laws at the EU level. Their nature varies.23 In Austria and Germany they have 
government funding and are central to the state’s regulatory structures as they 
enforce the laws by bringing injunction actions. In other states they are well-
funded, large-membership organisations.24 In some states they can be numerous 
small consumer groups. The task is to find criteria to ensure only those with a 
sufficient general public role have standing to engage in enforcement. Consumer 
organisations also need to consider how best to co-operate and co-ordinate with 
government regulators.
State regulation might seem to imply use of the criminal and administrative 
law. There are certainly many instances when breach of consumer law in many 
states will lead to criminal sanctions or administrative fines.25 Particularly for 
serious and/or deliberate breaches of the law this may be justified, but often 
the authorities prefer to find softer ways of educating traders about their obliga-
tions. Braithwaite’s regulatory pyramid model has become popular. It counsels in 
favour of initial interventions being at the base level of education and persuasion 
22 G Howells and T Wilhelmsson, ‘EC and US approaches to consumer protection – should 
the gap be bridged?’ (1997) Yearbook of European Law p.207.
23 The European Consumers Organisation (BEUC) is the umbrella organisation http://
www.beuc.eu/topics [accessed 12 July 2016]. 
24 Such as Which? in the UK; UFC Que Choisir in France, Test-Achats in Belgium and 
Consumentenbond in the Netherlands.
25 See e.g. P Cartwright, Consumer Protection and Criminal Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 2001).
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to comply with the law and only a gradual escalation to more serious sanctions.26 
The Nordic Ombudsmen, for example, often work with traders to find self-regu-
latory solutions and many regulators (including the European Commission) issue 
guidance notes27 and rely on undertakings to curb bad practices. Undertakings 
may be used as part of procedures that can lead to injunctions. The use of the 
injunction as a regulatory tool has been a key feature of EU law; and of course 
consumer organisations have to rely on it as they cannot invoke administrative 
or criminal sanctions. Injunctions are civil law remedies and they blur the private 
law/regulatory divide. In some countries injunctions might be seen as the typical 
armoury of the state, even if they are available in the civil courts. The same blur-
ring of lines is true about moves to promote restorative justice by giving powers 
to regulators and the courts to provide redress to consumers when they have suf-
fered harm from breach of regulatory law. 
The debates about the balance and relationship between private redress and 
public regulation, how best to reflect the collective dimension of many consumer 
disputes, and frequent lack of incentive for individual consumers to litigate have 
been intensely debated at the national level in recent years. The EU dimension 
adds an added layer of complication. 
Cross-border solutions
In most areas of consumer law the impact of EU law has been to prompt law 
reform, which has applied to national and cross-border disputes alike. In parts of 
the substantive law, notably in relation to sales law, a gradual shift of focus has taken 
place with recent proposals specifically addressing on-line or cross-border transac-
tions.28 By contrast many EU initiatives on redress and enforcement have restricted 
themselves to providing parallel regimes addressing the particular problems caused 
when seeking redress or enforcement across borders. However, in recent times, 
there has been some movement in favour of access to justice solutions that apply 
to all transactions whether domestic or cross-border. The ADR Directive,29 for 
26 The model was first put forward in J Braithwaite, To Punish or Persuade: Enforcement 
of Coal Mine Safety (State University of New York Press, 1985). See important work of 
I Ayres and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate, 
(Oxford University Press, 1992).
27 See e.g. Commission, Guidance on the Implementation/Application of Directive 2005/29/
EC on Unfair Commercial Practices SEC (2009) 1666; Directorate General Health 
and Consumer Protection, Guidance Document on the Relationship Between the General 
Product Safety Directive (GPSD) and Certain Sector Directives with Provisions on Product 
Safety (November 2003) http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_safe/prod_safe/
gpsd/guidance_gpsd_en.pdf [accessed 1 March 2016]; Directorate General Health and 
Consumer Protection, Guidance Document on the Relationship between the General Product 
Safety Directive (GPSD) and Certain Sector Directives with Provisions on Product Safety 
(DG SANCO, November 2005) http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_safe/prod_safe/
gpsd/gpsd_2ndchapiter_en.pdf [accessed 1 March 2016].
28 See Chapter 1, pp.9–10 and Chapter 5, pp.201–206. 
29 Directive 2013/11/EU.
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example, requires ADR be available for any dispute with a trader established in the 
state’s territory. ADR stands to some extent outside the core of national procedural 
law. The EU is conscious of the procedural autonomy afforded to national legal 
orders and this explains its hesitant approach to matters touching purely national 
court procedures. Whilst the consistent development of law for domestic and cross-
border disputes is generally to be preferred, these special rules for access to justice 
measures are not particularly problematic. For the most part, they simply seek to 
overcome the problems caused by the cross-border element. 
The recognition that cross-border trade poses unique challenges for con-
sumers that need specific remedial measures is an important concession by the 
EU. The Commission is well aware that the lack of effective means of redress 
is one of the most telling reasons why consumers are unwilling to shop across 
borders. It can do little directly about language barriers or distance, but it can 
seek to ameliorate the impact of disputes occurring across legal and national 
boundaries. It seeks to adopt measures that allow consumers to gain access to 
justice easier and ensure regulators and consumer organisations can control 
errant traders from exploiting national boundaries as barriers to effective regu-
latory control. Parallel national and cross-border substantive law regimes can 
be criticised for making the law over-complex. This is often not the case with 
parallel enforcement and access to justice rules. Very often these procedural 
rules simply make the process simpler for those seeking to enforce the law across 
borders. However, there are issues relating to the awareness of such rules. As 
there are in practice so few instances when the rules have been invoked, par-
ticipants in the procedures – including court staff, ADR system administrators 
and regulators – may well not be conversant with the special characteristics of 
the procedures. 
Ensuring effective redress and enforcement procedures take account of the 
needs of cross-border consumers is important as a means of giving consumers 
the confidence to shop across borders. However, it is necessary to recognise that 
the best these rules can do is ameliorate the problems caused by shopping across 
borders. Rationally, consumers should factor this detriment into any decision to 
shop in other Member States. All things being equal, shopping closer to home 
must be preferable and of course more environmentally friendly. 
One disadvantage of the EU approach of grafting on special rules for cross-
border consumers is that it can leave untouched national systems of varying 
effectiveness. However, effective redress and enforcement at the domestic level 
is also important if businesses across Europe are to have a level playing field. Of 
course the law should be applied without discrimination to all parties regard-
less of nationality. However, beyond that the impact of consumer law depends 
upon a combination of factors relating to the strength of the substantive law: 
the likelihood that breach will be detected and enforcement action taken or 
that consumers will seek and obtain redress, and the sanctions available. Strong 
laws, which are hardly ever invoked, or which only lead to mild sanctions, will 
have less impact than the same laws in states where consumers and regulators 
can easily invoke the laws and obtain effective redress and sanctions. Court 
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systems that are expensive or take a long time to deliver justice can effectively 
deny justice.30 Equally if regulators have few powers or resources regulation is 
fairly meaningless.
EU soft-law initiatives may have an impact on Member States and cause them 
to also develop better solutions in the domestic context. The establishment of 
consumer-friendly, cross-border regimes might also inspire domestic reform. 
Hence, for instance, if a small claims procedure is introduced for cross-border 
disputes, one would hope that within the national legal order there would be a 
debate about whether domestic procedures should offer at-least-as-good solutions 
for purely domestic disputes. The proposal in the proposed Market Surveillance 
Regulation 2013 in the context of product safety is that authorities draw up 
enforcement plans, including details on resources, so that the Commission can 
monitor the level of practical enforcement. This is a very positive move that 
should help ensure higher minimum standards.
Legal basis
The EU is aware of the need for judicial co-operation. Art. 2 of the Treaty on 
European Union and Art. 67 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union provides that the Union shall constitute an area of freedom, security 
and justice with respect for fundamental rights and the different legal systems 
and traditions of the Member States. As regards civil matters, Art. 81 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides for judicial co-
operation in civil matters having cross-border implications. Many of the meas-
ures adopted by the EU are related to ensuring the mutual recognition of 
judgments and extra-judicial decisions and the surrounding procedures. But 
the Treaty also mentions promoting effective access to justice and the develop-
ment of alternative methods of dispute resolution.31 Where criminal matters are 
involved there are similar powers to promote co-operation.32 Article 47 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides there should 
be access to a remedy, a fair trial and in appropriate cases legal aid. Article 2 of 
the Treaty on European Union also provides that Member States shall provide 
remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by 
Union law. Many of the measures discussed below draw upon these provisions 
as their legal base instead of or in addition to internal market or consumer 
protection Treaty provisions. However, some important measures such as the 
ADR Directive and ODR Regulation base themselves on Art. 114 the internal 
market provision and the support of consumer protection rather than on the 
civil justice provisions.
30 Lord Dyson, Delay Too Often Defeats Justice (The Law Society, Magna Carta Event, 22 
April 2015), pp.6–10, https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/
law-society-magna-carta-lecture.pdf [accessed 23 March 2016]. 
31 Arts. 81(e) and (g) TFEU.
32 Art. 82 TFEU.
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Choice of legal instrument
The choices of legal instrument in this area have been interesting. Directives have 
been used sometimes, but frequently Regulations have been preferred either in 
the private international law field, presumably to provide increased certainty, or 
because distinct free-standing procedures or institutions have been set up – such 
as those for European small claims33 and the ODR platform.34 In some areas the 
EU has hesitated to go beyond issuing Recommendations, for instance, as regards 
consumer collective redress. With respect to ADR, the Commission treaded tenta-
tively: first, adopting soft-law measures before moving on to legislation. This can 
be a useful model for other areas of law so that a greater consensus can be devel-
oped around principles before Member States are forced to comply with them.
General principles of equivalence and effectiveness
Our focus is on the EU laws establishing mechanisms for promoting consumer 
redress and enhancing enforcement. However, the importance of the general 
principles requiring national law to provide equivalent protection for EU laws 
as for national laws and ensuring effective protection should be remembered.35 
The Alassini36 case involved the review of a provision of Italian telecommuni-
cations law requiring users first to use a mandatory ADR procedure before being 
allowed access to courts. The CJEU noted that the principle of effectiveness 
might be impeded by this requirement, but noted restrictions could be allowed 
if they pursued the general objective of promoting out-of-court settlement of 
disputes and were not disproportionate. It noted that the procedure was non-
binding, involved no fee, suspended any time-bars and did not involve substan-
tive delay as it was required to be completed within 30 days. However, it required 
the national court to investigate whether complaints could only be submitted 
by electronic means and whether interim measures were possible, as the absence 
of non-electronic procedures and interim measures might allow the mandatory 
procedure to be challenged. 
In Aziz,37 national law was found to breach the effectiveness principle. The 
national procedural rules for enforcing mortgages did not allow a court handling 
the issues of unfairness of the mortgage terms to provide interim relief. Thus the 
law was helpless to prevent the debtor from being evicted whilst the matter was 
being resolved.38 
33 See Regulation 861/2007/EC establishing a European Small Claims Procedure (2007) 
OJ L199/1.
34 See Regulation 524/2013/EU on on-line dispute resolution for consumer disputes 
(2013) L165/2013.
35 N Reich, ‘Legal protection of individual and collective consumer interests’ in N Reich and 
others, European Consumer Law (Intersentia, 2014).
36 C-317/08 Rosalba Alassini v Telecom Italia SpA (The Alassini) [2010] ECR I-2213. 
37 C-415/11 Aziz v Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya [2013] 3 CMLR 5.
38 For other cases in this vein, see Chapter 4, pp.154–162.
300 Consumer access to justice and enforcement
The principle of effectiveness also lies behind why EU competition law gives 
harmed parties the right to seek damages.39 Consumers may be able to take advan-
tage of such claims, most likely by bringing follow-on damages actions when a 
substantive breach of competition law has been established. However, most of 
the substantive consumer rules provide for their own methods of redress and 
enforcement. It is unlikely, for instance, that a damages claim for unfair commer-
cial practices will be required to make the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’s 
protection effective. The Directive itself foresees other means of providing effec-
tive enforcement. To be truly effective, consumer remedies will require a collective 
redress mechanism, as most consumer losses will be small. It is unlikely a class action 
procedure will not be found necessary in Europe to fulfil the effectiveness principle. 
The effectiveness principle can also give consumers remedies when states have 
failed to implement EU law or have failed adapt their laws properly. A famous 
case where consumers benefitted from this rule was Dillenkofer.40 The German 
government was held liable to compensate consumers of an insolvent holiday 
company, because it had failed, by the required date, to adopt rules requiring 
such businesses to have the means to refund and repatriate consumers in the 
event of insolvency. 
These rules of effectiveness have also been used by businesses to restrict the 
means of enforcement to those prescribed in maximum harmonisation measures. 
Thus in AGM COS.MET41 the Finnish government was made potentially liable 
to pay damages to the manufacturer of a vehicle lift because of public statements 
made by an official about his concern for the safety of the lift. The permitted 
actions by a Member State on discovery of a defect had been fully harmonised by 
the relevant Machinery Directive42 and such public statements were not allowed. 
However, liability of the state will be relatively rare as the law must have been 
intended to confer individual rights and many duties of states will be consid-
ered of a more general supervisory nature.43 Equally, liability will only be paid if 
national courts assess the breach to have been ‘sufficiently serious’. These same 
limiting factors are likely to protect the Union from many claims.44
39 C-453/99 Courage v Crehan [2000] ECR I-6298; Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 
Vincenzo Manfredi and Others v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA [2006] ECR I-6619; 
Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 
2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements 
of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union Text 
with EEA relevance [2014] OJ L349/1.
40 Joined cases C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94 and C-190-94 Erich Dillenkofer & Others 
v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [1996] ECR I-4845.
41 C-470/03 A.G.M.-COS.MET Srl v Suomen valtio and Tarmo Lehtinen [2007] ECR 
I-2749.
42 Directive 98/37/EC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to 
machinery (1998) OJ L207/1.
43 C-222/02 Peter Paul and Others v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2004] ECR I-9425.
44 See the failed claim in in respect of Community liability for failing to take action against 
adulterated wine: Joined Cases 326/86 and 66/88 Benito Francesconi and Others v 
Commission of the European Communities [1989] ECR 2087.
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Court-based private redress
Private international law
Jurisdiction
The cross-border dimension of a dispute adds an extra layer of complication to 
consumer dispute resolution. Consumers do not like litigating in foreign courts. 
Consumers face the cost and inconvenience of travel to a foreign court. This can 
be expensive, unless the court is just across the border near the consumer’s home. 
Going to court is stressful for most consumers, but having to use a foreign system 
and possibly a foreign language makes this worse. A consumer might be able 
to navigate their own system in their own language, without a lawyer, but this 
is more difficult in a foreign jurisdiction. Consumers prefer the rules of private 
international law to allow them to sue in their home state. Businesses equally fear 
being exposed to litigation in foreign jurisdictions and want to defend actions 
where they are established. The benefits of substantive harmonisation based on 
full harmonisation seems to be undermined by the reality that a business will 
be concerned by any action brought against it in a foreign court regardless of 
which legal rules apply. The compromise struck by Council Regulation (EC) No. 
1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters (Brussels I)45 (replacing Regulation 44/2001) is 
to allow the cross-border consumer to have the right to litigate at home in par-
ticular circumstances, such as when they have been targeted by the foreign trader 
or goods have been sold on credit. Brussels I provides a general rule for contract 
disputes under which jurisdiction is linked to the place of performance of the 
obligation. In the case of sale of goods, this is where the goods were delivered or 
should have been delivered.46 In the case of services it is where the service was or 
should have been provided.47 The CJEU has established that where the contract 
does not expressly state the place for delivery, then the place for delivery is ‘the 
place where the physical transfer of the goods took place, as a result of which the 
purchaser obtained, or should have obtained, actual power of disposal over those 
goods at the final destination of the sales transaction.’48 This is different from the 
default position under many domestic sales-law regimes, and the effect is that a 
consumer will generally be able to sue in the courts of his jurisdiction. 
Special protection is afforded to consumers in order to allow them to sue and 
only be sued in their own home jurisdiction where the consumer has had goods 
supplied with the assistance of credit49 and most contentiously in cross-border 
45 Regulation 1215/2012/EC on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters (2012) OJ L351/1.
46 On the autonomous meaning of ‘delivery’ for these purposes, see C-386/05 Color Drack 
GmBH v Lexx International Vetriebs GmBH ECLI:EU:C:2007:262 and C-381/08 Car 
Trim GmbH v KeySafety Systems Srl ECLI:EU:C:2010:90.
47 Art. 7. 
48 C-381/08 Car Trim GmbH v KeySafety Systems Srl ECLI:EU:C:2010:90.
49 Brussels I, Art. 17(1)(a) and (b). 
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situations where the contract has been concluded with a person who pursues 
commercial or professional activities in the Member State of the consumer’s 
domicile50 or, by any means, directs such activities to that Member State or to 
several states including that Member State, and the contract falls within the 
scope of such activities.51 For the special rules to apply the goods need not have 
been bought using a distant means of communication. It would cover a con-
sumer travelling to another state to make a purchase following such targeted 
marketing.52 The complex task is to define what is understood by ‘directing 
activities’. Where the trader uses mailshots it is normally rather easy to deter-
mine whether consumers are being targeted in a particular state, as the act of 
posting to a particular address is sufficient proof. It is more complex to make 
such an assessment of websites.53 The CJEU has considered54 that mere access 
to a website in the consumer’s domicile was insufficient, as was mere mention 
of an e-mail or other contact address or the use of a language or currency gen-
erally used in the trader’s state. Nevertheless, the Regulation was intended to 
be more protective of consumers than the former Convention55 and the CJEU 
held the test was:
whether, before the conclusion of any contract with the consumer, it is 
apparent from those websites and the trader’s overall activity that the trader 
was envisaging doing business with consumers domiciled in one or more 
Member States, including the Member State of that consumer’s domicile, in 
the sense that it was minded to conclude a contract with them.56
A non-exhaustive list of relevant evidence included ‘the international nature of 
the activity, mention of itineraries from other Member States for going to the 
place where the trader is established, use of a language or a currency other than 
the language or currency generally used in the Member State in which the trader 
is established with the possibility of making and confirming the reservation in that 
other language, mention of telephone numbers with an international code, out-
lay of expenditure on an internet referencing service in order to facilitate access 
to the trader’s site or that of its intermediary by consumers domiciled in other 
Member States, use of a top-level domain name other than that of the Member 
50 Or has a branch, agency or other establishment in such Member State; Brussels I, Art. 
15(2).
51 Brussels I, Art. 17(1)(c).
52 C–190/11 Mühlleitner v Yusufi ECLI:EU:C:2012:542.
53 The ‘directing activities’ test bears some comparison with the ‘Zippo test’ in the United 
States: see Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 
1997). 
54 Joined Cases C–585/08 and C–144/09 Pammer v Reederei Karl Schluter GmbH & Co 
KG and Hotel Alpenhof GmbH v Heller [2010] ECR I-12527.
55 Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations (1980) OJ L266/1.
56 Joined Cases C-585/08 and C-144/09 Peter Pammer v Reederei Karl Schlüter GmbH & 
Co. KG and Hotel Alpenhof GesmbH v Oliver Heller [2010] ECR I-12527, para 92.
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State in which the trader is established, and mention of an international clientele 
composed of customers domiciled in various Member States.’57
Consumer are restricted as to their freedom to contract out of these rules 
before a dispute has arisen. 58 They can only do so if the rules are more generous 
to consumers by allowing then to bring the dispute before the courts of another 
state, or give jurisdiction to the court of a state where both parties reside or are 
habitually resident.
For torts, jurisdiction lies with the courts of the place where the harmful event 
occurred or may occur.59 In the product liability context this has been held to be 
the place of manufacture, with the need for certainty presiding over consumer 
protection issues.60
Applicable law 
A court with jurisdiction still needs to determine the applicable law. Regulation 
593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations61 (Rome I) deals with 
choice of law in contract. This has a general principle of freedom of contract,62 
but in the absence of choice applies the contract law of the state of habitual resi-
dence of the seller of goods or the supplier of a service.63 
There are special rules for consumers that apply where the trader either ‘(a) 
pursues his commercial or professional activities in the country where the con-
sumer has his habitual residence, or (b) by any means, directs such activities to 
that country or to several countries including that country.’64 
The function of Art. 6 Rome I Regulation is not to override the parties’ free-
dom of choice entirely. Where the consumer provisions apply, then, absent a 
choice of law by the parties, the contract will be governed be the law of the con-
sumer’s habitual residence. The parties retain the freedom to choose which law 
applies, but this cannot deprive the consumer ‘of the protection afforded to him 
by provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement by virtue of the law 
which, in the absence of choice, would have been applicable.’65 
57 Ibid. For a critical assessment, see C Bisping, ‘Mandatorily protected: The consumer in the 
European conflict of laws’ (2014) 22 European Review of Private Law p.513.
58 Brussels I, Art. 17.
59 Brussels I, Art. 7(2). 
60 C–45/13 Kainz v Pantherwerke AG [2010] ECR I-12527. Indeed the court noted 
consumer protection was not the motivation for the provision and that the place of damage 
may not in any event be the consumer’s domicile.
61 (2008) OJ L177/6.
62 Rome I, Art. 3.
63 Ibid., Art. 4.
64 Ibid., Art. 6(1). There are some exceptions, where the consumer rules do not apply: e.g. in 
a contract for the supply of services where the services are to be supplied to the consumer 
exclusively in a country other than that in which he has his habitual residence; contracts of 
carriage other than package holidays; property and tenancy contracts and certain securities 
contracts, Art. 6(4).
65 Ibid., Art. 6(2).
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For the most part this provision means that consumers targeted in their home 
state can benefit from their mandatory national law, which in some cases may 
offer higher protection than the level required in minimal harmonisation direc-
tives. In some rare cases it may also be possible to argue that some consumer laws 
are ‘overriding mandatory provisions’ i.e. they are laws ‘the respect for which is 
regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests, such as its 
political, social or economic organization, to such an extent that they are appli-
cable to any situation falling within their scope’66 and which should be applied in 
every contract. However, the courts are unlikely to classify many consumer rules 
in this way. 
Tort law applicable law is governed by of Regulation 864/2007 on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II).67 Art. 5 is of particular inter-
est as it has rules on the applicable law for product liability. The applicable law 
is that of the country in which the person sustaining the damage had his or her 
habitual residence when the damage occurred, if the product was marketed in 
that country; or, failing that the law of the country in which the product was 
acquired, if the product was marketed in that country; or, failing that the law of 
the country in which the damage occurred, if the product was marketed in that 
country. However, the applicable law will still be that of the defendant if he could 
not reasonably foresee the marketing of the product or a product of the same type 
in that country.68 These special rules do not displace the general rule that if the 
defendant and injured party have the same habitual residence when the damage 
occurs the law of that country applies.69 The tort law of another country will apply 
if it is manifestly more closely connected.70
Substantive EU consumer laws frequently contain rules preventing European 
law being applied by the choice of a law of a state outside the EU.
Enforcement
Once a judgment is handed down the Brussels I Regulation has provisions requir-
ing it to be recognised without any special procedure;71 though there are excep-
tions and that concerning whether the judgment is manifestly contrary to public 
policy72 may be relevant in countries that have concerns about class actions. There 
is also a procedure for courts to make judgments enforceable on application.73 
66 Ibid., Art. 9.
67 (2007) OJ L199/40.
68 Rome II, Art. 5(1).
69 Rome II, Art. 4(2).
70 Rome II, Art. 5(2). A manifestly closer connection with another country might be based 
in particular on a pre-existing relationship between the parties, such as a contract, that is 
closely connected with the tort/delict in question. 
71 Brussels I, Art. 36.
72 Ibid., Art. 45(1).
73 Ibid., Arts. 39–44.
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This intermediate step is removed in the European small claims procedure74 
and also under certain conditions for uncontested monetary claims under the 
European Enforcement Order.75
Legal aid
Consumers are likely to need legal assistance in cross-border disputes. This is 
due to the cases often involving private international law, foreign law and proce-
dures and possibly being undertaken in a foreign language and potentially being 
some physical distance from the consumer’s residence. Directive 2002/8/EC 
places obligations on Member States to provide legal aid for cross-border civil 
disputes.76 This can cover pre-litigation advice, legal representation and assistance 
at court, exemption or assistance with court fees and the covering of costs orders 
against the applicant to the same extent as under national law. It also can extend 
to interpretation and translation costs and travel costs if the legally aided party has 
to attend court in the other state. The procedure is not well known. There have 
only been two occasions in which a Member State has processed more than 100 
applications in a year.77
Simplified procedures
Simplified court procedures are one response to the costs of traditional litigation 
being prohibitive in many consumer cases. Reformed procedures might, inter 
alia, remove the requirement for the parties to be physically present at the court, 
thus avoiding travel costs. The use of lawyers can be made optional. 
Payment orders
The European payment order procedure78 applies to cross-border uncontested 
pecuniary claims and allows for a paper-based procedure under which representa-
tion is not mandatory and costs are limited to what they would be for national 
74 Regulation 861/2007/EC establishing a European Small Claims Procedure (2007) OJ 
L199/1.
75 Regulation 805/2004/EC creating a European Enforcement Order for Uncontested 
Claims (2004) OJ L143/15.
76 Directive 2002/8/EC to improve access to justice in cross-border disputes by establishing 
minimum common rules relating to legal aid for such disputes (2002) OJ L26/41.
77 Commission, Report from the Commission on the Application of Directive 2003/8/EC to 
Improve Access to Justice in Cross-border Disputes by Establishing Minimum Common Rules 
Relating to Legal Aid for Such Disputes COM (2012) 71 final. 
78 Regulation 1896/2006/EC creating a European order for payment procedure (2006) 
OJ L399/1; X Kramer, ‘Enhancing enforcement in the European Union: The European 
order for payment procedure and its implementation in the Member States, particularly in 
Germany, The Netherlands and England’ in CH van Rhee and A Uzelac (eds), Enforcement 
and Enforceability. Tradition and Reform (Intersentia, 2010).
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claims. This procedure is most likely to be used against consumers for typically 
they are the party that will owe the money. Nevertheless, it can still be a worth-
while procedure from the consumer perspective. Debtors normally have to pay 
any debt-recovery costs. If this procedure keeps those costs down they will indi-
rectly benefit.
Small claims 79
Consumers are more likely to take advantage of the European small claims pro-
cedure.80 This provides a simplified regime for cross-border claims for less than 
2000 euro, excluding interest, expenses and disbursements.81 This covers cross-
border claims where one party is domiciled or habitually resident in a Member 
State other than that of the court or tribunal seized of the case.82 The limitation 
to cross-border disputes has been criticised because the cross-border element may 
not be revealed until the enforcement phase. These claims would not benefit from 
the simplified enforcement procedures for orders made under the European pro-
cedure.83 The original Commission proposal intended it to apply also to domestic 
claims.84 There are a number of exceptions from the procedure. Those most rel-
evant to consumer claims concern matters relating to the status or legal capacity 
of natural persons, bankruptcy, arbitration, tenancies in immovable property apart 
from monetary claims and violations of privacy or rights to personality.
This is a novel procedure. There is a lack of knowledge about it by many 
local court staff. This can be problematic, especially as the staff are intended to 
assist parties. One solution might be that Member States should designate special 
courts whose staff are trained in the procedure. European Consumer Centres85 
could then direct consumers to these courts or national courts could redirect 
79 A Fiorini, ‘Facilitating cross-border debt recovery – the European payment order and small 
claims regulations’ (2008) 57 International and Comparative Law Quarterly p.449; X 
Kramer, ‘A major step in the harmonization of procedural law in Europe: The European 
small claims procedure. Accomplishments, new features and some fundamental questions 
of European harmonization’ in A Jongbloed (ed), The XIIIth World Congress of Procedural 
Law: The Belgian and Dutch Reports (Intersentia, 2008); X Kramer, ‘The European 
small claims procedure: Striking the balance between simplicity and fairness in European 
litigation’ (2008) Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht p.355. 
80 Regulation 861/2007/EC establishing a European small claims procedure (2007) OJ 
L199/1 (Small Claims Procedure Regulation); X Kramer, ‘Small claim, simple recovery? 
The European small claims procedure and its implementation in the Member States’. ERA 
Forum 12 (2011), p.119.
81 Small Claims Procedure Regulation, Art. 2(1).
82 Ibid., Art. 3(1).
83 P Cortés, Online Dispute Resolution for Consumers in the European Union (Routledge, 
2011), p.100.
84 Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Establishing a European Small Claims Procedure COM (2005) 87 final.
85 European Consumer Centres (European Commission, 10 February 2016) http://
ec.europa.eu/consumers/solving_consumer_disputes/non-judicial_redress/ecc-net/
index_en.htm [accessed 10 March 2016].
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claims. This may ensure more even implementation of the obligation courts have 
to assist parties in filling in forms.86 
The procedure is commenced by completing a standard claim form, which 
is submitted with a description of any evidence and supporting documentation. 
Service is facilitated by a provision allowing this to be made by post attested by 
an acknowledgment of receipt.87 Any national fees have to be paid on the same 
basis as in domestic proceedings. This may make access to justice more difficult 
in some states, though the relatively high fees in the United Kingdom do not 
seem to have deterred consumers’ applications relative to other states. Indeed, 
the United Kingdom has received the highest number of such actions.88 If there 
are any errors in the paperwork, then unless the application is clearly unfounded 
or inadmissible the court will give the claimant the opportunity to complete or 
rectify the form. The procedure is intended to be written. Oral hearings are only 
held when the court considers it necessary or a party so requests. A court can 
refuse such a request if a hearing is obviously not necessary for the fair conduct 
of the hearing. If an oral hearing is necessary positive encouragement is given 
to using technology such as video conferencing89 and a flexible approach to the 
taking of evidence is also promoted.90 The written documentation should be in 
the language of the court, though the court may, in practice, not always require 
documents to be translated. A party can, however, require translation if the docu-
ment is not in the language of the court or one he understands.91 Strict and 
relatively short timetables are laid down so that straightforward claims should 
be dealt with within 88 days.92 In practice the courts seem to take a pragmatic 
approach as regards language, service and time limits.93 
The Regulation provides that, whenever appropriate, the court or tribunal 
shall seek to reach a settlement between the parties. However, in many small 
claims procedures the restricted time allowed to deal with a case limits the practi-
cal scope for the judge to act as a mediator or conciliator. Legal representation 
is not mandatory,94 but most consumers tend to be legally represented in cross-
border claims. In many small claims schemes consumers are given confidence to 
bring claims by an exception being made to the ‘loser pays’ rules. The European 
procedure, however, provides that the unsuccessful party should bear the cost of 
86 Small Claims Procedure Regulation, Art. 11.
87 Ibid., Art. 13.
88 A 2011 IMCO study placed the UK at the top (233 applications in 2010) see F Alleweldt 
and others, Cross-border Alternative Dispute Resolution in the European Union (European 
Parliament, 2011), p.55, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/
documents/imco/dv/adr_study_/adr_study_en.pdf [accessed 10 March 2016].
89 Small Claims Procedure Regulation, Art. 8.
90 Ibid., Art. 9.
91 Ibid., Art. 6.
92 Ibid., Art. 5. Evidence from the Netherlands suggest in practice time limits are not adhered 
to but claims are dealt with relatively efficiently: X Kramer and E Ontanu, ‘The functioning 
of the European small claims procedure in the Netherlands: normative and empirical 
reflections’ (2013) 3 Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht p.324. 
93 Ibid., p.327. 
94 Small Claims Procedure Regulation Art. 10.
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the proceedings, albeit subject to controls against unnecessary or disproportion-
ate costs.95 This may be justified because of the added complexity of cross-border 
claims, but only serves to underline the risks faced by cross-border consumers. 
There are only limited grounds for defendants to seek review. These are based 
on procedural irregularities with the service of documents or their having been 
prevented from objecting by force majeure or extraordinary circumstances.96 
Appeals are a matter for national law, subject to the Commission being informed 
of what appeal process if any is available.
Any judgment becomes immediately enforceable in other Member States 
without the need for a declaration of enforceability and without any possibility of 
opposing its recognition if it has been properly certified by the court.97 
This procedure has a relatively low profile. The scheme is under-used. Some 
problems have also been revealed, such as those involving language issues.98 
Perhaps surprisingly, given its fairly high court fees for small claims, the United 
Kingdom is the leader in accepting such claims. In many other states this proce-
dure is less well used. This is perhaps not unexpected for consumers have few eco-
nomic incentives to engage in litigation for small claims even at the national level 
and the cross-border element adds additional costs, barriers and stress that can 
only ever be partially mitigated by this novel and potentially helpful procedure.
The Commission has made proposals to improve the scheme.99 These include 
raising the threshold to include claims up to 10,000 euro; broadening the defi-
nition of cross-border disputes to cover more claims; making more of the pro-
cedures electronic including the use of video-conferencing, when a hearing is 
needed: placing caps on court fees; and, only requiring the substance of the judg-
ment to be translated when seeking enforcement (as the rest of the form is avail-
able in the different languages).
Collective redress100
Class or group actions procedures aim to deal with mass claims involving indi-
viduals with similar claims. They can be complex and require lawyers to run 
them, but can also be valuable in making litigation more accessible to consumers. 
95 Ibid., Art. 16.
96 Ibid., Art. 18.
97 Small Claims Procedure Regulation, Art. 20.
98 X Kramer, ‘The European small claims procedure: Striking the balance between simplicity 
and fairness in European litigation’ (2008) Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht p.369. 
99 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 July 
2007 establishing a European small claims procedure and Regulation 1896/2006/EC 
creating a European order for payment procedure COM (2013) 794 final.
100 C Hodges, The Reform of Class and Representative Actions in European Legal Systems: 
A New Framework for Collective Redress in Europe (Hart, 2008); F Caffagi and HW 
Micklitz, New Frontiers of Consumer Protection – the Interplay between Private and Public 
Enforcement (Intersentia, 2009); J Steele and W van Boom (eds), Mass Justice – Challenges 
of Representation and Distribution (Edward Elgar, 2011); C Hodges and A Stadler, 
Resolving Mass Disputes – ADR and Settlement of Mass Claims (Edward Elgar, 2013).
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Combining small individual claims can make them viable to litigate. Collective 
redress procedures can also be useful in high-value complex claims as legal and 
expert costs can be shared. Collective litigation can also be helpful to courts that 
otherwise would be overwhelmed with litigation on particular issues. In Germany 
a collective mechanism was adopted when the Frankfurt courts were inundated 
with investment claims.101 ADR schemes can also have similar needs for collective 
solutions when facing major incidents affecting large numbers.102 
At the EU level, collective redress proposals in the competition field103 
prompted discussion of the similar need for collective redress in the consumer 
field. Indeed in the consumer field, factors like calculation of damages would be 
simpler to assess for a claim based on unfair competition or use of unfair terms 
than in the competition cases. Following a public consultation in 2011, Towards 
a More Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress,104 and EU Parliament 
Resolution105 the Commission published its Communication, Towards a 
European Horizontal Framework for Collective Redress.106 The intensity of debate 
can be gauged from the 19,000 responses to the 2011 consultation.107 The result 
was Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and 
compensatory redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of 
rights granted under EU law.108 It recommended Member States to have both 
injunctive and compensatory collective mechanisms in line with its principles. 
However, the Recommendation was also careful to propose safeguards against 
abuse. These include only allowing representative entities meeting strict criteria 
to bring representative actions; having early verification of claims; adoption of 
the ‘loser pays’ principle; controls on third-party funding; contingency fees being 
101 This led to the Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz (KapMuG) (the law governing test 
cases in capital investment) coming into effect in 2005.
102 Payment protection insurance under the United Kingdom’s Financial Ombudsman scheme 
is a good example of this. However, even with some guidance being given on collective 
general principles the Ombudsman’s official site notes the numbers mean it will take years 
rather than months to deal with the claims, see ‘PPI – Your Case with Us…’ (Financial 
Ombudsman Service Limited, 8 Mar 2016) http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/
contact/PPI-your-case.html [accessed 10 March 2016]. 
103 See Commission, Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules COM (2005) 672 
final; Commission, Damages Actions for Breach of Anti-trust Rules COM (2008) 16. See 
also Commission, Public Consultation: Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective 
Redress SEC (2011) 173 final.
104 SEC (2011) 173 final.
105 European Parliament, Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress 
(2011/2089(INI)).
106 Commission, Towards a European Horizontal Framework for Collective Redress COM 
(2013) 401 final.
107 X Kramer, ‘Enforcing mass settlements in the European Judicial Area: EU policy and 
the strange case of Dutch collective settlements (WCAM)’ in C Hodges and A Stadler, 
Resolving Mass Disputes – ADR and Settlement of Mass Claims (Edward Elgar, 2013).
108 Commission, Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on Common Principles for Injunctive and 
Compensatory Collective Redress Mechanisms in the Member States Concerning Violations of 
Rights Granted under Union Law (2013) OJ L201/60.
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viewed as exceptional and where allowed not creating incentives for unnecessary 
litigation and respecting the right to full compensation;109 and, a prohibition on 
punitive damages. Encouragement is also given to the use of ADR for collective 
settlements.
Europe has been frightened off anything approaching a US-style class action, 
by stories of abuse of the system by plaintiff lawyers and large awards affecting 
the business environment.110 Instead, Europe seems to favour promoting ADR 
as a means of individual redress and ensuring a stronger regulatory enforcement 
environment. Regulation may be valuable to promote a better-functioning mar-
ket and ADR may be helpful in securing individual redress at affordable costs.111 
They are both considered below. However, class actions have a role to play both 
as a deterrent and a practical means of managing floods of cases. It also helps to 
socialise risk as the collective dimension of consumer issues is exposed when the 
claims are combined. The Recommendation provides a framework to promote 
collective redress and given the need to integrate such procedures into national 
civil procedure this is probably the most Europe could do. The right approach 
is for the EU to nudge Member States to adopt such solutions, rather than to 
impose an EU model. This seems akin to the open method of co-operation that 
promotes Member States’ voluntary convergence and such an approach is to be 
applauded. 
Alternative dispute resolution112
ADR – general considerations
ADR is a popular technique to promote consumer access to justice. Court-based 
litigation has traditionally been seen as the model form of dispute resolution. 
However, its high costs and formality make it impractical and even inappropriate 
for low-value consumer claims, even, some might argue, in the slimmed-down 
small claims procedures. ADR, using arbitrators who are often familiar with the 
sector, can also produce better-informed decisions. Of course the impartiality of 
the third party must be secured. Some ADR schemes can also base decisions on 
fairness as well as the law thereby reflecting good practices which may be ahead 
of the formal law. 
Some ADR schemes hand down binding decisions. In others the decisions only 
bind the trader. Yet others might be mediation schemes which try to conciliate 
109 If the right to full compensation is to be respected then conditional fees (‘no win no fee’) 
should be favoured as opposed to contingency fees where traditionally this assumes the 
success fee comes out of the claimant’s award.
110 The extent to which these claims are true matters less than the perception of the US 
experience.
111 C Hodges and A Stadler, Resolving Mass Disputes – ADR and Settlement of Mass Claims 
(Edward Elgar, 2013).
112 N Reich, ‘Legal protection of individual and collective consumer interests’ in N Reich and 
others, European Consumer Law (Intersentia, 2014).
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between the parties and encourage settlement. As schemes move away from 
 application of the law towards encouraging settlement, there is clearly an issue of 
the consumer risking relinquishing rights as the price of settlement. Power may 
be exerted on the consumer in the face of practical realities and protecting his or 
her interest in a practical manner may be more important that fighting for full 
satisfaction of legal rights. Consumer dispute resolution is to some extent a com-
promise to ensure some redress where the value of claims would not justify full-
blown litigation. Some sacrifice of the pursuit of perfect justice may be justified, 
but the important factor is to ensure the schemes preserve minimum procedural 
standards to protect the consumer interest.
Mandatory arbitration clauses, as used in US, can be problematic as they force 
consumers out of the legal system’s protection. By contrast, giving consumers 
the option of using ADR can allow them a cheaper and more flexible way to seek 
redress. It typically does not require or encourage legal representation. It is now 
clear that in Europe consumers cannot be bound to ADR before a dispute arises 
and if they agree to submit a claim to ADR they must be informed in advance if 
such a clause is binding and have ‘specifically accepted’ it.113 
EU law promoting ADR
Many versions of ADR have bloomed across Europe. Prior to the ADR Directive, 
EU law had only required out-of-court dispute resolution systems in the tel-
ecoms,114 energy,115 consumer credit116 and payment services117 sectors. However, 
its use had been encouraged in several other directives.118 Those forms of ADR 
most favourable to consumers are free or low cost and only binding on the trader. 
But there are many variants. The Commission has welcomed the development 
113 Directive 2013/11/EU, Art. 10.
114 Directive 2009/136/EC amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ 
rights relating to electronic communications networks and services, Directive 2002/58/
EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the 
electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation 
between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws 
(2009) OJ L337/11, Art. 34(1).
115 Directive 2009/72/EC on common rules for the internal market in electricity (2009) OJ 
L211/55, Art. 13.
116 Directive 2008/48/EC on credit agreements for consumers (2008) OJ L133/66, Art. 24.
117 Directive 2007/64/EC on payment services in the internal market (2007) OJ L319/1, 
Art. 83.
118 Directive 2002/65/EC on the distance marketing of consumer financial services (2002) 
OJ L271/16, Art. 14; Directive 2008/122/EC on the protection of consumers in 
respect of certain aspects of timeshare, long-term holiday product, resale and exchange 
contracts (2009) OJ L33/10, Art. 14; Directive 2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects 
of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market 
(2000) OJ L178/1, Art. 17; Directive 2008/6/EC with regard to the full accomplishment 
of the internal market of Community postal services (2008) OJ L52/3, Art. 19; Directive 
2002/92/EC on insurance mediation (2003) OJ L9/3, Art. 11; Directive 2004/39/EC 
on markets in financial instruments, Art. 53.
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of ADR, but has also sought to ensure minimum safeguards are in place. It 
adopted two  recommendations on this topic: one for bodies providing out-of-
court settlement119 and another where the bodies seek to encourage consensual 
resolution of disputes.120 The CJEU has also supported ADR by not precluding 
national laws which make access to the courts dependent on first having tried to 
use ADR mechanisms.121 
Subsequently the EU has adopted binding legislation. First, there was a direc-
tive promoting mediation and subsequently a package on ADR and on-line dis-
pute resolution (ODR). The ADR Directive imposes a requirement that ADR 
schemes are available for all consumer disputes, whilst the ODR Regulation122 
establishes a platform to place consumers in touch with ADR schemes in other 
states and provides an infrastructure for the problem to be resolved using tech-
nology, if the ADR schemes allow for such ODR.
Mediation Directive123
The EU has encouraged mediation through the Mediation Directive.124 This 
requires national courts to be allowed to recommend the use of mediation or at 
least invite parties to attend an information session on mediation.125 It reinforces 
the principle of confidentiality for the mediation procedure,126 ensures use of 
mediation does not prevent claims subsequently being brought due to limitation 
or prescription periods,127 and enables parties to obtain an agreement equal to a 
court judgment.128 These rules only apply to cross-border civil and commercial 
matters,129 but Member States are not prevented from applying them to internal 
mediation processes. The Mediation Directive is facilitative and does not require 
the imposition of a duty to attempt mediation. 
119 Commission Recommendation 98/257/EC on the principles applicable to the bodies 
responsible for out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes (1998) OJ L115/31 This 
also had a European complaint form attached to it.
120 Commission Recommendation 2001/310 on the principles for out-of-court bodies 
involved in the consensual resolution of consumer disputes [2001] OJ L109/56. 
121 C-317/08 Rosalba Alassini v Telecom Italia SpA (The Alassini) [2010] ECR I-2213.
122 Regulation 524/2013/EU on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes (2013) OJ 
L165/1.
123 Directive 2008/52/EC on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters 
(Mediation Directive) (2008) OJ L136/3.
124 Ibid. In 2004 a voluntary Code of Conduct for Mediators had been promoted by the 
European Commission. See I Benöhr, ‘Alternative dispute resolution for consumers in the 
European Union’ in C Hodges, I Benöhr and N Creutzfeldt-Banda, Consumer ADR in 
Europe (Hart, 2012), pp.8–10. The Mediation Directive does not establish an accreditation 
procedure for mediators. Some trainers do offer special on-line mediation training: P Cortés, 
Online Dispute Resolution for Consumers in the European Union (Routledge, 2011), p.158.
125 Mediation Directive, Art. 5.
126 Ibid., Art. 7.
127 Ibid., Art. 8.
128 Ibid., Art. 6.
129 Ibid., Art. 1(2).
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ADR Directive
The ADR Directive has at its core the obligation on Member States to ensure 
there is an ADR procedure available for every consumer dispute.130 In countries 
that do not have one single consumer ADR procedure, but rather a patchwork of 
ADR procedures this is likely to be achieved by having a residual body. However, 
financing such a body may be problematic.131
The ADR Directive is one EU access-to-justice law that covers both purely 
domestic and cross-border disputes. However, the general duty to provide assis-
tance to consumers is restricted to cross-border disputes.132
ADR schemes are broadly interpreted to include schemes which either pro-
pose or impose a solution, as well as those that only bring the parties together 
with the aim of facilitating an amicable solution.133 In-house company schemes 
can be included, but have to satisfy additional criteria.134 No business is required 
to use ADR. The Directive merely ensures there is an available ADR body to use 
should they want to. ADR bodies may refuse cases for various reasons, such as 
the claim being frivolous or vexatious; the claimant not first attempting to contact 
the trader to resolve the dispute; previous consideration of dispute by another 
ADR entity; delay in bringing the claim or the claim being outside prescribed 
monetary limits.135
The Directive requires ADR entities that want to be recognised have (i) exper-
tise, independence and impartiality; (ii) transparency; (iii) effectiveness, including 
resolving disputes within 90 days; (iv) fairness; (v) liberty i.e. any decision being 
non-binding on the consumer if the use of procedure was agreed to in advance 
of dispute and only binding, in any event, if the consumer specifically accepted 
this and (vi) legality i.e. ensuring that the consumer is not deprived of protec-
tion that cannot be derogated from by agreement or that conflict of laws do not 
deprive the consumer of his mandatory protection.136 The legality criterion has 
been fiercely defended by many consumer advocates, but it can pose practical 
problems to many ADR schemes who may not have the knowledge or resources 
130 ADR Directive, Art. 5. N Reich, ‘Legal protection of individual and collective consumer 
interests’ in N Reich and others, European Consumer Law (Intersentia, 2014) takes a 
contrary view, though noting the ambiguous wording of Art. 5 suggests that to require 
Member States to set up such entities would go against the facilitative nature of the 
Directive, which should only require its rules are followed if there is an ADR body. 
131 Department for Business Innovation and Skills (BIS), Alternative Dispute Resolution for 
Consumers: Implementing the Alternative Dispute Resolution Directive and Online Dispute 
Resolution Regulation (BIS, March 2014) https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/288199/bis-14-575-implementing-alternative-
dispute-resolution-directive-and-online-dispute-resolution-regulation-consultation.pdf 
[accessed 11 March 2016].
132 ADR Directive, Art. 14.
133 Ibid., Art. 2 (1).
134 Ibid., Arts. 2(2) and 6(3).
135 Art. 5(4).
136 Ibid., Arts. 6–11.
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to apply the conflict rules, nor the wherewithal to discover and apply foreign law 
if that is required. 
ADR entities that comply with the above criteria can provide specified infor-
mation to the designated national competent authority which will provide a list 
to the Commission. There is no requirement that entities meet these criteria. 
Failure to do so simply means they cannot be on the list and so will not get refer-
rals though the European system. There is no prohibition on schemes that do not 
meet the minimum criteria.
Information is used as a tool to promote the use of ADR. First, traders must 
inform consumers if they are obliged or committed to using ADR. This includes 
giving notice on any website and in general terms and conditions.137 If a trader can-
not settle a dispute it must again provide the consumer with this information and 
explain whether it will make use of ADR. It seems strange that there is a duty on a 
trader to mention an ADR entity, but then be free to decline to use it. The UK’s 
BIS explains this as being driven by a desire to encourage traders to use ADR by 
hoping they will not want to look bad by disclosing an option they will not use.138 
Cross-border ADR
Only a few schemes have historically aimed specifically to address cross-border dis-
putes by ADR. The Austrian Internet Ombudsman was one example. It assisted 
consumers, but only from Austria, to complain against businesses established 
within the EU.139 The EU had funded a pilot project – the Electronic Consumer 
Dispute Resolution (ECODIR) – run by UCD Dublin and Namur University, 
Belgium, that operated a staged approach of negotiation, mediation and finally 
recommendation. There was low awareness of the scheme and it could not con-
tinue without further funding.140 It seems clear that such schemes need a subsidy 
from the trade or state and cannot rely on charges alone. The European Car Rental 
Conciliation Service and Seldia, the European Direct Selling Association, which 
has a European Code Administrator,141 are two sector schemes that attempt some 
form of cross-border ADR. There are also trader sponsored trustmark schemes 
such as Euro-label (run by the European co-operation of national suppliers of 
Internet trustmarks142), Trusted Shops143 and EMOTA - European E-Commerce 
137 Ibid., Art. 13(1).
138 BIS (n 135) 28.
139 ‘Volksanwaltschaft’ (The Austrian Ombudsman Board), http://volksanwaltschaft.gv.at/ 
[accessed 11 March 2016]; see J Hörnle, Cross-border Internet Dispute Resolution (CUP, 
2009), p.78.
140 C Hodges, I Benöhr and N Creutzfeldt-Banda, ‘Cross-border consumer ADR’ in C Hodges, 
I Benöhr and N Creutzfeldt-Banda, Consumer ADR in Europe (Hart, 2012), p.364.
141 Ibid., pp.355–358.
142 ‘Shop securely in verified online shops with the Euro-Label’ (Euro-Label), http://www.
euro-label.com/en/about-us/index.html [accessed 11 March 2016].
143 ‘Shop across Europe with peace of mind’ (Trusted Shops), http://www.trustedshops.eu/ 
[accessed 11 March 2016].
Consumer access to justice and enforcement 315
Association (the association representing distance and multi-channel selling).144 
However, these are struggling for wide-scale adoption in all Member States and 
for public recognition.
Assisting cross-border ODR – the ODR Regulation
Cross-border ADR is supported by the EU network of advice centres (European 
Consumer Centres) that assist consumer with cross-border disputes (ECC-
Net145). In 2014 this network received 93,741 contacts from consumers and 
handled 37,601 complaints.146 There is also a financial services network (Fin-
Net147). An important function they have is to channel consumers to appropriate 
national ADR bodies. This will be assisted by a new Online Dispute Resolution 
(ODR) platform the Commission has established under Regulation (EU) No 
524/2013 on on-line dispute resolution for consumer disputes.148 Although on-
line dispute resolution can cover a wide range of redress mechanisms including 
court-based schemes, this ODR Regulation is concerned with facilitating out-
of-court dispute resolution. It essentially establishes a clearing house provid-
ing a complaint form, which is then transmitted to relevant ADR bodies. It is 
modelled after the Belgian Belmed scheme, which is an abbreviation for Belgian 
Mediation.149 The ODR platform also will make available translation tools and 
a free-of-charge electronic case management tool.150 Each Member State must 
have one ODR contact point, which provides support to and facilitates com-
munication between the parties including advising on alternative means if the 
dispute cannot be resolved through the platform. The contact point also liaises 
with the Commission.151 This structure is linked to the promotion of ADR by 
Directive 2013/11/EU on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes 
(ADR Directive). However, in the past, most ADR bodies did not offer ODR, 
and there is no requirement for them to adopt IT-based processes. In some 
instances the ODR Regulation may simply be an IT means of transferring dis-
putes into traditional national procedures.
144 ‘EMOTA European Trustmark for e-Commerce’ (The European eCommerce & Omni-
Channel Trade Association), http://www.emota.eu/#!european-trustmark-/c1f52 
[accessed 11 March 2016].
145 ‘European Consumer Centres’ (n 87). This network was formed in 2005 by the merger of 
the EEJ-NET, a clearing house that assisted consumers with cross-border problems to find 
ADR providers and European Consumer Centres ‘Euroguichets’ that provide information 
and assistance on cross-border issues.
146 Ibid., (2015).
147 ‘Welcome to FIN-NET’ (Financial Dispute Resolution Network) http://ec.europa.eu/
internal_market/fin-net/ [accessed 11 March 2016].
148 (2013) OJ L 165/1.
149 S Voet, ‘Public enforcement and A(ODR) as mechanisms for resolving mass problems: 
A Belgian perspective’ in C Hodges and A Stadler, Resolving Mass Disputes – ADR and 
Settlement of Mass Claims (Edward Elgar, 2013).
150 ODR Regulation, Art. 6.
151 Ibid., Art. 7. 
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A criticism of the ODR Regulation is that it is not ambitious enough. The 
platform is too much of a mere conduit restricted to finding partners and provid-
ing technological assistance. ADR bodies cannot be required to participate or be 
made to use technology. The ODR Regulation fails to include any measure that 
encourages mediation (for example, the ODR platform might have had a func-
tion to seek conciliation between the trader and consumer152) or give sufficient 
incentives to use the scheme. 
ODR – the pros and cons
ODR is itself a contentious issue.153 Besides the general debate about the pros 
and cons of traditional litigation versus arbitration and mediation there are some 
specific issues relating to ODR. ODR has some obvious advantages over ADR. 
When purchases are made on the internet resolving them through IT seems an 
appropriate solution. It can help address the issue of distance between the parties 
that is involved in most cross-border disputes. There are obvious cost savings if 
parties do not need to travel. Time savings can be made as parties can respond to 
electronic communications according to their own schedule 24/7. Asynchronous 
messages can allow parties to reflect on their responses carefully and may have the 
effect of taking the heat out of disputes. The use of text messages may reduce the 
risk of discrimination and bias. 
However, there are also downsides to ODR. Lack of face-to-face contact can 
be a problem as parties cannot benefit from body language signals. At the very 
least neutral third parties may need different training. As Cortés states, technol-
ogy is not neutral as computer-mediated technology ‘emphasizes some aspects of 
communications and minimizes or eliminates others.’154 Not everyone may have 
access to the required technology and so based on the view of the CJEU making 
the use of ODR mandatory may mean the redress mechanism breaches the effec-
tiveness principle.155 ODR is still in its infancy and, as with all IT projects, there 
are risks of technological problems. Particularly where sensitive data is involved, 
security may be a concern. However, many consumer claims will not involve seri-
ous confidentiality issues.156 Language barriers are still a major problem, where 
English (or another language) is not common to all parties. Translation technol-
ogy needs to improve to be sufficiently reliable to be used in dispute resolution. 
152 P Cortés, Online Dispute Resolution for Consumers in the European Union (Routledge, 
2011), p.220.
153 See J Hörnle, Cross-border Internet Dispute Resolution (CUP, 2009), pp.86–90; P Cortés, 
Online Dispute Resolution for Consumers in the European Union (Routledge, 2011), pp. 
56–59.
154 P Cortés, Online Dispute Resolution for Consumers in the European Union (Routledge, 
2011), pp.56–59.
155 C-317/08 Rosalba Alassini v Telecom Italia SpA (The Alassini) [2010] ECR I-2213.
156 P Cortés, Online Dispute Resolution for Consumers in the European Union (Routledge, 
2011), p.156.
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There are a wide range of ODR bodies and consumers need to have confidence 
in their quality, but it may be difficult for consumers to assess the quality of 
ODR entities. Increasing confidence in such entities is the intention behind the 
ADR Directive. These bodies administering low-cost ODR, however, are likely to 
struggle fully to implement a principle of legality that requires accurate applica-
tion of private international law on jurisdiction and applicable law and possible 
research into foreign law. There are also debates about the enforceability of ODR 
arbitral decisions under Art. V of the New York Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958, with the advice being to print 
off a copy and have it signed.157 
ODR can include several innovative features such as automated negotia-
tion, whereby, blind offers are mediated to produce potential settlements. 
CyberSettle was a front-runner with such schemes. Parties in such schemes 
can usually make three offers and if they fall within a range then the settlement 
would be proposed at the midpoint. There has been discussion of the fairness 
of this scheme which might favour repeat players. Its main value seems to be 
in insurance and commercial disputes where parties want to settle without 
openly revealing their bottom line. It was most successful in the US, but never 
established itself in UK as lawyers at the time could not be remunerated out 
of proceeds.158 Obviously in any event a consumer claim would have to have a 
certain value to make such a scheme a viable option. Even in ODR, the eco-
nomics of consumer dispute resolution for small amounts can be problematic. 
The more complex ODR schemes may also simply be too expensive for resolv-
ing low-value consumer claims. 
The IT has been described as the fourth party in ODR, assisting or even 
replacing the neutral third party. Its performance can make or break an ODR 
system. Many schemes use assisted negotiation, where disputes are categorised 
and attempted to be matched with previous settlements. SquareTrade operated a 
scheme for eBay until 2008,159 which had software-match solutions to problems 
and provided an on-line mediator with asynchronous email and web communi-
cations.160 It was widely praised for its innovative use of technology, but part of 
its success was explained by its concentration on a limited number of issues.161 
157 Ibid., p.112. Art. V requires the presentation of an authenticated original or certified copy 
of the award, which presupposes a hard-copy document. The UN Convention on the Use 
of Electronic Communications 2005 has not been sufficiently ratified to allow the use of 
electronic means to comply with Art. V of the New York Convention.
158 C Hodges, I Benöhr and N Creutzfeldt-Banda, ‘Cross-border consumer ADR’ in C 
Hodges, I Benöhr and N Creutzfeldt-Banda, Consumer ADR in Europe (Hart, 2012), 
p.360; P Cortés, Online Dispute Resolution for Consumers in the European Union 
(Routledge, 2011), p.65.
159 Until changes in the eBay feedback system meant it was removed: see P Cortés, Online 
Dispute Resolution for Consumers in the European Union (Routledge, 2011), p.148.
160 C Hodges, I Benöhr and N Creutzfeldt-Banda, ‘Cross-border consumer ADR’ in C 
Hodges, I Benöhr and N Creutzfeldt-Banda, Consumer ADR in Europe (Hart, 2012), 
p.360.
161 P Cortés, Online Dispute Resolution for Consumers in the European Union (Routledge, 
2011), p.68.
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On-line businesses such as eBay,162 PayPal163 and Amazon164 use ODR, often 
involving assisted negotiation, which can also be advantageous for businesses if 
it reduces negative feedback. It has been estimated that, after PayPal launched 
its dispute resolution centre, buyers’ claims decreased by 50% and chargebacks 
by 20%.165 In practice in some countries help may also be provided through 
charge, credit and debit card holders’ chargeback schemes based on contract or 
statutory rules.166
Assessment of EU ADR policy in an international context
The European ADR/ODR structure is really a clearing house directing consumers 
to schemes that meet minimum criteria. Member States must provide the trader 
with the option of offering ADR, but it is for traders to decide whether to partici-
pate. Equally, it is left to ADR providers to determine the extent to which they adapt 
their procedures to ODR norms. European law is nevertheless concerned to protect 
consumers and is based on ensuring mandatory European consumer law is applied. 
By contrast work going on at the international level by the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) is far more concerned 
with finding routes to resolve low-value claims through ODR and less concerned 
with the niceties of national consumer law. It is likely to provide a framework for 
negotiation (within the ODR framework), followed by facilitation and then arbi-
tration or another form of adjudication. UNCITRAL is likely to establish (i) mini-
mum standards for ODR providers, (ii) guidelines for neutral third parties, (iii) 
substantive legal principles for resolving disputes, and (iv) an enforcement protocol. 
The extent to which this is embraced by Europe depends upon how a trade-off is 
struck between achieving practical justice and protecting existing levels of con-
sumer protection. Though many common problems can easily be resolved through 
a rough-and-ready ODR scheme, there is value in ensuring EU consumer law mini-
mum standards are maintained, or else the substantive protection built up will be 
sacrificed on the altar of commercial and technological convenience.167
162 It has an eBay Moneyback Guarantee and also eBay Motors Vehicle Purchase Protection 
(VPP), see ‘Shop on eBay with complete confidence’ (eBay), http://pages.ebay.com/
ebay-money-back-guarantee/ [accessed on 11 March 2016].
163 Buyer Protection Programme, see ‘We’re on your side’ (PayPal), https://www.
paypal.com/hk/webapps/mpp/paypal-buyer-protection?locale.x=en_HK&utm_
source=owned-homepage&utm_medium=onsite&utm_campaign=2015-jul&utm_
content=buyerprotection [accessed 11 March 2016]. 
164 ‘A-to-Z guarantee protection for buyers’ (Amazon Payments), https://payments.amazon.
co.uk/help/201212340 [accessed 11 March 2016]. 
165 P Cortés, Online Dispute Resolution for Consumers in the European Union (Routledge, 
2011), p.60.
166 E.g. s.75 of the UK’s Consumer Credit Act 1974, which makes credit card suppliers jointly 
liable with traders, has been held to apply when the card was used outside the UK.
167 J Hörnle, ‘Online dispute resolution in the EU and beyond – keeping costs low or standards 
high?’ (Queen Mary School of Law Legal Studies, 2011) Research Paper No. 122/2012, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2154214 [accessed 11 March 2016]; 
Hodges and Stadler (n 105); P Cortés, ‘A new regulatory framework for extra-judicial 
consumer redress: Where we are and how to move forward’ (2015) 35 Legal Studies p.114.
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Public enforcement
Introduction
Many states have strong traditions of public enforcement of consumer law in 
order to promote a strong market and in recognition that consumers will often 
not take action frequently enough to be an effective control on bad practices and 
rogue traders. In some countries there is a tradition of state agencies enforcing 
consumer law e.g. the Scandinavian Ombudsmen and UK Consumer and Markets 
Authority (previously Office of Fair Trading). In others, private consumer organi-
zations have played a major role e.g. France, Spain and Italy. In Austria and 
Germany consumer organizations play a major role, but are heavily financed by 
the state to perform this function. The resources put into enforcement varies 
widely between states. Several of the new Member States do not finance their 
consumer protection authorities well. Some regulators also have dual functions as 
banking regulators or competition authorities and there are debates as to whether 
this strengthens their power or dilutes their focus on protecting consumers. 
State agencies typically use administrative and criminal law sanctions. These 
must, under general principles of EU law and according to formula found in most 
secondary laws, be sufficiently effective so as to be dissuasive.168 The extent to 
which they have powers, or seek to use powers, to compensate consumers affected 
by breach of the laws varies. It does not seem to be an issue frequently discussed 
at the EU level. EU law seems to separate private rights concerned with indi-
vidual redress and public law rules concerned with general market regulation169 
Injunctions – a European enforcement mechanism
The remedy of injunction has been a favourite tool of the EU. This is in line with 
modern regulatory theory that believes in a hierarchy of actions, with criminal 
sanction being reserved for the most severe transgressions.170 In practice most 
breaches will be dealt with by negotiation or the obtaining of undertakings from 
traders. The injunction is a civil law remedy directing a party to cease conduct 
that breaks the law. However, it also has a public-law character when invoked by 
the state.
Many of the directives that provide for injunctive powers leave it to national 
law to decide which entities can bring legal actions: state authorities or consumer 
organisations.171 Though in the United Kingdom, Which? successfully used the 
168 As included in e.g. Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts (1993) 
OJ L95/29, Art. 7(1); Directive 2002/65/EC on distance marketing of financial services 
(2002) OJ L217/16, Art. 11; Directive 2011/83/EU on Consumer Rights (2011) OJ 
L304/64, Art. 24(1). 
169 See discussion above, pp.294–296.
170 I Ayres and J Braithwaite, Responsible Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate 
(OUP, 1992).
171 Directive 2009/22/EC on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interests (2009) 
OJ L110/30.
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wording of the EU laws to push for it to be given new rights of standing to chal-
lenge unfair terms and to be a designated enforcer under Part 8 of the Enterprise 
Act 2008.
Consumer Injunctions Directive172
Powers to seek injunctions had been included in several directives, but there was 
no coherent approach. Moreover, it became apparent that it was harder to use 
injunctions under national law to stop practices that harmed consumers in another 
state.173 National authorities or consumer organizations in the place where the 
trader was based may have lacked the motivation or even powers to bring such 
actions, whilst relevant bodies in the country affected normally lacked standing 
in the courts of other Member States. To protect the interests of consumers in 
the internal market and to ensure the injunction was available even if the trader 
was operating from another Member State, Directive 98/27/EC on injunctions 
for the protection of consumers’ interests174 was adopted. This was replaced by 
Directive 2009/22/EC on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ inter-
ests175 which extended its scope, but kept the same basic structure.
The Directive leaves it to the discretion of Member States whether independent 
public bodies or private organizations, or both, should be qualified entities so long 
as they aim to protect the collective interests of consumers in relation to the 13 
directives listed in the Directive’s annex.176 A Member State’s list of qualified enti-
ties is communicated to the Commission and then published in the Official Journal 
by the Commission. For intra-Community infringements i.e. where an infringe-
ment originating in a Member State affects the interests protected by a qualified 
entity in another Member State,177 the courts or administrative authorities must 
accept this as proof of the legal capacity of the qualified entity to act before the 
courts or administrative tribunals it has designated for this purpose.
The United Kingdom’s Office of Fair Trading (now replaced by the Competition 
and Markets Authority) used these powers to bring an action in the Belgium 
courts against the mail order company Duchesne.178 Although an injunction was 
eventually obtained, the litigation had a complex history involving expense and 
many technical legal arguments. The OFT used the power again in 2008 to seek 
172 S Wrbka, European Consumer Access to Justice Revisited (Cambridge University Press, 
2014), pp.40–53; P Rott, ‘The protection of consumers’ interests after the implementation 
of the EC Injunctions Directive Into German and English Law’. (2001) 24 JCP p.399; H 
Schulte-Nölke, C Twigg-Flesner and M Ebers, EU Consumer Law Compendium (Sellier, 
2008).
173 H Micklitz, ‘Cross-border consumer conflicts – A French-German experience’ in N Reich 
and G Woodroffe (eds), European Consumer Policy after Maastricht (Springer, 1994). 
174 (1998) OJ L166/51.
175 (2009) OJ L110/30.
176 Ibid., Art. 3.
177 Ibid., Art. 4(1).
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Consumer access to justice and enforcement 321
an injunction against the Dutch distance-selling company, Best Sales.179 However, 
the 2008 Injunctions Directive Report180 made disappointing reading. Only two 
cases had been brought using the Directive’s provisions. The 2012 Injunction 
Directive Report181 seemed to show an improvement with 70 cases, but Wrbka 
sounds a cautionary note by commenting that in practice these were often not 
true intra-Community infringements, but rather cases being brought by bodies 
in their own courts against overseas firms.182 There was also an example of a co-
ordinated action with France’s UFC-Que Choisir and Belgium’s Test-Achats co-
ordinating and obtaining a judgment in the Belgium courts  obliging three airlines 
to stop using a number of contract terms regarded as unfair.183
It was noticeable that most of the cases were brought by entities with profes-
sional staff. As there are no minimum requirements for such entities or duties to 
undertake such work there is an obvious risk of uneven application given that the 
level of staff varies between the Member States. The gap is particularly obvious 
between the professional consumer organisations that exist in some states and the 
volunteer organisations that operate in others. However, variations in resources 
for this type of work also exist between Member States’ public authorities due to 
the varying levels of funding.
Qualified entities often still prefer to use their own language and legal systems. 
In many cases, as private international law rules may lead to the application of the 
substantive law of the state where consumers are affected, their home state is a 
natural forum. The intra-Community infringement proceeding also suffers from 
being expensive, lengthy184 and complex. No standardised procedure is set down. 
Injunctions in many states are limited to the case at hand and had no erga omnes 
effect and could even be limited to the territory of the state. Once obtained there 
may still be difficulties in enforcing injunctions.185
179 S Wrbka, European Consumer Access to Justice Revisited (Cambridge University Press, 
2014), p.44.
180 Report from the Commission concerning the application of Directive 98/27/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ 
interest COM (2008) 756 final.
181 Report from the Commission concerning the application of Directive 2009/22/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ 
interest COM (2012) 635 final.
182 S Wrbka, European Consumer Access to Justice Revisited (Cambridge University Press, 
2014), p.50.
183 Injunction Directives Report 2012 COM (2012) 635 final, para 2.5.
184 A study by J Stuyck and others, An Analysis and Evaluation of Alternative Means of 
Consumer Redress Other than Redress through Ordinary Judicial Proceedings – Final 
Report (Leuven, 17 Jan 2007) http://www.eurofinas.org/uploads/documents/policies/
OTHER%20POLICY%20ISSUES/comparative_report_en.pdf [accessed 11 March 2016], 
p.324 found the proceedings could last from a few months to several years depending on 
which state they were brought in. The Injunctions Directive Report 2012 (COM (2012) 
635 final) para 4.2 noted it could take more than five years in some states.
185 See S Wrbka, European Consumer Access to Justice Revisited (Cambridge University 
Press, 2014), pp.45–51; Report from the Commission concerning the application of 
Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on injunctions for 
the protection of consumers’ interest COM (2008) 756 final, para 17–27; Injunctions 
Directive Report 2012 COM (2012) 635 final, paras 4.1–5.
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The Commission has been positive about states going beyond the minimum 
requirements to extend the injunctions to other fields.186 This is a rare recent 
endorsement from Brussels of the value of minimum harmonisation for consumers. 
It is fair to conclude that the EU has managed to make the injunction a per-
vasive method of addressing breaches of consumer law in order to strengthen the 
regulation of the market. It was not so easy to make it effective in cross-border 
contexts.
Consumer Protection Co-operation Regulation
The practical difficulties of obtaining cross-border injunctions persuaded the 
Commission to change course and in the Regulation on consumer protection 
co-operation187 instead requires the authorities in the state where the trader is 
located to take action. This has proven to be a helpful measure even if there has 
been a need to propose some modifications.188 
Each Member State has to produce a list of National Competent Authorities 
(NCAs) with specific responsibilities for enforcing consumer law, as well as a 
Single Liaison Office (SLO) which plays a co-ordinating role. These NCAs 
must be equipped with minimum powers to investigate and take action against 
intra-Community infringements.189 Intra-Community infringements cover acts 
or omissions that affect the collective interest of consumers in states other than 
the state where the act of omission occurred, or where the seller or supplier 
is established, or, where evidence or assets pertaining to the act or omission 
are.190 The annex lists 19 EU directives or regulations to which the Regulation 
applies.
One authority can request from another information on whether an intra-
Community infringement has occurred or may occur.191 There can also be a 
request that a national authority take all necessary enforcement measures to bring 
about the cessation or prohibition of the intra-Community infringement without 
delay.192 One potential gap in the legislation is that it does not cover action to 
prosecute infringements which have already ceased. There is a proposal to amend 
the Regulation in this respect.193 There may be good reasons for bringing actions 
against those who have behaved poorly in the past based on the impact and seri-
ousness of the infringement or the recidivist nature of the perpetrator. 
Member States should notify competent authorities and the Commission 
of actions taken as well as any knowledge they have of other intra-Community 
186 Injunctions Directive Report 2012 (COM (2012) 635 final), para 2.3.
187 Regulation 2006/2004/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 
2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of 
consumer protection laws (2004) OJ L364/1.
188 See COM (2016) 283 final.
189 Reg 2006/2004, Art. 4(6).
190 Ibid., Art. 3(b).
191 Ibid., Art. 6. 
192 Ibid., Art. 8.
193 See COM (2016) 283 final.
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infringements.194 These together with any details of co-ordinated actions195 
should be sent to Commission and are kept on its CPC IT System database.196 
Revised surveillance mechanisms are being proposed.197
Co-ordinated actions have been organised. These have involved sweeps against 
targeted bad practices. They have been some of the most high profile and success-
ful achievements of the Regulation. 
On the whole the Regulation seems to be welcomed by national authori-
ties. However, it often serves as a stop-gap measure as many of these activities 
would take place in any event through bilateral arrangements. Nevertheless, the 
Consumer Protection Cooperation Network (CPC Network) provides a good 
framework for co-operation. 
There has been a debate as to whether the Commission should have a more 
prominent role, either to nudge authorities to give proper resources and engage 
fully with the Regulation or in some instances to take on enforcement of EU-level 
infringements. Recent reform proposals suggest the Commission should have 
the power in the case of widespread infringements to adopt a common action by 
decision.198 As recent litigation around the Apple contract shows, there is a need 
to ensure that European law is not only applied across the Union, but is applied 
evenly and the Commission might have a role to play in this regard.199 It is also 
being proposed that the minimum powers of national authorities be increased.200 
It would also be helpful if the Commission was given the power to monitor the 
resources Member States invest in consumer enforcement, such as those in the 
Market Surveillance Regulation Proposal 2013. Some problems extend beyond 
resources and are harder to address as they go to the heart of national traditions. 
For example, delays are sometimes caused due to national rules requiring authori-
ties to go to court before taking action and there are differences in the range and 
extent of sanctions imposed.
Conclusions
The EU has attempted to raise the general level of market surveillance by requir-
ing agencies be established at the national level. In the context of product safety 
it was noted that it has proposed that their work programmes and resourcing be 
monitored. Further efforts in this direction are to be welcomed to promote a 
more consistent enforcement of EU law across the Member States. 
194 Reg 2006/2004, Art. 7. 
195 Ibid., Art. 9.
196 Ibid., Art. 10.
197 See COM (2016) 283 final.
198 See COM (2016) 283 final.
199 M Djurovic, ‘The Apple case: The commencement of pan-European battle against unfair 
commercial practices’ (2013) 9 European Review of Contract Law p.253.
200 See COM (2016) 283 final.
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The EU has promoted the use of the injunction as a tool for remedying market 
failure. EU policy favours effective public regulation of the market, but leaves 
Member States to determine which agents should be responsible for ensuring 
compliance. Traditional private law plays a more marginal role in market regula-
tion. The request, rather than demand, for Member States to consider introduc-
ing collective redress perhaps underlines this. However, ADR is emphasised for 
individual redress and these mechanisms often operate at least in the shadow of 
private law. Private law has an indirect effect on market conduct of traders.
Often, EU initiatives in this area have focused on the Single Market dimen-
sion, with some EU legislation in this field also covering domestic matters (nota-
bly as regards promotion of ADR). In the field of collective redress, it has been 
left to national systems to consider devising their own procedures based on rec-
ommendations. In this context, this approach should be welcomed as it respects 
the need for diversity within Europe based on national traditions and cultures. 
This is particularly prized in civil procedure where respect for national procedural 
autonomy is widely recognised as a guiding principle. It is nevertheless helpful to 
encourage states to converge voluntarily. 
Even at the national level consumers and regulators face problems in accessing 
or securing justice. However, the internal market creates additional problems for 
enforcers and consumers seeking redress. The EU is working to find enhanced 
solutions. Europe has realised that good laws need good enforcement. This is an 
area in which one might expect to see increased activity. This may not involve too 
many new laws, but rather practical initiatives promoting action on the ground. 
National traditions will continue to have important influences on the exact 
contours of Member States’ procedures and preferences on forms of redress and 
manner of enforcement. Nevertheless, the EU Commission has an important role 
to play in providing a viable framework for consumer enforcement and redress. 
This should not be restricted to ensuring only cross-border disputes can be han-
dled effectively. It needs to monitor the practical application of EU law within 
Member States to ensure it is being effectively enforced. Consumers and trad-
ers need to be assured that consumer law will be applied and enforced equally 
throughout the Union. This is in practice an even more demanding and longer-
term project than harmonising the substantive acquis.
9 To boldly go where EU consumer 
law has not gone before
Conclusions
In this final chapter, we seek to draw together our main conclusions which emerge 
from the detailed consideration of the various areas of EU consumer law surveyed 
in this book. Having considered the current state of EU consumer law, we look 
ahead at how things could develop in the future. At the time of writing, a number 
of initiatives are on the horizon, a sure sign that the field of EU consumer law 
continues to be an ‘incoming tide’.1 However, whilst we can already see a number 
of initiatives, we will take this opportunity to reflect on the lessons that can be 
drawn from our analysis of current EU consumer law to put forward a number of 
theses as to how we think EU consumer law should develop in the future.
The current state of EU consumer law
In our opening chapter, we set our six aspects which have shaped our discussion 
in this book. Having considered a number of areas of EU consumer law in detail, 
we return to these to set out how our analysis has substantiated those points:
The balance between internal market and consumer protection 
objectives has swung too much in favour of market integration by the 
overstatement of the case for maximum harmonisation
Over the preceding chapters, the tension between the EU Commission’s desire 
to pursue full, or maximum, harmonisation across all aspects of EU consumer 
law and the reluctance by (at least some of) the Member States to accept this 
has been a recurring theme. There can be no doubt that maximum harmonisa-
tion does have a role to play: for example with regard to technical standards for 
goods and services to ensure parity across the Single Market. One might even 
accept full harmonisation for rules governing individual contractual relation-
ships where these are of an essentially technical nature, such as the right of 
 1 A phrase famously used by Lord Denning MR in H.P. Bulmer Ltd v J. Bollinger SA [1974] 
Ch.401 in describing the effect of the United Kingdom becoming a member of the then-
European Economic Community. At the time of writing, the flow of the tide seems to be 
reversing in view of the UK’s vote to leave the EU.
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withdrawal or information duties. We can observe some success in this respect 
in the context of the Consumer Credit Directive,2 for example – as well as 
the rules on pre-contractual information and the right of withdrawal in other 
measures.3
However, with substantive rules of consumer law such as unfair terms or con-
sumer sales law, this has proven much more difficult, not least because the het-
erogeneous nature of European consumers in an EU of (still) 28 Member States 
does require some regional adjustment for the regulation of consumer contracts. 
Moreover, the experience with the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive has 
demonstrated that the implications of a maximum harmonisation approach may 
not always be appreciated fully at the time the Member States agree to a direc-
tive. The surprise this can cause was seen when the CJEU held that the Product 
Liability Directive was a maximum harmonisation measure – the Member States 
responded with a resolution calling on the Commission to mitigate the effects of 
this ruling (without success).4
A significant proportion of the CJEU’s case law in respect of the UCPD is 
concerned with national provisions which have been found to be incompat-
ible with the UCPD’s maximum harmonisation standard.5 The experience here 
shows in its starkest terms the effect of maximum harmonisation in removing 
any possibility for a Member State to deal with matters which might only affect 
that particular country or to deal with local peculiarities. The CJEU has time 
and again held that any commercial practices not included in Annex I to the 
UCPD cannot be prohibited outright.6 Instead, enforcement bodies have to 
challenge traders on the basis of the criteria in Arts. 5–8 UCPD. Ultimately, 
this will necessitate court action, including the possibility of appeals and prelim-
inary ruling requests, which could make this a process which is prohibitive both 
in terms of time and cost. The justification for removing the power of Member 
States to take any form of unilateral action once a field has become subject to 
maximum harmonisation is that permitting Member States to take unilateral 
action would adversely affected the level playing-field of the Single Market. 
Consumer protection concerns are brushed aside. The real problem here is the 
failure of the EU to recognise that there might be good reasons for national 
variations which outweigh any potential negative effect on the uniformity of 
the EU’s legal rules. Maximum harmonisation has created an imbalance in the 
ability of Member States to regulate, to the detriment of consumer protection 
(to mis-quote Art. 3 of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive). However, a bet-
ter balance could have been struck by providing for some mechanism by which 
Member States could take action unilaterally where specific domestic concerns 
so require. This could have taken a form similar to the safeguard procedure 
 2 See Chapter 6.
 3 See Chapter 3.
 4 See Chapter 7, p.265.
 5 See Chapter 2.
 6 See the discussion at pp.75–80.
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in the General Product Safety Directive,7 or notification procedures with the 
Commission providing temporary authorisation for action within one Member 
State.8 
As things stand, the absence of a general safeguard procedure that would 
allow a Member State to derogate from maximum harmonisation standards 
in circumstances where there is a consumer protection problem particular to 
that Member State is regrettable. Article 114 TFEU, the basis for most EU 
consumer law directives, provides a treaty-based derogation9 only in respect of 
the major needs referred to in Article 36 TFEU10 or ‘new scientific evidence 
relating to the protection of the environment or the working environment on 
grounds of a problem specific to that Member State’11 – but not consumer 
protection. Moreover, it is not permissible to introduce safeguard procedures 
into measures adopted on the basis of Art. 114 TFEU except for the reasons 
mentioned in Art. 36 TFEU.12 This leaves a binary choice when it comes to 
EU consumer law: minimum  harmonisation or insufficient political support for 
a measure. Member States might be more willing to explore the potential for 
maximum harmonisation in respect of aspects of consumer law currently sub-
ject to minimum harmonisation if they had some reassurance that, if domes-
tic circumstances so necessitated, they could derogate from this in particular 
instances.
In some areas of consumer law, minimum harmonisation was also seen as the 
only option for achieving any kind of common European set of rules, and this 
situation has not changed significantly over the decades. Particular examples of 
areas where minimum harmonisation was the only option are the directives deal-
ing with rules on substantive aspects of contract law, notably the directives on 
unfair contract terms and consumer sales.13 There is some variation as between 
the Member States in terms of the values and objectives of contract law. Broadly 
speaking, this ranges from the laissez-faire non-interventionist view in the com-
mon-law jurisdiction to the co-operative ethic championed by the Nordic coun-
tries, with other countries along the spectrum. The effect of three decades may 
have lessened the starkness of these variations, but they remain present in the 
fabric of domestic contract laws. Invariably, an attempt to introduce common 
EU rules on topics such as the regulation of unfair terms would clash with the 
range of different contract law philosophies, leaving minimum harmonisation as 
the only viable approach to achieve anything.
 7 Art. 3(4), Directive 2001/95/EC.
 8 Cf. Chapter 2, p.83.
 9 See Art. 114(4)–(10) TFEU.
10 These are: ‘public morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health and 
life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, 
historic or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property’, 
but do not include consumer protection.
11 Art. 114 (5) TFEU.
12 See Art. 114(10) TFEU.
13 Cf. Recitals (2)–(5) of the Consumer Sales Directive (99/44/EC).
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A high level of consumer protection is desirable not only for 
consumers but to enhance the international competitiveness of the 
‘European brand’
Our conception of a ‘European consumer protection brand’ is one which pri-
oritises a high common level of consumer protection throughout the EU. An 
attempt to give this a clear branding was the ‘blue button’ idea for the abandoned 
Common European Sales Law.14 A hallmark of this brand is the template function 
of the EU model of regulation for countries outside the EU.
A good example of the European brand is in the context of product safety 
regulation and the rules contained in the Product Liability Directive.15 This has 
had beneficial effects both in respect of the legislation itself – which has served 
as a template for regulation in various non-EU countries as far as Australia 
– and also for the products made in the EU which demonstrate compliance 
with its high standards. Indeed, in order to be able to sell goods into the EU 
market, compliance with its technical standards (as evidenced by the widely-
used ‘CE’ marking16) is essential. As a corollary, the EU’s safety standards can 
contribute to improving safety standards elsewhere in the world, because pro-
ducers wishing to sell their goods to the EU have to meet the EU’s strict safety 
requirements. 
Similarly, EU consumer legislation has served as a template for law reform in 
other jurisdictions. The Product Liability Directive17 has been influential in the 
Asia-Pacific region.18 Similarly, the Unfair Contract Terms Directive has served 
as a benchmark for the Australian rules on unfair terms.19 The inspiration for 
countries outside the EU to align their consumer laws with the EU’s rules seems, 
at least in part, to have been inspired by the legislation giving effect to the EU 
directives in the United Kingdom. Indeed, as a leading common-law jurisdiction, 
the UK’s consumer legislation could have a much broader impact throughout 
the common law world. In this regard, the withdrawal of the UK from the EU 
could lessen the reach of the ‘EU consumer protection brand’ in those countries, 
especially if the UK will not continue to benchmark its consumer laws against 
those of the EU.
14 See Chapter 5, p.203, and H Schulte-Nölke, “EC Law on the formation of contract – 
from the Common Frame of Reference to the ‘blue button’” (2007) European Review of 
Contract Law p.332.
15 Discussed in Chapter 7.
16 Although it has been noted that consumers might not fully appreciate the notion of this 
and other certification marks: see C Poncibo, ‘Private certification schemes as consumer 
protection: A viable supplement to regulation in Europe?’ (2007) 31 International Journal 
of Consumer Studies p.656.
17 Discussed in Chapter 7.
18 See J Kellam and L Nottage, ‘Europeanisation of product liability in the Asia-Pacific 
region: A preliminary empirical benchmark’ (2008) 31 Journal of Consumer Policy p.217.
19 See Schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010. Australian law does not have 
the same fairness test as that in the EU’s Directive (discussed in Chapter 4) – there is no 
reference to ‘good faith’, although the significant imbalance criterion does feature.
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Not every aspect of EU Consumer Law reflects the ‘EU consumer protec-
tion brand’, however. For example, the provision and regulation of consumer 
credit might work within the Single Market, but it is not something that could 
be offered beyond. There is limited cross-border provision of consumer credit 
and there is likely to be even less outside the EU’s borders. On the other hand, 
developments such as the increased focus on responsible lending20 could have 
beneficial effects in setting a trend for taking this into account elsewhere.
Moreover, the EU brand lacks coherence, which is in no small measure due 
to the piecemeal development of EU consumer law, particularly because this 
occurred without clear agreement on the broader principles which should under-
pin the various directives. There is room for strengthening the brand. At the end 
of this chapter, we will suggest a number of broader principles on which a more 
coherent brand could be built – indeed, we strongly argue for a debate about 
what those principles should be. 
The EU approach to consumer protection risks being viewed as 
insufficiently protective due to its adoption of the average consumer 
standard and an information-based protection model which has not 
been developed in a sophisticated manner taking into account the 
lessons of behavioural economics
At various points in this book, the focus on the normative (and rather unrealistic) 
concept of the ‘average consumer’ was criticised.21 The CJEU and the Commission 
have continued to invoke the ‘average consumer’ who is supposed to be reasonably 
well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect. This is despite the fact 
that there is a considerable amount of research which reveals that most consumers 
have none of these characteristics. Much can be learned from behavioural econom-
ics and consumer psychology in developing an entirely new consumer concept.
Already, there is a partial recognition that there are some groups of consum-
ers which do not fit the norm, and whose interests do nevertheless need to be 
protected in particular situations. EU consumer law does protect the needs of 
particular groups of consumers in some instances, although it lacks a coherent 
approach in this regard. For example, in several areas, there is an obligation to 
take into account the needs of certain vulnerable groups.22 In the context of 
product safety, this is done by requiring that account of is taken of categories 
of consumers who might be at particular risk when using a potentially danger-
ous product.23 Similarly, the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive provides 
for consideration of the impact of commercial practices on targeted groups of 
consumers, as well as particular categories of vulnerable consumers.24 However, 
20 See Chapter 6, p.218.
21 See e.g. Chapter 1, pp.27–31 and Chapter 2, pp.66–73.
22 Notably in the UCPD, Art. 5(2) and (3).
23 See Chapter 7, p.277.
24 See Chapter 2, p.72.
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these approaches lack a coherent and consistent approach; in particular, the 
criteria for establishing whether a consumer should be regarded as vulnerable 
seem rather basic.25
Linked to the notion of the ‘average consumer’ is the importance of informa-
tion, reflected in many rules of EU consumer law which mandate the provision of 
information to consumers. After all, in order to be a ‘reasonably well-informed’ 
consumer, a consumer must be given a lot of information! The information-
based approach filters through not only in the overt provision of information to 
consumers in various contexts, but also in the way that information is used to 
adjust the potential liability of a trader towards a consumer. For example, in the 
context of product safety and product liability, information about risks conveyed 
through warnings and instructions can reduce the exposure of a trader towards 
a consumer.26 Time and again, the preference of the EU’s legislature has been 
the promotion of information-based rules over substantive regulation, however. 
This may be in part the result of the emphasis put on the value of information 
over regulation in early rulings by the CJEU on the free movement of goods.27 
However, whilst there is clearly a place for rules requiring the provision of infor-
mation, insufficient thought has been given to research findings about an indi-
vidual’s ability to comprehend and process information which have emerged from 
the field of behavioural economics. Taking full account of these would necessitate 
a careful review of the rules in EU consumer law on the provision of information. 
This is particularly apparent e.g. in the context of consumer credit.28 It is not 
enough simply to require that consumers are furnished with a lot of information 
unless due account is taken of the personal context of each individual consumer. 
At present, information is insufficiently tailored towards an individual consumer’s 
particular requirements. Indeed, consumer credit is an example where too much 
information might not only undermine the ability of the consumer to make an 
informed choice but increase the risk of poor choices being made. Similarly, the 
volume of information routinely to be provided to a consumer when buying on-
line is unlikely to make a difference to many consumers. One solution for using 
information more effectively would be to find ways of personalising this so it 
becomes more relevant to an individual consumer.29
It is worth noting that in the context of unfair contract terms, the CJEU seems 
to want to lessen the rigour of the principle of the supposed circumspectness of 
the consumer. Although the average consumer test is also now applied in this 
context, the CJEU’s interpretation of the transparency test is done in a more 
consumer-friendly way. This is seen in particular in its focus on ensuring a term is 
25 See Chapter 2, p.71.
26 See Chapter 7, p.260.
27 Seminally, Case 120/78 Rewe v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de 
Dijon) [1979] ECR 649; see also e.g. C Mak, ‘Free movement and contract law’ in C 
Twigg-Flesner (ed), Research Handbook on EU Consumer and Contract Law (Elgar, 2016).
28 See Chapter 6.
29 Cf. Chapter 3, p.112.
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economically understandable for the consumer, rather than on pure grammatical 
intelligibility.30
Overall, however, the consumer image deployed in EU consumer law is in 
need of an overhaul and needs to be based on the rich evidence about human 
behaviour which is now available.
EU consumer law should be more explicit in recognising that it has 
a social welfare function of redistributing risk
An implicit feature of many consumer law rules is that they have the effect of 
distributing the risks associated with transactions across all consumers using the 
trader as the mediator and insurer of risk.
The risk-distribution function can be seen clearly with the Product Liability 
Directive, which spreads the risk of harm caused by defective products among all 
consumers. It does so by imposing strict liability on the producer of goods, who is 
likely to spread the risk of having to compensate some injured consumers among 
all consumers through the price charged for the product. In a similar vein, a 
minimum legal quality standard such as the conformity requirement in consumer 
sales has an insurance function. These functions have been recognised in business 
models which offer insurance going beyond the legal requirements, e.g. through 
the sale of so-called ‘extended warranties’.31
It is equally evident with the regulation of consumer credit – the risk of default of 
a proportion of consumer borrowers is factored into the cost a lender will impose on 
all its customers. Although that cost itself is not regulated in legislation, transparency 
about this cost is relevant e.g. in stating the APR.32 It is also possible to identify a 
risk-distribution function with the regulation of unfair contract terms. In providing 
that unfair standard terms are not binding on a consumer, there is less of a burden on 
individual consumers to check contract terms carefully before they conclude a con-
tract. A consumer can rely on the unfair terms rules subsequently if a trader relies on a 
term which would not withstand scrutiny. This risk-sharing function is reinforced by 
the strong public enforcement approach taken in the unfair contract terms directive.
In addition to the risk-distribution perspective, one should also employ a 
transaction cost perspective to the issue. The time used for studying the contract 
terms is a transaction cost for the consumer which is often forgotten in the con-
sumer policy discussions. If consumers would really study all the terms they are 
confronted with, both in traditional contracting and nowadays in particular in 
digital contracting, this might take several weeks of the year.33 
30 See Chapter 4, p.152.
31 These have been a particular issue in the UK, but are also an issue elsewhere in the EU. 
Cf. C Twigg-Flesner.‘Dissatisfaction guaranteed? The legal issues of extended warranties 
explored’ (2002) 4 Web Journal of Current Legal Issues. (archived at http://www.bailii.
org/uk/other/journals/WebJCLI/2002/issue4/twigg-flesner4.html)
32 Chapter 6, p.232.
33 As evidenced by the publicity exercise by the Norwegian Consumer Council in May 2016, 
when it read out all the terms and conditions of 33 smartphone apps. This took more than 
30 hours. See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36378215 [last accessed 30 
December 2016].
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However, whilst it is possible to identify the risk-distribution effect of consumer 
law when analysing particular directives, it is rarely set out as a function or effect of 
these directives during the legislative process, nor is this acknowledged explicitly in 
the recitals. Nevertheless, it is important to highlight the inherent risk-distribution 
effect of much of EU consumer law.34 This draws out the fact that risk-distribution 
is already a feature of EU consumer law, so when it comes to considering future 
developments in this field, lawmakers should not be afraid to make this characteris-
tic more visible and, indeed, expressly develop rules on the basis of this. 
EU legislation should be in a form which allows the EU rules to be 
integrated into national regimes and parallel regimes for cross-border 
sales should only be introduced where there are good justifications
Consumer protection should be seen as a matter of general importance for the 
EU, which means that there should be a pursuit of a common high base-line 
throughout the EU. However, the focus on the Single Market and the drive for 
maximum harmonisation have had the upper hand over consumer protection. 
Maximum harmonisation is justified as the best means of ensuring that traders 
can operate throughout the Single Market without having to deal with variations 
in legal rules. From that perspective, a regime on cross-border transactions might 
seem more logical.35 However, consumer protection should not be concerned 
with stark uniformity. There may be instances where specific rules for cross-bor-
der situations might seem desirable and should be adopted. One criticism that 
could be levelled at the Commission in this regard is that it has not been bold 
enough in identifying and tackling aspects of the substantive law which could spe-
cifically support cross-border transactions. A key example here is the continuing 
reluctance to develop proposals for the direct liability of a producer for the qual-
ity of goods (and digital content) or the even bolder idea of network liability.36 
Much of the harmonisation work of substantive consumer law has primarily been 
concerned with establishing a set of common rules on the assumption that this 
would facilitate consumer transactions in the Single Market.37 However, there has 
not been a consistent focus on considering whether the harmonised rules could 
really have this effect in practical terms.
On the other hand, in the context of redress and access to justice, more 
has been done to focus on cross-border issues.38 In particular, the ODR 
34 This extends beyond the topics considered in this book. Consider e.g. Regulation 261/2004/
EC establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of 
denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights (2004) OJ L46/1.
35 C Twigg-Flesner, A Cross-Border-Only Regulation for Consumer Transactions in the EU – A 
New Approach to EU Consumer Law (Springer, 2012).
36 See Chapter 5, p.202, and R Bradgate and C Twigg-Flesner, ‘Expanding the boundaries of 
liability for quality defects’ (2002) 25 Journal of Consumer Policy p.345.
37 For example, Recital 5 to the Consumer Sales Directive (99/44/EC) states that ‘the 
creation of a common set of minimum rules of consumer law, valid no matter where goods 
are purchased within the Community, will strengthen consumer confidence and enable 
consumers to make the most of the internal market’.
38 See Chapter 8.
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regulation39 has introduced a procedure which should make it easier for con-
sumers who have bought something in another Member State to raise a com-
plaint and seek redress. Similarly, mechanisms to ensure co-operation between 
national consumer protection authorities40 are welcome from a cross-border 
perspective. 
The overall impression is that the tension between consumer protection and 
the Single Market objective remains as present as ever. There is a need to ensure 
common levels of consumer protection throughout the Single Market, but that 
alone will not make it easier, nor encourage, consumers to source goods, ser-
vices or digital content from suppliers in another Member State. Procedures for 
easier redress should help to reassure consumers that it will not be too difficult 
to deal with subsequent complaints, and considerable progress on this has been 
made. However, if the legal rights of consumers are not suited to the particular 
difficulties associated with cross-border transactions, then the impact of these 
procedures will be limited. There is still a need to consider how a common 
standard of consumer protection can combine the issues associated with local 
face-to-face transactions and on-line cross-border transactions in a coherent and 
clear set of legal rules.
The EU needs to ensure laws are effectively enforced
As Chapter 8 on access to justice has demonstrated, the EU has developed a 
broad portfolio of initiatives to support the enforcement of EU consumer law, 
ranging from out-of-court procedures to litigation to public enforcement. The 
EU has covered the full spectrum of possible approaches. Yet, one cannot help 
but feel that despite the best of intentions, the EU has been fairly unsuccess-
ful in making a real difference, at least as far as enforcement across jurisdic-
tional boundaries is concerned – utilisation of the various procedures seems to 
be rather low.
However, looking beyond the obvious attempts of the EU to promote the 
enforcement of EU consumer law by various means, there has been a more 
indirect effect of some aspects on enforcement. The clearest example of this 
is the extensive body of case law developed by the CJEU in respect of the 
‘ex officio doctrine’, i.e. the obligation of national courts to raise the unfair-
ness of a contract term of their own motion. This is perhaps the strongest 
instance of the ‘Jack-in-the-box’ effect of EU consumer law – few anticipated 
the emergence of strong procedural requirements out of a basic duty to ensure 
the enforcement of the Directive. Indeed, this doctrine has developed beyond 
the area of unfair contract terms to apply to most areas of consumer law now. 
Although there are still areas of EU consumer law in respect of which the 
CJEU has not (yet) been asked to rule on the obligations of national courts 
39 See p.315.
40 See p.322.
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to apply consumer law rules of their own motion, it may be assumed that this 
doctrine now applies across the board. The extent to which this should be 
welcomed is linked to the onus put on national courts – are they permitted 
or obliged to raise consumer law of their own motion? This is also linked to 
questions of legal tradition which will influence the ability or willingness of 
national courts in a particular jurisdiction to respond. Many of the references 
to the CJEU which have resulted in the body of case law defining the scope of 
the ex officio doctrine originated in southern and eastern EU countries. Those 
might be more prepared to take this obligation seriously. In an adversarial 
system such as that in the UK, it might take more for judges to act in line with 
an ex officio obligation.41
Future developments
The picture of EU consumer law presented in this book is inevitably only a snap-
shot of the state-of-affairs at the beginning of 2017. A number of future devel-
opments are already on the horizon, and a few words on these are appropriate 
here. In particular, the EU’s current focus is on the digital environment and the 
possible legal challenges this creates. Alongside various initiatives in that context, 
there is also an ongoing review exercise into the current state of EU consumer law 
(‘REFIT’). However, these developments have a distinct flavour of ‘more of the 
same’ in terms of the techniques and approaches to EU consumer law discussed 
throughout this book, as the following overview demonstrates. 
The digital agenda
The EU has decided that the main focus of its activities in the near term should 
be on facilitating the development of a digital Single Market, i.e. to support the 
rapidly-evolving use of the internet and smart-technology. Invariably, this will 
mean considering new legislation on a range of issues, including consumer law. 
The Commission has set out its thinking in the Digital Single Market Strategy,42 
and has since followed this up with a range of proposals. 
Of immediate interest to us are the proposals for two new directives which 
were made in December 2015. The first would introduce maximum harmonisa-
tion rules for the on-line and distance sale of consumer goods,43 and the second, 
41 Although note that as far as the UK legislation on unfair terms is concerned, there is now a 
statutory duty on a court to consider the fairness of a term without this being raised by the 
parties, provided the court has sufficient factual and legal material to consider the term’s 
fairness: see s.70 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015.
42 The cornerstone document is the European Commission’s communication A Digital 
Single Market for Europe, COM (2015) 192 final, 6 May 2015.
43 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain Aspects 
Concerning Contracts for the Online and Other Distance Sales of Goods COM (2015) 635 
final, 9 December 2015.
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new rules for the supply of digital content.44 At the time of writing, neither 
directive had progressed significantly through the legislative process, although 
it seems that priority has been given to the proposal on digital content. This 
is not altogether surprising: the proposal for the on-line and distance sales of 
goods overlaps with the Consumer Rights Directive (2011/83/EU) and the 
Consumer Sales Directive (99/44/EC), and there seems to be no real need 
to introduce a new set of rules which deals with one particular means of selling 
goods. It seems that this proposal was only made in anticipation of the outcome 
of the REFIT exercise.45
The proposal on digital content is likely to fare better, not least because there 
are few Member States which currently have legislation on digital content in 
place.46 Developing legislation at the EU level in respect of matters which are 
not already widely regulated domestically is likely to fare better because there 
are fewer existing positions to be balanced. The proposal primarily focuses on 
establishing a conformity standard for digital content and remedies for instances 
when there is a lack of conformity of the digital content. However, there are 
concerns about the substance of these rules in the original proposal. For exam-
ple, the test for establishing whether digital content is in ‘conformity with the 
contract’ in draft Article 6 takes as its starting point the subjective agreement 
of the parties,47 and ‘fitness for normal use’ is merely a default requirement in 
the absence of any agreement. In the context of the sale of goods,48 there is a 
stronger objective element in the presumption of conformity, and traders are less 
able to manipulate these elements to lower the overall standard of quality. The 
approach taken in the digital content proposal is surprising, not least because 
the idea of party agreement on which it is based, particularly in the supply of 
digital content, seems to be even more of a fiction than it is in the context of 
the sale of goods. Generally, acquiring digital content is an automated process 
and there is no room for negotiation between the parties. With the absence of 
human intervention on the trader’s side, how can there be said to be any real 
agreement between the parties?49 This proposal, wedded as it is to old ideas of 
what constitutes a contract and how it is formed, is a clear illustration of one of 
the central problems with EU consumer law: a conception of law which is insuf-
ficiently forward-looking. 
44 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Certain Aspects 
Concerning Contracts for the Supply of Digital Content COM (2015) 634 final, 9 December 
2015.
45 See below.
46 The UK’s Consumer Rights Act 2015 contains a dedicated chapter on the quality and 
fitness for purpose of digital content and remedies. There is also specific legislation in place 
in the Netherlands.
47 See also Recital 25 of the proposal.
48 See Chapter 5, p.179.
49 Cf. J Smits, The New EU Proposal for Harmonised Rules for the Online Sales of Tangible 
Goods: Conformity, Lack of Conformity and Remedies, Study for the JURI Committee of 
the European Parliament (February 2016), p.9.
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We can also raise a more general question, taking us back to one of our main 
themes: the ‘European brand of consumer protection’. There needs to be clarity 
as to what the purpose of a ‘conformity’ requirement is. Historically, it served 
as a default rule for instances when the parties to a contract had not specified 
what qualities they had agreed on with regard to the goods supplied. However, 
in the modern consumer context, a conformity requirement increasingly fulfils 
the role of laying down a clear legal standard which goods – and therefore any 
digital content – supplied to consumers must meet. The EU would be best 
advised to think about how it can really create a clear legal framework in support 
of digital content. 
By way of contrast, it is also interesting to see that the Commission appears to 
have adopted a slightly more cautious attitude to the need for further legislation 
as regards online platforms that are central to many digital transactions, not least 
because the digital environment is one where new business models are still emerg-
ing. A particular area of difficulty is how the various types of on-line platforms 
should be regulated, if at all.50 The Commission’s approach seems to be not to rush 
towards adopting regulatory measures for on-line platforms. In its Communication 
on Online Platforms, it has indicated that it would adopt a two-stage approach 
to creating a regulatory environment for on-line platforms:51 first, prior to any 
action being taken, it will identify what problems will need to be tackled, and any 
regulatory action will be in response to identified problems; and second, instead of 
introducing new legislation, it will first be considered whether existing laws can be 
applied to deal with any specific problems which are discovered. 
This is further reflected in the separate Communication on the Collaborative 
Economy,52 where the European Commission considers whether sharing-economy 
platforms should be subject to specific regulation. It is already the case that these 
platforms are covered by the restrictive liability provisions of the E-Commerce 
Directive, at least to the extent that they provide an ‘information society ser-
vice’. However, many collaborative-economy platforms go further and could be 
regarded as providing the underlying service, particularly where they rely on a 
strong brand-image. Where that is the case, additional obligations such as licenc-
ing requirements must be complied with by the platform.53 Whether this applies 
to any particular platform requires a case-by-case analysis. The Commission has 
suggested that relevant factors include the extent to which the platform sets the 
final price and the key contract terms for the contractual relationship between 
50 Cf. G Noto La Diega, ‘Uber law and awareness by design. An empirical study on online 
platforms and dehumanised negotiations’ (2015) European Journal of Consumer Law 
p.383.
51 European Commission, Communication on Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market 
– Opportunities and Challenges for Europe, COM (2016) 288/2, p.5.
52 European Commission, Communication on a European Agenda for the Collaborative 
Economy COM (2016) 356 final.
53 One only needs to consider how the ride-sharing platform Uber has been treated in various 
EU countries.
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recipient and provider, and whether the platform owns the key assets used in pro-
viding the service.54 But this Communication also maintains a cautious approach. 
On the one hand, this is to be welcomed, because it avoids a rush towards new 
legislation. On the other, there is a real risk that some consumer issues might fall 
through the cracks of existing consumer laws, where it is not immediately pos-
sible to extend the reach of the current law to the specific matters which arise in 
the context of the on-line platform economy.
The various initiatives forming part of the digital agenda have yet to be adopted 
and, where required, implemented into national law, so it is too soon to say what 
the full extent of new legislation with a consumer protection focus and its likely 
impact will be. Maximum harmonisation is the Commission’s preferred option, 
but we remain unconvinced that this is appropriate for substantive rules of con-
sumer law for the reasons we have set out throughout this book. That aside, there 
is considerable room for improving the quality of substance of these proposals. It 
would be regrettable if the digital agenda were to suffer from the same problems 
affecting current EU consumer law. There is a window of opportunity for doing 
things differently and better but it will not be open forever. 
The REFIT exercise
At the time of preparing this book, the European Commission was undertaking 
a review of some of the areas of EU consumer law discussed in this book: unfair 
commercial practices, unfair terms, consumer sales and injunctions.55 This is part 
of a wider programme of review undertaken by the European Commission of 
a range of policy areas. The overall purpose is to ‘analyse the effectiveness, effi-
ciency, coherence, relevance and EU-added value’56 of these directives in order 
to establish whether their objectives have been fully attained. The Fitness Check 
Roadmap document highlights a focus on whether these directives have con-
tributed to the Single Market and the extent to which remaining minimum har-
monisation standards create barriers to trade.57 It seems that the Commission is 
seeking supporting evidence to justify a further attempt to push for maximum 
harmonisation in areas where Member States have hitherto shown reluctance to 
accept this. In addition, the Fitness Check Roadmap suggests that the relevance 
of these directives for new market trends and changes in consumer behaviour 
should be considered, as well as the fit of existing directives with the EU’s over-
all legal landscape.58 Furthermore, there is to be consideration of regulatory 
54 Ibid., 6–8.
55 The review also includes the price indications directive (98/6/EC) and the (non-
consumer) Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive (2006/114/EC).
56 European Commission, Evaluation and Fitness Check Roadmap (hereafter Fitness Check 
Roadmap); available athttp://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/roadmaps/docs/2016_
just_023_evaluation_consumer_law_en.pdf [last accessed 20 December 2016].
57 Fitness Check Roadmap, p.9.
58 Ibid. 
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simplification, e.g. through removing overlaps between different directives and 
improving overall consistency. The Fitness Check Roadmap even suggests that 
it would ‘explore whether and to what extent a potential codification of EU 
consumer law into a single EU instrument could bring added clarity, remove 
overlaps, and fill any gaps’.59 
To scholars who have been following EU consumer law for some time, this 
will provoke a sense of deja-vu: in the middle part of the first decade of the new 
millennium, the Commission undertook its ‘acquis review’, which was a similar 
exercise also prompted by a concern over the impact of minimum harmonisation 
clauses in some directives.60 At that time, the Commission proposed a ‘horizontal 
instrument’61 on EU consumer law. This would have brought together the unfair 
contract terms and sales directives with ‘common issues’ such as the right of 
withdrawal and information obligations, all with the objective of simplifying and 
rationalising the acquis in the interest of better regulation. It has been remarked at 
various points throughout this book that the Commission’s subsequent attempt 
to implement this proposal through the Consumer Rights Directive was largely 
unsuccessful as far as the areas of unfair terms and sale of goods are concerned.
It is surprising that, barely a decade later, the European Commission is essen-
tially repeating the same exercise – framed differently, but with a similar potential 
outcome, identified early on: maximum harmonisation, and a possible horizon-
tal instrument/consumer code. This exercise could, undoubtedly, produce some 
benefits: streamlining of the legislation and ensuring that there is consistency 
between the various elements of the consumer law directives might improve 
the quality of the current legislation. The discussion in this book noted various 
instances where the relationship between the different directives was found to be 
unclear, e.g. the way the UCPD relates to the directives on unfair contract terms 
and the Consumer Rights Directive.62 However, there is no indication that the 
REFIT review would involve a more fundamental reflection on the state of EU 
consumer law. Rather, the analysis undertaken by the Commission appears to 
focus primarily on the extent to which there already are standardised, and per-
haps even uniform, legal rules in place as a result of the initiatives thus far. It will 
extend to questions of relevance, which has both a deregulatory element (ask-
ing whether there is still need for aspects of the directives) and a scope element 
(adding objectives in view of market trends and consumer behaviour).63 There 
59 Ibid.
60 An academic study analysed the variations between national laws remaining after the 
implementation of eight directives: H Schulte-Nölke, C Twigg-Flesner and M Ebers (eds), 
EC Consumer Law Compendium (Sellier, 2008). This resulted in a Green Paper on the 
Review of the Consumer Acquis COM (2006) 744 final. See B Heiderhoff and M Kenny, 
‘The Commission’s 2007 Green Paper on the consumer acquis: Deliberate deliberation’ 
(2007) 35 European Law Review p.740, and C Twigg-Flesner, ‘No sense of purpose or 
direction?’ (2007) 3 European Review of Contract Law p.198.
61 Green Paper, pp.8–9.
62 See p.49 and p.86.
63 Fitness Check Roadmap, p.10.
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are also vague indications that the suitability of the rules from the various direc-
tives for B2B transactions (particularly involving SMEs) and C2C transactions 
(e.g. in the sharing economy) will be considered.64 Any changes which might be 
made to the existing acquis are likely to be incremental and are unlikely to result 
in a revolutionary change to the substance of EU consumer law.65 It would be 
regrettable if there was yet another attempt to push maximum harmonisation 
in areas where fairly recent experience has shown that there is reluctance on the 
part of the Member States to accept this. Both the passage of the Consumer 
Rights Directive and the failed proposal for a Common European Sales Law are 
a clear indication of where the lines are likely to be drawn. The straightjacket 
imposed by maximum harmonisation (as illustrated by the experience with the 
UCPD in particular66) is unlikely to prove popular politically.
Where should EU consumer law go in the future?
The analysis of the main areas of EU consumer law in this book has demonstrated 
that, despite its positive achievements in broadening the tools for consumer pro-
tection, there are considerable reservations about some of the fundamental fea-
tures of this area of law. In seeking to adopt new legislation on aspects of the 
digital environment, the European Commission might be taking EU consumer 
law into a new territory which is as yet largely untouched by domestic legislation. 
This should have provided the EU with a golden opportunity for using the largely 
blank canvas of legislation on digital matters to rethink its approach and develop 
new means of legislating. Instead, the proposals put forward by the Commission 
cling on to familiar themes: legislation addressing selected aspects of a topic, pro-
posed directives written in highly technical legal language, and a likely return to 
favouring a maximum harmonisation approach for many aspects of private law. It 
may be that these proposals will be adopted, and that they might have a positive 
practical effect. However, this is hardly revolutionary law-making, and the old 
adage that ‘there is nothing new under the sun’67 sums up the current and likely 
future state of EU consumer law.
This is disappointing. Both the digital agenda and the REFIT exercise 
should have provided the context for a debate about the role for EU con-
sumer law in the future. Indeed, there is still a window of opportunity for 
this debate within the REFIT exercise: analytical reports are due in 2017, and 
despite the desire to push ahead with a reform proposal swiftly, perhaps the 
Commission could be persuaded to pause before it embarks on the next stage 
of this review process.
64 Ibid.
65 Of course, we may be proved wrong on this. Readers are encouraged to study the follow-
up actions taken by the European Commission in the wake of the REFIT exercise.
66 See Chapter 2, pp.73–84.
67 Ecclesiastes 1:9.
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In the hope that there is room for such a debate, a number of thoughts to be 
taken on board are offered here.
Establishing a proper ‘European brand’ of consumer protection
One of the themes in this book has been that EU consumer law has the potential 
for establishing a distinct brand of consumer protection which could be an inter-
national benchmark. However, the analysis of the specific topics in the preceding 
chapters has also shown that this potential has not been fully realised. There is 
a lot more that could be done to turn EU consumer law into a prototype for 
twenty-first century consumer protection. 
At a basic level, there is the continuing failure at the European level to agree 
on and articulate clearly the fundamental principles and objectives on which 
EU consumer law should build. Most of the time, there is reference to the 
high level of consumer protection mandated by the Treaty, but no detailed 
exploration of what this might require. Alongside this is the economic impera-
tive of supporting the functioning of the Single Market. There is a distinct lack 
of discussion about the principles which might underpin the development of a 
high level of consumer protection. A debate about what these principles might 
be needs to start with a better understanding of the nature of consumers. It is 
a trite observation that consumers are a heterogeneous group and that con-
sumer law needs to operate with images of consumers which will invariably be 
a simplification. However, the rough-and-ready ‘average consumer’ test in EU 
consumer law is too much of a simplification and unrelated to real world experi-
ence (even if the CJEU has showed signs of a more realistic approach in some 
of its case law, especially on unfair contract terms68). Something more refined 
is needed. The consumer image describing a typical consumer should reflect 
pertinent research evidence from areas such as behavioural economics and con-
sumer psychology which offer insights as to the characteristics of consumers 
generally. Indeed, it is crucial to take this learning into account throughout the 
field of EU consumer law (although not necessarily to be slavishly followed) – 
and this might not even be as revolutionary as might be feared.69 It should also 
to an appropriate extent recognise the fact that the typical consumer image is 
partially culturally bound. Consumers in different parts of the EU show partially 
different behavioural patterns, and the proper rules should take these variations 
into account.70 The typical consumer image should be the benchmark for the 
development of both fundamental principles of consumer law and subsequent 
detailed legal rules.
68 See Chapter 4.
69 AL Sibony and G Helleringer, ‘EU consumer protection and behavioural sciences: 
Revolution or reform?’ in A Alemanno and AL Sibony, Nudge and the Law (Hart, 2015).
70 Cf. T Wilhemsson, ‘The average European consumer: A legal fiction?’ in T Wilhelmsson, 
E Paunio and A Pohjolainen (eds), Private Law and the Many Cultures of Europe (Kluwer 
Law International, 2007).
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Having determined the key characteristics of a typical consumer, it would 
then be necessary to determine the fundamental principles at the root of EU 
consumer law. Here, it is only possible to offer some tentative suggestions. 
One such principle might be the protection of fairness in all stages of consumer 
transactions. There is already a nascent EU vision of fairness inherent in existing 
directives, 71 and this could be developed into a coherent principle that would 
apply to the way transactions are concluded, the substance of the contract, and 
the way disputes are resolved. A second principle could be transparency and 
clarity, but developed in recognition of the fact that consumers are not fully 
rational in the pure  economic sense. A third might be giving effect to the rea-
sonable expectations of consumers. Other principles might flow from treating 
consumer protection rather than market integration as the dominant objec-
tive. Thus, the risk distribution/insurance function of consumer law, which 
was mentioned at various points in this book, should similarly be expressly 
recognised as a general principle – or at least be acknowledged as a legitimate 
objective. None of these principles is necessarily new; however, their substance 
would be developed afresh on the basis of a more realistic consumer image. In 
addition, these principles would be the foundation stones of EU consumer law, 
rather than identified as somehow underpinning diverse rules put into place 
over a period of time. Agreeing on these principles could also have the effect of 
promoting the elements of a common European consumer culture to comple-
ment national consumer cultures, which would provide more solid foundations 
for the development of substantive legal rules over time. This would provide 
the deep layers of the law for legal rules and case law which have thus far been 
lacking. 72
The legal tools
Once the consumer image and fundamental principles of the ‘EU consumer 
protection brand’ have been determined, legal rules have to be developed and 
subsequently enacted through appropriate means. These legal rules would be 
developed on the basis of the foundations set out above. A crucial factor in devel-
oping these is to consider how one could achieve a balanced and pragmatic use of 
both private and public law to create the best legal framework for consumer trans-
actions. EU consumer law has always been a combination of both – for example, 
the regulation of unfair commercial practices has been primarily via a public law 
approach, whereas consumer sales contracts have been dealt with through private 
law tools. The regulation of unfair contract terms has elements of both. However, 
the balance between private and public law, as well as the alignment between 
71 Cf. C Willett, Fairness in Consumer Contracts (Ashgate, 2007).
72 K Tuori, ‘EC Law: An independent legal order or a post-modern Jack-in-the-box?’ in LD 
Eriksson and S Hurri (eds), Dialectic of Law and Reality (Helsinki Faculty of Law, 1999); 
T Wilhelmsson, ‘Private law in the EU: Harmonised or fragmented Europeanisation?’ 
(2002) 10 European Review of Private Law p.77
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these spheres and resolution of possible overlaps is something that could be fine-
tuned considerably.73 
In terms of private law, many of these will relate to individual transactions 
between a consumer and a trader, and so will have to link with contract law. 
However, it would be important to stop approaching EU consumer (contract) 
law as a deviation from the general rules of contract law.74 The paradigm transac-
tion underpinning much of general contract law differs from most consumer con-
tracts. With most consumer contracts, there is no equality of bargaining strength, 
nor is there true consent and agreement resulting from negotiation. Instead, 
there is heavy mandatory regulation of most aspects of a typical consumer trans-
action. Although one cannot ignore the relevance of the rules of general contract 
law as background, the substance of EU consumer law should be developed by 
taking a distinct approach.75 
As for appropriate means, the choice of instruments in EU law is limited. 
The use of directives and regulations was discussed in the opening chapter.76 
Directives have the advantage of permitting the absorption of legal rules into their 
context of each domestic law, which has the advantage of ensuring that EU-based 
rules are connected properly with related aspects of domestic law. However, one 
important lesson that can be drawn from over three decades of using directives to 
harmonise aspects of consumer law is that the very technical nature of directives, 
with at times very detailed articles, has created many difficulties. If the desire for 
detailed legal rules which are to be applied consistently across the EU remains the 
dominant objective, then a directive might not be the best option. It has been 
argued that, if the Single Market objective of creating a single set of rules for con-
sumer contracts is taken as the primary objective, the use of a detailed regulation 
setting out the relevant legal rules would be the more appropriate means of doing 
so.77 However, it would put certainty about legal rules above ensuring suitable 
consumer protection. The problem of the current approach is that a set of legal 
rules determined at the European level are pushed into the national laws and the 
varying legal cultures of the Member States,78 where they are likely to take on a 
73 For example, consider the overlap between the UPCD and pre-contractual information 
duties (see Chapter 3, p.104), as well as that of the UCPD and national rules on harassment, 
duress and undue influence.
74 In this context, the combination of responsibilities for contract law and consumer law 
under the auspices of DG Just has been unfortunate.
75 R Brownsword, ‘Regulating transactions: Good faith and fair dealing’ in G Howells and 
R Schulze (eds), Modernising and Harmonizing Consumer Contract Law (Sellier, 2009); 
also R Brownsword, ‘Contract, consent and civil society: Private governance and public 
imposition’ in P Odell and C Willett, Global Governance and the Quest for Justice – Civil 
Society (Hart, 2008).
76 See Chapter 1, p.42.
77 C Twigg-Flesner, A Cross-Border-Only Regulation for Consumer Transactions in the EU – A 
New Approach to EU Consumer Law (Springer, 2012).
78 T Wilhelmsson, ‘The Legal, the cultural and the political – conclusions from different 
perspectives on harmonisation of European contract law’ (2002) European Business Law 
Review p.54.
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life of their own.79 As a result, the degree of actual convergence achieved might 
be lower than one might expect in view of the number of directives which have 
been adopted80 – even if there has been some convergence. 
Our argument is that consumer protection should be the primary objective 
for EU consumer law, rather than the demands of the Single Market. Whilst this 
could be effected through a regulation, it is preferable to rely on properly designed 
domestic law to achieve this in full. EU measures would continue to be used to 
improve domestic law, and this could best be done by using directives. However, 
it would seem appropriate to reconfigure the way directives are utilised: instead 
of detailed rules, directives could state broader objectives – more precise than 
fundamental principles, but less technical than is often the case currently. Article 
288 TFEU reminds us that directives specify a result to be achieved, and so a less 
rigid approach to drafting might be more beneficial. This approach would adapt 
a similar, less formal approach found in the open method of co-ordination.81 This 
operates at the policy level, rather than at the level of binding obligation, but a 
less rigid use of directives could provide a similar degree of flexibility whilst ensur-
ing a common standard of consumer protection can be achieved across the EU. It 
would allow the principles associated with the ‘EU consumer protection brand’ 
to become more portable as a consequence of not being expressed in detailed 
technical rules.82 Admittedly, there would be circumstances where more technical 
rules would not only be appropriate but essential. An obvious example is the area 
of technical standardisation which relies on precise and often quite detailed rules, 
and these, in turn, are relevant for the regulation of product safety.83 However, 
not every aspect of EU consumer law needs to be expressed through precise rules, 
particularly if these then need to become part of domestic law.
General outlook
The key message which emerges from this book and our concluding thoughts is 
that EU consumer law could have an important role to play in ensuring effective 
consumer protection throughout the EU, and beyond. It could become a true 
‘European brand of consumer protection’ and serve as a model for developing 
consumer law elsewhere in the world. However, for this to happen, the script 
79 G. Teubner, ‘Legal irritants: Good faith in British law or how unifying law ends up in new 
divergences’ (1998) 61 Modern Law Review p.11.
80 P Legrand, ‘European legal systems are not converging’ (1996) 45 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly p.52.
81 W van Gerven, ‘Bringing (private) laws closer at the European level’ in F Cafaggi (ed), 
The Institutional Framework of European Private Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006).
82 A detailed ‘omnibus EU consumer law’ might also help to sell the EU brand if it were to 
function as a model law, but it would almost certainly not be exhaustive and therefore still 
depend on how its rules would interact with domestic law. Overall integrity at national level 
is more important than at EU level.
83 See Chapter 7, p.259.
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needs to be re-written. The current consumer image is too far removed from 
reality, maximum harmonisation is too concerned with a focus on the Single 
Market imperative, and there is insufficient room for legitimate national vari-
ations. Individual directives would benefit from improvements. Some of these 
would be necessary to clarify issues concerning their detailed rules, as discussed 
in the preceding chapters. This would be a task for the short-term and something 
which the REFIT exercise might provide. 
One factor which might cause complications is the decision of the United 
Kingdom to leave the European Union. At the time of writing, the precise terms 
of the UK’s departure were unknown, but it is inevitable that the UK will cease 
to be an active player in the future development of EU consumer law, once it 
has left the EU. It is impossible to anticipate what kind of impact the exit of 
the largest common-law jurisdiction will have on the future development of EU 
consumer law. The UK has always had strong consumer protection laws, and the 
loss of its voice in reforming existing measures and developing new ones will not 
go unnoticed.
In our view, there is more that needs to be done for the ‘EU consumer protec-
tion brand’, starting with a more fundamental overhaul of the purpose for which 
EU consumer law is required. In recent years, the focus on developing general 
contract law at the European level84 has overshadowed discussions about EU con-
sumer law, but with the contract law agenda fading into the background, there 
is a fresh opportunity to focus on consumer law. Our analysis and discussion will 
hopefully prompt scholars to join this debate that now needs to be had to secure 
a bright future for EU consumer law, both within the EU and beyond.
84 C Twigg-Flesner, The Europeanisation of Contract Law, 2nd ed (Routledge, 2013).
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